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xx 
The purpose of the thesis is to critically analyse the current legal 
forms of mens rea which are shared by common law and statute, namely 
intention, recklessness, malice, negligence and strict liability. I 
shall argue that the current concepts are (i) inadequate since they lack 
conceptual clarity, consistency and cohesion; (ii) that the concepts of 
intention and recklessness lack terminological consistency since their 
parameters extend to states of mind which properly belong elsewhere and 
(iii) that they are unable to draw out significant moral distinctions in 
moral culpability with which agents perpetrate criminal offences. 
The major cause for the inadequacies of the present structure lies in 
the number of mental states which constitute mens rea at current law. 
They are so few that judges have seen fit to manipulate the contours to 
serve the needs of justice in the cases. This has led to considerable 
conceptual and terminological confusion both within and between the 
concepts. But the major failing of the current structure of mens rea, 
rooted in the same cause, is that it does not sufficiently draw out 
significant differences in moral status between agents who perpetrate 
harm. It fails to do this in two ways. First, the concepts of intention, 
recklesness and negligence are broad in their scope so that each 
includes a fairly wide area of moral turpitude. Second, where a 
particular offence admits more than one form of mens rea the conviction 
does not discriminate between the various requisite mental states and 
thus denies accurate ascriptions of moral culpability over a large area 
of mental attitude toward proscribed harm. 
I shall offer a new structure of wens rea which would be constituted by 
(i) direct intention, (ii) comcomitant intention, (iii) purpose, (iv) 
objective, (v) gross recklessness, (vi) simple recklessness, (vii) gross 
negligence and (viii) simple negligence. 
I shall argue that the proposed structure is preferable since the more 
sophisticated set of fault terms would be (1) conceptually clear, 
consistent and coherent, (ii) would be more terminologically consistent 
and (iii) would more clearly express the moral status of the agent in 
each case concerning the harm brought about by him. 
I shall demonstrate that the proposed structure is more able to express 
differences in moral culpability because (i) the more sophisticated set 
of mens rea terms would provide a better gradation in moral fault and 
(ii) it would be a requirement of the proposed structure of mens rea 
that the court or jury determine the precise mental state with which the 
agent perpetrates a criminal offence and that mental state would be 
recorded with the conviction. 
xxi 
The concepts of wens rea which current criminal law uses in ascriptions of 
criminal responsibility are (i) intention, (ii) malice (iii) recklessness, 
(iv) negligence and (v) strict liability. ' The purpose of this thesis is to 
critically assess the current structure of wens rea and to argue that the 
various current law concepts are inadequate in that they lack conceptual 
clarity, cohesion and consistency; lack terminological consistency, and 
lack consensus with people's views as to what are significant moral 
distinctions. I shall offer a new structure of mens rea consisting of (i) 
objective, (ii) purpose, (iii) direct intention, (iv) concomitant 
intention, (v) gross recklessness, (vi) simple recklessness, (vii) gross 
negligence and (viii) simple negligence. I shall argue that the proposed 
structure of wens rea is preferable since it is free from the inadequacies 
which I have ascribed to the current structure. 
My central claim is that our criminal law and its system of mens rea should 
be structured so that we can accurately record (place a fair label upon) 
the agent's moral culpability at the conviction stage. My major criticism 
of the criminal law in relation to the current structure of mens rea is 
that on two main grounds it fails to take sufficient account of 
significantly different moral turpitudes with which agents perpetrate 
activity. First, except in a few selected cases current law is not prepared 
to distinguish between the agent who perpetrates an offence without more 
and the agent who perpetrates that offence as a necessary preliminary to a 
further offence which for some reason does not take place. 2 However, as we 
shall see, the proposed structure of mens rea enables us to consider the 
entire causal chain in each case, both past and prospective links, and to 
attribute blame to the agent not only for what he has done but also for 
what he aims to bring about by his preliminary activity. 
Second, current law does not accurately record significant moral 
distinctions between agents in offences which admit more than one species 
of wens rea. In the offence of assault, for example, it must 
be proved that 
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the accused intended to cause the victim to apprehend the immediate 
application of force without his consent, or was reckless as to whether the 
victim might so apprehend such force. The mental element required is thus 
intention or recklessness in relation to the assault4 and juries convict 
the defendant without making any reference as to their opinion on whether 
he intended the assault or whether he merely foresaw the possibility that 
his victim might apprehend such force. However it is submitted that one 
might properly question a legal system which does not distinguish between 
significantly different mental states for the purpose of recording criminal 
convictions. Is it right to record the same criminality against the agent 
who takes a hammer to a public telephone in an act of sheer vandalism as 
that recorded against an agent such as Parkers who slams down and damages 
the receiver not thinking about damage because he is in a state of self- 
induced temper? Moreover a judge hearing a later case cannot accurately 
judge the mental state with which the agent perpetrated the earlier 
offence. This might lead to a lighter or more severe sentence than might 
otherwise have been the case. ' 
There are two alternative methods of structuring criminal law in order to 
accommodate the more accurate recording of moral turpitude with which an 
offence has been committed. First we might create more offences in relation 
to a particular type of activity in an ascending order of seriousness 
according to the agent's mental state which accompanies his activity. We 
already have instances of this in the criminal law; for example, the 
different offences under ss. 18 and 20 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861.7 We may thus consider dividing rape into two distinct offences 
reserving the term 'rape' to cases in which the agent has non-consensual 
intercourse knowing that his victim does not consent and reserving for a 
lesser offence those cases in which the agent is not sure that the victim 
is consenting. Secondly we may retain our existing corpus of criminal 
offences together with the mens rea requirement for each, but specifically 
state at the point of conviction the precise mental state with which the 
agent commits the offence. In this way we have on record whether the agent 
brought about a particular harm intentionally, recklessly or negligently 
(where the offence allows the latter two concepts within its definition of 
mens rea). We shall see in chapter 9 that the proposed structure of mens 
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rea would apply the second strategy but, since it contains a more 
sophisticated set of fault terms it would more accurately reflect the moral 
culpability of the agent. 
As a prelude to an analysis of the current law concepts of mans rea it 
would be useful to discuss the theoretical notions of subjectivism and 
objectivism which influence in varying degrees the parameters of the 
various designated mental states in any structure of mens rea. 
The Ideal Typical Constructions of Objectivism and Subjectivism. 
In what follows I formulate ideal typical constructions of objectivism and 
subjectivism. The methodology which underlies the formulations starts from 
an empirical labelling process taking account of the arguments put forward 
by judges and theorists who have labelled themselves (or have been 
labelled) either subjectivists or objectivists. `' From this initial 
empirical labelling process I draw out the logical implications from the 
material and construct what I perceive to be the most coherent'° and 
comprehensive version of subjectivism and objectivism. 
The Ideal Typical Construction of Objectivism. 
On the methodological approach which I have described above, the ideal 
typical construction of objectivism is constituted by the following 
propositions, namely (i) an agent intends an effect of his activity where 
it is a natural consequence thereof, (ii) the minimum wens rea requirement 
for recklessness is set at the point at which, on the facts and 
circumstances of the case, the actus reus would have been obvious to the 
ordinary prudent individual, (iii) liability should be determined by the 
actual (as distinct from the intended or believed) character and 
consequences of the agent's activity and/or what a reasonable person would 
(as distinct from what the actual agent did) foresee, believe or intend. 
The first ideal objectivist proposition informs us that the agent intends 
all the effects of activity which naturally flow therefrom. 
The second 
proposition states that the concept of recklessness should be based upon 
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the notion of what is obvious to the reasonable man to the exclusion of the 
agent's own mental state pertaining to the risk. 
The third ideal objectivist proposition has several features. First, since 
objectivism is concerned more with outcomes than with mental processes, the 
agent must have orchestrated some activity which causes or comes 
demonstrably close to causing injury or damage to another. Second, where an 
agent, by such activity, brings about (or comes close to bringing about) 
proscribed harm then his criminal liability shall be judged on the 
standards and perceptions of the ordinary man in society. Third, since 
ideal objectivism is generally not concerned with the agent's mental 
processes it is prepared to accept the concepts of negligence" and strict 
liability'2 as constituents of a general structure of wens rea. Fourth, the 
ideal objectivist proposition informs us, at least implicitly, that de 
facto innocent activity should not attract liability in cases in which the 
agent believes that activity to be criminal in nature (for example the 
agent who stabs a tailor's dummy believing it to be his enemy). The final 
feature of the third ideal objectivist proposition is that the defence of 
mistake is permissible provided that is a reasonable one to make in the 
circumstances of the case. '- The features of the third ideal objectivist 
proposition inform us that objectivism is concerned more with the 
dangerousness of the act than with the dangerousness of the agent. 
The Ideal Typical Construction of Subjectivism. 
On the same methodological approach's the ideal typical construction of 
subjectivism, as it applies to criminal responsibility, is constituted by 
the following five propositions, namely (i) an agent intends an effect of 
his activity when he aims to bring that effect about or where he is certain 
that his activity (aimed at something else) will bring that effect about, 
(ii) an agent is reckless concerning an effect of his activity aimed at 
something else where he appreciates that there is a risk of that effect 
which, in the circumstances, render it unjustified for him to take that 
risk, (iii) criminal liability should depend on choice and what the agent 
knows or believes to be within his control concerning activity upon which 
he has embarked rather than what flows or fails to flow from that activity 
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by chance, (iv) the form of the conviction should mark accurately the moral 
status of the agentthhas brought about proscribed harm and (v) punishment 
should be awarded in accordance with what the agent has chosen to bring 
about by a particular exertion and not with what actually occurs or fails 
to occur. 1 
The first ideal subjectivist proposition informs us that the concept of 
intention is constituted by a conscious decision by the agent to bring 
about a particular state of affairs by his activity; that is the agent acts 
as he does in order that a specific change in the world be brought about 
thereby, or by foresight by him that a particular untoward harm is certain 
to flow from his activity aimed at something else. Nothing short of direct 
intention or foresight of certainty will suffice. The second proposition 
requires as a necessary element of the concept of recklessness foresight by 
the agent of the possibility of untoward harm which might flow from his 
activity. This insistance on awareness underlines the cognitive character 
of subjectivism. The question of whether the reasonable man would have 
foreseen the harm is a matter of evidence which might persuade the jury 
that the defendant foresaw the risk but, for the ideal subjectivist, 
foresight by the defendant of the prospective proscribed harm is a sine qua 
non to a finding of recklessness. There is thus on the subjectivist 
construction a clear dividing line between recklessness and negligence: 
that dividing line concerns awareness (recklessness) and lack of awareness 
(negligence) by the agent in relation to the untoward harm which his 
activity produces. 's 
The third ideal subjectivist proposition has several features. First, it 
revolves around the concepts of choice and control and generally excludes 
chance as a factor in ascriptions of responsibility. " Thus, for example, 
where the agent aims and fires at his victim but his shot misses and kills 
a cat, the third ideal subjectivist proposition would attribute blame in 
accordance with that which the agent has chosen to bring about (and convict 
of attempted murder) and would take no account of what actually happens by 
chance (on my illustration the death of the cat) unless the agent at least 
foresees the possibility of the chance effect of his activity. 1 Ideal 
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subjectivism would not thus accept the principle of transferred intention 
in cases in which the agent lacked foresight of the risk. 19 
The second feature of the third ideal subjectivist proposition is that 
where the agent is mistaken about some fact or circumstance concerning his 
activity then he ought to be Judged on the facts or circumstances as he 
believed them to be. Thus where the agent shoots at a tailor's dummy 
believing it to be his enemy he should be treated for the purpose of 
ascriptions of liability as if he had in fact shot at his victim. On the 
other hand where the agent shoots at and injures V believing him to be a 
tailor's dummy the agent should be guilty of no offence. 2° This feature 
would apply also to defences. For the ideal subjectivist where the agent 
makes an honest mistake concerning some circumstance of the case then he 
shall have a defence to the substantive offence however unreasonable that 
mistake might be. Third, it is necessary that the agent take some physical 
step towards that which he aims to bring about by his activity. The ideal 
subjectivist would not thus attribute liability to the agent who merely 
thinks of committing a crime or who wills a movement of his body in order 
to perpetrate a particular actus reus but his body fails to respond to that 
act of willing. 2' 
The fourth ideal subjectivist proposition informs us that culpability 
should count as a factor in ascriptions of liability. For ideal 
subjectivism it is important that both the actus reus of a particular 
offence and the specified me ns rea requirement should accurately reflect 
the moral turpitude of the agent. If a particular criminal offence is 
defined too broadly either in terms of the actus reus or the mens rea then 
we attach to the perpetrator a label which does not accurately record his 
moral status or culpability in relation to his activity. 22 This ideal 
typical subjectivist proposition thus insists that the relevant fault 
element (whether intention, recklessness or negligence) must match the 
particulars of the offence stated in the conviction: that the mental state 
of the agent at the time of his activity ought to be defined with the 
appropriate specificity for the purpose of criminal convictions. 2: 3 
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The fifth ideal subjectivist proposition is concerned with just what 
amounts to appropriate punishment24 and insists upon equal blame and 
punishment for the agent who tries and succeeds and the agent who tries and 
fails on the ground that both have made the same exertion with the same 
intention and there is thus nothing to choose between them in respect of 
moral culpabilty: to award lesser punishment to the agent whose exertion 
fails to produce the intended result is to base punishment on chance rather 
than choice. 
In Appendix 1I offer a selection of material from the judges and theorists 
which indicate the general subjectivist and objectivist positions from 
which I draw out the necessary inferences in formulating the ideal typical 
constructions. 
Subjectivism, Objectivism, Current Law and Theory. 
Recent legislation, case reports and theoretical discussion indicate that 
the current law and academic writers tend to take positions between various 
points on a spectrum between the two ideal abstract models of subjectivism 
and objectivism. The Criminal Attempts Act 1981, arguably at least, steers 
a midway course between the ideal constructions when defining the threshold 
of attempts as something which is more than merely preparatory to the 
commission of the offence2s whilst accepting the ideal subjectivist model 
concerning the agent who attempts the impossible. 26 
In relation to an offence which admits only intention a jury must be 
satisfied that the defendant did in fact intend that the proscribed harm be 
brought about by his activity, " but the jury may apply the test of what 
the reasonable man would have foreseen as virtually certain2e as a standard 
for the inference that the defendant actually foresaw and intended as a 
consequence of his activity. I should point out here that there remains 
some conjecture on whether foresight of certainty amounts to intention at 
current law. More on this later. 2 
The concept of recklessness has seen significant movements of position by 
judges and theorists between the two ideal typical constructions of 
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subjectivism and objectivism. For some writers-° would count as reckless 
the agent who does not notice a risk because he does not care about it - 
the agent who exhibits 'practical indifference' regarding particular facts 
or circumstances in relation to his activity. The holder of this view 
requires that this particular agent display practical indifference to a 
risk which would have been plain to the reasonable man and there is thus a 
mixture of subjectivism and objectivism in his thinking. Stannard3' submits 
that where D consciously and without justification decides to run a risk he 
exhibits indifference or thoughtlessness, but such indifference or 
thoughtlessness can in fact cause D's inadvert6nce. He posits the case of 
an agent who sets fire to a bonfire without adverting to the risk of 
causing the death of many garden insects. He points out that such 
inadvertence is not culpable but a latter-day Caldwell who sets fire to a 
hotel without adverting to the risk of injury to guests exhibits 
"indifference which indicates a shocking state of mind - one that cares as 
little for human beings as for insects". 32 But Stannard concludes his point 
by stating that D might have good reason why he did not advert to a risk 
which might render his inadvertence non-culpable, for example honest 
mistake or a lack of capacity to appreciate the risk. : 33 However he submits 
that some reasons for inadvertence, such as heat of anger or drunkenness 
will not be sufficient as excusing factors. Duff would ascribe criminal 
responsibility to the agent whose unawareness of the risk has been brought 
about by practical indifference to an integral aspect of his activity. " 
Professor Glanville Williams, who has been labelled a subjectivist, has 
accepted that, in cases involving recklessness, the defendant should be 
convicted if he has failed to foresee a risk which he would have foreseen 
had he thought about the matter. `' This stance is clearly not entirely 
subjectivist since the agent does not appreciate the risk at the time of 
his exertion which produces the untoward harm. Nor is it entirely 
objectivist since it insists that the agent has the capacity generally to 
think about the risk and has the capacity to appreciate the risk if he 
does in fact think about it. 
Some judges, too, have taken up positions between the typical ideal 
constructions. 3° In Xarga n37 Lord Cross was prepared to allow indifference 
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as to the woman's consent as a relevant mental state in the offence of 
rape. Lord Hailsham was prepared to admit to liability the agent who does 
not care whether his victim is consenting or not e Lord Edmund-Davies 
decided that a defendant is guilty of rape where he has intercourse without 
caring whether or not the victim was a consenting party. : 3e I should point 
out that Lords Cross and Haiisham insisted that belief in consent, however 
ill-founded, should secure an acquittal, so they do not extend the scope of 
recklessness beyond entirely subjectivist limits. "39 
In the area of beliefs there exist significant differences of opinion 
between judges and theorists concerning just where on the spectrum between 
the ideal constructions of subjectivism and objectivism liability ought to 
be determined. The legislature and the courts are prepared to accept the 
ideal subjectivist construction and excuse the agent who perpetrates 
activity in the mistaken belief that there is no risk of untoward harm 
provided that the belief is honestly, if unreasonably, held. But there are 
academics who take the objectivist line and count as liable the agent whose 
wrong belief is unreasonably held. -" In the realm of impossible attempts 
the legislature and the courts apply the ideal typical subjectivist 
construction and judge the agent on the facts as he believes them to be. 41 
But there are those theorists who would wish to apply the objectivist 
construction to such cases and exclude the agent from criminal liability. " 
In relation to defences other than those involving wrongly held beliefs 
there has been a fair amount of movement in position between the ideal 
constructions by the criminal law and theorists. In in, 43 for example, 
Lord Simon declared that Bedder4 was overruled by s. 3 of the Homicide Act 
1957 on the ground that since words alone may amount to provocation and 
since the gravity of the verbal provocation will frequently depend an the 
personal characteristics of the defendant the Bedder principle is so 
undermined that it should no longer be followed whatever the nature of the 
provocation. Lord Simon thus allows the jury to look to the reasonable man 
endowed with the age, sex, and other personal characteristics of the 
accused, whether normal or abnormal. °b The decision in Caniplin thus shifts 
the objectivist approach to the defence of provocation established in 
der towards the subjectivist approach since the personal characteristics 
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of the defendant should now figure in the defence of provocation. There is 
a further objectivist element in the defence of provocation, namely that 
the defendant must display a reasonable degree of self restraint. 4 Thus 
whilst D must actually lose his self control (a subjectivist condition) 
liability will depend upon the fact that the reasonable man would have done 
so in the circumstances (an objectivist condition). Also if a defendant is 
of unusually high patience but decides, in a state of calm, to kill in 
circumstances in which the reasonable man would have lost his self control 
he would not be allowed the defence of provocation. 
In the defence of duress current law adopts a generally subjectivist 
approach but accepts the objective standard that the defendant must be 
faced with a threat in circumstances which might have affected a reasonably 
resolute man. Modern objectivists have shifted ground on this defence. For 
on the principle that the defendant must escape the duress if possible it 
seems that there is general agreement between subjectivists and 
objectivists that the court should look subjectively at the individual 
himself, his capabilities and his knowledge, in order to ascertain 
objectively whether it was reasonable for him to escape rather than submit 
to the duress. 47 In the defence of mistake the law adopts the wholly 
subjectivist view that the agent should be judged on the facts as he (and 
not the reasonable man) believed them to be. 4e 
In the content of the substantive offences there is some movement between 
the ideal constructions. In relation to the mental state in theft, for 
example the requisite mental state is (i) 'intention', which has been 
construed on the lines of the ideal typical construction of subjectivism, 
and (ii) 'dishonesty', which is based upon the standards of the reasonable 
man as opposed to those of the defendant in each case. Professor Smith, a 
leading subjectivist, in assessing the judgment in qhaa4`' which laid down 
the standard of reasonable and honest people as the test for dishonesty, 
said that 
"(t)his at least gets away from the extreme and unacceptable 
subjectivism of GilkSand Boggeln v Nilliane. D is no longer to be 
judged by his own standards". 5° 
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In the offence of blackmail there is an element of objectivity in that the 
the victim is expected to demonstrate reasonable (objective) fortitude and 
not be affected by trivial threats. 
Implicit in the examples above of the movements between the ideal 
constructions is the general principle that the normative standards by 
which the defendant's conduct is to be judged (was he honest; was he 
justified in taking the risk; did he exercise reasonable self control; and 
so on) are objective, not subjective. The subjectivist thus still insists 
upon an assessment of subjective factors in the cases but is prepared to 
place those subjective factors in the context of objective standards for 
the purpose of attributing criminal responsibility. 
The conflicting opinions of the theorists on the extent of the 
subjectivist/objectivist content in the criminal law, and the fact that the 
offences and defences at current law take diverse positions along the 
subjectivist/objectivist spectrum indicate that neither ideal typical 
construction is satisfactory as a basis for the purpose of ascriptions of 
criminal responsibility. 
In the following chapters I shall identify the various current legal 
concepts of wens rea and the extent to which each conforms to one or other 
ideal typical construction of subjectivism or objectivism. I shall appraise 
the relevant arguments which have been put forward by the theorists and 
judges in connection with the substantive content of each current legal 
concept and indicate that those concepts are inadequate since they lack 
conceptual clarity, cohesion and consistency and do not have sufficient 
regard to significant differences in moral culpability with which agents 
bring about harm. I shall offer a proposed structure of wens rea and test 
both the proposed and current law structures against the essential criteria 
stated above6' in order to demonstrate that the proposed structure is to be 
preferred. I begin with the concept of intention. 
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1. Of course there are in addition statutory forms of mens rea including 
'knowledge' and 'permitting'. In this thesis I confine discussion to the 
common law forms of mens rea. 
2. Take, for example, the hypotheticals Diana and Doreen who each take a 
carving knife from a supermarket without paying. Diana plans to use the 
knife for carving meat but Doreen steals the knife in order to kill her 
husband in his sleep this evening. Both agents are guilty of theft but 
there is a significant distinction in the moral status of the agents 
concerning the purpose which underlies their criminal activity. Examples 
of offences in which current law does provide for blame and punishment 
for prospective activity may be found in chapter 2 at p. 23ff. 
3. Infra chapter 9. 
4. See Cross and Jones, 10th ed. at p. 134. 
5. See infra chapter 6 at p. 206. 
6. See infra chapter 9. 
7. For a discussion on ss. 18 and 20 see Smith and Hogan, 6th ed. 
p. 397f f. 
8. The current definition of rape is contained in s. 1(1) of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 and s. 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1976. 
9. Selectivity is necessary here since there is some inconsistency in 
the opinions of some exponents, particularly judges who may be either 
more or less subjectivist or objectivist in their views in the cases and 
sometimes within the same case. 
10. 'Coherent', that is, with the views which I have taken to be either 
objectivist or subjectivist. 
11, See infra chapters 7 and 8. 
12. See infra chapter 8. 
13. I should point out that no one judge or theorist accepts the ideal 
typical construction without qualification since it is built upon the 
general empirical evidence from which I draw out what is implicit in a 
rather unorthodox body of opinions. 
14. As that adopted in constructing the ideal typical construction of 
objectivism. see supra p. 3. % 
15. The comments I made in note 13 concerning the ideal typical 
construction of objectivism apply here also. 
12 
16. Interesting discussion 
Comment' in the Cri1a L 
AC 341 and Lawrence [1982] 
Recklessness Again' in Imo, 
Robilliard, 'Intention and 
Studies (1982) 198. 
s on this point include J. C. Smith, 'Case and 
aw Review [1981] commenting on Caidwel [1982] 
AC 510. See also G. Williams, 'Intention and 
al Studies (1982) 2 189. See also McEwan and 
Recklessness Again: a Response' in Legal 
17. See generally A. Ashworth, infra note 22. 
18. 'Chosen' includes 'expectation' in addition to 'intention' for if 
the agent foresees a contingent outcome which might follow upon his 
activity and continues with that activity then he has chosen to run the 
risk of bringing about that outcome. 
19. For which see chapter 3. p. 34ff. 
20. Impossible attempts are discussed in some detail in chapter 5. 
21. See A. J. Ashworth, 'Sharpening the Subjectivist Element in Criminal 
Law' in Philosophy and the Criminal Law. Franz Steiner Verlag Weisbaden 
G. M. B. H. 1984 p. 79f f. 
22. See A. J. Ashworth, 'The Elasticity of Mens Rea' in 'Crime Proof and Punishment, (1981). 
23. Ibid p. 45f f. 
24. See A. J. Ashworth supra note 22. 
25. See infra chapter 5 at p. 149f f. 
26. See s. 1(3) of the 1981 Act. 
27. Moloney. [19851 AC 905. 
28. The 'Nedrick' test. See 119861 3 All ER 1. 
29. See infra chapter 3. 
30. See for example R. A. Duff in 'Recklessness' in the Criminal Law 
Review [1980] p. 283ff. and in 'Recklessness and Rape' in the Liverpool 
Law Review (1981] Vol. III (2) p. 62ff . 
31. J. E. Stannard, 'Subjectivism, Objectivism and the Draft Criminal 
Code' in the Law Quarterly Review [Vol. 101 October 19851 p. 540ff. 
32. Ibid at p. 550-1. He also points out the case of D who has sexual 
intercourse with V without discussing the state of the stock market or 
the price of cheese. He states that such inadvertence is not culpable as 
it does not relate to the activity in issue. But if D does not advert to 
her consent then he exhibits a culpable state of mind since for him her 
consent to intercourse is as irrelevant as her opinion as to the state 
of the stock market or the price of cheese. 
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33. Ibid at p. 551. 
34. See R. A. Duff, 'Professor Williams and Conditional Subjectivism' at 
p. 281. 
35. See G. Williams, 'Divergent Interpretations on Recklesness' in the 
New Law Journal (1982]. 
36. See G. Syrota, 'hens Rea in Gross Negligence Manslaughter' in the 
Criminal Law Review [1983] 776 for a selection of cases on the issue of 
'practical indifference'. 
37. [1976] AC 182. 
38. Italics added. 
39. I offer a more detailed account of the various judicial opinions on 
recklessness infra chapter 6. 
40. See, for example, J. Harris, 'Overexertion and Underachievement' in 
Philosophy and the Criminal Law. Franz Steiner Verlag Weisbaden G. M. B. H. 
[19841. 
41. See supra p. 7. 
42. See, for example J. Harris supra note 40.. 
43. (1978) 2 A11 ER 168. 
44.119541 2 All ER 801, 
45. It should be noted that D might not rely on his exceptional 
excitability or pugnacity, or ill-temper or his drunkenness (per Lord 
Simon). 
46. See Smith and Hogan, 5th ed. at p. 214ff. 
47. See for example, Hudson 119651 1 All ER at p. 74. 
48. See Smith and Hogan, 4th ed. at p. 205. 
49.119821 2 All ER 689. 
50. J. C. Smith, 'The Law of Theft' (5th ed. at p. 123). The cases cited 
are Gilkes [1972] 3 All ER 280 and Boggein v Vi11ians [1978] 2 All ER 
1061. 
51. Supra p. 1. 
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In this and the next Chapter I put forward my proposed model of 
intention which comprises two distinct mental states, namely direct 
intention and concomitant intention. I lay down the criteria upon which 
my model rests and test the models against the current law concepts of 
direct intention and oblique intention. ' To the extent that the current 
law models produce conclusions which differ from the proposed model I 
shall indicate why the proposed model is to be preferred. 
1. Direct Intention 
An agent has direct intention concerning a particular change in the 
world 
(i) when he contemplates or believes that it may flow from a particular 
exertion and he makes that exertion because of that belief, or 
(ii) when that change is conceptually indivisible from the change at 
which his exertion is directed. 
There are thus two species of the proposed model of direct intention. 
The first species of direct intention has six features. First the agent 
must be both aware of and believe that his exertion is capable of 
producing a particular proscribed harm or change in the world. If the 
agent is not aware that a particular change in the world will flow from 
his exertion then he cannot be said to have directly intended it. 2 If 
the agent believes that his exertion may bring about a particular change 
in the world when, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case 
that change cannot be brought about, the agent nonetheless has direct 
intention concerning that change when he makes his exertion. Thus where 
D stabs a corpse in the belief that it is his sleeping victim, V, he 
directly intends V's death since his activity is capable of producing 
that consequence on the facts and circumstances as he believes them to 
be. If, at the time of his exertion, he believes that there is no chance 
that it will produce the change then the agent cannot be said to 
directly intend it. Thus where D points a gun towards his enemy, V, and 
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fires, believing him to be well out of firing range of the weapon, one 
cannot say that he directly intends V's death whether or not his belief 
turns out to be false and V is killed. In this case D's direct intention 
is to discharge a firearm in a particular direction without more. 
Whether or not D may be subject to criminal liability on other grounds 
is discussed below. 
A second feature of this first species of direct intention informs us 
that the agent must in fact aim at or try to' bring about a change in 
the world which he contemplates as a consequence of his activity. The 
word 'because' is included to signify that the agent would not act as he 
does unless he has the belief that his exertion is capable of producing 
the consequence which he contemplates. Clearly he would not try to 
achieve a consequence which he believes to be impossible, but if the 
agent does make an exertion (goes through the motions) without belief in 
success concerning a particular consequence then he does not directly 
intend that consequences This second feature also informs us that if a 
particular contemplated effect does not figure as a factor in the 
agent's deciding to act as he does, then one cannot say that he intends 
that effect although he may have some other appropriate mental state 
sufficient for criminal liability. ' Suppose, for example, that Daniel is 
alone in a hot room and decides to open the window in order to reduce 
the temperature. He realises at the time of his activity that the sudden 
draught might damage or destroy his aunt Matilda's valuable, if 
delicate, orchid but Daniel feels that his needs must come first and he 
opens the window. The precious plant is affected and dies. It is 
submitted that Daniel cannot be said to have directly intended the death 
of the plant although he may incur criminal liability on other grounds. ' 
But what if the prospect of the death of the plant appeals to Daniel? 
Would his desire that the plant die elevate his mental state to one of 
direct intention? An answer to this question must await an analysis of 
intention and desire. ' 
However if the death of the plant figures in Daniel's deliberation as a 
reason, at least in part, for acting as he does then he directly 
intends the death of the plant on the proposed model. Suppose that 
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Daniel has two methods of cooling the room. He can turn down a radiator 
which will do the trick over a short period of time or he can open a 
window and cool the room more quickly. He realises that the second 
method may produce a draught and kill the delicate plant. That prospect 
appeals to Daniel and he chooses the latter alternative accordingly. It 
is submitted that here Daniel has the direct intention to cool the room 
&ad. to kill the plant since the latter outcome, at least in part, 
informs his decision to act as he does. 
One final point on the case of the orchid. Suppose that Daniel's only 
means of cooling the room is by opening the window. Daniel appreciates 
the risk to the plant. He realises that he can take the plant into 
another room where it will be safe from the elements but, because its 
death appeals to him, he leaves the orchid where it is and opens the 
window in order to cool the room. Does Daniel directly intend the death 
of the plant by his inactivity in relation to its removal to a safe 
place? I shall argue later that we ought to count Daniel as having 
'concomitant' intention concerning the death of the plant by his 
activity which was directed at some other effect since he foresees the 
death of the plant as an 'empirically' certain accompaniment of that 
activity. I 
There is a specific test which one might apply in order to establish 
whether in any case this second feature of direct intention is present, 
namely the test of failure. The test is briefly this. We may ask what 
would be the reaction of the agent to the non-occurrence of an 
anticipated effect of his activity. If the agent feels that his activity 
has been in some way frustrated; that his plans are in some way thwarted 
by the failure of the contemplated effect, then we may say that he was, 
by his activity, trying to bring that consequence about; that he acted 
as he did because of his belief and that he thus directly intended that 
consequence. Contrariwise if the agent is relieved that an anticipated 
consequence of his activity has failed to materialise, or if he is 
indifferent to that failure, then we may say that his activity was not 
motivated by his contemplation of that consequence; that that 
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consequence did not figure as a reason for his acting as he did and that 
he thus did not directly intend that consequence. 
We may apply the test to a hypothetical. Derek plants a bomb at a 
factory designed to explode after the plant has closed down. Derek is 
aware that there is a possibility that someone might be injured 
(overtime might be operating, or some personnel may still be on site 
after the main workforce has left the building). An employee is injured 
in the explosion. Does Derek's mental state concerning possible injuries 
fall within the first species of direct intention? Having taken note of 
all the facts of the case we may come to the conclusion that Derek would 
not have considered his mission a failure had no-one been injured, that 
he would have been relieved to note that his objective had been 
accomplished without injury to others. If we do come to this conclusion 
then I think that we are entitled to say that Derek did not directly 
intend injury to others when he acted as he did, although he will 
presumably be liable on the ground of some other mental state. 9 
A third feature of the first species of direct intention is that it is 
not necessary that the agent be certain of success: it is sufficient 
that he believes that his act may bring about the proscribed harm or 
state of affairs. Thus so long as the agent believes he has some chance, 
no matter how slight, of achieving the change in the world by his 
exertion and he acts as he does with that belief, 1° then he directly 
intends that change. Fourth, the agent must have actually made some 
physical exertion directed at a particular effect before one may include 
him in any assessment of criminal responsibility. The first species of 
the proposed model of direct intention thus excludes from criminal 
liability mental exertions which fail to produce the corresponding 
physical exertions although the mental exertion clearly amounts to 
direct intention. For example suppose that D is behind V on the top of a 
cliff and wills his arms to move in order to push V off the cliff but 
for some physiological reason his muscles fail to respond to his mental 
exertion. D certainly wills his bodily movement with the direct 
intention that he cause V to fall from the cliff but he is not subject 
to liability on the proposed species of direct intention since he has 
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made no physical change in the world concerning that direct intention. 
Thus the phrase 'he makes that exertion' relates to a physical act on 
the part of the agent. A comment by Professor Williams relating to this 
fourth feature is worthy of note. He suggests that it would be a misuse 
of language to assert that an agent who plans a crime has an intention 
to commit that crime when he has, as yet, made no physical exertion 
towards realisation of his plan. " 
A fifth and crucial feature of this first species of the proposed 
concept of direct intention is that, on the actual facts or on the facts 
as he reads them to be, 12 the effect contemplated by the agent must be a 
possible effect of the exertion made by him. The proposed species of 
direct intention thus has a temporal aspect: it does not include any 
effect towards which the agent's immediate exertion is directed unless 
that exertion is capable of bringing that effect about. An agent cannot 
thus be said to have direct intention in relation to any contemplated 
effect at any time before he brings himself to the point of an exertion 
which he believes to be capable of bringing about that effect. Thus 
where D makes a physical exertion which he believes to be capable of 
producing effect x then, provided that his case otherwise fits into the 
first species of direct intention, he directly intends x. But if, by 
activity which cannot produce effect y, he brings about x as a 
preliminary to y then the agent cannot be said to directly intend y 
whilst making the exertion which produces x, although he does directly 
intend x. If, however the exertion is itself capable of producing both 
the preliminary effect x and the ultimate effect y then the agent 
directly intends x and y. Thus where D, with the object of causing his 
death, takes aim and fires at V through a closed window D will directly 
intend the damage to the window (preliminary effect x) and the death of 
V (effect y). 
A hypothetical to illustrate the temporal aspect of direct intention 
would be useful. Suppose that D plans a burglary at a local supermarket. 
He breaks into the building but is arrested before he lays hands on any 
of the stock. In this case D directly intends to enter as a trespasser 
at the point of physical entry into the premises since that exertion 
is, 
19 
per se, capable of producing that consequence; but on the proposed 
model, D does not directly intend to steal as he enters the building 
since his exertion (entering the building) is not itself capable of 
bringing that consequence about. D does not thus have direct intention 
in relation to theft. '3 
The sixth and final feature of this first species of direct intention is 
that it is not necessary that the agent desire the contemplated effect 
aimed at by him-" 
The Proposed Species of Direct Intention and the Current Law Model. 
There have been numerous cases in our criminal law which have restricted 
the concept of intention so that it equates with my model of direct 
intention. In Cunliffe v Gogdmn, 15 a civil case, Asquith LJ stated that 
"an 'intention' to my mind, connotes a state of affairs which the 
party 'intending' ... does more than merely contemplate. It connotes 
a state of affairs which, on the contrary, he decides, so far as in 
him lies, to bring about, and which, in point of possibility, he has 
a reasonable prospect of being able to bring about by his own act of 
volition". 
It should be pointed out that Asquith LJ was talking about 'intending' 
and 'contemplating' a future course of action so there is a temporal 
dimension here which is not shared by the proposed species of direct 
intention. Nonetheless I think that the dictum shows that the learned 
Lord Justice views the concept of intention generally in terms of aiming 
to bring about the proscribed harm. 
In S e1' D made a broadcast for the Germans after he had been 
physically assaulted and his family threatened with incarceration in a 
concentration camp. D was charged with doing acts likely to assist the 
enemy with the intent to assist the enemy contrary to the then current 
Defence Regulations. His conviction was quashed on the ground of 
misdirection by the judge to the jury. It was stated that the jury 
should have been instructed that it was for the prosecution to prove 
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that the accused had the specific intent of assisting the enemy, and 
that he should have been acquitted if they had any doubt about the 
existence of such intent. It is submitted that the Court was restricting 
the mens rea element of the particular offence to direct intention 
concerning assistance. 17 
In lfi21° D was charged with attempting by wanton driving to cause 
bodily harm to a policeman. The judge directed the jury that it was not 
necessary to prove direct intent to cause bodily harm: that foresight 
that his driving was likely to cause bodily harm, or recklessness in 
relation to it is sufficient. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction 
on the ground that intention was an essential ingredient of the offence 
of attempt. The court defined that concept as 
"a decision to bring about, insofar as it lies within the accused's 
power, the commission of an offence which it is alleged the accused 
attempted to commit, no matter whether the accused desired that 
consequence of his act or not". 
In Sinnasamy Selvanayagam'`' D remained in occupation of his home despite 
a legal order to quit. He was convicted of remaining in occupation with 
intent to annoy the owner contrary to the Ceylon Penal Code. The Privy 
Council made the comment that knowledge by the defendant that the owner 
would certainly be annoyed did not amount to intention to annoy him: 
that the defendant's 'dominant intention' was to remain in his home. It 
is submitted that the Privy Council had in mind direct intention 
concerning the regulatory offence when talking of dominant intention. In 
Gil i ck v Vest Norfolk and Visbech Area Health Authoritv20 the House of 
Lords indicated that contraceptive advice given by a doctor to a female 
patient under sixteen did not amount to aiding a principal to commit the 
substantive offence of unlawful sexual intercourse since his advice 
amounted to the protection of the minor. It seems that the opinion here 
is that foresight by the doctor that his counselling might encourage 
sexual intercourse with his patient could not amount to an intention to 
aid it - that intention requires an aiming at the proscribed 
harm. 21 
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In Thorne v Motor Trade Association22 Lord Atkin stated that where a 
supplier puts a trader's name on a 'stop list' so that the business 
would certainly be ruined it is an act done 
"in lawful furtherance of business interests, and ... without any 
express intent to injure the person whose name is published" 
Lord Atkin 
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Most if not all theorists would accept the first species of the proposed 
model of direct intention. 
The case studies above indicate that the courts, in some areas of 
criminal law at least, are prepared to accept a concept of direct 
intention which is restricted to what the agent is aiming to achieve by 
his activity. Those case studies also inform us that for some offences 
at least the proposed temporal restriction on direct intention is 
recognised at law. For example in the offence of theft the offence 
occurs when the agent actually takes hold of the property (the actus 
reus) with the appropriate direct intention regarding that exertion, 
i. e. with the intention of permanently depriving the owner of his 
property. It thus seems that there is no room for any 'future' act in 
the offence of theft.: pc- Also in murder the offender must have inflicted 
or caused the fatal injury to his victim and at that time must have the 
necessary direct intention, i. e. the intention to kill or cause grievous 
bodily harm. : 27 However the temporal aspect of direct intention is not 
recognised as a universal proposition since, in specific instances, the 
law is prepared to count planned future activity as directly intended by 
the agent and hold him liable therefor although his activity has not 
reached the point of execution. 
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In the offence of burglary2e for example a person is guilty of burglary 
if, inter alia, he enters any building or part of a building as a 
trespasser with intent to commit any offence stated in s. 9(2). It is 
clear that Parliament is talking in terms of direct intention concerning 
the agent's future activity after he has entered as a trespasser and 
that the notion of direct intention does not have the temporal 
restriction which is imposed by the proposed model of direct intention. 
By s. 25 of the Theft Act 1968 a person is guilty of an offence if, when 
not at his place of abode, he has with him any article for use in the 
course of or in connection with any burglary, theft or cheat. The 
precise mental state for this offence is not stated clearly but it is 
suggested that the mens rea for the offence under s. 25 is constituted by 
knowledge by the agent that he has the article in his possession and a 
direct intention to use it at a future point in time in connection with 
a specified offence. In the offence of assault with intent to rob=11 the 
intention clearly relates to an effect of future activity in relation to 
the physical assault itself. The same applies to the offence of assault 
with intent to commit buggery. 3° As Smith and Hogan point out=" the 
offence will be commitfd where D assaults his victim intending to carry 
him off and commit buggery some hours later. "-'ý-' A further example is 
attempts since there will be cases here for which the law ascribes 
liability to the agent in respect of activity which cannot itself bring 
about the consequence planned but is more than merely preparatory to 
that offence. 3 Thus where D, with a view to committing burglary, 
damages the door of a house he is guilty of attempted burglary. 14 His 
'future' intention to steal is thus accepted as direct intention at 
current law. 
A final illustration is conspiracy. By s. 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 
1977 it an offence for a person to agree with another person or persons 
that a course of conduct "shall be pursued which, if completed in 
accordance with their intentionec- ... will necessarily amount 
to or 
involve the commission of any offence or offences by one or more of the 
parties to the agreement". The words in italics clearly indicate that 
the law treats as intended an effect of activity the physical causal 
chain of which has not even begun at the point when the conspiracy is 
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complete. The above examples of offences which admit as intention the 
agent's plan concerning prospective activity betokens a lack of 
consensus between the first species of the proposed concept of direct 
intention and intention as it is understood at criminal law. Adoption of 
the proposed model would thus require a significant restructuring of 
those offences whose wens rea includes an intention pertaining to future 
activity. Yet I think that direct intention should be restricted to 
effects which, as the agent reads it, are capable of being produced by a 
not- ro 
particular exertion, and t4at any prospective effect at which that 
exertion is directed but cannot produce. E 
Any proposal which would require significant changes to the structure of 
an existing concept of mens rea at current law requires justification. 
The major ground upon which my submission rests concerns the issue of 
conceptual clarity. In the cases the judges have given the concept of 
intention varying and conflicting meanings so that it is not possible 
to define that concept with precision. For example we have 'direct 
intention'"' to signal the fact that the agent must aim to bring about a 
particular proscribed change in the world; 'dominant intention''8 to 
restrict intention to the more immediate aim of the agent; 'actual 
intent' ; ''' 'specific intent' 4.0 which, as Cross and Jones point out, " is 
capable of four interpretations; and 'basic intent', d2 which seemingly 
applies to any positive state concerning the proscribed change in the 
world; 4: ' The courts have also talked in terms of 'express intent"' and 
'already formed intent'. 46 The courts have also been prepared to 
consider foresight of a proscribed change in the world as intention in 
varying degrees. 4E Thus foresight of likelihood, 47 probability, "' high 
probability, 41- certaintys° and several other types of foresight of harm 
have been designated as intention by the courts. Where the definition of 
the offence requires an intention concerning a change in the world 
temporarily beyond the preliminary activity carried out by the agent the 
courts talk in terms of 'further intention' or 'ulterior intention'. 
The various definitions and meanings which the courts have given to 
the 
concept of intention means that the notion lacks conceptual clarity and 
cohesion with other concepts of mens rea. It is this lack of clarity 
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which has led to so much confusion as to the precise parameters of the 
concept of intention as it relates to the various specific offences. It 
is this confusion which fuels the controversy concerning offences in 
which the requisite mens rea is restricted to intention and thus renders 
a precise definition essential. But if we are to have a precise 
definition of intention which might apply across the spectrum of 
criminal offences (reserving lesser mental states which we wish to 
attribute to particular offences to some other designated concept of 
mens rea), then intention must necessarily be vested with minimum 
content. That minimum content would mean a concept of intention which is 
restricted in two ways, namely to effects (i) which the agent is aiming 
to bring about and (ii) which are capable of being brought about by his 
exertion. If we restrict the temporal aspect of intention in this way we 
achieve a definition of intention which is generally acceptable in 
relation to the total spectrum of criminal offences. Then if we wish to 
punish an agent's attitude toward a risk of untoward harm or his 
criminal objects which lie beyond his present activity (which will lead 
to them) we may do so by way of ascribing a different mental state to 
him. In this way we maintain a concept of intention which is 
conceptually clear and which is not susceptible to wide interpretations 
which generate so much confusion. 
In order to accommodate my submission within the criminal law it would 
be necessary to restructure the mental element in those criminal 
offences which admit intention as to a prospective exertion and in 
others to restructure the offences themselves. In the offence of 
burglary, for example, we would need a concept to replace the expression 
'with intention' in relation to the further intents' with which D enters 
as a trespasser, since, on my definition of intention, D cannot intend 
one of the four ulterior offences until he has made an exertion which is 
itself capable of producing one of them (simple entry as a trespasser is 
not sufficient). I shall argue later--: 2 that we may designate the mental 
state pertaining to the prospective change in the world as 'purpose' or 
'objective'. We may thus charge D with entry as a trespasser for the 
purpose of committing one of the four offences stated in s. 9(2). Also we 
may wish to define the s. 9 offence so that D must directly intend to 
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enter as a trespasser. In relation to s. 25 of the Theft Act 19683 we 
would need to redefine the mens rea concerning the prospective activity 
of stealing or cheating. 614 It is submitted that D, in such a case, 
carries the item for the purpose of committing one of the designated 
harms. 66 In relation to the offence of assault with intent to rob-`E and 
assault with intent to commit buggery' we would need to redefine the 
mans rea regarding the prospective forcible taking of property or 
buggery respectively. I submit that we may charge D with assault for the 
purpose of commitl ng robbery or for the purpose of committing buggery. s 
In respect of the inchoate offence of attempt we would need to redefine 
the mens rea element concerning the actus reus towards which the agent 
has done something which is more than merely preparatory. This issue 
takes up nearly the whole of my discussion in Chapter 511 but it is 
worth noting here that the first species of the proposed concept of 
direct intention pushes the parameters of the offence of attempt to the 
last act necessary in order to bring about the substantive offence since 
D cannot intend the substantive offence until he has made an exertion 
which, as he reads it, is capable of producing the actus reus. Finally 
the mens rea concerning the prospective harm in the inchoate offence of 
conspiracy would need redefinition. My view is that the defendants 
should be charged with conspiracy for the purpose of committing the 
substantive offence. s°' 
A second point for consideration here is whether we are entitled to 
include in ascriptions of criminal responsibility both the preliminary 
criminal offence brought about by the agent and the criminal objective 
which is the reason why the preliminary criminal offence has been 
brought about by him. An illustration will assist discussion here. 
Suppose that Donald breaks into an armoury and takes a rifle. His plan 
is to use the rifle to assassinate the king later that evening. Can we 
charge Donald with burglary (the preliminary offence) for the purpose of 
assassination (the agent's objective)? One or two offences do allow us 
to ascribe liability for the unattained objective where 
the preliminary 
activity is itself criminal in nature. "' In at least one offence 
the law 
attributes liability for an innocent exertion which 
is in fact a 
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preliminary towards a criminal objective. In the offence of burglary the 
agent who has entered a building as a trespasser (an exertion which is 
not criminal in nature) with a view to committing one of the four 
offences stated in s. 9(2) of the Theft Act 1968 is guilty even if he 
does not succeed in bringing about his criminal objective. But the 
criminal law has been slow to extend criminal responsibility in this way 
and refuses to attribute liability in relation to an objective which is 
remote from the preparatory activity. On current law Donald would be 
guilty of burglary but would not be charged in connection with the 
objective (assassination) which informs that otherwise preparatory 
activity. 
My view here is that, in assessing criminal activity, we are entitled to 
consider the whole causal chain which leads to the agent's objective; 
that we are entitled to pick out from the causal chain both past and 
prospective links which constitute criminal offences, and ascribe 
liability to the agent in respect of those offences. Donald should be 
charged with burglary for the purpose of, assassination. More on this 
later. °-' 
To summarise on the first species of the proposed concept of direct 
intention. An agent directly intends an effect of his activity where he 
(i) contemplates or believes that it may flow from his activity and (ii) 
he acts as he does because of that belief. As the agent reads it the 
exertion must be capable of bringing about the effect at which it is 
directed. An agent cannot directly intend a prospective effect until his 
activity has reached a stage at which (as he sees things) it is capable 
of producing that effect. Desire for the effect is not a necessary 
prerequisite for the purpose of ascriptions of criminal liability on the 
basis of direct intention. 
(ii) Direct Intention as Conceptual Certainty. 
I turn now to the second species of the proposed concept of direct 
intention. 6 One may note from my summary above that the first species 
of direct intention does not extend to foresight of the effect 
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simpliciter but rather insists upon the agent's aiming to bring the 
effect about by his activity. Foresight of certainty is thus not 
sufficient. However I think that foresight of certainty should figure as 
a species of intention since there is a moral distinction to be drawn 
between the agent who anticipates an effect as a probable accompaniment 
of his exertion aimed at some other effect (and who is thus reckless 
concerning the effect) and the agent who foresees the untoward effect as 
certain to flow from his exertion aimed at some other effect. That moral 
distinction may be drawn by the inclusion of foresight of certainty in 
the concept of direct intention. However it is submitted that there are 
two distinct kinds of foresight of certainty, namely foresight of 
'conceptual' certainty and foresight of 'empirical' certainty. The 
former concept constitutes the second species of direct intention and is 
discussed below. The latter concept constitutes my proposed model of 
concomitant intention which is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
The second species of the proposed concept of direct intention takes the 
following form. 
An agent has direct intention concerning an untoward effect of his 
activity where that effect is conceptually indivisible from the 
effect at which his exertion is directed. The agent will generally 
be liable for the untoward and indivisible effect whether or not he 
actually alludes to it. In such a case, however he may avoid 
liability where he can prove on the balance of probabilities that at 
the time of his activity there existed some legally recognised 
factor sufficient in the circumstances to prevent his perception of 
the untoward and indivisible effect. Subject to this proviso an 
agent will be liable for an attempt at both the effect aimed at by 
him and the untoward and indivisible effect where he has brought his 
activity to that point of the causal chain which brings him within 
the actus reus of attempt. " 
The substance of the proposed species of direct intention requires some 
elucidation. 
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1. Indivisible Effect. 
Where, on the facts and in the circumstances of the agent's exertion, 
an effect y is indivisible from the directly intended" effect x, then y 
is 'conceptually related' to x and is thus conceptually certain to flow 
from the agent's exertion should that be successful in bringing about x. 
It is submitted that in such cases to directly intend x is to directly 
intend y. Thus where the Heir Apparent shoots and kills his father then 
the death of the king and the immediate installation of the prince in 
accordance with ancient tradition are indivisible transactions and, on 
my submission, the prince directly intends both the king's death and his 
accession as king. A classic illustration is provided by Glanville 
William's amoral surgeon who cuts out his patient's heart in order to 
experiment with it, not intending to kill his patient, but knowing that 
he is killing him. In this case the patient's death must logically 
follow upon the surgeon's activity: the removal of the heart and the 
death of the patient are indivisible. On my submission the surgeon 
directly intends his victim's death. " 
There are several case studies which demonstrate that the current 
criminal law treats as intended an untoward and indivisible effect of 
the agent's activity aimed at something else. 
In D. P. P. v Luft' the House of Lords held that an intention to prevent 
the election of one candidate necessarily involves an intention to 
improve the chances of success of the remaining candidates though the 
person so intending is indifferent which of them is successful. In 
Hunterýe three men accidentally killed their young female victim in the 
course of horseplay. In panic they hid the body under some stones. They 
were found guilty of conspiracy to prevent the burial of a corpse. The 
Court of Appeal decided that where an agreement to conceal a body in 
fact prevented burial then the offence is proved although prevention of 
burial was not the object of the agreement. It is submitted that both 
judgments were grounded on the fact that the two consequences in issue 
were indistinct and in fact constituted the same transaction. 
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In Hills v E11is19 a by-stander, D, took hold of the arm of a police 
officer in order to prevent him from making what D thought to be a 
mistake in arresting the wrong man. D's aim was to prevent a mistake 
being made but his act necessarily hindered the officer and he was found 
guilty of obstructing him. 7 ' Similarly in Lewis v Cox71 D's friend had 
been arrested by the police and put into a van. D continued in his 
efforts to open the door of the van in order to establish just where his 
friend was to be taken. His intention was not to obstruct the police but 
his activity necessarily brought about that effect. It is submitted that 
both cases provide examples of my proposed second species of direct 
intention. In Arrowsmith v Jenkins-z'72 D set up an impromtu meeting on the 
highway thus causing an obstruction. She was convicted of wilfully 
obstructing the highway although, on her submission, her intention was 
to hold a meeting and not to obstruct the highway. It is submitted that 
the defendant was rightly convicted. In the circumstances of the case 
there is no distinction between the meeting and the obstruction of the 
highway - they are of a piece and to intend one is surely to (directly) 
intend the other. The same holds for the case of Hills and Ellis: '' the 
taking hold of the constable's arm and obstructing him in carrying out 
his duty are one and the same thing, it thus matters not which was the 
motivation behind the agent's activity; both were directly intended on 
the proposed second species of direct intention. 
Some theorists have alluded to untoward and indivisible effects although 
using different terms. Duff writes 
"suppose that I intend to decapitate Brown: can I say that his death 
is a foreseen but not intended consequence of my action? Most 
commentators agree that I cannot: that the connection between the 
intended result and his death is too "close" to allow this 
distinction ... The connection 
is rather logical. '4 "Brown is 
decapitated but survives" does not specify any intelligible 
possibility since it is part of the logic of "human beings" that 
'6 decapitation kills them". 
From my explication of the notion one may note that conceptual certainty 
involves an untoward harm x which is indivisible from directly 
intended 
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harm y; that in such cases x=y, and that we are thus justified in 
holding conceptually certain consequences as directly intended by the 
agent. I think that most judges and commentators are prepared to include 
the notion of 'conceptual certainty' within the parameters of intention 
generally. Lord Hailsham drew the limits of intention at 'virtual 
certainty' in Hyd'E and may thus be counted as accepting conceptually 
certain results as directly intended by the agent. As Glanville Williams 
would include cases of virtual certainty as intended he would clearly 
accept conceptually certain consequences as directly intended. " 
Clarkson and Keating state that a consequence ought only to be regarded 
as intended when it is the aim or objective of the agent, or is foreseen 
as certain"e to result. ''' It is clear from this statement that the 
learned authors are prepared to count as intended conceptually certain 
consequences. e° 
However I should point out that whilst most, if not all, judges and 
theorists include the concept of conceptual certainty as a species of 
intention, they would also count empirically certain effectse' as 
intended: they would not thus discriminate between the two proposed 
species of 'certainty'. It also seems clear that they insist upon 
foresight by the agent of both the effect aimed at by him and the effect 
which is certain to flow from his exertion as a necessary prerequisite 
to criminal liability. This represents the ideal typical construction of 
subjectivism concerning the concept of intention. " 
2. Failure to Allude to an Untoward and Indivisible Effect. 
Notwithstanding this general approach by the judges and theorists my 
submission here is that a conceptually certain consequence of his 
intended activity should be counted as directly intended by the agent 
whether or not he actually contemplates that consequence at the time of 
his activity. Thus where D embarks upon activity in order to prevent V 
from winning an election he should be counted as directly intending to 
assist the only other candidate to win even though the thought of his 
aiding the other had not crossed his mind. This contention falls outside 
the traditional subjectivist notion of intention which requires actual 
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contemplation of the untoward harm, but I think that the departure is 
justified on the ground that the effect intended and the indivisible 
second effect are of a piece and to intend one is to intend the other. 
3. The Proposed Rebutting Provision. 
The notion of conceptual certainty is subject to the proviso that the 
defendant who brings about conceptually certain harm y by activity aimed 
at x may be able to avoid liability for the occurrence of y (but not of 
x if x constitutes a criminal offence) where he can prove to the 
satisfaction of the court or jury on the balance of probabilities that 
there was present some legally recognised factor in sufficient degree in 
the circumstances to prevent him from perceiving the occurrence of y. It 
is envisaged that Parliament would stipulate the legally recognised 
factors when creating this second species of the proposed species of 
intention. I discuss this issue in some detail in Chapter 7. c`3 Generally 
the legally recognised factor would be one of (i) lack of capacity or 
(ii) misperception of a fact or circumstance concerning the conceptually 
certain harm. 
We may illustrate (i) with a case study. In Elliot vGD, a fourteen 
year old girl of low intelligence who had not slept for some twelve 
hours and had had no food or drink during that time, entered a garden 
shed, poured spirit onto a carpet and set a match to it. The shed was 
destroyed. D was charged with arson to the shed, contrary to s. 1(2) of 
the Criminal Damage Act. D was acquitted by the magistrates but the 
appeal by the prosecution was successful on the ground that D had been 
reckless concerning the damage to the shed in accordance with the 
criteria laid down by the House of Lords in Caldwell. " But it is 
submitted that the damage to the shed was a conceptually certain 
accompaniment of her setting fire to the spirit (or the carpet, 
whichever she had in mind at the time of her exertion) since damage to 
the shed was an indivisible effect of her soaking the carpet with spirit 
and setting fire to it. On the proposed second species of 
direct 
intention she is thus guilty of causing criminal damage with direct 
intention. But she would be able to avoid liability if the court or 
jury 
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were satisfied on the balance of probabilities that, given the 
subjective factors present, she was unable to appreciate the 
conceptually certain effect of her exertion aimed at some other 
effect. '36 
We may illustrate (ii) by means of a hypothetical. Suppose that D has 
been advised that P is the only nomination in a forthcoming election. 
Subsequently, unknown to D, a second nomination is put forward. D is 
active in trying to prevent the election of P and does not allude to the 
fact that he is, by that activity, improving the chances of the other 
candidate to win the election. D's belief that P is the only candidate 
prevents his perception that he is, by his activity, assisting the only 
other candidate to win. 
4. Conceptual Certainty and Attempts. 
Where the agent has done something which is more than merely preparatory 
to the commission of the substantive offence he is guilty of an attempt 
at that offence. '7 It is submitted that on the second species of direct 
intention the agent who brings about the actus reus of attempt at the 
offence aimed at should also be liable for an attempt at the untoward 
and indivisible effect of his activity. This contention flows naturally 
from the nature of the proposed notion of conceptual certainty: the 
agent who brings about effect x would be counted as directly intending 
conceptually certain effect y since y is indivisible from the primary 
consequence x at which his activity is directed, i. e. x=y. It is 
because harm x and y are indivisible that to aim at x is to aim at y and 
the agent should be counted as attempting y in cases in which he has 
attempted but failed to bring about effect x by his activity. My 
submissions here are, however subject to the proposed proviso. If D has 
attempted to bring about x having failed to allude to the prospect of 
indivisible effect y through either lack of capacity or misperception of 
some fact or circumstance concerning y then he may not be said to be 
attempting y. 
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We may summarise the second species of the concept of direct intention 
by way of noting its features. Note here that the features concerning 
the first species of direct intentionc-'9 apply here also concerning the 
effect x at which the agent's exertion is directed. The features are 
(1) the agent must be aware or believe that his exertion may produce 
effect x-11 
(ii) he must be aiming to bring x about by his exertion. 81: 1 
(iii) that exertion must be physical in character. 90 
(iv) it is not necessary that D is certain of success concerning x. 91 
(v) effect y must be conceptually indivisible from effect x. `-1 
(vi) It is not necessary that the agent contemplate effect y at the 
time of his exertion aimed at x although he may avoid liability if 
his failure to allude to y was caused by some factor which 
prevented him from perceiving the indivisible effect of his 
activity. '93 
(vii) Where the agent brings about the actus reus of an attempt at x he 
will be liable for an attempt at x and also an attempt at the 
indivisible effect y subject to the proposed proviso in (vi). 94 
Donald aims and shoots at the king with the intention of killing him but 
the bullet misses its target and strikes and kills the Queen standing 
close by. This case brings into focus the current legal concept of 
transferred malice or transferred intention. It is suggested that the 
latter term is, perhaps, more appropriate since many of the old offences 
which admitted malice have been repealed, 96 and today we talk generally 
in terms of intention rather than malice. -Is I shall use the latter term 
for the purpose of present discussion. The current law on transferred 
intention is that where an agent aims at a particular harm to V, but in 
fact causes that harm to V` then we may transfer the agent's intention 
to the unintended actus reus and convict him of the appropriate 
offence. 97 Thus on current law an agent intends a consequence of his 
activity which he does not aim at, and the risk of which he might not 
even know about, where that consequence has been brought about 
by 
activity aimed at a separate but identical consequence. 
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An early case which illustrates the doctrine of transferred intention is 
fie. '9"I In that case the defendant, Agnes Gore, with the intention of 
killing her husband, added ratsbane to a medicine which had been 
prepared for her husband by an apothecary. Her husband became ill and 
returned the potion to the apothecary who tasted it and died of the 
poison. Agnes was convicted of the murder of the apothecary since "the 
law conjoins the murderous intention with the event which thence 
ensued". The doctrine thus combines the agent's mens rea (the intention 
to kill in Gore) with the identical albeit untoward actus reus brought 
about by the agent and holds him criminally responsible for the 
unintended consequence as though he had brought about that consequence 
with direct intention to do so. 
In Latimer '1 D swung his belt at V, ,a male adversary. The belt struck 
him lightly and re-bounded into the face of V2, a female friend of Vi. D 
was charged with maliciously wounding the woman contrary to s. 20 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861. D argued that an intention to 
wound the particular person struck was a prerequisite for the statutory 
offence. In the Court For Crown Cases Reserved Lord Coleridge C. J. 
decided that malice against V, was sufficient to sustain a conviction 
for wounding V8. ' c'° 
The doctrine can only apply, however, where the harm brought about by 
the agent is the same as that which he tried to bring about by his 
activity. In Pembliton'01 it was established that malice cannot be 
transferred from one statutory offence to another. In that case D threw 
a stone at an adversary but the missile missed the designated target and 
damaged a window in a public house. He was convicted of malicious damage 
to the window (a statutory offence) but his conviction was quashed on 
appeal since his malice was directed at the well being of his 
adversaries and not toward the safety of surrounding property. It is 
interesting to note here that Lord Coleridge and Blackburn J. agreed 
that had the jury been directed (as they were not) that if the prisoner 
knew there were windows behind, and that the probable consequence of his 
activity would be that a window would be broken, that would be evidence 
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of malice. The learned judges were in fact suggesting that Pembliton may 
have been guilty of malicious damage caused recklessly. 102 
The doctrine of transferred intention applies to secondary parties to a 
criminal offence. Thus where D counsels P to kill V, and P shoots to 
kill V, but strikes and kills V2 then D will be guilty of the murder of 
V2 as a secondary party. 10 Also the doctrine applies to defences 
generally. Thus where D strikes out at V, in self defence but his blow 
strikes V: 2 then his criminal liability will be assessed on the basis 
that he had in fact struck V, and not V : z:. 
The doctrine of transferred intention begs several questions. First, can 
we transfer an innocent intent to an untoward identical harm which 
constitutes the actus reus of a criminal offence? Let us take a variant 
of a hypothetical postulated by Austin as an aid to dicussion here. ' 04 
Suppose I find that my donkey is suffering from a particular disease and 
a veterinary surgeon has recommended destruction of the beast. I go to 
the field where it grazes, take aim and fire. At that moment the donkey 
moves and the bullet strikes a donkey belonging to you. Now I certainly 
aim at my donkey with the intention of killing it but the bullet misses 
and kills your donkey. Can one transfer my innocent intent to the 
untoward harm (the death of your donkey) and convict me of a criminal 
offence concerning the death of your donkey? 
One might respond that the intention (or malice) must relate to 
prospective proscribed harm and that an innocent intent aimed at an 
innocent effect is not sufficient. This leads to a second question. 
Where the agent aims at what he wrongly believes to be proscribed harm x 
but he brings about untoward identical harm y which is proscribed, can 
we transfer the agent's objectively innocent (although subjectively 
criminal) intent to the proscribed harm y and convict? As an 
illustration suppose D shoots at a particular species of bird believing 
it to be protected at law when it is not. The bullet misses its target 
and kills a bird which is protected by the criminal law. Can we transfer 
the 'wicked' intention and convict D of the appropriate offence? 
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Third, 7°s using the traditional form of the doctrine - 'transferred 
malice'- can one apply the doctrine to a case in which 'foresight' is 
the mental state in issue? Suppose, for example, that D is about to 
throw a brick at a window. He realises that if he goes through with his 
activity there is a risk of injury to V, standing close by. He throws 
the brick at the window but it misses and strikes and injures V2 who, 
given the facts and circumstances of the case, neither D nor the 
reasonable man could have contemplated as being at risk. It is clear 
that D would not be guilty of the appropriate offence under the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861 on the 'Cunningham' test of malice1°~" but 
can we hold D guilty on the basis of transferred malice? 
Fourth, given that D's intention concerns a specific offence, can we 
transfer his intention where he has brought about a lesser substantive 
offence? Suppose, for example that D throws a brick at V, intending to 
cause serious injury. The brick in fact strikes V2 causing a bruise. 
Given the facts and circumstances of the case neither D nor the ordinary 
person could have anticipated such injury to V2. In this hypothetical D 
intends grievous bodily harm' °7 but in fact brings about actual harm' °8 
so the of fences are not the same. But one might say that serious harm 
includes actual harm (and both include an assault) and also that an 
intention to cause serious harm includes and extends beyond an intention 
to cause actual harm: so can we transfer D's intention concerning V, to 
the injury inflicted upon V2 and convict him of an offence under s. 47 of 
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861? 
Fifth, where the defendant has succeeded in bringing about intended harm 
x but has also brought about identical untoward harm y does the doctrine 
enable us to transfer D's (successful) intention to the untoward harm 
and convict him in respect of both harms? Suppose that D, in a field, 
shoots at V, intending to kill him. He succeeds but the sound of the 
shot causes cattle in the next field to bolt killing V2, a farm hand. 
Can we convict D with the murder of V2 on the basis of transferred 
intention even although that intention was an element in D's successful 
enterprise regarding Vi? 10" 
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Sixth, what is the position where D, in a field, aims at V, intending to 
kill her, causes her grievous bodily harm, and the sound of the shot 
causes cattle in the next field to bolt killing V2? Do we transfer the 
intention to kill to the death of V2, or retain the intention (which 
presumably incorporates serious injury) for the serious injury inflicted 
on V, and exclude the death of V2 from liability? Can we split the mens 
rea so that we may convict D of both the murder of Vom. on the basis of 
transferred intention and the attempted murder of V, and/or causing 
grievous bodily harm to her with direct intention contrary to s. 18 of 
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861? 
Seventh, is the doctrine of transferred intention not incompatible with 
the general legal requirement that there must be contemporaneity between 
actus reus and mens rea. An illustration will assist here. If we 
juxtapose the facts of Gore "" so that Agnes places the poison in the 
medicine and hands the mixture to her husband, V,, who drinks some and 
becomes ill. He hands it to his father V2 with the instruction that he 
return it to the apothecary and obtain a fresh supply. Agnes is advised 
about the instruction to father, realises that her plot has failed and 
decides not to try again. V places the contaminated mixture in the 
cupboard and forgets to do his son's bidding. A week has passed by and 
V2 is ill with the same complaint as that suffered by his son. Agnes 
goes to the cupboard and, believing the medicine to be a fresh supply, 
pours a spoonful and administers it to V- who subsequently dies. Is 
Agnes guilty of the murder of V4:? Adopting a consistent approach to the 
doctrine of transferred intention Agnes would be guilty of the murder of 
V2 since the doctrine conjoins the original mens rea with the actus reus 
(the death of V2) and holds her guilty in respect of the unintended 
result. If this is right then the doctrine seems to be out of line with 
the general legal requirement of contemporaneity between actus reus and 
mens rea. 111 
One might be able to explain away these questions on the contours of 
transferred intention but they at least suggest that the doctrine is 
open to several difficulties or objections. Should the doctrine of 
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transferred intention figure as a concept in the assessment of criminal 
responsibility? 
Ashworth points out that the doctrine of transferred intention was a 
necessary expedient in earlier centuries when the law on attempts was 
passing through its development stages, but claims that the doctrine is 
no longer necessary given the present sophisticated state of that 
inchoate offence. "' He suggests either of two alternatives to the 
doctrine namely 
(i) liability for the crime attempted, ignoring the accidental result, 
or 
(ii) liability for the actual result based upon recklessness. " 
Presumably Ashworth would allow some lesser mental element where 
the offence in issue admits such. 
Ashworth points out that we may select either alternative to the 
doctrine of transferred intention depending upon which we consider 
appropriate to the particular case. He cites the case of Pembliton114 
and says that we might charge D with an attempt under the appropriate 
section of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 since to charge him 
with property damage (caused recklessly) would not accurately describe 
his moral turpitude. Ashworth's reasoning is surely correct but his 
example is not in fact one of transferred intention. Perhaps a more 
appropriate example of Ashworth's suggestion is where D aims at the 
destruction of property x (value £100) but his exertion causes the 
destruction of property y (value £2.500). Here the harm brought about is 
identical in nature to the harm intended and we may thus transfer the 
intention. Ashworth would presumably argue however that we should charge 
D with an attempt concerning the destruction of x and not with the 
substantive offence concerning y since the case will then be heard as a 
summary offence in the magistrates' court and the conviction and 
sanction would presumably reflect more accurately D's moral 
turpitude. "s 
In relation to Ashworth's suggested alternatives to the doctrine of 
transferred intention I would point out that in a case in which the 
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agent lacks an appropriate mens rea for the untoward identical harm 
which he brings about by his activity aimed at something else1 we 
cannot charge him with the substantive offence as an alternative to 
transferred intention: we would be restricted to a charge of an attempt 
at the harm at which the agent's activity is directed. 
Williams agrees with Ashworth that in cases of criminal damage we could 
conveniently do away with the doctrine of transferred intention since it 
"can make the offender guilty of damage far exceeding that which he 
intended or foresaw, and can even make him guilty where he was not 
negligent as to the damage that occurred". '1 17 However Williams does not 
accept Ashworth's suggestion that we ought to abolish transferred 
intention in respect of injuries to the person and deal with such cases 
as attempts on the main ground that "we do not generally regard an 
attack upon X as either more or less reprehensible than an attack upon 
Y". 1 He argues that current practice involves lenient treatment for 
the offender who is guilty of an attempt and that this is in accord with 
public feeling since D has not brought about any harm. But if we convict 
the agent of an attempt when he has actually brought about injury the 
court would probably feel disposed to apply a more severe sentence for 
the attempt, and this might lead to the abandonment of the general 
practice of lenient sentencing policy concerning attempts. For Williams 
lenient sentencing for attempts is desirable on the practical ground 
that it reduces the scale of punishment thereby reducing pressure on the 
prisons. With respect to Williams, Ashworth does offer an alternative to 
a charge of attempt concerning the harm aimed at. 1' In any event I 
shall argue below that we have the legal machinery (other than a charge 
of attempt simpliciter) to blame and award appropriate punishment to the 
agent who fails to bring about the harm aimed at but brings about 
untoward identical harm. 12° 
I should like to object to the doctrine of transferred intention on two 
main grounds. First, the invocation of transferred intention for 
unintended identical harm is not necessary where the agent has a 
relevant lesser mental state concerning the untoward identical harm, for 
we may charge him with the substantive offence in relation to it. 
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Second, invocation of the doctrine is not fair in cases in which the 
agent does not have a necessary lesser mental state concerning the 
untoward identical harm since to convict him amounts to the imposition 
of constructive liability in the sense that he is liable for harm which, 
given the facts and circumstances of the case, neither he nor the 
ordinary man could have anticipated. 
We may illustrate this point with the case of D who shoots at V, but 
misses and kills V1 hidden behind a curtain. Now if we convict D in 
respect of the unintended consequence of his act (the death of V2) then 
we are ascribing criminal liability to him for a consequence as to which 
he is not even negligent. Also suppose that Douglas, in a field, shoots 
at Vera with the intention of killing her. The bullet misses but the 
sound of the shot causes cows in the next field to bolt killing farmer 
Styles. The doctrine of transferred intention would hold Douglas guilty 
of the murder of Styles but, on the facts, Styles' death might not have 
been reasonably foreseeable so why should we count Douglas as having 
intended that death? 
I agree with Ashworth that we ought to exclude the doctrine of 
transferred intention from our criminal law. However my suggestion for 
an alternative strategy differs from his. In my view the one alternative 
to the doctrine of transferred intention is that we may (i) convict the 
agent of an attempt at the harm aimed at and, (ii) where appropriate 
convict the agent of the substantive offence concerning the identical 
untoward harm, i. e. where the agent has some mental state concerning the 
untoward identical harm which is recognised by the offence with which 
he is to be charged. The suggestion uses the existing legal machinery 
without the need to resort to the somewhat artificial concept of 
transferred intention. For example in the case where D shoots at V, with 
the intention of causing grievous bodily harm but the bullet misses and 
cause grievous bodily harm to V2: standing nearby we may convict D of 
both an attempt under s. 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861 
in relation to V, and the substantive offence under s. 20 of that 
Act in 
relation to the harm sustained by V2 which he has brought about 
maliciously. In this way we more accurately record 
the moral 
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blameworthiness of D. He has aimed to bring about serious harm to a 
fellow being in circumstances which create a danger of serious harm to 
someone other than the intended victim. My strategy differs from 
transferred intention in two material respects. First the agent will be 
charged with an attempt at the harm aimed at in every case. Second, 
where the agent lacks a necessary mental state concerning the untoward 
identical harm then we cannot charge him in connection with that harm. 
But there are objections to the use of the law of attempts and 
recklessness (or other appropriate mental state) as instruments for 
blame and punishment of the agent who has brought about an unintended 
and identical consequence to that aimed at by him. First one might say 
that there is no point in charging an agent with an attempt simpliciter 
in cases in which the untoward harm brought about was not reasonably 
foreseeable since he will receive a lighter sentence for an attempt 
when he has in fact brought about harm identical to that intended. My 
response here is that in cases of transferred intention the agent has in 
fact completed the last act necessary in order to bring about the harm 
aimed at by him and is thus as morally blameworthy as the agent who 
succeeds in his enterprise. We are thus justified in applying the same 
punishment as that which might be awarded for the consumated offence. 121 
On this argument there is thus no distinction in the sentence awarded to 
the agent whether we use the concept of transferred intention or the law 
of attempts in relation to the actual harm aimed at by the agent. 
However where the agent has some necessary wens rea concerning the 
untoward harm the agent is liable for both an attempt at the harm aimed 
at by him and for the commission of the identical untoward harm which he 
has brought about. On this basis the agent would receive both blame and 
punishment which is at least commensurate with that which is currently 
awarded under the doctrine of transferred intention. This leads to a 
second and converse argument that if we convict and punish for both an 
attempt at the harm aimed at and commission of the substantive offence 
(where appropriate) in relation to the untoward harm then we award too 
much punishment to the agent since had he been successful with 
his 
attempt he would have been liable for the substantive offence only (by 
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way of intention). In response I would state that on my suggested 
formula the agent is either guilty of a lesser substantive offence (e. g. 
an offence under s. 20 and not s. 18 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861) or liable to lesser punishment for the substantive offence 
since he has brought about the proscribed harm recklessly rather than 
intentionally. This response does not fully meet the argument since 
overall punishment would still be greater on the proposed alternative to 
transferred intention, especially if we accept Ashworth's suggestion of 
equal punishment for the completed attempt and the consumated offence. 
However invocation of the doctrine that an agent cannot be punished 
twice in relation to the same transaction would meet the argument. 
A third objection to the suggested removal of transferred intention is 
that whilst one might concede that for property crimes there might be 
some justification for the discountenance of transferred intention'22 
one cannot say the same for the crime of murder. An agent is guilty of 
murder where he has caused the death with the necessary malice 
aforethought. But there are no degrees of death as there are values 
(intrinsic or otherwise) of property, so, it may be argued, we should 
accept the argument that if D intended to kill and did kill, it cannot 
be correct to describe the killing as unintended merely because the 
victim was V, instead of V2 
Glanville Williams provides an answer to this claim in his plea for 
observance of ordinary language and the f orm of the indictment. He says 
that the claim 
"sounds plausible only because part of the real intention is 
omitted. Although the result in the sense of killing was intended, 
the result in the sense of killing (Vi) was not intended. After all, 
the accused is not indicted for killing in the abstract; he is 
indicted for killing (V2); and it should therefore, on a strict 
view, be necessary to establish mens rea in relation to the killing 
of (V2011.12 
Smith and Hogan disagree with Williams holding that 
"the killing of (V2) is only unintentional in a respect which is 
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immaterial. The test of materiality in a difference of result is 
whether it affects the existence of the actus reus which D intended. 
Thus it would be immaterial that D intended to shoot P in the heart 
but, because of a quite unexpected movement by P, shot him 
(unintentionally) in the head. The actus reus is the killing of a 
human being - any human being - under the Queen's peace, and his 
identity is irrelevant". 124 
My own view is that Williams is confining his restriction on untoward 
effects to consequences which are unforeseen by the defendant who is not 
negligent. It seems that he would convict of murder the agent in the 
example raised by Smith and Hogan. 12ý Also Williams would convict of 
murder the agent who shoots and kills V, believing him to be V2 on the 
basis that he is directing his activity at a fellow being. ' 2- Williams' 
reluctance to convict for murder is thus restricted to cases in which 
the agent, D, has failed to bring about the death of his intended victim 
but his activity has brought about the death of another in circumstances 
in which neither D nor the ordinary person could have anticipated that 
death. I am in agreement with this reasoning. For the reasons stated 
above' : 27 D should be convicted of attempted murder only. 
To summarise on transferred intention. The doctrine applies to untoward 
harm which the agent brings about whilst aiming at (and presumably 
missing) an identical harm. When the doctrine is applied the agent's 
failed attempt is ignored and he is liable for the untoward identical 
harm as if he had directly intended it. The doctrine thus covers (i) 
untoward harm which the agent (or an ordinary person) might have 
contemplated as a possible effect of his activity and (ii) untoward harm 
which neither the agent nor the ordinary man could have contemplated as 
a possible effect. It is submitted that the doctrine of transferred 
intention is unneccessary since we have existing legal machinery to 
attribute adequate blame and punishment to the agent in cases (i) and 
(ii) above. As regards (i) we may convict him of both an attempt at the 
harm aimed at and the substantive offence concerning the harm caused on 
the basis of an appropriate mental state concerning that harm. As 
regards (ii) we may convict the agent of an attempt at the harm aimed at 
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without more. This is right: we ought not to attribute liability to the 
agent here since to do so would mean the attribution of liability for an 
effect as to which he was not negligent. If my submissions are accepted 
then the doctrine of transferred intention is rendered otiose. 
Transferred Intention and Mistaken Identity. 
Donald, with the intention of killing the King, takes aim in the gloom 
and shoots at and kills the Queen. In this hypothetical the agent knows 
that he is shooting at a fellow being with the intention of killing that 
person; but here, unlike cases of transferred intention which involve 
incompetence in execution, he has misperceived the facts or 
cricumstances surrounding his intentional activity. It is submitted that 
cases of mistaken identity are thus distinct from cases of transferred 
intention. But if my submission is accepted then just what strategy 
ought we to adopt for the purpose of assessing criminal liability in 
such cases? 
My view here is that in relation to offences against the person the 
agent should be convicted of the appropriate offence concerning the 
injury caused without reference to his mistaken perception as to the 
identity of the victim. My suggestion is based upon my plea for the 
recognition of, and strict adherence to, the principle of fair 
labelling. In our instant case, Donald has directed activity at a human 
being with the intention of causing the death of that person12e and a 
conviction for murder of the victim is in accord with the principle. The 
same statement can be applied to the case of a non-fatal offence against 
the person. 12-1 
However there is a problem for the preservation of the principle of fair 
labelling in cases of mistaken identity concerning property crimes. 
Suppose D damages Vi's cheap flower pot believing it to be V2's rare 
ancient Greek urn (value say £10.000). Given s. 38 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 '°' the agent has committed a summary offence and the 
case will be heard in the magistrates' court. However a conviction for 
criminal damage without more would not reflect the agent's moral 
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turpitude since, at the time of his act, the agent believed that he was 
committing a more serious offence. The same problem arises in the 
contrary case in which the agent damages Vi's property of high value 
(over £2.000) mistaking it for V2's relatively worthless property: to 
convict him with the more serious offence would not present an adequate 
picture of his moral turpitude. I think that the strategy to apply in 
cases of mistaken identity concerning property offences is for the jury 
to decide upon guilt in relation to the actus reus and the specific wens 
rea requirement of the offence without reference to D's belief about 
value. Where the jury convicts then the judge may frame the conviction 
so that it takes into account the agent's state of mind concerning the 
financial extent of the damage which he believes he has caused. Thus 
where D is convicted of criminal damage to Vi's expensive property 
which, at the time of his activity he believed to be Vg's cheap property 
the judge might phrase the conviction (say) "causing criminal damage to 
property estimated by him at less than £10". '? ' 
One might interject that if we are to quantify the agent's belief as to 
value of the property he believed he was damaging (accurate or 
inaccurate) in the phraseology of the conviction then we may find 
difficulties in establishing the defendant's valuation of the property 
which he intended to destroy. Also one might ask if we are to put a 
precise figure on that value in each case or whether we would apply 
general bands. My response here is that we ought to at least have a 
definite point of valuation at £2.000 so that we can mark the difference 
in the agent's intention to commit a summary or more serious offence 
under s. 38 of the Criminal Justice Act. That apart we may perhaps have 
bands of say £1.000. This would both reduce or eliminate the problem 
concerning the establishment of the defendant's valuation of the 
property which he intended to destroy and provide fairly significant 
gradations of seriousness in moral turpitude displayed by the agent as 
he brings about the actus reus of the offence. 
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Direct Intention and Hope. 
What of the case in which the agent hopes that his activity will produce 
a particular effect although he is not sure about a particular fact or 
circumstance pertaining to his activity? Suppose for example that D 
takes aim and fires at V's bed hoping but unsure whether or not V is 
there. Does D directly intend V's death? In such a case D is certainly 
aiming to achieve the effect hoped for and the second constituent"2 of 
direct intention is thus present. My view is that the other two 
constituent parts of direct intention are also present since, in such 
cases generally, D is aware that the fact or circumstance might be 
present (otherwise he could not hope for the effect at which his 
activity is directed) and he believes that his activity may produce the 
effect hoped for if the fact or circumstance does in fact obtain. " 
Smith and Hogan agree with my view. ' : -'d- They contend that 
"an act may be intentional with respect to circumstances as well as 
consequences. Intention here means either hope that the circumstance 
exists - which corresponds to purpose in relation to consequences - 
or knowledge that the circumstance exists - which corresponds to 
foresight of certainty in relation to consequences". 
Salmond says 
"he who steals a letter containing a cheque, intentionally steals 
the cheque also if he hopes that the letter may contain one, even 
though he well knows that the odds against the existence of such a 
circumstance are very great". 13" 
I would accept this contention but think that there may be cases in 
which the possibility becomes so remote that one cannot say that D 
intends the effect he hopes for. 
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To summarise the proposed concept of direct intention. An agent directly 
intends an effect when 
(i) he believes that his exertion may bring about that effect and he 
makes that exertion because of that belief (i. e. he aims at that 
effect), or 
(ii) that effect is indivisible from an exertion aimed at something 
else, subject to the proviso that he may avoid liability if he can prove 
the presence of some factor which prevented him from perceiving the 
indivisible effect of his activity. 
I turn now to the second species of the proposed model of intention, 
namely concomitant intention. 
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1. In fact the current law talks of only one type of intention which 
includes direct intention and foresight to some degree. Bentham calls 
the latter oblique intention for which see chapter 3. 
2. Although he may be liable on other grounds. see, for example, my 
model of gross and simple negligence infra chapters 7 and 8. 
3. See infra Chapter 8 dealing with the proposed general offence of 
criminal damage. But what if D, in order to prove to a friend that he is 
out of range, tries to shoot V in order to demonstrate that it cannot be 
done. If the proof is to be persuasive then D must actually try to hit V 
and one normally supposes that if one tries to do x then one intends x. 
My response to the question is that in the proposed hypothetical D is 
aiming the gun in V's direction with the belief that he cannot possibly 
hit him, and does what he does with the direct intention of 
demonstrating the truth of that belief. D cannot thus be said to have 
directly intended V's death whether or not death follows upon his 
activity. 
4. Professor Jackson asks if there is not a distinction between 'aiming 
at' and 'aiming to'. He thinks that if the latter is included there 
might be such aiming without the agent acting. My view here is that an 
agent cannot aim to bring about a change in the world by inactivity 
since his inactivity cannot itself influence the sequence of events 
which may or may not lead to that change. The agent may thus only allow 
the sequence of events-to take its course by his inactivity. 'Aiming' is 
thus confined to positive activity. 
5. See preceding paragraph. 
6. For example recklessness for which see infra chapter 6. 
7. For which see infra Chapter 3 at p. 100. 
8. 'Concomitant intention' and 'empirical certainty' are explained infra 
chapter 3. 
9. E. g. gross recklessness for which see infra chapter 7. 
10. See the second feature of this species of direct intention supra 
p. 2. 
11. G. Williams, 'Oblique Intent' in the Cambridge 
p. 418. Professor Williams is here talking about m 
have not been converted into any form of physical 
agent has decided to commit a crime but is yet to 
but the text indicates that Professor Williams is 
'acts of willing' from ascriptions of liability. 
Law Journal [1987] at 
ental processes which 
activity (i. e. the 
do anything about it) 
prepared to exclude 
12. The phrase 'or on the facts as he believes them to 
be' is intended 
to catch the agent who is trying to bring about an effect which 
is not 
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de facto possible, as where D shoots at a tree stump believing it to be 
his enemy V. See chapter 5 for a discussion on impossible attempts. 
13. Theft here will be D's purpose or objective for which see chapter 4. 
14. The feature is discussed in detail infra Chapter 3 p. 90ff. 
15.119501 2 KB 237. 
16.119471 KB 997. 
17. C. f. Cross and Jones 10th ed. at p. 34. The learned authors think 
that the assistance was a means to a desired objective. I agree with the 
learned authors but I reach their conclusion by another route. My own 
view is that Steane foresaw the assistance as a conceptually certain 
consequence of his directly intended activity of making the broadcasts 
and that his mental state equates with the second species of the 
proposed concept of direct intention discussed below p. 37ff. On this 
analysis Steane had direct intention concerning that assistance. Note 
here that AlIlt-rs 11915] KB 616 provides a similar case study indicating 
the harmony between current law and the proposed species of direct 
intention. 
18.119761 QB 1 
19. [19511 AC 83. 
20.119841 QB 581. 
21. See also Salford Health Area Authority, ex warte Janaway (1988) Times 
January 5 cited in Smith and Hogan 6th ed. 58. 
22. (1937] AC 797. 
23. See also Gollins v Gollins [1964] AC 644 in which Lord Reid thought 
that 'aimed at' is a phrase in ordinary use understood by everybody. "If 
you aim at something you intend to hit it and if you hit it 
unintentionally you have not aimed to hit it". In Rv Mohan (supra note 
18) the dicta of James LJ indicate, in the law of attempts at least, the 
agent intends a consequence if his purpose is to achieve it. 
24. (1976) 63 Cr App Rep 59. 
25. [1976] 3 All ER 46. Australian courts, too, have adopted this 
limited view of intention. see, for example, La Fontaine (11 A. L. R. 
526). See generally J. C. Smith, ''Intent' a Reply' in the Criminal 
LdOeview [1978] 14. 
26. Duff is not sure that theft would not count as 
my account (for which see below chapter 4) for, D',. 
of V's property is not by itself enough to deprive 
it. D may need to keep it or at least refrain from 
would submit that permanent deprivation is a state 
commences immediately D takes the item from V with 
a crime of purpose on 
mere appropriation 
him permanently of 
returning it. But I 
of affairs which 
the intention of 
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permanently depriving V of it. It is possible that V may recover the 
property at some future date (the police may find it in D's possession) 
but later possibilities do not affect the position at the taking from D 
with the intention to permanently deprive. This is in accordance with 
s. 1 of the Theft Act 1968: theft is complete at the taking with the 
intention to permantly deprive. 
27. For a useful discussion on the mens rea in murder see Smith and 
Hogan 6th ed. at p. 309ff. and Cross and Jones 10th ed. at p. 154ff. 
28. See s. 9 of the Theft Act 1968. 
29. S. 8(2) of the Theft Act 1968. 
30. see s, 16(1) of the Sexual Of fences Act 1956. 
31.6th ed. pp. 473-4. 
32. See generally Lankford, [1959] Criminal Law Review 209. 
33. See s. 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. There will be convictions 
for attempt concerning activity which (as the agent sees it) is 
generally capable of producing the harm aimed at but which in fact fails 
to bring that harm about. For example where D takes aim and fires at V 
aiming to kill him but the bullet misses its target 
34. See Boyle and Boyle (1987) 84 Cr App Rep 270. See also Gullefer 
[1987] Criminal Law Review 195 CA (infra Chapter 7 p. 272) concerning a 
future intention to obtain property by deception under s, 15 of the Theft 
Act 1968. 
35. Italics added. 
36. However the agent may be said to have such a future effect as either 
his purpose or objective. For a general discussion on these concepts see 
chapter 4. 
37. See Johan supra note 18 
38. See Sinnasamv Selvanayagam supra note 19. 
39. see Bramwell B in Qox (1818) Russ and Ry 362. 
40. For example 1jewski [ 19771 AC 142. 
41.10th ed. at p. 36. 
42. Aga (1976 1 AC 182. 
43. See the dicta of Lord Simon in XorjMn at p. 363. 
44. See $ supra note 16. 
45. Bayley and Basterbraak [ 19801 Criminal Law Review (503). 
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46. See infra Chapter 3. 
47. e. g. Lt--Mn [ 19781 AC 617. . 
48. See, for example, Lord Cross in HyAii infra p. 76. 
49. See, for example, Viscount Dilhorne in $yan infra p. 79. 
50. e. g. Relfnn 119761 3 All ER 46. 
51. 'Intent' as used in the current law. 
52. Infra Chapter 4. 
53. Supra p. 23. 
54. As I have pointed out (supra p. 23) the mens rea element here is not 
clearly stated in the Act. 
55. For an explanation of the proposed concept of purpose (and 
objective) see infra chapter 4. 
56. Supra note 29. 
57. Supra p. 30. 
58. See supra note 55. 
59. Infra p. 149f f. 
60. See supra note 55. 
61. See, for example assault with intent to rob, assault with intent to 
commit buggery and conspiracy supra pp. 23-4. 
62. See infra Chapter 9. 
63. See supra p. 1. 
64. And, of course, for each substantive offence where he succeeds in 
bringing about the effect aimed at. 
65. As per my definition of direct intention at the beginning of this 
chapter. 
66. See Smith and Hogan, 5th ed. at p. 51. 
67. [1976] 2 All ER 569. 
68. (1976) 63 Cr App Rep R. 
69.119831 QB 680. 
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70. As Williams points out (supra note 11 pp. 417-8) this case was one 
involving 'wilfulness' and cannot thus be conclusive on intention since 
the courts extend the contours of the former concept into recklessness. 
The case does however provide an instance of conceptual certainty. 
71.119851 QB 509. 
72.119633 2 QB 561. 
73. Supra note 69. 
74. Italics supplied. 
75. In 'Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report'. 
76. Supra note 49. 
77. In 'Oblique Intent' supra note 11. 
78. Italics supplied. 
79. Clarkson and Keating, Criminal Law: Cases and Material (1984) at 
p. 137. 
80. Of course all those who would count as intended untoward harm which 
is, in some degree, a probable consequence of intentional activity would 
accept my contention here. 
81. For a discussion on empirical certainty see chapter 3. 
82. For which see chapter 1. 
83. See infra p. 265ff. Note here that the types of legally recognised 
factor which I have in mind would include (i) mental states, permanent 
or transient, such as schizophrenia, depression, exhaustion and panic, 
(ii) physical impairments (permanent or transient) such as severe colds 
which cause loss of the sense of smell and so forth and (iii) 
misperceptions concerning a fact or circumstance in relation to the 
untoward harm. The court or Jury will decide whether or not the factor 
was present and to such a degree in the circumstances as to cause the 
defendant to fail to appreciate the risk of the untoward harm. I explain 
the appropriate test in chapter 7 at p. 266. 
84.119831 2 All ER 1005. 
85. [1982] AC 341. For a more detailed account of Elliot vC and 
Caldwell see infra chapter 6. 
86. Note that D in ll iot presumably intended to damage the carpet in 
setting fire to it and would thus be guilty of an offence under s. 1(2) 
of the Criminal Damage Act in any event. A nice academic point arises if 
we juxtapose with Elliot the case of D, of the same age and in the same 
circumstance, who takes into the shed some twigs and sets fire to them 
causing damage to the shed, presumably we now have a case which equates 
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with Stephenson t 1979] QB 695 (see infra p. 207 for the facts). However 
it is submitted that Stephenson would not fall within the proposed 
proviso since in his case the damage to the haystack was not a 
conceptually certain effect of his activity aimed at something else. But 
Stephenson would be free from liability in accordance with the proviso 
to gross negligence. See infra chapter 4 pp265-6. 
87. Criminal Attempts Act 1981. I shall argue in chapter 
threshold of attempts should be set at the point at which 
exertion is capable of producing the proscribed harm. 
88. Supra p. 15. 
89. Supra p. 16. 
90. Supra p. 18. 
91. Supra p. 18. 
92. Supra p. 29f f. 
93. Supra p. 32. 
94. Supra p. 33. 
5 that the 
the agent's 
95. Particularly the offences of malice contained in the Malicious 
Damage Act 1861: most of those offences are now offences of recklessness 
under the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Professor Williams thinks that the 
term 'transferred malice' is now out of date and he talks generally in 
terms of transferred intention. See G. Williams, 'Convictions and Fair 
Labelling' 119831 Cambridge Law Journal at p. 86. 
96. Of course the mens rea in murder is malice aforethought but recent 
cases (e. g. Moloney ([1985] AC 905), Hancock ([1986] AC 455) and 
gack) (11986] 3 All ER 1)) at least suggest that the courts are 
looking for intention as the requisite mental state for murder. 
97. For a general discussion on transferred intention see Smith and 
Hogan 6th ed. 73ff. Note the learned authors use the phrase transferred 
malice. see also Cross and Jones 10th ed. pp. 45ff. 
98. (1611) 9 Co. Rep 81. 
99. (1866) 16 Cox 70. 
100. Ashworth points out that Lord Coleridge added the phrase "because 
he is guilty of general malice", a phrase which confuses transferred 
malice with the doctrine that intention to harm anyone in the line of 
fire can support a charge of wounding or murdering a person who was in 
fact harmed. see A. J. Ashworth infra note 112 at p. 79. 
101. (1874) 12 Cox 607. 
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102. On this aspect of the case see G. Williams, 'Textbook of Criminal 
Law' 1978 at p. 78. 
103. Note that the secondary party will not be liable where the 
principal commits an act outside of the agreement or otherwise deviates 
from the course of the agreement. See Saunders Y Archer (1576) 2 Plowd. 
473. 
104. In 'A Plea for Excuses' (1956-7) LV II Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society. 
105. And perhaps out of context since we are involved in a discussion on 
direct intention. However it is convenient to deal with the point here. 
106. For which see below chapter 6 p. lff. 
107. And would thus be guilty under s. 18 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 had he struck his intended victim. 
108. Which constitutes an offence under s. 47 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861. 
109. Ritz (in Felony Murder, Transferred Intent, and the Palsgraf 
Doctrine in the Criminal law' (1959) 16 Wash and Lee L. R. 169) argues 
that an intention cannot be both transferred and untransferred and that 
there cannot thus be double criminalisation on the basis of transferred 
intention. He refers to State v Cogswell (1959) 339 P. 2d, 465, 
discussed in Ashworth supra note 112 at p. 84, where D shot and killed 
his wife but the bullet passed through her body and injured the child, 
he considers that Cogswell could not be guilty of injury to his daughter 
on the doctrine of transferred intention since an intention cannot be 
applied to more than one crime. 
110. Supra page 35. 
111. The hypothetical does not seem to fall into the recognised 
exceptions to the requirement. Unlike Thabo Meli vR ([1954] 1 All ER 
373) and Church ([ 1965] 2 All ER 72) it does not seem to fit in with the 
'series of acts' category since the cases indicate that D believes that 
he has perpetrated the actus reus when he continues with the series of 
acts, whereas in our variant of Gore D is not aware of any actus reus. 
The hypothetical does not seem to fall into the 'continuing act' 
category (e. g. Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner ([1968] 3 All ER 
442) and Xiller ([1983] 2 AC 161)) since in those cases D has realised 
an existence of danger or actual harm and has done nothing to eradicate 
or alleviate it, whereas in the variant of Gore D is not aware of the 
danger. 
112. A. J. Ashworth, 'Transferred Malice and Punishment for Unforseen 
Consequences in Reshaping the Criminal Law. 
113. Ibid at p. 85. 
114. Supra p. 35. 
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115. See s. 38 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 which renders criminal 
damage of less than £2000 a summary offence only. 
116. E. g. neither D nor the ordinary person could have anticipated the 
harm caused. 
117. G. Williams, 'Convictions and Fair Labelling' in the Cambridge Law 
Journal 119831 at p. 87. 
118, Ibid. Professor Williams' reluctance to deny the doctrine of 
transferred intention concerning non-fatal offences against the person 
is surprising since he seems to accept the doctrine concerning the 
offence of murder in Criminal Law - The General Part. 
119. Supra p. 39. It is conceded that charging the defendant with the 
substantive offence concerning the harm caused cannot apply where 
neither the defendant nor the ordinary person could have foreseen that 
harm. 
120. Infra p. 41. 
121. See A. Ashworth, 'Sharpening the Subjective Element' for a more 
detailed discussion on this issue. 
122. see G. Williams 'Convictions and Fair Labelling' below note 131. 
123. See G. Williams, note 118 at p. 135. 
124. Smith and Hogan 6th ed. at p. 75. Emphasis supplied. 
125. see his comments supra p. 43. 
126. See below on cases of mistaken identity pp. 31ff. 
127, See supra p. 41. 
128. i. e. the person aimed at although he believes that person to be 
someone else. 
129. Thus where D strikes out and seriously injures V, intending serious 
injury to V_ we may convict D of causing grievous bodily harm to V1. 
with intent under s. 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act since 
D 
was directing his activity at a particular human being and his mistake 
as to identity is surely immaterial here. 
130. Which states that criminal damage to property under X2.000 is to 
be 
tried as a summary offence. 
131. Professor Williams comes to a similar conclusion in 'Convictions 
and Fair Labelling at p. 91/2 although he would extend 
his comments to 
both property crimes and offences against the person. 
He says "... the 
courts should assume the power to order the conviction 
to be recorded in 
terms that, while properly representing the abstract offence, 
do not 
include details that give a misleading impression of its gravity. 
Where 
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the jury have not pronounced on an issue (for example, whether the 
defendant knew the value of the property he was damaging) the judge 
would have to decide it, as he has to decide issues of fact in relation 
to sentence. The discretion as to the wording of the conviction should 
be exercisable by the trial judge alone". Professor Williams thinks that 
there should bo no appeal against the phrasing of the conviction. 
132. Supra p. 16. 
133. C. f. Salmond, in 'Jurisprudence' 11th ed. (1947) at p. 411. 
134. Smith and Hogan, 'Criminal Law' 5th ed. at p. 52. 
135. Supra note 133. 
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In chapter 3I explicated the two species of the proposed concept of 
direct intention. In this chapter I put forward my proposed model of 
concomitant intention which completes the proposed structure of 
intention. 
Where an agent contemplates that a contingent and empirically certain 
effect y may flow from his activity aimed at effect x, then he 
concomitantly intends y as he aims his activity at x. If the empirically 
certain effect y is brought about by the agent's activity aimed at x 
the agent may be charged with the substantive offence relating to y by 
way of concomitant intention and liable to the same sanction as that 
which may be awarded to the agent who has brought about the substantive 
offence with direct intention. If the agent fails to bring about the 
empirically certain effect y then he cannot be convicted of an attempt 
at the substantive offence concerning y. This proposed mental state has 
several features. 
(i) it is not necessary that the agent be certain that his exertion will 
produce effect x directly intended by him. All that is necessary is that 
he believes his activity may bring about effect x. 
(ii) the agent must have made a positive exertion concerning the effect 
aimed at. Thus where D wills a bodily movement at effect x but his body 
fails to respond to his mental act of willing we can say neither that he 
directly intends x nor that he concomitantly intends the contingent and 
empirically certain effect y. 
(iii) it is irrelevant whether or not the agent desires that an 
empirically certain effect follow upon his activity directed at 
something else. This is discussed in detail below. ' 
(iv) the empirically certain (or concomitant) effect must be untoward 
in 
that it does not figure as a reason for the agent's deciding 
to act as 
he does. If the concomitant effect plays some part in his deciding 
to 
act as he does then the agent directly intends 
both effects of his 
activity. We may illustrate the point by reference 
to my earlier 
58 
hypothetical of Daniel and the orchid. 2 Suppose that Daniel wishes to 
cool the room. There are two methods, namely opening a window or turning 
off the radiator. Daniel considers that if he opens the window his aunt 
Matilda's orchid will certainlfý be destroyed by the draught unless his 
aunt takes preventative action in time. The death of the orchid appeals 
to Daniel so he chooses the first alternative. The orchid dies. In this 
hypothetical the otherwise concomitant effect has figured as a reason 
for Daniel's deciding to act as he does and thus constitutes a directly 
intended effect of his activity. 
(v) the empirically certain effect must be a contingent (and not a 
conceptual) effect of the agent's activity aimed at something else: ` 
i. e. a separate and distinct effect from that aimed at. It is because 
the two effects are separate and distinct that it is possible for the 
directly intended result to occur without the occurrence of the 
empirically certain result. 
(vi) the agent must contemplate the empirically certain effect of his 
activity aimed at something else, but it is not necessary that he assess 
accurately the degree of probability. If he fails to allude to the 
empirically certain effect he will be liable on other grounds. ' 
(vii) it is necessary that the concomitant effect be brought about by 
the agent's activity before we may ascribe liability to him in relation 
to it. Thus where D aims at effect x in the knowledge that empirically 
certain effect y may follow, and is successful in bringing x about but y 
is prevented by extraneous agency, ' we ought not convict D with an 
attempt at y although we may convict him of bringing x about with direct 
intention. More on this below. ' 
(viii) a final and crucial feature of concomitant intention is that the 
untoward and empirically certain effect must be such that, in the nature 
of things, it must follow upon the effect at which the agent's activity 
is directed subject to some difference or change in the existing facts 
or circumstances as the agent perceives them to be at the time of 
his 
activity. ' For the purpose of discussion it would be convenient to apply 
shorthand to the proviso in italics and I shall use the phrase 
'extraneous agency'. Empirical certainty is thus constituted 
by the 
formula "if x in c then y in c, subject to extraneous agency" 
(where c 
represents the facts and circumstances perceived by the agent as 
he 
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carries out his activity aimed at x). An illustration would be useful. 
Suppose that D, on board a plane in flight, shoots the pilot dead. There 
is no co-pilot aboard and the plane crashes killing most passengers and 
crew. D survives. Here D directly intends the pilot's death and he 
concomitantly intends the death of the rest of the crew and passengers 
since those deaths must occur subject to a change in circumstances from 
those perceived by him at the time of his activity. ' This feature of 
concomitant intention is important and deserves a detailed discussion. 
Extraneous Agency. 
The concept of 'extraneous agency' has been alluded to indirectly in the 
case law. In Moloney`' Lord Bridge insisted on the need for a 'moral 
certainty"' for liability for an intention: a probability which is 
"little short of overwhelming" and an act that "will lead to a certain 
event unless something unexpected supervenes to prevent it". '' Of course 
Lord Bridge is here defining the limits of intention at current law but 
my submission is that this dictum at least comes close to my concept of 
concomitant intention which is constituted by foresight of certainty 
subject to some change or difference in the existing facts or 
circumstances as the agent perceives them to be. 
Professor Williams indirectly alludes to 'extraneous agency' when 
discussing 'certainty' generally. '- He says that 
"(w)hen one speaks of the unwanted consequence as being 'certain' 
one does not, of course, mean certain. 'Nothing is certain save 
death and taxes'. For example, a person who would otherwise have been 
the victim of the criminal's act may be warned in time or 
providentially happen to change his plans, and so escape what might 
have otherwise been his fate. Certainty in human affairs means 
certainty as a matter of common sense - certainty apart from 
unforeseen events or remote possibilities". 13 
Note that Professor Williams talks of unforeseen events and remote 
possibilities. My proposed concept of concomitant intention includes 
extraneous agency whether foreseen or not, " or of any degree of 
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possibility. This is I think right. If an agent directs activity at :: 
realising that empirically certain y may also be brought about and on 
the facts and in the circumstances extraneous agency is very likely, the 
fact that intervention is likely as opposed to remote does not change 
the fact that y is certain to follow x unless that very likely 
intervention does take place. Take my hypothetical of D who shoots the 
pilot as an illustration here. Suppose that at the time of his exertion 
which kills the pilot D is aware that the co-pilot is elsewhere on the 
plane and will take over control when made aware of the situation. 
Unfortunately the sudden downward thrust of the aircraft causes the co- 
pilot to bang his head against a bulkhead. He becomes unconscious and 
the plane crashes killing most members of crew and passengers. D 
survives. On my proposed model of intention D directly intends the death 
of the pilot and concomitantly intends the death of the passengers since 
a circumstance at the time of his activity (an aircraft in flight 
without a competent operator) must bring the deaths about unless there 
is a change in that circumstance which, on the facts, was likely 
although it did not in fact take place. 
Note that it is sufficient for liability that the agent appreciates that 
the untoward and empirically certain effect may'`= follow upon his 
activity. Thus if in our illustration of aunt Matilda's orchid Daniel 
considers the death of the orchid as a possible side-effect of his 
activity (as opposed to an objective certainty subject to extraneous 
agency) and he fails to allude to the fact that aunt might intervene we 
may hold him liable for the damage on the basis of concomitant 
intention. 
But what is the position where the agent performs activity in the 
wrongful belief that the empirically certain effect will not be brought 
about, or does not allude to that effect, because he is mistaken 
concerning one or more facts or circumstances of the case? Suppose for 
example that a free-fall team are in an aircraft in flight. D pushes his 
friend V through the 'jump' exit before everything is ready, believing 
that V is wearing his parachute. In fact V is wearing a ruck sack which 
looks very much like a parachute pack. V falls to 
his death. It is 
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submitted here that D does not concomitantly intend V's death since 
there is no possibility of the empirically certain death on the facts or 
In the circumstances as D perceives them to be. I shall argue in chapter 
7 that D is guilty of bringing about V's death by gross negligence 
unless he can successfully plead the excluding proviso (which on the 
facts is a fair possibility). 
Extraneous agency is a crucial feature of the concept of concomitant 
intention since it sets the concept apart from direct intention'- and 
recklessness. " The concept is distinct from direct intention since the 
minimum mental state for the latter is constituted by foresight of a 
conceptually certain effect, i. e. an indivisible effect which must 
follow upon the agent's activity aimed at something else without 
qualification. The concept is distinct from recklessness since the 
maximum mental state for the latter is constituted by foresight of a 
risk which is in fact virtually certain to occur. " The concept of 
concomitant intention is thus a separate and distinct form of mens rea 
which provides a clear demarcation between direct intention and 
recklessness. 
It would be useful to illustrate the distinction between concomitant 
intention and the most serious form of recklessness (foresight of 
virtual certainty). Suppose that D, throws a small explosive device into 
a crowd at a football match with the intention of publicising some 
cause. He does not intend to kill or injure any person but he realises 
that injury is virtually certain. Suppose also that D,. throws a concrete 
post from a motorway bridge directly into the path of a fast approaching 
car. His plan is to merely frighten the driver but he realises that if 
the driver does not take evasive action there will be impact and the 
driver will be injured. The case of D, involves 'virtual certainty'. We 
cannot say that any supporter is going to be injured - the dangerous 
situation has been created and it is a matter of waiting to see the 
upshot. An injury may or may not be sustained. The case of D2 involves 
my concept of concomitant intention. Here the injury must occur unless 
there is some change in the circumstances as he perceives 
them to be 
(e. g. the driver alters course in order to evade the 
impact or a tyre 
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bursts and the vehicle changes course). Unless that change in 
circumstance takes place then the anticipated effect will occur. 
Where would Lord Hailsham's instance of the aircraft saboteur fit into 
the proposed model of intention? In ft= v D. P. P. 'I- he says 
"a man may desire to blow up an aircraft in flight in order to 
obtain insurance moneys. But if any passengers are killed he is 
guilty of murder as their death will be a moral certainty if he 
carries out his intention. There is no difference between the 
blowing up of the aircraft and intending the death of some or all of 
the passengers". 
Two issues are worthy of note in deliberating upon the question. First 
one might say that whether D directly or concomitantly causes the deaths 
is dependant upon the event description we wish to apply to the 
saboteur's case. Would we wish to describe his act as the blowing up of 
an aircraft in flight or blowing up a plane load of people in flight? If 
we apply, and are right in applying, the latter description to his 
activity then we might say that he directly intends the destruction of 
the aircraft &ad, the deaths of the passengers: on that reasoning the 
hypothetical represents a case of direct intention. Second, one should 
note that Lord Hailsham restricted the extension of direct intention to 
"the means as well as the end and the inseparable consequences of the 
end as well as the means". "--' I think that the learned Law Lord's phrase 
'moral certainty' in his former statement equates with empirical 
certainty; but his latter statement appears to restrict Lord Hailsham's 
view of the extended meaning of intention to cases of conceptual 
certainty. Lord Hailsham does not thus make a distinction between 
'empirical' and 'conceptual certainty'. =° 
I am inclined to the view that, provided D does not aim at the deaths of 
the passengers, Lord Hailsham's hypothetical is one of direct intention 
on the basis of conceptual certainty. Suppose that the terrorists who 
planted the bomb which exploded on board the 'Pan Am' jumbo jet which 
came to grief over Lockerbie claimed that they only intended the 
destruction of the plane and not the death of passengers. I would submit 
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that in such a case serious injury or death is indivisible from the 
directly intended effect of their activity and that to intend one is to 
intend the other. 21 
We may obtain instances of empirical certainty from the case law. In the 
case of Miss Christina Ediunds, heard at the Central Criminal Court on 
January 15th 1872,11 D fell in love with the family doctor and, she 
alleged, had an intimate relationship with him. She placed strycnine 
into some chocolates and handed one to the doctor's wife, V,. She spat 
it out but became quite ill. She and her husband agreed that D had tried 
to poison V, and the doctor broke off all relations with her. In an 
attempt to prove to the doctor that she was innocent of criminal intent 
she claimed that poisoned chocolates from some other source were 
circulating in town. To back up her claim she obtained chocolates from 
shops, impregnated them with strycnine, and returned them to the shops 
on a particular pretext. A small child, V2, ate a poisoned chocolate and 
died. D was charged with and, since the evidence against her was 
overwhelming, 2=' she was convicted of murder. But D's intention was to 
(falsely) demonstrate her innocence and not to cause the death of any 
person. On the test of failure34 it is clear that D did not directly 
intend the death of the child since she would have been at least 
indifferent as to his fate. Yet one might say that death or injury was 
an inevitable result of D's act unless some change in the circumstances 
as perceived by her had taken place, for example the retailer had 
spotted that the box had been tampered with and removed the box from 
sale. The case thus falls within my definition of 'empirical certainty'. 
One should note that the mens rea of murder in 1872 included 
constructive malice so the task for the prosecution was more simple than 
that which is faced by the prosecution in murder trials today. 
What if 
Miss Edmunds had claimed that it had never crossed her mind that someone 
might buy and be injured or killed by eating the chocolates? 
In such a 
case the agent should be allowed to make the plea and 
if the jury are 
satisfied on the evidence that the thought had not crossed 
the 
defendant's mind then they ought to acquit of murder and convict of 
manslaughter on the basis of gross negligence. " 
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In Iob`6 D, in response to a police officer's signal to stop, slowed 
his vehicle down, but then accelerated and drove the car directly at the 
police officer who jumped aside thus avoiding certain impact. D's 
intention was simply to avoid detention but he must have contemplated 
death or injury as an inevitable accompaniment of his activity in the 
absence of some change in the circumstances (which in fact occurred). 
The case thus falls within the concept of empirical certainty. 
Professor Jackson is prepared to set Nobaa apart from Miss Edmunds on 
the ground that here it is the agent's own activity which is directly 
going to produce the consequence. 27 He does not think that anyone would 
possibly argue against the view that Mohan had the mens rea necessary 
for an attempt notwithstanding that an attempt always requires the 
highest degree of mens rea. Professor Jackson argues that if Mohan 
accelerated and drove his car directly at the police officer then how 
can one say that he had not decided to bring about the consequences? The 
learned author thinks that this is not a case of foresight of certainty 
at all: Mohan did not decide to bring about the mere acceleration of the 
car - he decided to bring about the injury to the officer. Professor 
Jackson thinks that extraneous agency (the possibility that the police 
officer may jump aside) is irrelevant to any decision as to whether 
Mohan had a direct intention to knock him down. He concludes that Mohan 
desired to injure the police officer and decided to do so even though in 
the abstract he would not normally either wish or decide to injure 
police officers. 
There is support for Professor Jackson's contention in the case law. In 
Pemr=n`e the court concluded that if an agent drives straight at a 
police officer at high speed, a jury is likely to conclude that he 
intended to injure a police officer and maybe cause him serious bodily 
harm. I would ask what form of intention the court in Pearman had in 
mind. I have pointed out- that the courts have applied several meanings 
to the concept of intention; the one used in Mohan involving 
"a decision to bring about, in so far as it lies within the 
accused's power, the commission of the offence which 
it is alleged 
the accused attempted to commit". 
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It is submitted that whilst a court or jury might conclude on the 
evidence that the defendant in the hypothetical posited in Pearman 
intended to cause injury to the police officers they are not obliged to 
do so on the facts. They are entitled to acquit if they are not 
satisfied that he was trying to injure them. If the defendant genuinely 
claims that he did not intend to injure the police officers but knew 
that they would be injured if they did not take evasive action then the 
case is one of foresight of certain injury subject to some change in the 
existing circumstances as the agent perceives them to be. I do not agree 
that Mohan either decided to or desired to injure the police officer. He 
decided to and desired to escape apprehension. Smith and Hogan allude to 
the dictum in Pearman and suggest that the problem remains that the 
notion of attempt requires an intended result. ý"°' If we apply the test of 
failure to Mohan's case I feel we would conclude that Mohan would not 
have felt that his enterprise had been in some way frustrated by the 
police officer's evading impact: on the contrary he would no doubt have 
been relieved to find that he had effected his escape without injury to 
another. 
On my structure of intention we may say that Mohan had concomitant 
intention to injure a police officer since he anticipated some harm 
which, since he was driving towards his victim, was certain to flow from 
his activity subject to some change in the circumstances as he (rightly) 
perceived them to be. This enables us to charge him with the substantive 
offence on the basis of concomitant intention but to exclude him from 
liability for an attempt if we wish to restrict that offence to direct 
intention. As I point out below31 we may provide for liability where the 
concomitant effect is not brought about by charging the agent with a 
specific substantive offence in relation to the proscribed harm in issue 
(e. g. endangering life). 
My proposed structure of intention thus comprises two distinct mental 
states, namely direct intention and concomitant intention. 
The 
separation of the two distinct mental states provides machinery 
for the 
legislature, when enacting new legislation, to restrict 
the notion of 
intention where it feels appropriate. For where the 
legislature feels 
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that liability should attach only in respect of harm which is aimed at 
or is a conceptually certain effect of the agent's activity, it may 
achieve its purpose by including only direct intention as the requisite 
mental state in the definition of the offence. Where, in addition, 
Parliament wishes to attribute blame for anticipated empirically certain 
side-effects it may include both species of intention in the definition 
of the offence. The concept of concomitant intention is thus equivalent 
to the current law concept of oblique intention, although much more 
narrow. One might ask why I do not simply use the phrase 'oblique 
intention' instead of concomitant intention. I would comment that 
oblique intention dates back to BenthanP2 and his model includes 
foresight of likelihood and is thus too wide for the purpose. Also I 
think the judges and theorists have 'played the concertina' with that 
expression to the extent that its precise boundaries are far from clear. 
The newly created mental state of concomitant intention provides us with 
a definition which is precise. 
Most if not all judges and commentators would accept the contours of 
concomitant intention as falling within intention but one might object 
that my notion of concomitant intention is markedly narrow; that its 
substance is too thin to justify its existence apart from direct 
intention and that there is thus no ground for the division of intention 
into the proposed two species for the purpose of ascribing mental states 
to the agent who has brought about proscribed harm. But I would uphold 
the distinction between direct and concomitant intention on four 
grounds. 
First, whilst the concept is admittedly thin in substance it is 
conceptually distinct from both direct intention and recklessness and 
thus forms an effective boundary between the two major species of mans 
rea. The courts would thus no longer be able to extend the contours of 
intention to include the most serious types of recklessness-33 
Second, we may wish to mark the distinction between the two species in 
specific substantive offences. In order to illustrate the point let us 
take a variant of Mahan in which Di's car strikes the police officer 
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and causes serious injury to him. On current law D, has brought about 
the injury with intention to do so. Now suppose that D2., driving in his 
car, sees a police officer on point duty and drives towards him at speed 
intending to cause him serious harm and in fact does so. On current law 
D2 has brought about the injury with intention to do so. In both cases 
the agents ought to be guilty of the substantive offence under s. 18 of 
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 but, it is submitted, there is 
a significant difference in the moral culpability which obtains in each 
case. The proposed concept of concomitant intention enables us to draw 
out this significant moral distinction. We may convict D2 of an offence 
under s. 18 with direct intention to do so and D, with the same offence 
by way of concomitant intention. We thus indicate in the conviction that 
D, (unlike D2) was not aiming at the proscribed concomitant harm but 
foresaw it as possible to some degree. 
Third, I think that we ought to preserve the distinction between direct 
and concomitant intention in relation to attempts. For since an 
empirically certain consequence y is distinct from the directly intended 
consequence x aimed at by the agent, one cannot say that he attempts 
harm y as he attempts but fails to bring about harm x. My view is that 
in such a case the agent should be convicted of an attempt at x 
simpliciter. We may achieve this by restricting the mens rea of attempts 
to direct intention. The same argument may be put forward concerning the 
case where D succeeds in bringing x about but empirically certain 
consequence y is prevented by supervening agency. 
A variant of a hypothetical case posited by Professor Williams" will 
serve to illustrate my point. Suppose that D, and V are walking together 
on a bridge over a road. They see a diamond ring lying on the floor half 
way across and close to the edge of the bridge at a point where there is 
no safety barrier, and, realising that the other might lay claim to it 
first, each runs forward. They are running side by side and D, realises 
that V will be pushed off the bridge and fall 150 feet to his death 
unless he (D, ) slows down. But in his determination to reach the ring 
first he decides to keep running. V is forced off the bridge but some 
recently erected scaffolding breaks his fall and he sustains only minor 
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injury. 'r- In this case D, sees V's death as an empirically certain 
effect of his activity which is aimed at reaching the ring before V 
does. Should we count D, as attempting to murder V? Surely not; for 
although D, 's activity is reprehensible in the light of his attitude to 
the safety of V he ought not to be equated in terms of moral status with 
the agent D4 who, aiming to kill, shoots at V to stop him getting the 
ring but his shot misses. If the proscribed harm occurs we may mark the 
distinction in moral status by charging D, with the commission of the 
substantive offence with concomit4nt intention and D2 with the 
substantive offence with direct intention. Where the proscribed harm 
does not ensue we mark the difference by charging Dz with an attempt at 
the substantive offence and D, either with no offence or with a specific 
substantive offence concerning the risk to which he has exposed his 
victim.: B7 
One might object to this claim on the ground that if D, in the above 
illustration is to be excluded from liability for an attempt at the 
empirically certain consequence on the the basis that he is not aiming 
at it then surely we must also excuse the agent D: -: whose activity has 
failed to bring about the directly intended effect and thus the 
conceptually certain effect of his activity since he, too, is not aiming 
at that effect. Two comments may be made on the objection. First, unlike 
an empirically certain effect which is quite distinct from the effect 
aimed at, a conceptually certain effect is indivisible from the effect 
which informs the agent's decision to act as he does. On this basis to 
intend one effect is to intend the other and the agent has direct 
intention in respect of each effect. D: is thus guilty of an attempt at 
the conceptually certain effect of his activity where his exertion fails 
to bring about the effect which informs his decision to act. Second, in 
punishing for attempts we are punishing the agent for what he is aiming 
to bring about by his activity. If we convict the agent of an attempt 
concerning untoward and empirically certain harm then we are treating 
his activity in relation to that harm as intended when it is not, and, 
as Clarkson and Keating properly point out 
"if one wishes to punish for something less than intention, 
then one 
should name that 'something' and be explicit that it 
is rendering 
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the defendant liable to the same extent as if he had the requisite 
intent ion" . ; 39 
I am in agreement with the learned authors and would suggest the 
strategy to apply here is the creation of new offences to cover failure 
of concomitantly intended harm. Where, for example, the death of others 
is an empirically certain consequence of the agent's activity if his 
directly intenled consequence is brought about then we may, for example, 
charge him with endangering life in relation to the empirically certain 
consequence of his activity. ý'y This strategy maintains a central 
subjectivist notion that we ought to record the agent's criminality with 
precision since we charge him with an attempt at the directly intended 
consequence which he fails to bring about4c' and with a substantive 
offence which accurately reflects the failed empirically certain harm 
which he contemplated in some degree. The strategy would also maintain 
the objectivist notion that the agent who has done everything necessary 
to bring about the directly intended effect ought to be liable for an 
effect which would certainly have followed that effect had the agent 
bk irr 
been successful in his activity ýýt to extraneous agency. 
A fourth use which we might wish to make of the separate concept of 
concomitant intention would be to mark the moral distinction between the 
agent who fails to allude to a conceptually certain effect of his 
activity and the agent who fails to allude to an empirically certain 
effect of his activity. One might wish to count the agent who has failed 
to allude to a conceptually certain effect of his activity as directly 
intending that effect on the ground that the two consequences are 
indivisible and that to intend one is to intend the other. However one 
might be prepared to hold the agent who fails to allude to an 
empirically certain effect of his activity as less culpable since that 
effect is distinct and separate from the effect directly intended and 
thus less conspicuous. I would accept that the distinction is marginal 
but the separate concept of concomitant intention would allow 
the 
distinction to be drawn. Of course, if we exclude the agent from 
liability for intention in relation to the unforeseen empirically 
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certain effect of his activity he will nonetheless be liable for that 
effect on other grounds. 41 
One crucial aspect of the proposed model of intention, whether direct or 
concomitant, is that it relates to an effect which, as he reads it, the 
agent's exertion may itself produce. This temporal dimension to the 
concept means that we cannot treat as intended any consequence towards 
which the agent directs preliminary activity but which is not itself 
capable of being produced by that activity. In the next chapter I offer 
two new models of wens rea which extend liability to prospective 
offences towards which a perpetrated actus reus is a necessary 
preliminary. 11 
Given that concomitant intention represents indirect intention on my 
structure of intention, to what extent is it in harmony with the 
contours of indirect intention in the current criminal law? This 
question leads to a discussion of the case law as it relates to indirect 
intention. 
Indirect (or oblique) intention at current law is constituted by 
contemplation of the possibility, in some degree, of a particular 
consequence of one's activity which is untoward in the sense that one is 
not aiming to bring that consequence about. There seems to be general 
consensus that some form of contemplation of untoward harm should count 
as having been brought about intentionally but there has been much 
judicial and academic discord concerning the boundaries of indirect 
intention. It would be useful to discuss the cases and material by way 
of headings. 
1. Contemplation by the reasonable man of the natural consequences of 
the agent's activity. 
There is authority to the effect that an agent intends the natural 
consequences of his activity. In Rv Smith 4" Viscount Kilmuir, talking 
of intention in murder, concluded that 
"the sole question is whether the unlawful act was of such a kind 
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that grievous bodily harm was a natural and probable result. The 
only test available for this is what the ordinary responsible 
man ... would have contemplated as the natural and probable result". 
Viscount Kilmuir was thus prepared to hold as intentional any result 
which is a natural consequence of an agent's act provided only that that 
consequence was foreseeable by the reasonable man. But what do we mean 
by the term 'natural consequence'? I think that there are two possible 
answers. First the expression may include those consequences which 
actually flow in an unbroken chain from the agent's initial activity. 
This definition includes consequences which do not normally flow from 
activity such as that carried out by the agent. The sole issue is then 
would the ordinary man have contemplated the consequence as a natural 
consequence generally. A second meaning is those consequences which, in 
the nature of things normally flow from the initial activity. This 
definition is more restricted than the first since it excludes those 
untoward consequences which the ordinary man might contemplate but not 
expect to flow from such activity. Thus if a consequence which has 
flowed from an unbroken chain from D's initial activity is not a 
consequence which one normally expects to follow such activity then it 
is not a natural consequence on the second definition and cannot thus 
rank as intended on Viscount Kilmuir's judgment. Either interpretation 
of 'natural consequences' involves 'foresight by the reasonable man'. 
The decision in Snith is thus objectionable since it brings into the 
realms of intention a large chunk of the concept of recklessness. " I 
have argued above that the minimum mental state for intention ought to 
be foresight of an empirically certain effect of one's activity. I shall 
argue below that contemplation of probability short of certainty belongs 
in the realm of recklessness. " 
The decision in Smith was the subject of much academic criticism which 
led to the passage of s. 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 which states 
that a court or jury in determining whether a person has committed an 
offence 
"a) shall not be bound to infer that he intended or foresaw a result 
of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and 
probable consequence of those actions; but 
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b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by 
reference to all the evidence drawing such inferences from the 
evidence as appear proper in the circumstances". 
Since the passage of s. 8 there has been little support for the claim that 
an agent intends the natural consequences of his act whether he has 
foreseen such consequences or not. It is interesting to note that in 
y4 Lord Bridge, whilst insisting upon direct intention as the 
sole mens rea requirement of murder, suggested that foresight (by the 
defendant) of the natural consequences of his act may be taken by the 
jury as evidence of his intention in relation to those consequences. He 
used the phrase 'natural consequence' in the sense of probability little 
short of overwhelming. It should be noted that Lord Bridge uses the 
phrase in connection with evidence of intention and he does not thus 
take us back to the situation as defined in Smith. In Ha cw Lord 
Scarman agreed that the mental state in murder is intention and that 
foresight belongs to the realm of evidence. However he objected to the 
phrase 'natural consequence' as the criterion for evidence of intention 
since it does not take account of the accused's assessment of 
probability which, in cases of murder at least, is of critical 
importance. Lord Scarman went on to posit a test for evidence of 
intention couched in terms of probability and likelihood which was 
interpreted in Hedrick47 to mean that the jury can infer intention where 
the proscribed harm in issue is known by the defendant to be a virtually 
certain consequence of his activity. It seems that for the present at 
least we have heard the last of contemplation of natural consequences as 
a species of intention. 
2. Contemplation by the agent that his activity might possibly bring 
about the untoward harm. 
There have been one or two authorities which regard such contemplation 
as a species of intention. In 1i11. er4 Lord Diplock thought 
that 
recognition of the existence of 'some risk'of the consequence occurring 
amounted to an intention in respect of that consequence. 
Lord Diplock 
thus admits a fairly low level of foresight into 
the structure of 
intention. Also in the Law of South Africa "legal intention in respect 
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of a consequence consists of foresight on the part of the accused that 
the consequence may possibly occur coupled with a recklessness as to 
whether it does or not". °1-' 
3. Contemplation by the agent that his activity is likely to bring 
about the untoward consequence. 
In Hardy v Iifotor Insurers' Bureaus`' the issue before the Court of Appeal 
was the meaning of 'intent to do grievous bodily harm' under s. 18 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Lord Denning considered that the 
question for the jury was 
"(i)s the evidence so strong that we are satisfied that he, the 
accused man, must himself have been aware that grievous bodily harm 
was likely to result? "" 
In H2 Lord Diplock stated obiter that 
"there is no distinction in English law between the state of mind 
of one who does an act because he desires it to produce a particular 
evil consequence and the state of mind of one who does an act 
knowing full well that it is likely to produce that consequence" 
although it was not the object he was seeking to achieve by doing 
that act. What is common to both states of mind is willingness to 
produce the particular evil consequence: and this, in my wiew, is 
the mens rea needed to satisfy a requirement ... that in order to 
constitute the offence with which the accused is charged he must 
have acted with 'intent' to produce a particular evil 
consequence". a te 
Lord Kilbrandon concurred with Lord Diplock stating that intention in 
murder includes knowledge by the accused that death was a "likely 
consequence of the acts and was indifferent whether that consequence 
followed or not". 
Theorists who accept contemplation of likelihood as a species of 
intention include Bentham. sE, and Cross. S7 Lord Denning accepted the view 
in his Lionel Cohen lecture. " 
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There are, however, dicta which deny foresight of likelihood as a 
species of intention. In fie" D was charged on Count 2 with 
attempting by wanton driving to cause bodily harm to a police officer. 
The judge directed the jury that it was not necessary to prove an 
intention to cause bodily harm; it was sufficient that D drove wantonly, 
realising that such wanton driving would be likely to cause bodily harm. 
D was convicted and appealed. James L. J. considered the parameters of 
mens rea in relation to attempts and said 
"(e)vidence of knowledge of likely consequences, or from which 
knowledge of likely consequences can be inferred, c-° is evidence by 
which intent may be established but it is not, in relation to the 
offence of attempt, to be equated with intent. If the jury find such 
knowledge established they may and, using commonsense, they probably 
will find intent proved, but it is not the case that they must do 
so, '. 
Most theorists reject likelihood of consequences as a species of 
intention. '' One reason for rejection concerns the difficulties for 
the Jury in ascertaining the precise level of contemplation which 
amounts to likelihood. Professor Smith points out that Lord Reid, in a 
civil case, E2 talked of the test for breach of contract as whether the 
loss was "not unlikely" to occur, explaining the phrase as "a degree of 
probability considerably less than an even chance but nevertheless not 
very unusual and easily foreseeable". ': --: ' Williams asks of the expression 
'likely' 
"(w)hat does (the word) imply? Some would feel that it is a stronger 
word than 'probable', implying say a 66 per cent chance. Others may 
feel that it is not so strong, and that it would be satisfied by a 
33 per cent chance. If the word is used in a legal rule to refer to 
the degree of possibility, then surely we need to have some 
agreement upon the degree, at least upon its order of magnitude". " 
Austin takes the expression as any degree of probability in excess of 
even probability that the untoward harm will occur. 6s Austin': concept 
of intention is echoed by Lord Denning. " An interesting point here is 
that if 'likely' involves probability in excess of even probability and 
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'unlikely' means probability below even probability then just where does 
even probability stand in relation to the notion of likelihood? 
4. Contemplation by the agent that his activity will probably bring 
about the untoward harm. 
In Lang v Lane 7 the Privy Council considered whether the appellant had 
intended to cause his wife to leave the matrimonial home. Their 
Lordships decided that 
" (i) f the husband knows the proba b1 e resul t of his act", and 
persists in them, in spite of warning that the wife will be 
compelled to leave the matrimonial home ... that is enough however 
passionately he may desire that she should remain". 
In Chandler v D. P. P. 1ý"` Lord Devlin considered the word 'purpose' and 
decided that 
"(a) purpose must exist in the mind-The word can be used to 
designate either the main object which a man wants or hopes to 
achieve by the contemplated act, or it can be used to designate 
those objects which he knows will probably be achieved by the act? 
whether he wants them or not. I am satisfied that in the criminal 
law in general, and in this statute in particular" its ordinary 
sense is the latter one". 
Lord Reid, in interpreting 'purpose' said 
"(t)he accused both Intended and desired that the base should be 
immobilised for a time, and I cannot construe purpose in any sense 
that does not include that state of mind" 
Lord Devlin concurred with parts of Lord Reid's speech and did not 
dissent on the meaning of purpose. One might thus argue that the House 
in Chand ler accepted that intention includes foresight of probability. 
In $ya Lord Cross of Chelsea, in deciding upon whether foresight of 
high probability was a sufficient element for intention in murder 
concluded 73 
"I think that the only criticism which can be directed against 
Ackner J's summing up is that by the insertion of the word 'highly' 
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before 'probable' it was unduly favourable to the appellant". -7, t 
In Lynch v D. P. P. for Northern Ireland'"" Lord Simon, dealing with an 
appeal against a conviction for murder considered, obiter, the offence 
of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm and said that 
"(t)he actus reus is the wounding and the ... wens rea ... is (inter 
alia) that the accused foresaw that the victim would as a result of 
the act probably be wounded "715, such a way as to result in serious 
injury to hid'. 
However in Belfcaill the Court of Appeal, dealing with a case of wounding 
with intent, came to a contrary conclusion, In the instant case the 
trial judge directed the jury 
"(a) person intends the consequences of his voluntary act in each 
of two quite separate cases ... secondly when he foresees that they 
are likely to follow from his act but he commits the act recklessly 
irrespective of appreciating that these results will follow". 
Belfon appealed against his subsequent conviction and the Court of 
Appeal stated that 
"(t)here is certainly no authority that recklessness can constitute 
an intention to do grievous bodily harm. Adding the concept of 
recklessness to foresight not only does not assist but will 
inevitably confuse the jury. Foresight and recklessness are evidence 
from which intent may be inferred but they cannot be equated either 
separately or in conjunction with intent to do grievous bodily 
harm! '. 7° 
The Court of Appeal thus denied that foresight of probability (or 
likelihood, the expression chosen by trial judge, ) is an element of the 
concept of intention. 
Judge Buzzard accepts that the concept of intention includes 
consequences which the agent foresees as a probable result of his 
activity, except for the inchoate offence which he accepts requires 
direct intention. 79 
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There has been some support for 'probability' as a constituent of 
'intention' by the jurists. The minority of the Law Commission's 
Working Party$° reported that "a person intends an event not only (a) 
when his purpose is to cause that event but also (b) when he foresees 
that the event will probably result from his conduct". 
Austin is prepared to equate 'probability' with intention. He writes 
"when you shoot at Styles, I am talking with him and am standing 
close by him. And from the position in which I stand with regard to 
the person you aim at, you think it not unlikely that you may kill 
me in your attempt to kill him. You fire and kill me accordingly. 
Now here you intend my death without desiring it ... since you 
contemplate my death as a probable consequencee' of your act, you 
intend my death although you desire it not". 82- 
Lord Devlin has said that where a man has decided that certain 
consequences would probably happen, then "for the purposes of the law he 
intended them to happen". *: ':! ' But there are those who reject 'probability' 
as a species of intention. Williams points out the difficulty in 
specifying just what constitutes the notion. He writes 
"(t)he word ... is generally taken to include something beyond bare 
possibility and less than certainty; I think that most people would 
say that it implies at least a 50 per cent chance". " 
In his review of the terms 'probable' and 'likely' he says 
"(t)here is no agreed mathematical translation of 'probable', and 
all we can say about 'likely' is that it may cover a lower degree of 
probability than 'probable' (though dictionaries make them both the 
same). In statistics 'probability' means the whole range of 
possibility between impossibility and certainty ... 'Chance' 
is a 
non-technical synonym for probability, as also is 'risk' (the chance 
of the untoward event). Popular 'probability' means substantial 
chance, but no one knows whether this means a probability of at 
least 
. 34, . 51 (more likely 
than not), . 67, . 
80 or what. It could mean 
something less than those figures. Even if there were an Act of 
Parliament saying that probability in law means probability of 
(say) 
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. 51, the jury would 
have great difficulty in adjudicating the issue 
unless evidence were presented of elaborate experiments to determine 
the probability". ms's 
With respect to Professor Williams I would argue against the view that 
we should not use 'probability' merely because we cannot determine its 
boundaries precisely. To accept the view would lead to difficulties in 
several other significant areas of criminal law. For example just what 
is 'grievous' in grievous bodily harm? I do not think that it is too 
vague to talk in terms of 'really serious harm' here. Nor do I think 
that it is too vague to talk of foreseeing a consequence as being "more 
likely than not". 'F I shall argue later that we can distinguish between 
'gross' and 'simple' recklessness and that distinction may be drawn in 
terms of a consequence which is more likely than not to flow from the 
agent's activity. `' However I would wish to dissociate myself from the 
view that 'probability' is a constituent part of intention for reasons 
stated below. "'e 
5. Contemplation by the agent of the high probability that his activity 
will bring about the untoward consequence. 
Some judges are prepared to allow as a constituent part of intention 
foresight by the agent that a particular change in the world is a highly 
probable consequence of his activity. This particular mental state was 
the one at issue in Hyam. c"1 In that case the point of law before the 
House of Lords was whether 'malice aforethought in the crime of murder 
(is) established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that when doing the 
act which led to the death of another the accused knew it was highly 
probable that that act would result in death or serious bodily harm'. 
Viscount Dilhorne said that 
"a man may do an act with a number of intentions. If he does it 
deliberately and intentionally, knowing when he does it that it is 
highly probable that grievous bodily harm will result, `° I think 
most people would say and be justified in saying, that whatever 
other intentions he may have as well, he at least intended grievous 
bodily harm". 
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Lord Kilbrandon agreed with Viscount Dilhorne. Lord Diplock was prepared 
to accept a lesser mental state as a requisite mental state for murjer, 
namely foresight of 'likelihood'. " Lord Cross of Chelsea was prepared 
to accept foresight of 'mere probability' as a requisite mental state 
for intention in murder. The House thus affirmed the question and, until 
Hyam was overruled, foresight of high probability formed a part of the 
concept of intention as it applied to murder. 
I will argue against foresight of probability belowP2 but would comment 
on the decision on $y-min here. The question before the House concerned 
malice aforethought and not intention. Now malice is a special mental 
state quite distinct from intention and generally includes intention and 
subjective foresight of the risk of proscribed harm. " Stephen had in 
fact defined malice aforethought for the purpose of murder as Including 
"knowledge that the act which causes death will probably cause the 
death". 4II It is submitted therefore that their Lordships' statements 
concerning probability and intention where obiter since the issue of 
just what constitutes intention was not before them. I would further 
submit that since the decisions in y, lc- Hancocky1=" and Iedrick'ý'7 
(which overrule Hyam) talk in terms of intention only the time is right 
to abolish the concept of malice aforethought in murder and replace it 
with intention. 
In Hardy v Motor Insurer's Bureau"'e" Pearson L. J. thought that a man who 
foresees that his act "will in all probabili typ'" injure another person 
intends to injure that person". 
However there have been dicta against the proposition that foresight of 
high probability is a constituent of intention. In Hmm 10° Lord Hailsham 
stated that 
"I do not ... consider ... 
that the fact that a state of affairs is 
correctly foreseen as a highly probable consequence of what was done 
is the same thing as the fact that the state of affairs is 
intended". 
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For the theorists Brett uses the phrase 'highly probable' when setting 
the limits of the concept of intention. '"' 
6. Contemplation by the agent with no substantial doubt that a 
particular consequence will flow from his activity. '"2 
The proponent of this level of foresight as a minimum constituent of 
'intention' insists that the agent must have foreseen as near certain 
the probability of the consequence of his activity before we may 
describe his activity as intentional. The Law Commission have offered 
this level of foresight as a species of intention, They suggest the 
following: 
"2(1). The standard test of intention is - did the person whose 
conduct is in issue either intend to produce the result or have no 
substantial doubt that his conduct would produce 
The reasoning behind The Law Commission's proposal is presumably that in 
cases in which the agent has no substantial doubt that a particular 
untoward harm will flow from his activity the risk is so high that we 
may count the agent's activity as intentional in relation to the harm. I 
shall argue later that this level of foresight is not sufficiently 
distinct from recklessness to enable us to count it as a species of 
intention. "'n I would point out here that acceptance of this mental 
state as intention presents problems for the law on attempts. Consider 
the case of D who acts intending to bring about x having no substantial 
doubt that he will also bring about untoward harm y. He is successful in 
relation to x but y does not occur. Can we convict D of the substantive 
offence regarding x and also an attempt regarding y? My submission is 
that the mental requirement for attempts is direct intention, that is a 
resolve by the agent that he, by his activity, bring about a specific 
change in the world. '°6 Now if we extend the concept of 'intention' to 
foresight of virtual certainty or 'no substantial doubt' then we must 
include D's foresight of y as intentional and hold him guilty of an 
attempt which seems wrong and is certainly not in accordance with 
current law on the subject. 
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If we would wish to count this category of foresight as intention and 
preclude it from the criminal law on attempts then we would need to 
distinguish between two separate categories of intention. This would 
enable us to distinguish between cases such as Cawthorne1os from cases 
in which the agent aims unsuccessfully to bring about a particular 
proscribed harm-"" It is worth noting here that the Law Commission has 
recognised that in some cases a more narrow definition of 'intention' 
might be appropriate and considers that attempts is an area in which the 
narrow definition should apply. 1de 
Glanville Williams restricts foresight in intention to cases where the 
consequence is virtually, practically or morally certain. He says 
"a person can be taken to intend a consequence that follows under 
his nose from what he continues to do, and the law should be the 
same where he is aware that a consequence in the future is the 
certain or practically certain result of what he does ... A 
consequence should normally be taken as intended although it was not 
desired, if it is foreseen by the actor as the virtually certain 
accompaniment of what was intended ... Clearly, one cannot confine 
the notion of foresight of certainty in the most absolute sense. It 
is a question of human certainty, This is still not the same as 
speaking in terms of probability". '"' 
Hart, too, argues that only foresight of virtual certainty should be 
admitted as a species of intention. He puts forward the case of RY 
Des n Barrett and Others"' where the defendant Barrett dynamited a 
prison wall in order to effect the escape of two Irish Fenians 
imprisoned there. Though the plot failed the explosion killed some 
persons living nearby. It was no part of Barrett's purpose or aim to 
kill or injure anyone but he was convicted on the ground that he foresaw 
their death or serious injury. Hart argues that 
"It is perhaps easy to understand why ... the 
law should neglect the 
difference between oblique and direct intention ... The reason 
is, I 
suggest, that both ... direct 
intention and ... oblique 
intention 
share one feature which any system of assigning responsibility 
for 
conduct must always regard as of crucial importance. 
This can be 
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seen if we compare the actual facts of the Desmond case with a case 
of direct intention. Suppose Barrett shot the prison guard to obtain 
from them (sic) the keys to release the prisoners. Both in the 
actual case and this imaginary variant, so far as Barrett had 
control over the alternative between the victim's dying or living 
his choice tipped the balance; in both cases he had control over and 
may be considered to have chosen the outcome since he consciously 
opted for a course leading to the victims' deaths. Whether he sought 
to achieve this as an end or a means to his end, or merely foresaw 
it as an unwelcome consequence of his intention, II ' is irrelevant at 
the stage of conviction where the question of control is crucial. 
However, when one comes to the question of sentence and the 
determination of the severity of the punishment it may be (though I 
am not sure that this is in fact the case) "2 that on both 
retributive and utilitarian theory of punishment the distinction 
between direct intention and oblique intention is relevant". " 3 
The italicised phraseology indicates, I think, that Hart is prepared to 
accept foresight of near certainty in his model of intention. But one 
might question Hart's choice of illustration here. Were Desmond and 
Barrett certain that they would cause death? Professor Hogan points out 
that, assuming Barrett was implicated in the explosion, it may be 
questioned whether he foresaw (the jury were instructed to apply the 
subjective test) that life was likely to be endangered. Barrett 
certainly believed that the two Fenians imprisoned behind the wall would 
not be injured since they would no doubt have been taking precautions 
against the expected explosion (they were in fact still in their cells 
at the time of the explosion). Professor Hogan concludes that whilst 
Barrett ought to have been aware of the risk to inhabitants the question 
of whether he did so may be questioned. "a 
In 1985 a group of distinguished lawyers (the Code Team, hereafter 
referred to as the Team) was approached by the Law Commission to 
deliberate and report upon how the general principles of criminal 
law 
might be enacted in legislative form. The Team, chaired by 
Professor 
Smith, suggested that a greater number of fault terms be used 
for the 
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purpose of ascribing criminal responsibility. '1s The ested 
definition of intention is as follows: - 
"a person acts 'intentionally' in respect of an element of an 
offence when he wants it to exist or occur, is aware that it exists 
or is almost certain that it exists or will exist or occur. ''E- 
The Team introduced the phrase 'almost certain' in place of the 'no 
substantial doubt' test suggested by the Law Commission' 7 on two 
grounds. First it is not inaccurate to claim that even one who has no 
state of mind in relation to a proscribed harm or state of affairs has 
no substantial doubt. Secondly difficulty might be had by the jury in 
considering whether they have no reasonable doubt that the defendant had 
no substantial doubt that something would occur or be the case. "' 
The Team's definition of intentional action brings into account 
intention as to circumstances. Thus if D attempts to have sexual 
intercourse with P, who does not consent, he is guilty of attempted rape 
only if he is aware, or is almost certain, that she does not consent. "I 
One should note that the team use Lord Hailsham's aircraft saboteur'2° 
as an illustration of their proposed structure of intention. It is 
submitted that the Team's definition of intention is to be preferred to 
the Law Commission's definition since it removes at least two objections 
to that definition. '2' However one may object to the structure of 
intention proposed by the Team on the ground that the concept of 'want' 
has no role to play in any ascription of intentional activity. This 
objection is dealt with in detail below-"' 
The six levels of foresight stated above are fairly representative of 
the positions taken by the various judges and jurists when setting the 
threshold between intention and recklessness. I should like to raise 
several objections to the inclusion of foresight of consequences to any 
degree short of certainty as a constituent element of the concept of 
intention. 
1. If the function of the criminal law is to signal society's 
condemnation of particular conduct then the concepts of blame utilised 
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should reflect as much as is possible the ordinary meaning which society 
assigns to them. Duff argues that 
"appeal to ordinary language should not be despised; not just 
because it may cause confusion if the law uses terms whose legal and 
extra-legal meanings differ radically; but because the term's 
ordinary usage reflects our moral understanding of its relevance to 
ascriptions of responsibility, and of those distinctions which we 
regard as morally significant. Thus if it is any part of the law's 
purpose to assign legal liability in accordance with moral 
responsibility, there must be a presumption in favour of preserving 
the ordinary meanings of the concepts through which responsibility 
is assigned". '"' 
On this point it should be noted that it is the ordinary man, as a 
juror, who must ultimately decide whether or not an agent intended a 
particular consequence of his activity. If intention is to bear a legal 
meaning markedly different from that recognised in ordinary discourse 
then the task of the jury is made that more difficult; a situation which 
was amply demonstrated by the proceedings at the trial of Hancock and 
Shankland. '124 It is just that confusion found by the jury in that case 
which the Court of Appeal had in mind when considering the appeal of 
Betfon. 12`' In the latter case D was convicted under s. 18 of the Of fences 
Against the Person Act 1861 and appealed on the ground that the trial 
judge had misdirected the jury on the meaning of intent within the 
section. Wein J., in allowing the appeal, said that 
"there is certainly no authority that recklessness can constitute an 
intent to do grievous bodily harm. Adding the concept of 
recklessness to foresight not only does not assist but will 
inevitably confuse the jury". 
And in Beer12 Lawton L. J. said that 
"(t)he realities of the case were that he either intended to cause 
her really serious injury or he did not. There was no other issue 
for the jury to consider". 
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There are one or two criticisms concerning the plea for ordinary 
language. One obvious comment is that there is not necessarily any 
settled or ordinary usage of the notion of intention - that in any event 
ordinary usage tends to be less precise and consistent than some kind of 
stipulative legal usage. I would respond that it is open to the criminal 
law to create a legal definition of intention which complies with what 
is considers to be the general understanding of that word. It would then 
be possible to cement that definition into the criminal law so that it 
acquires a stipulative usage. 
Professor Jackson questions the force of my contention that it is the 
ordinary man as a juror who must ultimately decide whether or not an 
agent intended a particular consequence of his activity. He claims that 
the legal system certainly pretends that it is true in the sense that it 
assumes that the ordinary person in the jury box, properly directed by a 
judge, actually goes through the analytical processes which the positive 
or dogmatic statements of the law require. Professor Jackson considers 
that intention is too abstract or philosophical a term to make it worth 
while to start asking what the ordinary usage of intention is. Drawing 
upon the psycological work of Bennet and Feldman, '"' he instead argues 
for an investigation into how the ordinary person would categorise a 
particular fact situation, for example murder. That becomes in one sense 
a question of the ordinary usage of the term murder which Professor 
Jackson thinks to be more reliable than the ordinary usage of the word 
intention. He distinguishes between narrative and conceptual models. He 
feels that the Juror is far more likely to ask himself whether the story 
which has been constructed in the court room sounds like his typical 
stories of murder to Justify labelling this story as murder or not. 
I would make a few comments on this view. 12e First, if the juror is 
going to justify conviction for murder on the story itself then he must 
surely base his decision on the morality of the case. Several factors 
combine to make 'the morality of the case' including the extent to which 
the agent was able to exercise control over his activity, the causal 
connection between his activity and the proscribed harm, external 
influences upon his activity, his attitude towards the occurrence of the 
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proscribed harm and so forth. One major factor here is surely his 
attitude to the fact of death. If the agent had aimed to kill his victim 
then the juror in Professor Jackson's commentary would treat the case a--- 
the paradigm of murder. Where the agent's attitude towards the risk of 
death or grievous bodily harm becomes less reprehensible the juror will 
at some point decide that it is no longer a story of murder but one of 
some lesser wrong. This leads to a second difficulty. Just where will 
the juror draw the line and decide that a particular story falls into a 
less (or more) serious offence? Again there will be several factors 
which will lead him to a decision but surely the agent's attitude 
towards the risk will play a central role, and that factor must include 
the concepts of intention, recklessness and so forth. Third, would not 
the stories of murder not register differently - perhaps markedly 
differently - between the jurors, leading to a rise in the the cases 
where jury cannot agree? Would some direction from bench be necessary? 
If so would not 'direct aim' and 'degree of foresight' necessarily 
figure prominently? In any event it would seem strange that our criminal 
law should put out a very detailed account of the varying mental states 
that constitute wens rea and then accept (perhaps insist) that the jury 
simply decide on guilt, or at least upon the mental state, on their own 
perceptions about the story as it unfolds. 
2. For the purpose of assessing criminal responsibility we use several 
distinct mental states which reflect differences in moral turpitude with 
which agents bring about proscribed harm. Sometimes we draw the line 
between distinct offences on the basis of these mental states (e. g. the 
offences under s. 18 and s. 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861) and in so doing we mark out clearly the moral turpitude which 
accompanied the agent's activity which brought about the actus reus of 
the offence. Now if the mental states are based upon distinctions in 
moral turpitude then I think it is necessary to reserve the most moral 
blameworthy state of mind to the most severe form of moral 
blame; that 
is intention. Now if we include some degree of foresight of probability 
as a species of intention then we fail to distinguish 
between 
significantly different forms of moral turpitude. We would, 
for example, 
convict of murder both the systematic killer who 
has direct intention 
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and the agent who embarks upon a non-fatal criminal enterprise in which 
he foresees that death or grievous bodily harm is probable to some 
degree. It is submitted that if we paint the concept of intention with a 
broad brush we run the serious risk that the attitude of society to 
crime generally might be adversely affected thereby. 'Y' Two cases, one 
on probability and one on virtual certainty, are illustrative here. 
In Cawthorn v H. II. Advocate':: "' D fired randomly into an occupied room. 
He was convicted of attempted murder and his appeal was upheld on the 
rtr 
ground the wens rea of an attempt is the same as that of the completed 
crime, and his action exhibited that 'wicked recklessness- as to 
consequences' which constitutes the mens rea of murder. Yet Cawthorne's 
intention was, in fact, to cause terror and not to cause death. To this 
extent he was entirely successful, his activity went according to plan 
exactly. Thus as Duff points out, 
"(w>e may ascribe to him an 'intent' which would make him guilty of 
murder if he caused death; but that is not to ascribe to him the 
intention 'to commit murder'". '"ti' 
In Lang'32 D continued in his cruelty towards his wife in the knowledge 
that this would 'in all human probability' cause her to leave the 
matrimonial home. Constructive desertion was found against him on the 
ground that he Intended to drive her out despite the fact that he 
desired and requested her not to leave. But if we apply the test of 
failure to Lang's case"-`1 we find that the decision that he intended to 
drive her out is not tenable since, had his wife remained against all 
reasonable expectation, Lang would not have felt that his activity had 
been frustrated: on the contrary he would have felt relieved and 
delighted that his fear about the untoward consequence of his activity 
had been ill-founded. Lang is thus morally less blameworthy than the 
agent who has perpetrated the same activity with the direct intention of 
driving his wife from the matrimonial home. 
3. If we apply to a particular criminal offence a broad definition of 
intention which includes foreseight of probability to some degree then 
we would not be able to apply a more restricted definition to those 
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offences which we might consider to require a more serious moral 
turpitude, unless we give to the concept of intention variable meanir. _ 
which we apply to the spectrum of criminal offences as we think fit. 
This is the position which obtains at current law: the judges place a 
very narrow meaning on the concept of intention in some offences such as 
attempts, and extend the meaning to include probability to some degree 
in others. But it is submitted that it is a highly unsatisfactory `tate 
of affairs that this important element of our criminal law should harre 
such flexible contours, particularly when one considers that the most 
heinous crime, murder, effectively admits only intention as a necessary 
mental state. The position stems from the fact that our criminal law 
uses so few concepts of mens rea to accommodate the entire spectrum (or 
possibly spectrums) of mental state - from direct intention to blameless 
inadvertence. My view is that we should have a structure of mens rea 
which enables Parliament to state more precisely the minimum mens rea 
requirement for each newly enacted offence. It is submitted that the 
proposed notions of direct and concomitant intention, together with 
purpose, objective, gross and simple recklessness and gross and simple 
negligence134 enable us to construct relatively sharp forms of mental 
state for each new offence thus avoiding the need for the variable 
meanings which the courts have attributed to the concept of intention. 
One might argue against this. After all what harm is actually done by 
the present state of the law in which generally speaking the definition 
of the wens rea of each individual offence is clear enough even if the 
terms used to describe it have inconsistent meanings across the spectrum 
of criminal offences? My submission here is that if we have variab"e 
meanings of the concept of intention then it simply cannot be clear just 
what are the parameters of intention in each case. Also when Parliament 
creates a new offence which admits only intention as the requisite 
mental state then just what version of intention is to be applied to the 
offence? I suggest that we ought to have a clear and universal 
definition of intention which is to be applied in all cases and that 
intention should be restricted to the most serious form of moral 
turpitude. 
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4. If we integrate direct intention and foresight of an untoward 
consequence as probable to some degree in our conception of intention 
then we have no means, at the conviction stage, of rewarding the agent 
who takes steps to avoid a known (and probable) untoward side effect. 
Suppose that Dominic is determined to bring about x. He foresees that y 
is a probable consequence of his enterprise. He appreciates that he can 
take some measures in order to reduce the possibility of bringing y 
about by his activity although not sufficient to reduce 'probability' 
below the minimum required for 'intention'. Dominic may feel inclined to 
take the available steps to reduce the risk in order to reduce the 
probability of being punished for its occurrence but I feel that is 
right that we reward such efforts to reduce the risk of untoward harm at 
the conviction stage. After all the agent in such a case has not merely 
alluded to the risk of probability, and gone on to take it: he has acted 
upon that appreciation of risk in order to reduce it to a minimum in the 
context of his activity. We can reward the agent in such cases by making 
sharp divisions between the categories of mens rea. We can and should do 
much more to sharpen the various levels of mens rea so that we are able 
to more clearly indicate the moral turpitude of the offender at the 
conviction stage. 
For the reasons I have stated I submit that foresight of probability 
short of certainty ought not to figure in any account of intention. 
In my definitions of direct and concomitant intention I expressly 
exclude 'desire' as a constituent. My view is that desire is a necessary 
element in neither the proposed model nor the current law model of 
intention. There has been much debate upon the issue and it would be 
useful to consider the arguments. In what follows I shall talk of 
intention as the concept is understood at current criminal 
law. As a 
useful starting point to discussion it is worth noting 
that in fact 
there is a clear distinction between the concepts of 
intention and 
desire. For an agent may desire that some change in 
the world occur 
without any intention of bringing that change about. 
Furthermore one may 
90 
desire something which is not in one's power to bring about 
intentionally or otherwise. As Lord Asquith pointed out "X cannot, with 
any due regard to English language, be said to 'intend' ... that it 
shall be a fine day tomorrow": "'"5 In the context of an agent's activity 
the same proposition holds. For, although an agent may intend Euch 
contemplated effects of his activity which he desires (in which case he 
both desires and intends those effects), he may desire an expected 
effect of his activity without acting in order to bring it about. 
Contrariwise an agent may aim at and bring about a particular change in 
the world which he regrets or toward which he is indifferent. For 
example in order to claim more than its value on my household insurance 
I destroy a family heirloom which I treasure. Intention and desire are 
thus free standing concepts. 
Despite this clear distinction between them, however, there have been a 
number of cases in which the judges have been prepared to treat the 
notion of desire as an integral aspect of the concept of intention for 
the purpose of ascriptions of criminal liability. 
In tea' Ic- Lord Diplock talked of the state of mind of one who does an 
act because he desires it to produce a particular evil consequence and 
considered that state of mind to be intention. In Xolý'3' the trial 
judge, in directing the jury on intention stated that a man intends the 
consequence of his voluntary act (inter alia) "when be desires it to 
happen" Some analyses of Styel'-'e suggest that the court in that case 
had in mind the fact that desire might be equated with intention. Lord 
Denning thought that the case decided that lack of desire proves lack of 
intent, "' and Lord Simon in Lynch v D. P. P. ' 4`° considered that the court 
in Steane must have had in mind that intention was desire. White points 
out that such views of the decision in Steane seem to ignore the 
fact 
that the actual decision was based not on the absence of 
desire by 
Steane to assist the enemy but on the fact that the prosecution could 
not prove such intention other than by relying on the 
fact that such 
asistance was a probable result of his broadcasting as 
he did-"' 
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Some theorists too are prepared to treat 'desire' as a necessary 
component part of the concept of direct intention. Professor Williams 
says that 
"(except) in one type of case'42 intention as to a consequence of 
what is done requires desire of that consequence ... With one 
exception'42 an act is intentional as to a consequence if it is 
done with (motivated by) the wish, desire, purpose or aim (all 
synonyms in this context)'4' of producing the result in 
question". 141 
The learned author points out that a contemplated effect of the agent's 
activity might be counted as intended although not desired but such 
instances fall within oblique intention"' and not direct intention. 
Williams notes that some theorists refute the proposition that direct 
intention necessarily includes desire"' on the main ground that one can 
intend to do an unpleasant thing such as visit a dentist and thus direct 
intention need not involve desire. He argues that the premise is true 
but the conclusion does not follow since a person visits the dentist in 
order to obtain specific benefits (e. g. relief from continuous pain or 
preservation of teeth) and the pain suffered at the hands of the dentist 
is accepted as a part of the total package which is desired. 74' 
Let us apply Williams' contention to a hypothetical involving criminal 
activity. Suppose that D poisons his grandmother in order to claim as 
beneficiary under her will. D adores his grandmother but, given his dire 
financial straits, he feels that the premature demise of grandmother 
(with the attendant acceleration of the benefit of her estate) is 
preferable to his being the subject of bankruptcy proceedings. In this 
case the death of grandmother is part of a package and the object of the 
package is desired by him but can we say that D desires his relative's 
death? Can we not say that D intends her death as an undesired means to 
a desired end? 
My illustration involves a further consequence which follows upon the 
agent's initial activity but we may posit a hypothetical more akin to 
the 'dentist' illustration. Suppose that D had poisoned his grandmother 
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as an act of mercy given that she was in great pain and had only days to 
live. In this variant there is (as with the dentist ca3? ) no further 
consequence: the death of grandmother necessarily involves the effect 
which motivated D's activity, i. e. the relief from agonising rain. Must 
we agree with Williams that D desires his relative's death or can we say 
that although D intended her death he did not desire it? My response to 
the questions posed in this and the last paragraph is that we may say 
that D intends but does not desire the death of his grandmother. The 
reasons in support of my conclusion are stated below. l4t 
One might say of the variant illustration that the death of grandmother 
and her rlief from pain are inseparable effects of the agent's activity. 
On this basis we may conclude that to intend one is to intend the other 
and that D intends both her death and her relief from pain although he 
only desires the latter. The same contention may be applied to the case 
of my visit to the dentist. The undesired pain suffered at the hands of 
the dentist is inseparable from the desired effect (say the preservation 
of my teeth) since the occurrence of the former necessarily includes 
the latter: we may thus say that I intend to suffer the pain, not 
because I desire it but because it is inseparable from the preservation 
of my teeth which I do desire and which motivated my visit to the 
dentist. This would explain Williams' view in cases in which the desired 
effect is inseparable from the undesired effect but, for the reasons set 
out below. "4e I think that he is wrong to insist that intention involves 
desire in all cases of direct intention. 
Smith and Hogan state their position shortly. On their interpretation of 
the dicta by the Court of Appeal in Kohan" that intention involves "a 
decision to bring about ... the commission of 
the offence ... no matter 
whether the accused desired that consequence of his act or not" they say 
"it is difficult to envisage a person doing all in his power to bring 
about a certain end, yet not desiring it to occur". '"`' They explain that 
the dictum was intended to prevent an agent from avoiding liability on 
the ground that he did not desire x (running down a policeman) 
for its 
own sake, but had brought it about in order to achieve some other object 
y (effecting an escape). They conclude that Mohan intended 
to escape and 
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injury to the police officer was, as he read it, a condition precedent 
to escape. But was the police officer's injury a condition preceJent to 
Mohan's escape? The police officer may (as he did in the case) jump 
clear and the escape effected without injury. It might be argued that it 
was the officer's fear of injury, and his likely reaction to it, xhi:. h 
was the condition precedent to Mohan's escape. 's' 
Professor Kenny says that 
"(a) man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it. It 
may well be a thing that he dislikes doing, but he dislikes still 
more the consequences of his not doing it. That is. to say he desire!: 
the lesser of two evils and therefore has made up his mind to bring 
about that one". '-' 
I think that this welter of authority insisting upon desire as an 
element of intention has been matched by those opposed to the 
proposition. There have been several judgments denying the assimilation 
of desire into intention. In Lord Kilbrandon decided that the 
agent who forsees a consequence as likely, and who is indifferent 
whether or not it follows upon his activity intends that consequence. 
In Lang v Lang'64 the Privy Council decided that the husband who 
foresees that his wife will probably leave the matrimonial home because 
of his persistent cruelty intends to drive her out "however passionately 
he may desire that she should remain". "' 
In Xohan11 intention was described as a decision to bring about, 
insofar as it lies within the accused's power, a proscribed ch n0- in 
the world whether or not the accused desired the change. "' In Lynch v 
D. P. P. 'c-*3 it was held that although the act committed under duress might 
not have been accompanied by a desire for the result, that did not rule 
out the possibility that the act was intended. 
In Nblnnay1c-'ý Lord Bridge stated that intention is "something quite 
distinct from ... desire". 
He posits the case of the man who, in order 
to escape his pursuer, boards a plane bound for Manchester. 
For Lord 
Bridge the man "clearly intends to travel to Manchester, even 
though 
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Manchester is the last place he wants to be and his motive for boardinS 
the plane is simply to avoid pursuit". 
With the words 'the last place he wants to be' it is clear that 'Ord 
Bridge accepts that intention does not include desire. However in 
]edrick''-" Lord Lane C. J. whilst saying that the appropriate direction 
to the jury is (inter alia) that a man may intend to achieve a certain 
result while at the same time not desiring it to come about, referred to 
Lord Bridge's illustration and said 
"(t)he man who knowingly boards the Manchester aircraft wants to go 
there in the sense that boarding it is a voluntary act. His desire 
to leave London predominates over his desire not to go to 
Manchester". 
It is submitted that the view of the learned Lord Chief Justice resolves 
itself into a question of preference over competing evils rather than 
conflicting desires. If, as Lord Bridge indicates in his illustration, 
Manchester is the last place where the man wants to be then the 
situation confronting him before he boards the plane might take this 
form. 
"If I do not board this plane now I will be caught, charged with 
murder and will ultimately receive a sentence of life imprisonment. 
If I do board the plane I will be flown to Manchester which is the 
last place I want to be. I would much prefer that neither outcome 
take place: I desire neither to be in Manchester nor prison. But one 
place it must be so which shall I choose? " 
If our man on the run weighs up the alternatives and boards the plane 
must we conclude that he wants to go to Manchester, or can we say that 
he prefers to suffer in Manchester rather than suffer in prison? In 
support of the latter contention we may argue that the alternative he 
has chosen (when he boards the plane) gives him the opportunity at the 
earliest convenient moment to rid himself of the undesired location 
in 
which he finds himself. The distinction between 'dos-ire' and 
'preference' here is thus this: if the agent wants x to occur for its 
own sake (whether or not x is also a means to y) then we may say 
that he 
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desires x. If the agent does not want x to occur for its own sake "u*_ 
sees x as a means of preventing y, or as a condition rr C- dent to the 
occurrence of z, then we may say that he prefers :: rather than y or not 
Z. 
Duff is prepared to accept the 'preference over alternatives' stance and 
illustrates his position with (inter alia) the case of the agent who 
claims "I did not want to give him the money, but he had a gun at my 
head", and concludes " (a)mongst our intended actions we distinguish what 
we want to do from what we have to do or ought to do or are forced to Sao 
... we will do better to analyse 'intention' without reference to 
'desires' or 'wants"'. I-' 
Halpin considers that 'desire' is an integral component of 
' intention' .'6,2 Of Duff' s example he comments 
"(t)he person who says, "I didn't want to give him the money, but he 
had a gun to my head", does not actually mean that he didn't want to 
give him the money; but rather that he hadn't" wanted to give him 
the money (before the gun was placed at his head), and that he 
wouldn't'`` have wanted to give him the money (if the gun had not 
been placed at his head). 
Thus for Halpin the fugitive who boards a plane for Manchester does 
desire or want to go to Manchester since that city offers him a safe 
haven; and the man who hands over the money desires to hand over the 
money since this will avoid being killed. Duff, in his article' ""° does 
note that there is a usage of 'want' or 'desire' such that I necessarily 
want whatever I intend; and he now thinks that he should have allowed 
more weight to this. l6E He would still argue, however, that a definition 
in terms of 'desire' will confuse rather than clarify, since juries will 
need to work out which usage is involved; and since, as I argue below, 
reference to desire is anyway otiose. 
The conflicting views of Halpin and Duff concern a specific quality of 
an agent's mental state at the point at which he does act x which he 
does not want for its own sake but which is a necessary preliminary to 
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his preventing (or bringing about) the occurrence of y. the agent 
who brings about x as a necessary means to achieving y always want x as 
a first consequence of his activity? We could, perhap , di: -t ngui':!,, 
between the agent who brings about x for its own sake and the ý nt who 
brings about x as a means of achieving y by way of a twofold definition 
of desire. We might say, for example, that the agent who brings about x 
for its own sake has intrinsic desire in relation to x. Thus where D 
brings about x for the pleasure that x gives him we may say that at the 
time of his act D has the intrinsic desire to cause x. However where the 
agent brings about x in order to prevent y or in order that z is brought 
about we might say that he has extrinsic desire in relation to x to 
indicate that he does not want xf or its own sake. 1¬E" Thus where D 
boards a plane for Manchester in order to escape pursuit we might say he 
has extrinsic desire to travel to Manchester: he does not wish to go to 
Manchester for its own sake but for the sake of avoiding arrest and 
detention. 
But is there any need for this twofold definition of desire? Is there 
any need for desire at all as a necessary aspect of direct intention? 
For if the agent acts in order to bring about consequence x, then he 
surely intends to bring about that consequence whether it is an end in 
itself or is a means to an end; and it seems otiose to insist that, as a 
necessary condition of intentional activity the agent must also desire 
to bring it about. 
It seems that the main reason why judges and theorists insist on '. -D,, ire 
as a constituent of intention is that, for them, the presence of desire 
marks the distinction between intention and recklessness. '' However it 
is submitted that if we usenotion of desire as the threshold for the 
concept of intention then that concept would collapse into recklessness. 
For in a case in which D has brought about a foreseen side-effect y az a 
result of his activity aimed at x the jury will decide whether or not 
D 
desired y, and if so satisfied count him as having intended both x and y 
since he directly intended x and desired the side-effect y. This would 
inevitably lead to findings of direct intention in relation to effects 
which D contemplated as probable or even possible. "' 
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Proponents of desire as a constituent of direct intention may put 
forward two responses to this unsatisfactory effect of their definition: 
of intention. 
(i) They might respond that their insistance that desire is included in 
intention only applies to cases in which the agent acts as he does 
because he desires the effect of that act. This modified stance would 
avoid the collapse of intention into recklessness but would -till 
present problems for the jury. Suppose for example that D, from a 
vantage point, shoots and kills his wife who is about to report to a 
police officer a recent murder committed by him. At his trial- ample 
evidence is put forward to show that D aimed at the death of his wife; 
that he loved her and bitterly regretted the directly intended effect of 
his activity. If the jury decide that desire is absent in thiý case then 
D cannot be found guilty of murder on the 'intention includes desire' 
model; yet the case seems to be a paradigm of that offence. The only 
possible response for the proponents of that model, it seems, is that 
we should count as desired any effect which is aimed at by the agent. 
But if this is the response then just what purpose is 'desire' serving 
in the concept of direct intention? For the jury must first decide 
whether or not D is aiming at a particular effect and once satisfied of 
that they must simply state that he therefore desired it. What 
justification is there in insisting that the jury make this presumption? 
They have already established direct intention at this point. 
(ii) They might respond that desire is only necessary in relation to 
effects which the agent contemplates as certain to flow from his 
activity. Professor Williams alludes to this view"' when discussing t: 
defendants in Aoloney'71-1 and Hancock'" He says 
"(e)ither the defendants ... foresaw 
that death or grievous bodily 
harm was the inevitable consequence of their acts (in which case 
they clearly desired such consequence, "I since no other 
interpretation of their conduct was reasonably possible), or they 
did not foresee this". 
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This view would again avoid a collapse of intention into recklessne, =s 
but there are objections. First the jury would have the difficult; in 
deciding whether a particular defendant actually desired an inevitable 
consequence of his activity. Second, one might question a system of law 
which, at the conviction stage, distinguishes between agents who have 
foreseen inevitable consequences of their activity on the basis that 
they did or did not desire that consequence. I have already illustrated 
this point in cases such as Lord Hailsham's aircraft saboteur and the 
case of Miss Edmunds. 17 
Williams (who espouses the notion of desire as a necessary element of 
direct intention) rejects this second contention, He says 
"(t)he one type of case in which it is reasonable to say that an 
undesired consequence can be intended in law is in respect of known 
certainties. A person can be held ... to intend an undesired event 
that he knows for sure he is bringing about". "' 
Now if, as we should, we reject (ii) above, and reserve discussion on 
desire to contention (i), which concerns cases of direct intention, 
there remains my submission that desire is strictly otiose in any 
consideration of criminal responsibility based upon direct intention 
since once the court or jury has established that the defendant acted 
with direct intention in the sense that he aimed at the particular 
effect of his activity then there is nothing left on which to 
deliberate. The decision that the agent also desired the effect iý a 
presumption which (on the 'intention' includes 'desire' model) they are 
bound to infer. The notion of desire adds nothing either to the 
definition of direct intention or to the process in deciding whether 
direct intention is present in a given case. We should reject the notion 
that direct intention includes the notion of desire. 
American case law seems to reject the notion that intention include, -- 
desire. In Uni ed States V United States Gypsum Company "E Berger Cj 
said that a person intends a result of his activity where he "knows that 
the result is practically certain to follow from his conduct whatever 
his desire may be as to that resul t" . 
99 
I conclude on intention and desire by applying discussion to the 
proposed concepts. The proposed concept of direct intention Foes not 
incorporate desire as a necessary element: and since concep u-1 
certainty fits into my model of direct intention, desire for the 
conceptually certain effect by the agent is irrelevant in ascribing 
liability to him for direct intent. I should point out that there is 
existing case law which supports my contention here. In D. P. P. v Luft 16 
it was stated that an intention to prevent the election of one candidate 
necessarily involves an intention to improve the chances of success of 
the remaining ... candidates though the person so intending it 
indifferent which of them is successful. 
From what has gone before it is quite clear that it iss not necessary 
that an agent desire an empirically certain consequence of his activity. 
But given my model of concomitant intention, what is the position where 
the agent desires both the directly intended result and the empirically 
certain consequence which he contemplates? My view here is that desire 
is irrelevant unless it has somehow figured in the agent's deciding to 
act as he does. If the agent contemplates both consequences and acts in 
order that both consequences are brought about by his activity then he 
directly intends both. "' But if his activity relates to consequence x 
and empirically certain side-effect y has played no part in his deciding 
to act as he does then D cannot be said to have directly intended y, 
even if its occurrence appeals to him, since its prospective 
manifestation has not figured in his deliberations which inform his 
decision to act as he does. 
I conclude here with a summary of the proposed twofold model of 
intention by summarising its constituent parts. 
1. An agent directly intends an effect when 
(i) he is aware that that effect may flow from his exertion and he makes 
that exertion because of that belief""' or, 
(ii) that effect is indivisible from an exertion aimed at something 
else; subject to the proviso that he may avoid liability if `_: e can prove 
NO 
the presence of some legally recognised factor sufficient i:. the 
circumsatnces to prevent him from per,: Eiving the indivisible effect of 
his activity. "' 
2. An agent concomitantly intends an effect of his activity when he 
contemplates that a contingent and empirically certain effect y may'"° 
flow from his activity aimed at x. However the agent will in: +jr no 
liability for his concomitant intention unless the empirically certain 
effect actually occurs. Thus where D aims at effect x but concomitant 
offence y is not brought about by his activity, D cannot be convicted 
oc t" - an attempt at concomitant offence y, whether or not effect x is 
brought about thereby. However where the concomitant offence y is 
brought about by his activity we may convict him of the substantive 
offence concerning y whether or not he brings about the directly 
intended effect x. If the agent fails to allude to the empirically 
certain effect of his activity we may not attribute concomitant 
intention to him although he may be liable on other grounds. 'e" 
In this and the last chapter I have stressed that the proposed model of 
intention is restricted to an effect which, as the agent reads it, is 
capable of being produced by his exertion. Where the agent brings about 
effect x which is a necessary preliminary to (but cannot bring about) 
effect y the agent does not directly intend y as he brings about x, 
although he directly intends x. My submission is that where an agent 
brings about effect x as a preliminary to effect y he directly inte^di_ 
to bring about x for the 'purpose' or with the 'objective' of bringing 
about y. It is to these two mental states which I now turn. 
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discussion by the learned authors on this point. 
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In Chapters 2 and 3I posited a structure of intention which is 
restricted temporarily to an effect which is capable of being produced 
by the agent's exertion. In this chapter I posit two further models of 
mans rea which are designed to incorporate within ascriptions of 
liability proscribed harm which the agent's exertion is not itself 
capable of producing but towards which that exertion is a necessary 
preliminary. There are two possibilities here. First where the agent 
perpetrates a preliminary effect which is itself a criminal offence and 
second, where the preliminary effect is not by itself contrary to the 
criminal law. The latter possibility is a topic for chapter 5. In this 
chapter we are concerned with a preliminary criminal effect and its 
relation to the proscribed effect towards which the preliminary criminal 
effect is directed. 
Where an agent perpetrates a criminal offence x which is itself a 
necessary preliminary to a prospective criminal offence y which he 
believes he may bring about and towards which his activity (which brings 
about x) is directed then the agent directly intends' x for the purpose 
of committing y. Since 'purpose' involves a preliminary offence which is 
directed at some further offence the concept is concerned with causal 
chains of activity instigated by the agent and directed at some ultimate 
goal. The proposed model of 'purpose' has several features. 
(i) 'Purpose' is a mental state. We might thus say that D 'purposes' y 
in the same way as we say that he directly intends x as 
he makes the 
exertion which he believes is capable of producing X. 
It is because 
purpose is a mental state that we may ascribe purpose 
to D in the 
conviction in every case in which the offence with which 
he has been 
convicted is a necessary preliminary to a prospective offence. 
(ii) As with direct intention, the agent must 
believe that, by his 
activity which constitutes the causal chain, 
he can cause the proscribed 
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change in the world which constitutes his purpose. Provided that he has 
this belief it does not matter that he personally cannot cause that 
change or that the change cannot be brought about at all (e. g. the 
person he plans to kill is already dead). 
(iii) The criminal offence committed must be a necessary preliminary to 
the prospective criminal offence further along the causal chain of 
activity. Thus where the agent plans to commit two independent criminal 
offences in relatively quick succession he does not purpose the later 
offence as he perpetrates the first. 
(iv) The preliminary criminal offence must have been committed in fact 
before we may say that the agent purposes the offence further along the 
causal chain. This feature clearly excludes the agent who has made a 
firm decision to bring about a particular proscribed harm or state of 
affairs but has not yet taken any positive and necessary step towards 
achieving it. ' Thus where an agent has determined to bring about a 
change in the world, has formulated the causal chain, but has not yet 
made any physical movement along it, then that causal chain constitutes 
his plan concerning future activity. I use the word 'plan' to connote 
that the agent's decision to bring about a proscribed harm at some 
future date has not been accompanied by any physical exertion in 
relation to the selected causal chain. The feature also excludes the 
agent who sets in motion the causal chain but has not yet reached the 
point at which he has perpetrated the preliminary criminal offence. 
Suppose that Dudley plans to commit arson (contrary to s. 1(3) of the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971) at his mother's home in order to submit a 
fraudulent insurance claim in connection with his personal effects. He 
purchases some petrol from a local garage with which to carry out the 
arson element of his plan. His (directly intended) act of purchasing 
petrol is a necessary preliminary to the commission of arson and a 
later 
offence under s. 15 of the Theft Act 1968, but it is an innocent act and 
preliminary to the first criminal link in the planned causal chain, and 
we cannot thus say that Dudley purposes the offence under s. 
15. Whether 
or not Dudley is criminally liable in relation to planned arson 
(the 
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more immediate criminal offence) as he purchases the petrol is an issue 
which is discussed in chapter 5. 
(v) When the agent has brought about the preliminary offence x we may 
charge him with that substantive offence on the basis of direct 
intention, and we may include in the charge his purpose for committing 
that offence. Thus if Dudley (above) pours petrol over the carpet and 
sets fire to it but is apprehended before he can complete the causal 
chain we may charge him with arson contrary to s. 1(3) of the Criminal 
Damage Act for the purpose of obtaining money by deception contrary to 
s. 15 of the Theft Act 1968. Of course if Dudley completes the causal 
chain then we may charge him with both offences on the basis of direct 
intention in each case. This feature draws out the point that in 
ascribing purpose to the agent in the conviction we do not in fact 
convict him of a separate offence: rather we describe more accurately 
the wickedness with which the agent has brought about the preliminary 
criminal offence. It may be the case however that a judge would wish to 
take the agent's purpose into account when assessing the sanction. If 
such a discretion were available to him it is suggested that it should 
be restricted to the maximum penalty which might be imposed for the 
offence committed. 
Would the proposed model of purpose apply to attempts? Suppose that 
Dudley had poured the petrol on the carpet but was apprehended as he was 
about to strike a match. Would Dudley be guilty of attempted arson for 
the purpose of obtaining by deception? It is submitted that the agent 
should be charged with attempted arson only. The main argument which 
inclines me to this view is that we ought not to ascribe purpose 
concerning a future offence to an agent whose activity precedes the 
commission of a preliminary criminal offence. 
(vi) The exertion which is to forge the link in the causal chain which 
constitutes the agent's purpose may be made by some person or persons 
other than the agent. Suppose that D kidnaps V, and threatens V2 that 
he 
will kill V, unless V2 steals the day's takings from his place of 
employment and hands them over to D. Here D kidnaps° V, 
for the purpose 
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of committing theft contrary to s. 1(1) of the Theft Act 1968 even 
although it is someone else who commits the latter substantive offence. 
It is worth noting here that at the point in the causal chain at which 
the offence which is D's purpose is itself capable of being brought 
about by V8 it is V2, and not D, who directly intends that offence. 
However it is submitted that we may charge and convict D of the 
substantive offence through extraneous agency. 6 
A few periphery points pertaining to purpose are worthy of note. The 
causal chain may involve an isolated act. Suppose that Denise is in a 
confectioner's and decides to take a bar of chocolate whilst the 
retailer's back is turned. As she takes hold of the item is it Denise's 
direct intention that the retailer be permanently deprived of his stock 
or is that her purpose f or her acting as she does? I think that it is 
clear on the proposed models that the taking of the chocolate is 
accompanied by direct intention, and, since there is no other 
prospective activity in relation to her plan (i. e. the chain of activity 
is completed with the taking) then there is no purpose in issue in this 
hypothetical. ' 
Professor Jackson disagrees with my contention here. ' He offers the 
argument that the taking of the bar is not capable itself of permanently 
depriving the owner of it: whether the owner would be permanently 
deprived of it will depend upon exertions or lack of exertions by people 
(such as whether the police intercept her before the chocolate is 
consumed). My response here is that if we give credence to the 
possibility that a stolen item may be restored to the true owner at some 
future time then cannot every person accused of theft say that permanent 
deprivation cannot be proved since it is recognised that the property 
may at some point be restored by supervening agency? In any event s. 1 of 
the Theft Act does not state that the victim must be permanently 
deprived of his property but rather that the defendant must 
dishonestly 
appropriate the property with the intention of permanently 
depriving the 
owner of i t. 
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Can an agent purpose the securement of a particular status quo? ateangs 
highlights the substance of the question. On the proposed models may we 
say that a defendant such as Steane directly intends to make each 
broadcast for the purpose of preventing loss of liberty? My view here is 
that the concept of purpose does not extend to preservation of an 
existing state of affairs since the agent's directly intended exertion 
brings about the directly intended effect (the broadcast in our 
illustration) and also brings about the preservation of the existing 
state of affairs which figures as a reason for the agent's acting as he 
does. On my models of mens rea Steane made each broadcast (i) with the 
direct intention to make the broadcast, (ii) with the direct intention 
to assist the enemy and (iii) with the direct intention of preventing 
loss of liberty (since that loss is capable of being prevented by each 
broadcast). It is worth explaining why on the proposed structure of wens 
rea Steane would have direct intention concerning the assistance to the 
Germans. Steane's direct intention was to make the broadcast and since 
the broadcast and assistance to the enemy were indivisible effects of 
his activity, the assistance was a conceptually certain effect of that 
activity aimed at the broadcast. Steane thus directly intended that 
assistance and, on the proposed structure would have been guilty of the 
offence on the ground of appropriate mens rea. However I point out below 
that Steane ought to be excused from liability on the ground of duress. ' 
A final point to observe about the proposed concept of purpose is that 
an agent's planned causal chain may include several purposes which lead 
to the agent's ultimate purpose (when his plan is complete). In such a 
case we may designate the overall purpose at which the agent's causal 
chain is directed the agent's objective in acting as he does. This 
aspect is dealt with in detail below. 10 
As I have stated above the proposed definition of purpose relates to 
future activity and is thus quite distinct from my definition of 
intention which is concerned with present activity and the effects 
thereof. However in the current criminal law 'purpose' has been used as 
a synonym for intention. " 
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In Ah1ers1 D, a German Consul, assisted German nationals to return home 
after the declaration of war in 1914. He was charged with aiding the 
King's enemies with the intention to do so. It was decided that D's 
intention was not in fact to aid the King's enemies but to do his duty 
as consul. Smith and Hogan' suggest that the court is restricting the 
mens rea element of the offence to purpose and that Ahlers cannot thus 
be said to have intended to assist the King's enemies. But on the 
proposed model of intention Ahlers had direct intention to assist his 
fellow countrymen to leave Britain since, as a matter of conceptual 
certainty, assisting nationals of military age to leave the host country 
at a time of war between the two nations does assist the enemy. The two 
effects are indivisible. Thus on the proposed models Ahlers would be 
counted as having directly intended aiding the enemy even if the thought 
that his act was rendering such aid had not crossed his mind. 14 Ads 
is thus not a case involving purpose on my proposed species of mens rea. 
In Steane'5 Lord Goddard LCJ, in quashing the conviction, considered 
that 
"(t)he proper direction to the jury in this case would have been 
that it was for the prosecution to prove the criminal intent and ... 
they would not be entitled to presume it if the circumstances showed 
that the act was ... equally consistent with an innocent intent as 
with a criminal intent. They should only convict if satisfied by the 
evidence that the act complained of was in fact done to assist the 
enemy and if there was any doubt about the matter the prisoner was 
entitled to be acquitted". 
Lord Denning agrees with the dicta of Lord Goddard. He states that 
"(t)his man Steane had no desire or purpose to assist the enemy. The 
Gestapo had said to him 'If you don't obey, your wife and children 
will be put in a concentration camp'. So he obeyed their commands. 
It would be very hard to convict him of 'intent to assist' the enemy 
if that was the last thing he desired to do". 16 
Lord Denning says that Steane had, inter alia, no purpose to assist the 
enemy which at least suggests that he would require purpose as an 
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element in the mens rea of the offence with which Steane was charged. On 
my analysis Steane had direct intention to make the broadcasts and 
since, as a matter of conceptual certainty, '? such broadcasts did assist 
the Germans then Steane directly intended to assist the enemy regardless 
of whether or not he alluded to that aspect of his activity. Note that 
the broadcasts and the assistance are indivisible and occur at the same 
time. Purpose thus does not figure in this case on my analysis since 
purpose is restricted to effects which may be brought about by some 
future exertion. 
In Xohan James LJ said that a defendant intends a consequence if it is 
his purpose to achieve it. The definition of intention in Xaloney, 1' as 
modified by dicta in the cases of Hancock2° and Nedrick21 seems to be 
that "a result is intended when it is the agent's purpose".: 22 
Some theorists, too, have been prepared to assimilate purpose with 
intention. Smith and Hogan consider that purpose is synonomous with 
intention. They say that "everyone agrees that a person intends to cause 
a result if he acts with the purpose of doing so".. In discussing the 
case of the agent who shoots at his victim they say "<i)t is sufficient 
that killing is his object or purpose". `2" 
Austin talks of intention as expectation, desire and purpose. 26 Salmond 
and Kenny talk of purpose as an essential ingredient of intention. 
Salmond states that "an intentional act is one done in order that the 
result may happen.. G Kenny insists that "(t)o intend is to have in mind 
a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective". 27 
Professor Williams is content to conflate the notions of intention and 
purpose. He says "an act is intentional as to a consequence if it is 
done with (motivated by)28 the wish, desire, purpose or aim (all 
synonyms in this context)28 of producing the result in question". 29 He 
points to an illustration by Professor White who distinguishes between 
the two concepts. A person may go to Australia with the intention of 
staying for not more than a year; this is his intention when 
he goes, 
but not his purpose for going. If he goes to Australia with 
the 
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intention of visiting his grandchildren, that is his purpose. --40 
Professor Williams suggests that 'goes to Australia' is ambiguous. When 
the traveller embarks his intention (and purpose) is to travel to 
Australia (not necessarily his only purpose). When he arrives in 
Australia that intention is fulfilled. B1 
One reason why the judges and theorists admit purpose as an element of 
intention is the fact that often intention and purpose do coincide so 
that the agent's intention might also be said to be his purpose. Thus 
where D enters a premises as a trespasser in order to steal we might say 
either that it is D's further intention to steal or that the removal of 
the article is the purpose for which D enters the premises. 
However it is not in every case that intention and purpose coincide. For 
example where an employee takes a valuable article from the shop with 
the intention32 of returning it next morning before the employer is 
aware of the situation one might say that it is the agent's further 
intent ion2 to return the article but one cannot say that the agent's 
purpose for taking the article was to return it the following morning. 
My view on such a case is that we should look to the overall objective 
of the agent's planned chain or chains of activity. It is submitted that 
in our instant illustration there are in fact two planned chains of 
activity both of which are quite distinct as regards the objective and 
time of execution. The agent's overall objective of the first chain of 
activity is the use of the valuable article at home that evening. That 
is thus the object or purpose for which he takes the article. The 
overall objective of the second chain of activity is to avoid any 
censure by his employer (or the law) in relation to the first chain of 
activity. He may achieve this by returning the article next morning 
before his employer arrives. He thus returns it for the purpose of 
escaping detection. His returning the valuable article is thus a link in 
a particular chain of activity which leads to a particular objective, 
namely evasion of detection in relation to the former chain of activity. 
It is submitted that although 'intention' and 'purpose' coincide 
in 
specific cases the two concepts are quite distinct and separate. 
I put 
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forward several points in support of my submission. " First, an 
intention is what the agent has in mind at the time he brings about a 
particular proscribed harm or state of affairs, but he need have nothing 
else in mind at the time he brings that effect about. In such a case we 
might say that the agent has no purpose in mind in acting as he does. I 
think that the recent mass killing by Michael Ryan in Hungerford 
provides an illustration of this point. 
Second, an agent's purpose for doing something is his reason for doing 
it. When an agent brings about a consequence we might ask two quite 
distinct questions; namely was it his aim that the particular 
consequence follow upon his activity (intention) and was there a reason 
for his bringing that consequence about (purpose). If we ask these two 
questions in each case we shall receive one of three answers, 
(i) it was his aim that a particular consequence follow upon his 
activity but he had no purpose for bringing that consequence about. 
The case of Michael Ryan above illustrates this response. 
(ii) it was both the agent's intention and purpose that a particular 
consequence follow upon his activity. An illustration here is the 
case of an agent who shoots V out of revenge. 
(iii) it was the agent's intention to bring about a particular 
consequence and his purpose for bringing about the consequence was 
to enable him to bring about a further consequence of his 
activity. An illustration here is the case of the agent who kills 
his mother in order to submit a fraudulent claim on her life 
assurers. In this case the killing of mother is a necessary and 
intentional step on the way to the realisation of the agent's 
purpose - the procurement of a sum of money from an assurance 
company by deception. When the agent sends in the claim form to 
the assurer he will have reached the same stage as the agent in 
case (ii) and it will now be both his intention and purpose to 
obtain by deception (contrary to s. 15 of the Thefrt Act 1968) in 
acting as he does. 
Third, on occasion a particular consequence might be 
described as both 
my intention and my purpose as where I attend a prize 
fight with the 
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intention and for the purpose of taking a full part as a spectator. Thus 
my intention and purpose are the same. Nonetheless the two concepts are 
distinct although they coincide. We can see this if we introduce a 
further element into the illustration. Suppose that I attend the prize 
fight with the intention of taking an active part as a spectator for the 
first two fights and also of leaving before the third and final fight. 
Now if 'intention' and 'purpose' are the same then I must have attended 
the prize fight with the purpose of leaving before the third fight which 
is clearly not the case since if that was my purpose I could have 
achieved it by not attending the prize fight at all. 
Finally the common usage of purpose concerns some future effect which 
the agent has in mind with reference to his present activity. When we 
use the term 'purpose' we usually have in mind an object in view; an end 
or future aim, a design. If a bystander were to ask me why, by an 
imminent exertion, I am about to bring about a particular effect xI 
would not normally respond in terms of my purpose in bringing x about 
unless there were some further end towards which effect x is a necessary 
preliminary. I would normally rely on the term intention when talking 
about my attitude to an effect which I am about to bring about by my 
activity. This being the case then if purpose is to have a function as a 
mental element in criminal law then it must be at the expense of the 
'future' dimension of intention. 
Now if one accepts that the notions of intention and purpose are quite 
distinct then one may argue for the inclusion of purpose as a specific 
mental state in ascriptions of criminal responsibility. The Code Team" 
separates the notions of 'intention' and 'purpose'. The Team says that a 
person acts 'purposely' in respect of an element of an offence when he 
wants it to exist or occur. 3=' They say that a person acts 
'intentionally' in respect of an element of an offence when he wants it 
to exist or occur, is aware that it exists or is almost certain that 
it 
exists or will exist or occur. They say that for some offences 
'intention' as they define it must be used in a narrower sense 
than 
others and they introduce 'purpose' in order to restrict 
the mental 
element to one of aiming at the proscribed harm. 3r- 
They point out that 
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the Law Commission has canvassed a possible new offence which would 
invoke the fault element of purpose, namely sending a poison-pen letter 
for the purpose of causing needless anxiety or distress. 37 
The Law Commission, in an earlier Working Paper , ~8 indirectly alluded to 
the 'purpose/intention' model offered by the Team. In that Working Paper 
the Law Commission proposed the offence of insulting religious 
feelings" which requires an intent to wound such feelings, but the Law 
Commission proposed that "intent' should bear as restricted a meaning as 
possible". It is suggested that this restriction renders the Law 
Commission's proposed mental state more or less equivalent to the Team's 
definition of 'purpose'. 
I think that the Code Team's definition of 'purpose' is useful since, 
being 'intention'`" minus 'mere knowledge or foresight' it enables us to 
ascribe more precise mental states to offences and avoids to some extent 
the varying definitions of intention in the cases. 4*1 However, I think 
that we may achieve that position without departing from the concept of 
intention. For we may apply the proposed twofold model of intention; 
designate as direct intention" the particular mental state which the 
Team describe as purpose (i. e. aiming to bring about the effec) and 
bring the Team's definition of intention within the framework of 
ý concomitant intention. 
The Proposed Concept of 'Purpose' and the Current Law Notion. 
If one accepts the proposed temporal distinction between direct and 
concomitant intention and purpose, then we face the task of providing 
for those cases in which the current law has used purpose as a form of 
restricted intention. In . teanea4 for example the conviction was quashed 
on the ground that the defendant's purpose was to prevent his family 
being incarcerated in a concentration camp. But on the proposed 
structure of wens rea, Steane made the broadcasts for the 
Germans with 
the direct intention to do so and, since assisting the enemy is a 
conceptually certain effect of that activity, " he also 
directly 
intended to assist the enemy. We cannot thus excuse 
him on the ground 
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that the effect aimed at (the broadcasts) is done for a purpose46 which 
is not illegal. The conceptually certain effect (assistance) is 
indivisible from the directly intended effect to intend one is to intend 
the other. It is submitted that this should have been the ratio in the 
case. I would comment here that there is a fair measure of academic 
opinion that Steane should have been held to have had the necessary mens 
rea for the offence but acquitted on the ground of duress. 47 
This strategy removes an objection which may be voiced against the 
decision in Steane, namely that if we excuse Steane on the basis of his 
innocent purpose then we would have to excuse the agent who broadcasts 
because he has been promised a home in residential Berlin. In 
attributing to Steane the appropriate mens rea but excusing on the basis 
of an appropriate defence we distinguish between Steane and the agent 
who broadcasts for the purpose of obtaining a property advantage: the 
latter has committed the actus reus with the appropriate mens rea and 
has no defence. 
In what has gone before we have discussed purpose as a specific mental 
state held by the agent in relation to future effect to be brought about 
by a specific future exertion. But what of the agent who has decided to 
bring about a specific future effect provided that a specific 
circumstance or factor obtains at the appropriate time. Suppose for 
example that D decides to have intercourse with V and to stab her to 
death if she offers any resistance. In the hypothetical the agent has 
formulated a plan to bring about a proscribed harm (rape) and, in 
addition, he has formulated another plan which he has decided to 
activate only if a necessary condition of his first plan is realised. On 
current law the agent is said to have a conditional intention concerning 
the latter scheme, and that intention ascends in status 
to direct 
intention from the point in time at which the agent decides to execute 
that plan. The theorists talk of this phenomenon in 
the same terms. It 
would be useful first to analyse the concept of conditional 
intention at 
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current law and then to see where the concept fits into the proposed 
models of wens rea outlined in this and the latter two chapters. 
Conditional Intention. 
We may begin an assessment of the current status of conditional 
intention by way of an analysis of the cases on theft. In Eas y 
Edmund Davies LJ decided that conditional intention (or conditional 
appropriation as he called it) is not sufficient as a requisite mental 
state in the criminal law. If an agent looks through the personal 
belongings of another intending to take anything valuable, finds nothing 
of value and returns it to the owner, he has not stolen. Edmund Davies 
posits the case of the dishonest postal sorter who "picks up a pile of 
letters intending to steal any that might be registered, but, on finding 
that none of them are, replaces them, he has stolen nothing". 
The dictum of the learned Lord Justice (as he then was) has been 
criticised' mainly on the ground that insufficient emphasis was placed 
on Easom's state of mind at the time of the appropriation. Koffman 
contends that an intention remains an intention although it may be 
subject to a condition and that in nearly all cases the intention is in 
some degree at least conditional. s° It is submitted that Koffman's 
contention is correct, for one might plausibly argue that where an agent 
puts his hands into another's pocket he intends to steal on the 
condition that there is something in the pocket, or that a burglar who 
enters a premises intends to steal on the condition that there is 
something in the building. 
Jaques Parry provides an interesting discussion on the concept of 
conditional intention s' He suggests that there are in fact two distinct 
categories of conditional intention. 11 This distinction had been made 
earlier by Williams. s The first he calls conditional intention in the 
strict sense. He gives as an example here Edmund Davies' illustration of 
the postal sorter. He argues that this agent has made up his mind 
that 
he is going to steal if and when the appropriate state of affairs 
manifests itself. The second he calls 'suspended intention'. He gives as 
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an example of the second category the case of Easom itself. for Parry 
the agent who looks through a bag of another intends to steal if, and 
only if, he subsequently decides to steal. The distinction between the 
two categories is that in the f ormer the agent has made up his mind that 
he is going to steal given the occurrence of a particular circumstance 
whilst in the latter category the agent has not made his mind up to 
steal; he may not do so, he will make his mind up once he has had the 
opportunity to weigh up the situation in the light of the circumstances 
as he finds them to be. Parry contends that whilst we may hold the agent 
in the first category guilty of theft (or attempted theft) we may not 
ascribe liability to the agent in the second category on the ground that 
he lacks wens rea since "to intend to decide whether to do something is 
not the same as intending to do it". 64 
Parry's suggested distinction is open to at least two objections. First, 
one might argue that it would be difficult for the prosecution to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant's mental state amounted to a 
conditional intention as opposed to a suspended intention. Parry's 
response to this would presumably be that the distinction between 
conditional intention in the strict sense and suspended intention is a 
practical distinction and is thus, for the purpose of criminal 
proceedings a question of proof which might suitably be left to the good 
sense of the court or jury. However on a matter of proof it would be 
difficult for an agent to plead that he was uncommitted at the time of 
his activity where that activity constitutes his being a trespasser or a 
person in possession of property of another without the consent of that 
other. 
Second, the distinction may decriminalise certain activity which is at 
present regarded as contrary to the law. For example the agent who gains 
access to premises with a view to looking around in order to see if 
there is anything worth taking would fall into the concept of suspended 
intention and thus not be guilty of burglary. -' Parry defends his theory 
against this objection on the basis that a person may have both 
suspended and conditional intention (i. e. he may have decided to take 
something and all that is left in the decision process is precisely what 
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to take). However an agent may have Only suspended intention - namely 
the agent who has genuinely not made his mind up either way at the time 
he takes any physical step in order to weigh up the situation. An 
example here might be the case of D who enters a second hand store in 
order to browse. Seeing no-one present in the shop he thinks about 
taking something but does not know if there is anything of sufficient 
value to him. He looks around the stock but before he sees anything of 
interest to him the shopkeeper emerges from the rear of the premises. In 
this case D has made no physical exertion following his decision to 
weigh up the possibilities and my suggestion is that D does indeed fall 
within Parry's concept of suspended intention. 
It is submitted that were an agent has made no physical step in 
preparation regarding his thoughts as to possible future activity 
then his mental state remains suspended intention. Parry admits this, 
implicitly at least, when he says that it is unlikely that an agent may 
successfully plead suspended intention when he has been caught in a 
house or place where he has no business to be or has his hand in 
somebody elses pocket or handbag. " Parry thus admits that Easanm is a 
case of conditional intention in the strict sense and seemingly insists 
upon some physical movement which is a necessary step in preparation for 
a substantive offence (he talks of an unequivocal step which suggests 
that D was not merely contemplating theft but had decided upon it). 6-7 
However Parry is prepared to excuse an agent who has taken, perhaps 
considerable, physical steps in preparation for the commission of a 
substantive offence provided that he is genuinely uncommitted as to 
whether he will execute the offence. He defends the decision in 
Hu n I3 on the ground that the contents of the holdall in the van are 
much less likely to contain valuables than, say, a lady's handbag. He 
suggests that we might say of Husseyn that he genuinely had not made 
his 
mind up to steal; he was uncommitted, his activity was no more 
than a 
reconnaissance which enabled him to assess the situation and 
finally 
make a decision as to whether or not to commit a substantive offence. 
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Decisions by the courts show that current law does not accept the 
distinction between conditional and suspended intention; that either 
concept is sufficient for offences which admit the actus reus of theft. 
In Bayley and Easterbrook, 5'59 for example, the Court of Appeal dismissed 
the defendants' appeal against conviction on the ground that the trial 
judge had misdirected the jury in saying that it was sufficient if the 
defendant s took the box "with the already-formed intention of keeping 
its contents, whatever they might be, if of value to them". The contents 
of the box were valuable but the appellants did not want them. At the 
trial the jury were not directed on the distinction between conditional 
and suspended intention and the Court of Appeal was clearly of the 
opinion that the distinction was not important in the assessment of 
liability for theft. 
Should we agree with Parry and distinguish between conditional and 
suspended intention? In deliberating on the question it should be borne 
in mind that the cases put forward by Parry involve an actual 
appropriation of property, i. e. the agent has perpetrated the actus reus 
of theft. The distinction is thus restricted to cases in which the agent 
has appropriated the property of another and the crux of the matter is 
his mental state at the time of the appropriation. If he is genuinely 
uncommitted as to whether he will keep all of any of the property (he 
has not yet decided to steal) then, for Parry, he should not be 
convicted of theft. 
In my submission we ought not make the distinction for several reasons. 
First, Parry bases the distinction on the element of 'decision': if the 
agent has already formed the decision to steal before he takes hold of 
the property then he has conditional intention but not otherwise. But it 
is not always clear at what point in an agent's thinking he has reached 
the point of a firm decision. Hampshire and Hart say that "an action 
is 
often performed, voluntary and deliberately, without the agent's 
having 
stopped to wonder whether he would perform it or not, and without 
his 
having rehearsed in his mind the reasons for and against performing 
it". '-° Thus the agent in the 'second hand' store who realises 
that no- 
one is present may be forming some mental state as 
he picks up an item 
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to examine it but it may be that not even the agent himself can 
accurately state whether or not he had formed a decision to steal at the 
moment he picked up the item. The learned authors also point out that 
"as there are degrees of knowledge, ranging from complete certainty to 
complete uncertainty, so there are degrees of decision. ' If this 
contention is accepted then, in trying to maintain the distinction 
between conditional and suspended intention, we must in some way resolve 
the difficult question of the precise stage in the decision making 
process at which we may say that the agent has in fact made up his mind 
to steal. 
Second, Parry suggests that the agent in such cases as Eaam is forming 
a decision or has formed a decision as to what, if anything, he might 
take in relation to the property appropriated. But may we not equally 
say that in such a case an agent is forming or has formed a decision to 
leave behind that property which he does not want? Viewed in this way we 
may say that all agents who appropriate property with the intention of 
taking something, all or nothing, depending upon what they find, have 
formed a firm decision to steal and are allowing themselves the 
discretion whether or not to return or discard the property which is of 
no value to them. Also an agent in such a case might not have considered 
the possibility that there was nothing of value at the time of his 
appropriation. All of this suggests the difficulty for a jury in 
deciding on the evidence just which of the two distinct states of mind 
was held by the defendant at the appropriate time. 
Third, Parry himself suggests that one distinction between conditional 
and suspended intention concerns the objective facts of each case. If 
the property appropriated ordinarily contains valuables (such as a 
lady's handbag) then, as Parry admits, we may properly count the agent's 
mental state as conditional intention: but if the property is of such a 
kind which, viewed objectively, does not necessarily contain valuables 
(e. g. a holdall or box) then, provided the agent has not made up 
his 
mind to steal, he has suspended intention. But this opens up 
the 
question of precisely what property ordinarily connotes 
that it or its 
contents are valuable and which property does not. 
Also we have the 
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problem of deciding whether value should be viewed subjectively or 
objectively. A particular defendant might claim that a sole copy of a 
doctoral thesis which is near completion is of no value to him but 
doubtless it would be extremely valuable to the student from whom it has 
been taken. These points indicate that Parry's thesis involves a very 
fine distinction which might well lead to uncertainty in this area of 
our criminal law. 
Finally, it is crucial to Parry's distinction just what, if anything, 
the agent has decided, prior to the appropriation. In my view we should 
not give so much emphasis to a decision (of whatever type or degree) 
taken before the appropriation since it is intention (and not a 
decision) which is the necessary mental state for the theft or attempted 
theft. In Easo '= and $i c`' the defendants intended to steal at the 
time of their acts. In each case their intention was subject to a 
condition but that condition was in each case a collateral aspect of, 
and did not go to the root of, the mental state which remained 
intention. Viewed in this way we might plausibly argue that the 
defendants in Faom and Hmsseyn perpetrated the actus reus of theft with 
the appropriate wens rea. However the courts have not interpreted the 
mental state in this way, presumably since the prosecution must specify 
the property stolen in order to secure a conviction. The Court of Appeal 
has applied a procedural solution in the charge of attempted theft of 
unspecified items. 16-4 My suggestion is that the agent in such cases 
should be charged with the substantive offence where he has in fact 
appropriated property, and with attempted theft where he has not, as, 
for example, where an agent puts his hand in someone else's pocket in 
order to steal but there is nothing there. However this would require a 
positive statement by the legislator to put the issue beyond doubt. 
An interesting point by way of conclusion on conditional intention in 
cases of theft. The postal sorter posited by Edmund Davies (above) would 
not in fact be guilty of theft if there are no registered letters in 
the 
batch since he has authority to act as he does and cannot thus 
be said 
to have appropriated property belonging to another. 
One should note here 
the case of Poyntoný'6 which, it is submitted, is authority on 
this 
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issue. Presumably he is also not guilty of attempted theft since he has 
done nothing which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of 
the substantive offence. 
What of conditional intention in cases other than theft? Illustrations 
include the burglar who takes along a cosh in order to render senseless 
anyone who interrupts his enterprise, or the paramour who carries a gun 
in order to kill V if she does not agree to divorce her husband and 
marry him. '-' Worthy of note is that in such cases the agent may 
perpetrate preliminary activity concerning his conditional intent at 
some point in time removed from the moment at which he makes his mind up 
whether or not to go through with it. Two points for discussion here are 
(i> whether or not the agent can be said to intend the object of a plan 
which is subject to a condition which may or may not obtain at the 
relevant time, and (ii) whether we may ascribe liability to the agent in 
relation to that conditional intention, and if so at just what point 
along the causal chain which may lead to the object of that conditional 
intention should we admit the agent to criminal liability for it? 
Provisional Purpose. 
Regarding (i) we cannot say that an agent intends a conditionally 
intended effect of his activity on my proposed model of direct intention 
since this excludes the effects of future activity (which a 
conditionally intended effect surely is). Any criminal offence which is 
the object of a future exertion constitutes an agent's purpose. I would 
thus call a planned future effect which is subject to a condition the 
agent's 'provisional purpose' or 'provisional objective' and the causal 
chain which leads to that purpose the 'provisional causal chain'. It is 
submitted that in such a case there are in fact two causal chains, one 
leading to the primary end which may or may not be criminal, and the 
other to a contingent illegal end which is subject to a condition which 
must be satisfied if the provisional chain is to be completed. 
Regarding (ii) we would certainly ascribe liability to the agent who 
completes the provisional causal chain, or charge him with an attempt 
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where he decides to bring about the object of his conditional intention 
and has taken steps which are more than merely preparatory to bringing 
it about. I think too that we are entitled to and should record in the 
conviction a provisional purpose which accompanies the criminal offence 
and towards which the offence is a necessary preliminary. Suppose for 
example Dudley plans to break into a museum and steal a valuable 
exhibit. He appreciates that he might set off a 'silent' alarm which 
would, unknown to him, alert the police. He thus includes in his plan 
the possession of a gun to shoot dead any police officer who might 
interrupt him. He gains entry to the museum with a weapon and 
successfully completes his enterprise without interruption. It is 
submitted that when Dudley takes possession of the gun he commits an 
offence contrary to s. 1(1) of the Firearms Act 1968 (and presumably an 
offence contrary to s. 16 of that Act concerning his conditional 
intention to endanger life if that section admits conditional intention 
as a requisite mental state). 
In the hypothetical Dudley embarkes on two causal chains which are quite 
separate and distinct although they share preliminary links in the 
causal chain. Whether or not the provisional chain of activity will 
proceed to completion cannot be answered until the agent has actually 
brought about the earlier separate and concurrent links of the separate 
causal chains to the point at which he can determine the situation upon 
which his provisional purpose hangs. The situation may be such that the 
provisional chain of activity breaks down before that link at which the 
chain would change from provisional to resolute in character. 
It is submitted that where the agent perpetrates a criminal offence 
which is a necessary preliminary to a further prospective criminal 
offence which is subject to a condition we are entitled to include that 
provisional purpose in the conviction for the preliminary offence. My 
view is based upon two grounds. First, it conforms with the criterion 
that, for the purpose of recording convictions we ought to mark an 
agent's moral culpability with sufficient specifity. Second, where the 
agent has actually perpetrated a preliminary criminal offence 
he 
provides us with fairly strong evidence of his resolve 
to carry out the 
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provisional purpose should it prove necessary for him to do so: for why 
else would he bring himself within the perview of the criminal law 
concerning that preliminary activity? However I think that there is a 
significant moral difference between provisional and unconditional 
purpose since, to the extent that my purpose is provisional I may be 
less committed to it and thus less culpable insofar as my purpose 
remains provisional. For example it is submitted that Donald who travels 
to the palace in order to pursuade the King to desist from his cruelty 
towards the Queen with the plan of shooting him if he refuses is less 
culpable than Desmond who travels to the palace with the unconditional 
aim of killing the King. This moral distinction deserves legal 
recognition at the conviction stage. We may mark that distinction in the 
way in which we frame the conviction. We may, for example, convict 
Donald with an offence contrary to s. 1 of the Firearms Act 1968 with the 
provisional purpose of committing assassination and convict Desmond with 
that substantive offence with the direct purpose of committing 
assassination. The forms of conviction show clearly that Desmond acts 
with the unconditional aim of killing the monarch whereas Donald's 
propective act of assassination hangs upon a condition which, if 
unfulfilled, will exclude his attempt thereat. 
I return to the hypothetical of Dudley to demonstrate that my proposals 
here draw a much sharper distinction in moral blameworthiness than does 
current criminal law. On the proposed concepts of purpose and objective 
Dudley would be convicted of burglary contrary to s. 9 of the Theft Act 
1968 and an offence under s. 16 of the Firearms Act 1968 with the 
provisional purpose of committing murder. However suppose Douglas enters 
a museum to steal a valuable 18th Century pistol. He takes with him a 
loaded and fully working replica which he intends to put in the place of 
the valuable exhibit so that his enterprise will remain undetected. He 
has decided to flee should he be confronted by any person. He completes 
his enterprise without incident. On the proposed structure Douglas is 
guilty of burglary simpliciter. The significant moral distinction 
between Dudley and Douglas is thus drawn out in the conviction. However 
at current law both Dudley and Douglas would be guilty of aggravated 
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burglary contrary to s. 10 of the Theft Act 1968 and Dudley's provisional 
purpose concerning his possession of the weapon is ignored. 
An interesting point on provisional purpose emerges. What if the agent 
plans a particular harm and realises that there are options to achieve 
it depending upon circumstances prevailing at the time of execution, and 
sets about preparing for each option only one of which he will rely upon 
at the appropriate time? Suppose Daphne plans the untimely demise of her 
mother Veronica in order to bring forward her inheritance of mother's 
sizable estate. She considers that a shooting and a fake robbery would 
be the ideal method of disposal but if the neighbours are at home then 
the chances of detection are enhanced. She considers that the 
administration of poison would be a somewhat quieter expedient but the 
chance of detection would be greater than a shooting with the neighbours 
absent. All would then depend upon the presence or otherwise of the 
neighbours. Daphne steals some poison from a local store, takes her 
husband's shotgun and sets off to her mother's home to conclude her 
enterprise one way or the other. She is arrested before she reaches her 
mother's home and confesses all to the police. In this hypothetical D 
plans to set in motion two separate causal chains each of which is 
provisional although either will bring about the same object. Also D 
perpetrates a preliminary criminal offence concerning each provisional 
causal chain, namely theft and an offence under s. 18 of the Firearms Act 
1968 respectively. On the proposed models of intention and purpose 
Daphne would be guilty of the appropriate substantive offences each for 
the purpose of committing murder. We would not refer to provisional 
purpose in such a case since there is none: Deirdrie has a positive 
purpose and it is the means of securing it which are provisional. 
An objection to the inclusion of provisional purpose in the framework of 
criminal law is that if the concept is to apply universally it might 
catch the agent who perhaps ought not to be accountable at criminal law 
concerning his provisional purpose. I have in mind here, for example, 
the agent who goes home armed with a knife intending to kill 
his wife if 
he finds her in the act of adultery with another man. If this agent 
has 
a defence to the substantive offence then one might exclude this case at 
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least from the parameters of the proposed model of purpose since in 
convicting him with the preliminary offence contrary to s-1(1) of the 
Prevention of Crime Act 1953 for the provisional purpose of committing 
murder we would be convicting him without reference to his possible 
defence. I would reject the argument. The agent has planned fully the 
form that his activity will take should he find his wife in the act of 
adultery and he has calmly prepared accordingly. He could not thus plead 
provocation under the provisions of s. 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 
concerning the substantive offence so why should we treat his case 
differently from any other concerning provisional purpose? 
I would thus attribute provisional purpose to an agent who has 
perpetrated a preliminary criminal offence: I would not however extend 
the concept of provisional purpose to the agent whose preliminary 
activity towards an illegal end is otherwise innocent. ": -7 Suppose for 
example that D has been advised that his girl friend has been unfaithful 
to him. He places a sledge hammer in his car boot for the purpose of 
causing extensive damage at her flat if he finds that the allegation is 
true. My submission here is that we may not ascribe provisional purpose 
to D for his de facto innocent activity concerning the sledge hammer on 
the ground that the agent who makes an innocent preliminary exertion 
along a provisional causal chain does not exhibit the same commitment to 
his provisional purpose as that demonstrated by the agent who 
perpetrates a preliminary criminal offence. Whether D who perpetrates 
innocent activity towards a criminal end should be liable for that 
preliminary activity is a question for discussion in Chapter 5.11 
The agent's objective is the ultimate purpose which completes the causal 
chain of activity chosen by him as the means with which to achieve 
it. 
An objective is thus a purpose like any earlier purpose in the causal 
chain, but the objective is the ultimate purpose at which 
the agent 
directs the selected causal chain. Since the objective 
is a purpose it 
has all the qualities which I pointed out in relation 
to my definition 
of the latter concept above., ý`3 It is thus possible 
for the agent to 
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bring about his objective with his first exertion70 in which case the 
agent's intention, purpose and objective all coincide. " In such a case 
it is submitted that the agent's objective and intention are conflated 
and it is thus proper to talk solely in terms of direct intention. 72 
Where the planned causal chain comprises several purposes then they may 
be all legal or illegal in nature or there may be a combination of 
innocent and criminal purposes. An illustration will facilitate 
discussion here. Suppose Dominique wishes to go on a long holiday to 
America. Because she has insufficient funds to achieve her ambition she 
formulates a plan comprising the following stages: 
(i) breaking into the local supermarket and removing the money from 
the tills, 
(ii) purchasing a quantity of cannabis from a drug pedlar known by her, 
(iii) allowing persons into her home to buy and smoke the cannabis 
there, 
(iv) purchasing an airline ticket to America, 
(v) flying to America, 
(vi) spending the balance of the money received for drugs so that she 
enjoys a long and expensive holiday there. 
Dominique thus plans to break into the store (i) for the purpose of 
stealing money, (ii) for the purpose of buying cannabis, (iii) for the 
purpose of selling and allowing it to be smoked on her premises, (iv) 
for the purpose of buying an airline ticket, (v) for the purpose of 
flying to America (vi) with the objective of having a long holiday 
there. Dominique thus has six purposes concerning her planned chain of 
activity the last of which constitutes her objective. Some of her 
purposes are legal whilst others constitute criminal offences at 
appropriate stages as her chain of activity proceeds. 
The Status of the Proposed Concepts of 'Purpose' and 'Object'. 
I have described the nature and substance of the proposed concepts of 
'purpose' and 'objective'. It remains to state the relationship 
between 
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those concepts and the proposed structure of intention and to examine 
how the three models would fit into attributions of criminal 
responsibility. My submission is that in assessing criminal liability we 
are entitled to look to the entire causal chain and attribute liability 
for both the criminal link which has in fact been forged by the agent 
and the unattained prospective criminal link in the causal chain towards 
which the offence committed is a necessary preliminary. We would base 
liability for the preliminary offence committed on the concept of direct 
intention: 7 we would base liability for the unattained prospective 
offence on the concept of purpose or objective. In so doing we do not 
convict the agent with the unrealised offence: we simply record more 
accurately the moral culpability with which he brings about the 
preliminary criminal offence. 
We may take the hypothetical of Dominique above as an illustration here. 
Suppose that Dominique is apprehended by the police as she is leaving 
the store with the money. On current law she is guilty of burglary 
contrary to s. 9 of the Theft Act 1968, and perhaps criminal damage 
contrary to s. 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. On my proposed models 
of mens rea Dominique would suffer the same fate on the basis of direct 
intention. But suppose that Dominique later discloses to the police the 
full extent of her criminal enterprise. On current criminal law there is 
presumably no liability for the unrealised criminal links in the causal 
chain namely unauthorised possession of a drug contrary to s. 1(1) of the 
Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act 1964, and being a occupier concerned in 
the management of premises knowingly permits or suffers the smoking of 
cannabis contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. However on the 
proposed models of purpose and object we may convict Dominique of 
burglary (and perhaps criminal damage) for the purpose of possession of 
a controled drug with the objective of 'knowingly permitting' . 74 Notice 
how the proposed strategy takes account of significantly different moral 
mental states concerning activity. Dominique's activity in taking 
the 
money is much more morally reprehensible than that of 
Doreen who simply 
takes the money in order to take as good a holiday as 
is possible with 
the money she has taken. 
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I should point out that it is not prospective activity which is the 
subject of liability here, it is the prospective proscribed harm. It is 
thus necessary that the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
the agent had in mind an existing criminal offence as a specific 
prospective (and unrealised) link in the causal chain. The proposed 
models of purpose and objective do not thus give a judge any power to 
create new criminal offences: they are mental states which enable us to 
attribute liability for completed activity which constitutes a necessary 
preliminary to the perpetration of a prospective criminal offence. 
Direct and Concomitant Intention, Purpose and Objective. 
My submissions on direct and concomitant intention, purpose and 
objective would involve a significant restructuring of current law and 
thus stand in need of justification. There are several advantages for 
the proposed models. I have already alluded to several advantages for 
the two proposed concepts of intention, 7 but there are other advantages 
for the concepts of direct and concomitant intention, purpose and 
objective. 
First the proposed models provide us with a more sophisticated set of 
terms in relation to wens rea which would enable Parliament to state 
more precisely the mental element required for each particular offence 
in a way which causes no confusion as to the parameters of the 
individual types of mens rea. We thus avoid all the present obfuscation 
concerning the notion of intention in current law. 
Secondly my proposed structure would enable us to ascribe purpose to the 
agent for all prospective criminal harm towards which he has perpetrated 
preliminary criminal activity. This would make our structure of wens rea 
consistent across the spectrum of criminal offences. 
I have pointed out 
above? that our current criminal law only ascribes 
liability for 
prospective harm in some but not all offences and is thus 
inconsistent. 
That inconsistency leads to anomalies in the cases. We may illustrate 
the point with a particular substantive offence. 
In the offence of 
burglary the defendant is guilty if he enters a building as a 
trespasser 
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with the intention" of committing one of four specific offences78 One 
of these is rape. But what of the agent who enters as a trespasser with 
the intention of subjecting a female to acts of the grossest indecency 
but he is apprehended before he reaches her bedroom? Just what offence 
has D committed on current law? It cannot be burglary since his further 
intention does not correspond to one of the four specific offences. It 
cannot be attempt since, presumably, he has not done something which is 
more than merely preparatory to the commission of the substantive 
offene. ' Now if we subject my model of purpose to criminal liability 
then we are entitled to ascribe purpose to D in such a case since he has 
perpetrated a preliminary act of trespassory entry onto premises for the 
purpose of committing a (serious) crime therein. Of course this would 
mean the demise of burglary in its current form since that offence is 
restricted to one of four proscribed harms by the agent, whereas on my 
proposed model of purpose he is guilty of an offence when he enters any 
building as a trespasser, whatever the nature of the prospective 
proscribed harm purposed by him. I would however retain the name 
burglary in order to criminalise entry as a trespasser for the purpose 
of committing the particular offence. We would thus charge the agent 
above with burglary for the purpose of committing indecent assault. 
Third, the proposed models are in accord with the criterion that 
criminal blame and punishment should accurately reflect the moral 
culpability with which the agent perpetrates a criminal offence. The 
hypotheticals of Dominique and Doreen illustrate the contention. 
Current law does in fact accept my model of purpose as a freestanding 
mental state in some areas. For example the official Secrets Act 1911 
makes it an offence to enter a prohibited place for a "purpose 
prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state". In Chandler V 
I). P. P. S° Radcliffe L. J. stated that the appellants had made their entry 
for two separate purposes: an immediate purpose of obstructing 
the 
airfield, and a further or long term purpose of inducing the government 
to abandon nuclear weapons in the true interests of 
the state. This 
reasoning fits into my pattern of purpose although I would call 
the 
latter purpose the appellant's objective. 
138 
Objections to the Proposed Models of Kiens Rea. 
There are objections to my proposed models of purpose and objective. 
First one might argue that the proposal goes too far since it extends 
criminal liability to both the agent who has been prevented from 
completing the causal chain but might well have desisted in any event 
and the agent who has in fact voluntarily desisted after perpetration of 
a preliminary criminal offence. In any event why should we punish an 
agent in relation to a prospective as opposed to an actual exertion? In 
response I would point out that it is not unusual for the criminal law 
to punish prospective harm. Burglary provides an instance here. e' Also 
in attempts we punish for a prospective harm towards which his activity 
is sufficiently proximate. ß=1 
My more specific comment is that we ought not treat sympathetically 
either the agent who has been prevented from completing the prospective 
criminal offence but who might have desisted or the agent who actually 
desists before completing the criminal objective. I base my contention 
on the ground that there is no moral difference to be drawn between 
these two agents and the agent who has been prevented from but would 
have completed the criminal objective. For all three agents have the 
same mental state at the time that the preliminary criminal offence is 
committed: each perpetrates the preliminary offence with the same mental 
state concerning the objective and it is the mental state at the time of 
the actus reus of the preliminary offence which is crucial to 
ascriptions of liability and purpose. If any concession is to be granted 
to the agent for voluntary abandonment of the criminal objective (actual 
or supposed) it ought to be made at the point of sentence. 
Objective, Purpose and Motive. 
A second objection to the proposed models of purpose and objective is 
that it seems that the proposed concept of 'objective' is closer to the 
conventional usage of the word motive than to the concept of purpose. I 
would accept that this may be the case but would point out 
that the 
conventional usage of motive is vague. My own view 
is that motive should 
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be restricted to some inner mental state held by the agent concerning 
the consequences of his activity: that motive should be confined to 
emotions such as greed, hate, jealousy, compassion, fear, envy, 
distrust, and so forth. F"oK In this way we separate the proscribed harm Ithe 
emotion which accompanies it. I accept that this proposal would not meet 
with judicial approbation. For example in Hyam Ackner J directed the 
jury that D was guilty if she knew that it was highly probable that her 
act would cause at least serious bodily harm and it mattered not that 
her motive was to frighten Mrs. Booth. But in my view Mrs. Hyam's motive 
for her activity was jealousy. It is submitted that Mrs. Hyam ignited 
the petrol with the direct intention to cause some property damage for 
the purpose of frightening Mrs. Booth with the objective of causing her 
to leave the neighbourhood: her entire enterprise was motivated by her 
jealousy, and, perhaps, animosity towards Mrs. Booth. 
A third objection to the proposed notions is that if we ascribe purpose 
and/or objective in every case in which the agent has perpetrated a 
criminal offence which constitutes a necessary preliminary towards a 
prospective criminal objective then how is Parliament to legislate for 
crimes based upon purpose: i. e. offences in which the purpose is central 
to liability and appropriate punishment as opposed to a secondary 
consideration in connection with the preliminary offence committed? We 
may take burglary as an illustration here. In that offence the agent 
perpetrates the actus reus when, inter alia, he enters a building as a 
trespasser. a4 The actus reus is in fact not itself criminal but 
Parliament has seen fit to criminalise and award severe penalties where 
trespassery entry is effected with the purpose of committing one of four 
specified offences whether or not the purpose is successfully 
achieved. O= My response to the question is that it would be available to 
Parliament to pass legislation creating a specific offence of purpose 
within the proposed structure of mens rea where it wishes to subject 
purpose to specific liability and punishment. Where an agent is charged 
atjuty 
with such an offence the court would be able (as now) to decide upon 
guilt in accordance with the requisite mens rea requirement and 
the 
judge may (as now) take into account the maximum sentence 
for the 
statutory offence of purpose when deliberating upon appropriate 
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sanction. Statutory offences of purpose such as burglary would thus form 
a part of the proposed structure. It is envisaged that the specific 
offence of purpose would only be necessary where Parliament wishes to 
criminalise otherwise innocent activity, 
One problem for the dual system concerning the offence of burglary would 
remain. I have pointed out $s that the offence of burglary is restricted 
in relation to the agent's aim as he enters the building as a 
trespasser. If he enters as a trespasser with the purpose of raping a 
woman but is prevented from doing so we may convict him of burglary 
contrary to s. 9 of the Theft Act 1968 and award an appropriate sentence 
which reflects his purpose. But if he enters a building as a trespasser 
in order to commit acts of indecency on a woman we presumably cannot 
blame or punish him for his trespassery entry since that act is not 
itself criminal and he cannot thus fall into either a current crime of 
purpose or the proposed notion of purpose which rests upon a preliminary 
criminal offence. If we wish to ascribe liability to this agent we would 
have to criminalise entry as a trespasser for the purpose of committing 
a criminal offence which falls outside the current parameters of 
burglary. "'' There are two alternative strategies here. First we may 
retain burglary in its current form and include trespassery entry for 
the purpose of committing other offences in the proposed offence of 
peregration. ''7 Alternatively we may extend the parameters of burglary to 
include all criminal purposes. I would argue for the second strategy on 
two grounds. First the four offences specified in s. 9(2) cover most 
criminal harm and its extension to at least all indictable offences 
would not involve an undue extension of criminal responsibility. Second, 
the latter strategy would eradicate the incoherence of the offence of 
burglary which is best explained by way of illustration. Suppose that D, 
enters a building as a trespasser in order to steal some cigarettes. He 
is guilty of burglary but D2 who enters as a trespasser in order to 
perform acts of indecency with the occupier is not. It is submitted 
that 
the restricted contours of burglary lead to incongruity in ascriptions 
of liability. The subjection of all criminal purposes to the offence of 
burglary would lead to a more consistent and coherent structure of 
criminal responsibility. 
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A fourth objection. One might say that if purpose and objective is to be 
used as a ground for the ascriptions of liability then this will create 
evidentiary problems of establishing ultimate purpose. For how could a 
jury conclude beyond reasonable doubt that x was the ultimate purpose of 
the accused if he is in the witness box saying that he had some other 
reason y for perpetrating a criminal offence? " The main thrust of this 
argument is that in creating such offences we would extend the crime of 
attempt into the sphere of really preliminary not to speak of 
preparatory activity. 
I would comment here that difficulty in proving the precise prospective 
links of the causal chain should not be a bar to subjecting the agent to 
criminal liability in cases in which that proof is available. As to the 
suggestion that the proposed mental states would extend the crime of 
attempt to preliminary activity, I would point out that the agent would 
not be charged with an attempt on the proposed models: he would be 
charged with committing the substantive criminal offence for the purpose 
of committing the prospective criminal offence towards which the 
substantive offence is a necessary preliminary. We would thus convict 
the agent of the offence which completes a preliminary link in the 
causal chain and we would characterize the moral basis upon which that 
preliminary link was forged by stating in the conviction the criminal 
purpose or purposes at which the preliminary offence was directed. " 
This is not to bring into account the concept of double criminalisation: 
we are simply placing an accurate label on the agent's activity in terms 
of moral culpability. However it might be the case that his criminal 
purpose, when proved, might affect the sentence awarded to the agent for 
the preliminary substantive offence committed. "' 
My comments above relating to attempts lead us to another objection to 
the proposed structure of mens rea. For if we restrict the notion of 
intention to an exertion which is itself capable of producing the actus 
reus of the offence then just what is left of the current law offence of 
attempts? It is to this issue that discussion turns in the next chapter. 
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1. For which see supra chapter 3. 
2. See supra chapter at pp. 18-19. 
3. But I would charge D with the preliminary activity leading to the 
preliminary offence. see chapter 5 for a discussion on this point. 
4. For a summary of the law on kidnapping see RvD 119841 AC 778. 
5. Extraneous agency and not innocent agency since V perpetrates the 
offence with intention although it is likely that he has the defence of 
duress. But what if D incites P to commit an offence against V? Here P 
will be perpetrating the actus reus with intent and has no defence so 
what is D's liability. This issue is discussed infra chapter 5. 
6. In fact purpose and direct intention are conflated at this point but 
since purpose on the proposed model involves some future exertion, we 
would talk simply in terms of direct intention here. If Denise had 
entered the shop with the intention of taking chocolate so that she 
could feed her hungry child then her chain of activity has a purpose 
beyond the retailer's premises and we may say that she directly intends 
to steal the chocolate for the purpose of feeding her child. Her 
exertion would certainly constitute an offence under s. 1 of the Theft 
Act 1968 and may constitute an offence under s. 9(1) of that Act (see 
Jones and Smith [1976] 3 All ER 54) since she has the necessary wens rea 
in relation to theft before she enters the building. Of course since her 
purpose (feeding the child) is not criminal in nature we would not 
include it in he charge: we would charge Denise with theft (or burglary) 
simpliciter. 
?, In conversation with me. 
8.119471 KB 997. See supra p. x for facts. 
9. Infra p. 123. 
10. Infra p. 134ff. 
11 i. e. intention as it is understood generally in current 
law. 
12.119151 1 KB 616. 
13.6th ed. at p. 58. 
14. See supra chapter 2 at p. 31. 
15. Supra note 8. 
16. In 'Responsibility Before the Law'. 1961 at p. 27. 
17. See supra p. 116. 
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(London, 1911). 
26. J. Salmond, 'Jurisprudence' 7th ed. 1947 ss. 133-4. 
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contrary view of intention see Lord Simon in Rv Jaiewski [ 19763 2 WLR 
628. 
28. Parenthesis supplied. 
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31. G. Williams, 'Oblique Intent' in the Criminal Law Review p. 418 
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32. Intention in the sense used at current criminal law. 
33. See generally A. White, 'Grounds for Liability', Chapter 6. 
34. Headed by Professor Smith. See 'Codification of the Criminal Law Law 
Comm. No. 143. 
35. At p. 183. 
36. Thus excluding mere knowledge of circumstances or foresight of 
consequences. 
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40. Intention as understood in Current criminal law. 
41. My models of direct intention and concomitant intention serve the 
same purpose. Direct intention concerns effects aimed at by the agent 
and is thus equivalent to the Team's 'purpose'. Concomitant intention 
relates to an awareness of a particular consequence and is thus similar 
to the Team's 'intention' but differs as to the degree of probability of 
the effect. 
42. Supra Chapter 2 p. if f. 
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to the 'future intention' aspect of burglary (and other offences) and 
state that their definition of intention includes purpose which will 
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cosh a criminal offence contrary to s. 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime 
Act 1953. Note that the definitional section 1(4) has been amended by 
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the Firearms Act 1968. 
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69. Supra p. 1ff. 
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illustrative here. 
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72. See supra p. 115. 
73. See supra chapter 2. Of course if the agent brings about any 
concomitant effect of his activity concerning the causal chain we may 
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in which Parliament ascribes liability for prospective harm. 
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84. Theft Act 1968 s. 9(1). 
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87. We may wish to restrict this to indictable offences. I should point 
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In this chapter I consider a selection of inchoate offences in order to 
assess how the current parameters of those offences might be affected by 
the adoption of the proposed models of intention, purpose and objective. 
I begin with the inchoate offence of attempt. 
1. Attempts. 
One dispute between judges and theorists in this area of law is 
concerned with the precise boundaries of the inchoate offence of 
attempt. Two major issues of that dispute involve (i) the point along 
the chain of activity towards commission of the substantive offence 
which renders the agent guilty of attempting the substantive offence and 
(ii) the criminal status of the agent who attempts to bring about a 
proscribed harm which, on the facts of the case, is not capable of 
fruition. In order to facilitate discussion upon the competing views I 
divide attempts into six categories although, for reasons which will 
become apparent I shall deal with five only in this chapter. ' 
(i) The Complete and Competent Attempt. 
In this category of attempt the agent has completed all the steps 
necessary for the commission of the substantive offence, the offence is 
capable of fruition, and yet his attempt has failed. For example D, has 
shot at V and missed or D: z has handed a poisoned drink to V 
but V has 
spilled it before drinking any of the mixture. Here there is no dispute 
between the judges and theorists; in each of the above examples both 
would hold the agent accountable for the state of affairs which violates 
the criminal law. Also both the ideal typical subjectivist and 
objectivist models would attribute liability to the agent 
in this 
category of attempt; the subjectivist model on the ground of 
both the 
dangerousness of the agent and his culpability, the objectivist model on 
the ground of dangerousness of the act. 2 
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Current law holds the agent in this category guilty of an attempt: 
s. 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 talks of acts which are more 
than merely preparatory to the commission of the substantive offence. 
An interesting issue on the objectivist position emerges from an 
analysis of a variant of the shooting case above. Suppose that D, had in 
fact deliberately shot wide of V in order to frighten him. In each case 
the same state of affairs has been brought about (a bullet narrowly 
missing the victim) but the intention in each case is quite different. 
On the ideal typical subjectivist model D, is not guilty of an attempt 
in respect of injury since there is no intention to cause such. -' The 
ideal typical objectivist construction would also give intention a 
central role in the definition of attempts, but, viewed objectively, D's 
act is dangerous and, on the facts, not unlikely to cause injury. The 
objectivist model would thus be prepared to ascribe liability in some 
form to D in relation to the danger of injury to V. For the 
subjectivist, too, there is good reason to ascribe liability to D 
concerning the danger of injury for if we convict D with assault we do 
not accurately record his moral turpitude since he is subjecting his 
victim to some risk of injury. The proper strategy in such a case, which 
would satisfy both the subjectivist and the objectivist models, is the 
creation of an appropriate substantive offence (e. g. endangering life) 
which would reflect the dangerousness of both the act and the agent and 
inform the judge on his culpability for the purpose of sentencing. ' 
(ii) Breakdown in the Causal Chain before the Last Step in Execution. 
In this category the agent has desisted at some point prior to the last 
step which is capable of producing the actus reus of the substantive 
offence. The abandonment might have been voluntary or the agent might 
have been prevented from completing his illegal enterprise. Both the 
subjectivist and objectivist are prepared to ascribe criminal 
responsibility for an attempt to the agent in this category provided 
that he has gone a considerable way towards commission of the 
substantive offence. Unfortunately the proponents of neither school have 
formulated adequate guidelines about the relative proximity of the 
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agent's activity to the commission of the offence sufficient for 
liability. 
Early objectivist formulations on proximity may be found in cases such 
as Eng1etQIl5 where the court spoke of "acts immediately connected with 
the commission of the offence". Objectivist thought thus latched onto 
the principle of 'last proximate step' towards the commission of the 
substantive offence as the watershed of criminal responsibility for 
attempts. I think that this formulation is open to two major objections: 
(i) conduct which might otherwise be considered 'in flagrante delicto' 
may be immune from early intervention and criminal responsibility on the 
ground that the agent has not arrived at the last proximate step. 
(ii) it is not always clear when an agent has brought himself to the 
point of the last proximate step. There is no difficulty in the case of 
the agent who shoots at his victim and misses but when has a would-be 
burglar arrived at the last proximate step of burglary? When he has 
brought a ladder to the scene of the crime? When he has placed it 
against a wall? When he climbs the ladder? When he fiddles with the 
latch? 
Objectivists have accepted the existence of fundamental defects in the 
principle of 'the last proximate step' and are now prepared to shift the 
focus of criminal responsibility for attempts further back along the 
spectrum between conception and execution. They insist, however, that 
the act of attempting must be linked with the definition of the 
substantive offence so that the criminal law is certain and free from a 
discretionary system of justice. There seems to be no consensus between 
the theorists of that school about an alternative focal point to the 
'last proximate step'. Three possibilities have been postulated by 
Fletcher, 'namely 
(a) the stages of activity from conception to perpetration are 
ascertained and function as a gauge to criminal responsibility according 
to whether the agent has reached a stage in the chain of acts 
sufficiently proximate to the execution of the substantive offence. 
This 
viewpoint is as deficient as that of the ' last proximate step' since we 
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cannot determine the relevant degree of proximity sufficient for 
liability with any accuracy. 
(b) the criterion of danger. This viewpoint admits to criminal liability 
those acts toward the commission of the substantive offence which are, 
per se, dangerous to legally protected interests. The dividing line 
between mere preparation and attempt is ascertained according to the 
"nearness of the danger, the greatness of the harm and the degree of 
apprehension felt". 7 This approach is less certain than the concept of 
'last proximate step' since one is left to speculate about just what 
otherwise preliminary step towards commission of the substantive offence 
is sufficiently dangerous to legally protected interests to bring it 
within the objectivist purview of criminal attempts. Perhaps we would 
need infinite degrees of 'nearness to the danger' between the 
substantive offences. Also this viewpoint would leave free from criminal 
responsibility the agent who has come very close to commission of the 
substantive offence but whose activity has not yet manifested itself as 
activity which is dangerous to legally protected social interests. This 
leads us to the third alternative objectivist standpoint, 
(c) apprehension and unequivocal conduct. This approach is inextricably 
bound up with the concept of manifest criminality. Salmond J. alludes to 
this view when he says that a criminal attempt is "an act which shows 
criminal intent on the face of it", '2=1 i. e. an act which unequivocally 
bespeaks criminality. This test for criminal attempts brings out clearly 
Fletcher's theory of shared imagery of criminal conduct. According to 
this view an agent has passed the preparation stage either when his act 
unequivocally shows criminal intent or, possibly, when it will be 
unequivocally interpreted as wrongful conduct by a third party observer. 
The essence here is that the act must be one which is res ipsa loquitor; 
an act which is innocent on its face is not a criminal attempt - "it 
cannot be brought within the scope of criminal attempts by evidence 
aliunde as to the criminal purpose with which it is done". ' 
It is submitted that this proposition is wrong since it emphasises 
the 
appearance of the agent's attempt and not its proximity 
to the 
commission of the substantive offence. Weinreb points out 
that "when we 
convict someone of attempted murder for administering an almost 
fatal 
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dose of poison it is not because she looks like a murderer, but because 
she came dangerously close to being one". 1° Most of the early cases 
which adopted an objectivist position stressed proximity as the test for 
criminal liability for attempts. Furthermore one should note the more 
general stance of Salmond J. in Rv Barker" which does not support the 
concept of unequivocal conduct. In a later passage in that case, dealing 
with impossible attempts, he said that "in determining whether he is 
guilty of a criminal attempt (the agent is not) to be judged by 
reference to the facts as they were (but) by reference to the facts as 
he believed them to be ... where a man puts sugar into his wife's tea 
... if he believes 
that it was arsenic he is guilty of attempted 
murder". '=2 This passage demonstrates that Salmond J. does not espouse 
the concept of unequivocal conduct as a legal principle although he is 
prepared to consider that conduct has an evidentiary role to play in the 
law of criminal attempts. 1 -' 
One final point on the objectivist viewpoint. I think that it would be 
capricious to convict and punish the agent who tries and fails using a 
method which gives away his criminal purpose and ignore the agent who 
tries and fails but chooses a modus operandi which is innocent on its 
face. 
Subjectivists insist on intention as the requisite mens rea requirement 
for this category of attempts. As regard actus reus they are prepared to 
set criminal responsibility at some point before the last act necessary 
and sufficient in order to bring about the proscribed harm, but 
unfortunately there is a lack of clarity in the subjectivist account 
about the precise point along the spectrum of activity from conception 
to execution which admits the agent to criminal responsibility for an 
attempt. 
Current criminal law, which has tried to steer a middle course 
between 
the subjectivist and objectivist models, talks of acts which are more 
than merely preparatory to the commission of the substantive offence. 
' 
This compromise approach inherits the problem of vagueness as 
to the 
precise threshold of criminal responsibility for attempts. 
Also the test 
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as to whether an accused's act was more than merely preparatory is to be 
left to the jury and this will undoubtedly lead to inconsistent 
decisions in the cases. 
The vague boundaries set by the theorists and current law are 
unfortunate for several reasons. First, they cause problems for the 
magistrates or jury in the cases in deciding whether or not a particular 
defendant has in fact done sufficient in relation to his intended 
enterprise in order to impose liability upon him in respect of an 
attempt at the substantive offence. Second, it is at the link in the 
causal chain which admits the agent to liability for an attempt that 
responsibility at criminal law begins. It is therefore of major 
importance to the agent, to all concerned in the administration of the 
criminal process and to society in general that we have a sharp boundary 
between attempt and non-attempt. Third the vague boundaries have 
practical implications. Suppose that Brown, a police constable, is 
following Smith whom he believes is on his way to perpetrate an 
arrestable offence. At what point may Brown affect an arrest? Whilst 
Smith is driving to the designated target? When he parks his car? When 
he walks up the garden path? When he breaks a window? It is possible 
that a premature arrest might lead to an action by Smith against the 
police authority. ' `- 
Another problem area caused by the vague boundaries of attempts concerns 
the agent who has gone some distance toward commission of the 
substantive offence and decides to desist provided that, in terms of 
criminal liability, it is worth his while to do so. If the agent has 
crossed the threshold of criminal liability for an attempt he is guilty 
of an attempt and liable to some punisment. If he has not yet crossed 
the threshold he is not liable or punishable in relation to his activity 
up to the point at which he desists. But given the vague boundaries 
supplied by the theorists and current law how will this agent know if 
his activity has reached that link in the causal chain which makes 
him 
liable for an attempt? 
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One might respond that it is advisable for the defendant to desist at 
dny point of his activity up to the last act which is capable of 
producing the substantive offence since generally he will receive 
punishment, if at all, depending upon the length he has travelled along 
the causal chain toward completion of the illegal enterprise aimed at by 
him. ' However it should be pointed out that more often than not at 
current law the threshold of criminal responsibility for an attempt 
occurs at an advanced stage of the causal chain. Robinson" and 
Gullefer'e are ideal illustrations of this point. In such cases where 
the point of criminal liability occurs close to the last link in the 
causal chain which may bring about the proscribed harm the agent will 
either not be liable at all or liable to near maximum punishment 
depending upon whether or not he has reached that link in the causal 
chain which constitutes the threshold of responsibility. It is thus 
important that the agent who is embarked upon such a causal chain and 
who considers the possibility of desisting should be aware of his 
criminal status, if any, at the point of his deliberation. We should 
thus have some general formula set out in advance so that agents who set 
out on activity toward a criminal offence know precisely when they have 
reached a point in the chain of causal activity which admits them to 
criminal responsibility. 
Duff'- asks here why we cannot say that one who embarks on a criminal 
enterprise must take the risk that at some uncertain point he will 
become liable to punishment? My response is that we ought to have a 
clear statement of just when activity becomes subject to criminal 
liability and the various points along a chain of activity at which the 
agent is subject to more serious blame and punishment first, in order to 
give the agent the maximum opportunity and encouragement to desist from 
criminal activity and second, to provide the court or jury with an 
appropriate yardstick for deciding upon criminal liability for an 
attempt in any particular case. My proposed structure of 'executive 
link' attempts/ peregration2" provides a clear boundary on the 
threshold 
of attempts: the agent attempts a substantive offence when 
he brings 
about the last link in the causal chain which is capable of producing 
the actus reus of that offence. However the agent would 
be liable for 
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all singularly necessary preliminary activity leading to the 
substantive offence but that liability (and appropriate sanction which 
increases as the agent proceeds along the causal chain) is less than 
that which we ascribe to him where he has completed that link in the 
causal chain which is itself capable of bringing about the proscribed 
harm-21 The agent is thus provided with a clear incentive to desist from 
his criminal activity at all points along the physical causal chain. 
A final problem concerning the vague boundaries of the concept of 
attempt set by the theorists and the criminal law is that they may lead 
to the exclusion of agents who perhaps ought to be criminally 
responsible for their activity. In Robinson2 for example the jeweller 
had faked a robbery at his shop, had tied himself up and had called out 
the police. However he was found not guilty of attempting to obtain 
money by deception since he had not at that point contacted his 
insurers. But I would submit that Robinson should have been subject to 
some form of criminal responsibility in relation to his illegal 
enterprise given the amount of preparation he haJ put into it. He has 
reached and executed a link in the causal chain which has led to a drain 
on a public resource (police manpower in the investigation). 23 Also in 
Gullefer244 the defendant had placed a bet at the track in a dog race. 
Realising that the dog he backed was about to lose the race he jumped 
onto the track in an effort to distract the dogs and have the race 
declared void so that he could obtain his stake money from the turf 
accountant. His efforts were only marginally successful and the race was 
not declared void. He was charged with attempting to obtain money by 
deception from the turf accountant but was held to be not guilty since 
his activity amounted to no more than mere preparation. But surely 
Gullefer should be liable to some form of criminal liability. He came 
close to spoiling a public event. I might add here that even if the race 
had been declared void (and the public event spoiled) Gullefer 
presumably would be not guilty of any offence since his exertion remains 
preparatory to his illegal objective. 
My submission gains weight when we introduce the concept of 
participation into cases such as Rob inson and Gulle fer. 
Suppose, for 
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example, that Gullefer was with his friend X at the race meeting. 
Realising that his dog is losing Gullefer conspires with X to stop the 
race and thereby obtain money by deception. X helps Gullefer scramble 
onto the track. The story then unfolds as per the actual facts of 
Gullefer. In this variant the agent would be guilty of conspiracy in 
relation to the substantive offence and liable to the same punishment as t1 
agent who completes the commission of the offence. Now if current law is 
prepared to ascribe some form of criminal liability to the agent in the 
variant of Gullefer on the basis of a 'team effort' why should it allow 
Gullefer to avoid liability in relation to the same causal chain which 
he has brought about by himself? Of course this contention would apply 
wherever one draws the line as to the actus reus in attempt. Professor 
Jackson thinks that this distinction between attempt and conspiracy is 
based upon the idea that if one communicates his intention to someone 
else, that act of communication and the securing of the agreement to it 
is incontrovertible evidence of the intention to carry through the 
criminal act whereas in the case of attempt the behaviour might be 
capable of interpretation in different ways up to a later stage. 2s But 
what if the police secure incontrovertible evidence that D is alone 
progressing along a causal chain towards commission of a criminal 
offence? What is the difference which renders the 'team' agent guilty 
and punishable as for the substantive offence but the 'solo' agent free 
from criminal liability? 
The solution to the problems set out above lies in (i) a definition of 
attempts which provides a precise borderline between attempt and 
preparation and (ii) an assessment of whether preparatory activity 
should count as an appropriate actus reus in our criminal law. 
In my submission it is the link in the causal chain which is itself 
capable2, E,: of producing the substantive offence aimed at (the 'executive 
causal link') which sets the boundary of criminal responsibility 
for 
attempts. Where the causal chain of activity breaks down before the 
executive causal link the agent would thus be excluded 
from the criminal 
law on attempts. I submit further that the agent who proceeds along 
the 
causal chain of activity but desists (voluntarily or 
involuntarily) 
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before the executive causal link has engaged in intentional activity 
necessary for the commission of that offence with t±e purpose'-7 that 
that offence be brought about by his activity when complete and that 
activity should thus be subject to the scrutiny of the criminal law. 
This would involve the creation of a new preparatory crime which, for 
the purpose of discussion, I shall call 'peregration'. 
My submission is that the agent who, with direct intention, brings about 
a singularly necessary link (or links) in a causal chain towards the 
commission of a substantive offence shall be guilty of peregration for 
the purpose of committing that substantive offence. 'Peregration' is 
derived from the word peregrination (meaning travel, especially abroad) 
but whereas peregrination involves an innocent excursion peregration is 
meant to describe the agent who is 'abroad' with the purpose of 
furthering an illegal end. The proposed preliminary offence of 
peregration has several features. 
(i) The agent must have embarked upon a criminal chain of activity which 
will lead to at least one criminal offence. This feature excludes from 
liability the agent who has planned a particular causal chain leading to 
one or more criminal offences but has yet to set that causal chain in 
motion. 2' 
(ii) Nothing short of direct intention`' will suffice as the wens rea 
for the peregratory effect itself. However when an agent commits 
peregration he does so with a view to committing the later substantive 
offence towards which his preliminary activity is directed; and the mens 
rea requirement for that later offence is 'purpose' . "' 
Singularly Necessary Exertion. 
(iii) A peregratory link in the causal chain is constituted by a 
singularly necessary exertion concerning a later criminal offence. By 
'singularly necessary exertion' is meant an exertion which is made 
solely for the purpose of bringing about the later offence, and not 
jointly in connection with other purposes or objectives. Thus where an 
agent gets out of bed having in mind the commission of arson later that 
day he does not commit the preparatory offence of peregrat i on since his 
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getting out of bed is not exclusively referable to the propective harm. 
However when he purchases a gallon of petrol to use in the arson attack 
he commits peregration (with direct intention) for the purpose of 
committing arson since his activity in purchasing that petrol is 
restricted exclusively to his prospective activity concerning that 
offence. 
(iv) The effect which has been brought about by the peregratory exertion 
must not be criminal in nature. If the preliminary effect is in fact 
criminal we may charge the agent with the substantive offence for the 
purpose of committing the later offence. " 
(v) The peregratory exertion must not be capable of bringing about the 
proscribed harm or else the exertion constitutes the executive link in 
the causal chain and the agent is now guilty of an attempt at the 
substantive offence and not the preparatory offence of peregration. 
(vi) It is sufficient that the agent believe that his peregratory 
exertion my- lead to the later criminal offence. It thus does not matter 
that D is not certain of success or that his purpose is not capable of 
fruition (e. g. unknown to D the person he intends to kill is already 
dead). - 
(vii) It is not necessary that the agent desire the later criminal 
offence at which his preliminary activity is directed. " 
(viii) Liability for peregration does not extend beyond the first 
criminal offence in the causal chain. Thus where D plans the commission 
of several criminal offences each of which is a necessary preliminary to 
his criminal objective and he perpetrates activity which is preparatory 
to the first criminal offence he is guilty of peregration for the 
purpose of committing the first criminal offence in the causal chain. 
I 
introduce this restriction because where the causal chain breaks 
down 
short of the first criminal offence we ought only to ascribe 
liability 
to the agent concerning that first offence since, in my view, 
it is the 
commission of the first offence which is the signpost of 
the agent's 
resolve to proceed further along the causal chain 
towards his criminal 
objective. Of course when the agent brings about 
the first criminal 
offence which is preparatory to a later criminal offence we 
would charge 
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him with the substantive offence for the purpose'-14 of committing the 
later offence or offences. 6 
(ix) The maximum sentence for peregration (which will involve those 
cases in which the causal chain has broken down just short of the 
executive causal link) would be low in comparison with the maximum 
sentence for an 'executive link' attempt. This feature provides the 
agent with the maximum incentive to desist from his criminal activity in 
the preparation stages. In accordance with this feature of peregration 
the agent who aims a gun at his victim and desists would receive a much 
lesser sanction than the agent who fires and misses. More on this 
later. 
(x) Although ideally the agent who is prevented from completing the 
causal chain should, for the purpose of conviction, be treated 
differently from the agent who desists voluntarily this would not be 
practicable. The offence of peregration would thus contain machinery to 
enable the judge to take the distinction into account when awarding 
sentence; applying a sentence nearer to the maximum for the offence of 
peregration where D has been prevented from completing his illegal 
enterprise. A variant of the case of the three I. R. A. terrorists 
killed by the S. A. S. in Gibralter (30.8.88) would provide a useful 
illustration here. Suppose that the Hart brothers and Mullin had not in 
fact been killed but merely taken into custody. On my theory they would 
be guilty of peregration for the purpose of committing murder but surely 
they ought to be punished more severely for that preparation than the 
agent who freely desists in the preparation stages. The judge ought to 
be able to bring out the distinction by way of the sentence awarded. Of 
course there might be some other charge which could have been levelled 
at the defendants in the case in issue=-7 in which case we may charge 
with the appropriate substantive offence for the purpose of committing 
murder. 
The proposed models of peregration and 'executive link' attempts may 
be 
stated thus. The preliminary offence of peregration consists of any 
exertion perpetrated by an agent which, although incapable of producing 
the illegal end per se, is a singularly necessary act 
toward the 
completion of that end and is directly intended 
by the agent for the 
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purpose of bringing about that end which he knows or believes will 
eventuate. 3a Once the agent's activity has reached that link in the 
causal chain which is itself capable of bringing about the proscribed 
harm aimed at by him (the executive causal link) he is guilty of an 
attempt in relation to that substantive offence. 
Let us call my model the 'executive link' theory of attempts. On this 
theory the agent is guilty of peregration for the purpose of committing 
the substantive offence aimed at by him at all singularly necessary 
points along the causal chain up to the executive causal link (the last 
act which is per se capable of producing the proscribed harm) at which 
point the agent is guilty of an attempt at the substantive offence. 
Several advantages flow from the proposed model. First it offers a much 
more definitive account of the notion of attempts than that supplied by 
subjectivist or objectivist theory. For example I have already pointed 
out the difficulty in deciding at just what point a would-be burglar 
would be guilty of attempted burglary on the objectivist view of 
attempts. With the 'executive link' theory of attempts one is not 
concerned with an analysis of various links along the causal chain of 
activity between conception and perpetration: an agent is not guilty of 
attempted burglary on present theory until he has arrived at the point 
of competent execution although he will be guilty of the new lesser 
offence in relation to earlier singularly necessary activity along the 
causal chain. 
Second, the theory enables one to distinguish at the conviction stage 
between the agent who desists before the stage of competent execution 
and the agent who proceeds to that point without success. One is thus 
able to record more accurately the moral status of the agent in relation 
to his activity. Consider the case of D who aims a gun at 
V and then 
decides not to go through with his evil design (killing 
V). Here the 
agent has voluntarily desisted from his course of action 
before the 
excutive causal link and is thus not guilty of attempted murder. 
One may 
thus charge him with peregration for the purpose of committing murder 
and thus distinguish this agent from the more evil agent who actually 
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fires at his victim but misses. 3c-' One may thus describe more accurately 
the events which have taken place in the indictment. All of this is in 
accord with Bentham' s statement that 
(i)f the punishment of a preliminary, or an offence begun but not 
yet finished, were the same with that of the completed offence, 
without allowing anything for the possibility of repentance or 
a prudent stopping short, the delinquent perceiving that he had 
begun would feel himself at liberty to consumate the offence 
without incurring any further risk". 4C' 
The proposed models would grant concession at the conviction stage to 
the agent who desists before his activity has reached the executive 
causal link since he would be charged with the lesser preliminary 
offence which would be subject to lesser sanction than that which is 
awarded for an attempt. `4' 
A third advantage of my proposed conceptual models is that they bring 
within the bounds of criminal responsibility cases which perhaps deserve 
criminal censure but which do not fall within the current law notions of 
inchoate offences. I have already pointed out the case of Robinson`' on 
this point. In that case Lord Reading C. J. said 
"the real difficulty lies in the fact that that there is no evidence 
of any act done by the appellant in the nature of the false attempt 
which ever reached the minds of the underwriters, though they were 
the persons who were induced to part with the money ... In truth 
what the appellant did was preparation for the commission of the 
crime ... We think the conviction must 
be quashed ... upon the 
ground that no communication of any kind of the false pretence was 
made to them'. 
On the proposed models 
an attempt since he is 
executive causal link) 
guilty of peregration 
s. 15 of the Theft Act 
an agent such as Robinson would not be guilty of 
not at the point of competent execution (i. e. the 
since he is yet to contact his insurer. 
But he is 
for the purpose of committing an offence under 
1968. In much the same way Gullefer43 would be 
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guilty of peregration for the purpose of committing an offence under 
S. 15. 
Note how the proposed structure enables one to place a more precise 
label on the agent: in charging him with the new preparatory offence we 
ensure that he is subject to criminal liability for his singularly 
necessary preliminary activity whilst separating him from the agent who 
perpetrates the same activity with a much lesser moral turpitude, for 
example the hoax caller who sends the police out to a bogus traffic 
accident. 
A further hypothetical is worthy of note here. Suppose that Dominic has 
borrowed Vincent's car and has agreed to return it to Vincent's house by 
12 noon on a particular day. Whilst driving the vehicle to Vincent's 
home on the agreed day and time Dominic forms the plan not to return the 
car to Vincent but to drive on, past Vincent's home, to a motor dealer 
and sell the vehicle as his own. Before Dominic passes Vincent's home he 
is involved in a road traffic accident and the vehicle is damaged beyond 
economic repair. Dominic's scheme is thereby frustrated. Objectivists 
would not ascribe liability to Dominic since there is nothing in his 
activity which has been proscribed by criminal law. Subjectivists would 
be more willing to attribute liability to Dominic on the ground of 
culpability but might, perhaps reluctantly, concede that the causal 
chain of activity has not progressed sufficiently for Dominic to be 
admitted to criminal responsibility for an attempt. On current law 
Dominic is presumably not guilty of any crime. He is not guilty of theft 
since he has neither assumed the rights of owner nor usurped the rights 
of ownership" up to the point of the vehicular collision; he is merely 
doing that which he has agreed with Vincent i. e. driving along the road 
to Vincent's home. Also he cannot presumably be guilty of an attempt at 
law since, arguably, he has not reached the first step in preparation. 
However I think that Dominic should be subject to liability since 
from 
the moment that he decides to breach the agreement with 
Vincent and 
travel to the motor dealer he is no longer driving 
the vehicle to 
Vincent's home: the character of his activity is altered 
by his 
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intention and we may say that he he is coincidentally driving towards 
Vincent's home whilst on his way to his chosen destination elsewhere. On 
this basis one might plausibly argue that Dominic ought to be guilty of 
the substantive offence of theft at the moment he decides to drive on to 
the dealer and sell the car as his own since, at that moment, he assumes 
ownership of the vehicle. ' In any event he would be guilty of theft on 
current law at the time he passes Vincent's house since from that moment 
he usurps the right of ownership of the vehicle. My submission is that 
Dominic has started the causal chain in relation to both theft and 
obtaining a pecuniary advantage from a motor dealer by deception from 
the moment that he forms the decision to steal the car and carries on 
driving so why should the fact that the road accident occur at some time 
before Dominic reaches Vincent's home, as opposed to some time after 
that point, be the crucial factor in the assessment of his liability? 
The proposed models would attribute liability to Dominic. I do not think 
that he has reached the executive causal link of theft at the time of 
the collision (and he has certainly not reached that link in relation to 
obtaining by deception) but he has nonetheless activated the causal 
chain in relation to each offence at the moment of his decision to drive 
on past Vincent's home. In continuing to drive following his decision to 
steal and sell the car Dominic instigates the first and singularly 
necessary link in the selected causal chain. We may thus charge Dominic 
with peregration for the purpose of committing theft. " It is submitted 
that when Dominic passes Victor's house he is guilty of theft and we may 
charge him with theft with the objective4" of committing an offence 
under s. 15 of the Theft Act 1968 since the theft is only a preliminary 
criminal link in a causal chain which leads to his criminal objective 
(obtaining property by deception). 
One final advantage of my theory is that the new preparatory offence 
enables early intervention by police into what would amount 
to criminal 
activity. 
I should point out that there are some jurisdictions which, 
in varying 
degrees, give support to my 'executive link/preparatory 
offence' theory 
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of attempts. For example the criminal law of Scotland , 48 Indian penal 
law49 and Canadian criminal law. I should point out that Canadian 
criminal law is in fact quite different from my proposed models since 
the former admits to criminal responsibility for an attempt any agent 
who 'having the intent ... does ... anything for the purpose of carrying 
out his intention'. " However, as with the proposed model of 
peregration, the Criminal Code of Canada is prepared to ascribe 
liability to the agent who takes the first physical step which is 
physically necessary to bring about a particular proscribed harm where 
it is his purpose that his activity bring about that harm. 
Also in America the Model Penal Code provides for specific offences of, 
for example, possessing instruments of crime and offensive weapons,, -' 
criminal trespass, " and many other offences relating to activity which 
is a preliminary to a more serious criminal offence. These specific 
Code offences demonstrate that American criminal law is prepared to 
attribute liability to the agent who sets in motion a causal chain 
towards commission of the substantive offence but fails to reach the 
executive causal link. 61- 
In English law, too, there is authority supporting the proposed model of 
'executive link' attempt. " In the law of theft the definition of the 
offence is such that the agent is required to have completed the 
executive causal link before he may be counted as having attempted the 
substantive offence. Lord Mansfield lends support to the proposed model 
of peregration. He states that 
"so long as an act rests in bare intention, it is not punishable by 
our laws: but immediately when an act is done, the law judges, not 
only of the act done, but of the intent with which it is done; and 
if it is coupled with an unlawful and malicious intent, though the 
act itself would otherwise have been innocent, the intent being 
criminal, the act done becomes punishable". ` 
My view is that Lord Mansfield is advocating a system of criminal 
liability from the moment the agent sets out on criminal activity: 
from 
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the first link in the causal chain of activity towards commission of the 
substantive offence. 
In addition there are numerous statutes, particularly the prevention 
statutes, which, like the Model Penal Code, render illegal various acts 
which are themselves preparatory to the commission of a more serious 
offence. " Of course in current law we would not charge the defendant 
with such an offence for the purpose of committing a later criminal 
offence: the offences are free standing: but the point I am making is 
that, albeit selectively, the current criminal law is prepared to 
ascribe liability for what is essentially preparatory activity for a 
later criminal offence. 
All of the authorities cited above give support in varying degrees to my 
proposal for the introduction of a new preparatory offence which is 
committed at the first singularly necessary physical link in the causal 
chain which is directed at an illegal end and continues to the executive 
causal link at which the agent is guilty of attempting the substantive 
offence. 
However the proposed models of peregration and 'executive link' attempts 
are not free from objection. Glazebrooks'-' argues that in pushing the 
inchoate offence to the extreme end of the spectrum between conception 
and execution one narrows the concept of attempts to vanishing point. 
Three comments may be put forward concerning this objection. First, it 
may be noted that most offences are narrow with respect to the actus 
reus element. In the case of murder, for example, the actus reus (the 
death of the victim) is extremely narrow: no type of injury other than 
fatal will suffice and the death must have occurred in accordance with 
narrow legal rules of causation. On present theory the agent must 
have 
brought about the executive causal link with direct intent; no other 
link along the causal chain will suffice for conviction 
for an attempt. 
Second, and more important, the narrow offence of attempt created 
by 
current theory may be justified on the ground that 
it enables one to 
distinguish between significantly different moral turpitudes at 
the 
conviction stage. The theory sets apart the agent 
D, who aims a gun at 
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his victim, If ires and misses from D: _. who aims a gun at . victim but 
desists before pulling the trigger and this is surely right. On current 
theory D, is guilty of attempted murder whereas D.. is guilty of 
peregration for the purpose of committing murder: the theory thus 
enables us to record the much lesser wickedness of D2. The definition of 
peregration does not differentiate between the agent who desists 
voluntarily and the agent who is prevented from completing the causal 
chain but, as I have mentioned-'9 we may mark this moral distinction at 
the sentence stage. Third, in pushing the threshold of criminal 
responsibility for attempts to the executive causal link in the chain of 
activity, and providing for a much lesser maximum sentence for 
peregration, s" we provide the agent with the maximum incentive to desist 
during the preparation stages of his activity since he is aware that he 
may abandon his enterprise at any point short of the executive causal 
link and incur liability and lesser punishment for the preliminary 
offence of peregration. 
In response to my second comment above one might object that if we are 
to distinguish between D, and D2 at the conviction stage then we ought 
to distinguish between D2 and D. - who merely pulls a gun out in V's 
presence and then desists (both agents acting with the purpose of 
killing V). My reply is that there is a major distinction between the 
moral turpitudes of the agent who tries and fails and the agent who 
decides not to try at some point during his preparations. Any moral 
distinction between the agents who desist at different points in 
preparation pales into insignificance in the light of that major moral 
distinction. Also I am not sure that there is a significant moral 
distinction between agents who, desist at different points in 
preparation since both demonstrate that they do not wish to go (and 
have 
not gone) through with their criminal design. In any event the facts of 
the cases may enable us to distinguish between such agents 
for the 
purpose of attributions of liability. Suppose for example 
that D4 places 
his hand in his pocket in order to pull out a gun and shoot 
V but 
changes his mind and does not expose the weapon. 
We would convict D3 
with an assault on V for the purpose of committing murder 
(since the 
assault is itself criminalb: z) but we would convict 
D4 (who has desisted 
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from committing murder at an earlier point in the causal chain) of 
peregration (and not assault) for the purpose of committing murder. ý-3 
Glazebrook notes a second objection to the 'executive link' theory of 
attempts. E4 He states that it would not be so easy to apply as might 
first seem. He posits the case of an intending incendiary crouched by a 
haystack with a full box of matches, and strikes one which is blown out 
by the wind just as he puts it to the hay. Glazebrook asks whether the 
incendiary has attempted to set fire to the stack. Is there something 
more that he can do if the crime is to be committed - to wit, strike 
another - and another match? With respect to Glazebrook the question 
poses no difficulty for my proposal. At the moment when the incendiary 
puts the match to the haystack he has completed the executive causal 
link: that act which is itself capable of producing the actus reus aimed 
at by him, and he is guilty of attempted arson. This case is analogous 
to the case of an agent who fires a gun at his victim but misses. Some 
extraneous phenomenon has caused the first bullet to miss but one would 
not deny that the agent is guilty of an attempt on his victim's life 
with the first and each succeeding shot fired by him. Is it then unfair 
to convict the incendiary of attempted arson? My submission is that we 
should ignore reasons for failure and look exclusively to the act of the 
defendant: if that act is capable, ceteris paribus, of producing the 
illegal consequence then one may ascribe responsibility to him for an 
attempt. Glazebrook's comment that the agent may strike another and 
another match fits into the pattern of the proposal. At the point at 
which the agent decides to try again and sets his desire into physical 
motion (by opening the matchbox again) he sets in motion a new causal 
chain of activity quite distinct from, although identical to, the first 
and may be judged afresh in relation to this new activity. In short the 
incendiary is guilty of an attempt each time that he places a lighted 
match to the haystack since on each occasion he brings himself to the 
executive causal link of a separate and distinct causal chain. 
A third objection to the proposal is that in assessing the entire 
conduct of an agent one might have difficulty in establishing 
just which 
acts of the agent amount to peregration. Implicit in this objection 
is 
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the truism that the agent who does an act x with intent y is to be 
distinguished from the agent who does act x whilst having intent y. The 
objection may be illustrated as follows. D decides to commit a burglary 
at 25 Acacia Avenue. He places some necessary tools in a bag and sets 
out to his designated target. En route he stops off at a restaurant for 
a meal. Are we to charge D with peregration with the purpose of 
committing burglary in respect of his act of eating a meal? 
This objection provides no obstacle for my proposals which insist that 
an act of peregration occurs at each link of the causal chain, i. e. the 
effect of each exertion by the agent, which is a singularly necessary 
preliminary step toward a later criminal offence. As I have explained 
above6c, a 'singularly necessary exertion' is one which is exclusively 
preparatory to the later criminal offence: there is no other effect 
towards which that exertion is a necessary preliminary. Any exertion 
which is not a singularly necessary preliminary step towards the 
prospective offence cannot amount to peregration. When he sets off from 
home with the tool kit D is guilty of peregration since this is a 
singularly necessary preliminary step towards the commission of 
burglary. 6-IE" As he eats (doing act x) in the restaurant his intention 
(while having intent y) remains, but his eating has nothing to do with 
his enterprise; it is thus not a singularly necessary link in the causal 
chain of activityS7 and attracts no criminal liability per se, although, 
as already stated, his liability for peregration has been established 
before he enters the restaurant. 
One final criticism of the proposed model of peregration is that it 
significantly increases the scope of the criminal law and any such 
extension requires some justification. I would make one or two points in 
answer to this criticism. First, the theory would not in fact extend the 
the scope of the criminal law as much as might at first appear. 
We 
already have in our law a number of offences which are effectively 
preparatory to a further substantive offence. Examples include s. 
25 of 
the Theft Act 1968 ('going equipped') and s. 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 
(being found on enclosed premises). The proposed 
theory would thus 
extend the law to the extent that it would admit 
to criminal 
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responsibility preliminary acts towards commission of a substantive 
offence which are, in themselves, innocent. I think that this increase in 
the scope of criminal law is justified for the reasons which I have 
stated above, 68 the most noteworthy here being that my proposeal enables 
us to distinguish between seemingly innocent acts which, given the 
reasons for commission, point to significant differences between the 
agents in terms of moral turpitude. ~9 
'Executive Link' Attempts, Peregration and Provisional Purpose. 
In chapter 4I proposed that the agent who commits a criminal offence 
which is a necessary preliminary to a prospective criminal offence which 
is subject to a condition should be guilty of the substantive offence 
with the provisional purpose of committing the prospective offence. 7° 
The issue here is whether or not we ought to attribute liability to an 
agent who has taken otherwise innocent activity along a causal chain 
which leads to a criminal objective which is subject to a condition. 
Suppose for example that D, decides to approach his ex-fiancee with a 
view to a reconciliation (the primary causal chain and not criminal per 
se). He plans to abduct her if she refuses (the provisional objective 
which is criminal in nature) and to this end he places a length of rope 
in the boot of his car (a singularly necessary exertion along the 
provisional causal chain selected by him). Should we ascribe liability 
to D, for his act in placing the rope in the car on the basis that that 
act is taken with a criminal offence in mind, albeit subject to a 
condition? 
I submitted in chapter 4 that there is a significant moral difference 
between provisional and unconditional purpose since to the extent that 
my purpose is provisional I may be less committed to it. 7° I think also 
that within the area of preliminary activity concerning a prospective 
offence which is subject to a condition there is a significant moral 
difference between the agent who has and the agent who has not 
perpetrated a preliminary criminal offence, since 
the agent who has 
brought about a preliminary actus reus demonstrates 
that he is more 
committed to his provisional objective. That distinction 
deserves legal 
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recognition. We may achieve this by attributing provisional purpose only 
to criminal offences which constitute a nece-1.4 y preliminary to a 
provisional criminal purpose or objective. On this basis the preliminary 
substantive offence of peregration could not apply to a provisional 
objective whilst it remains provisional. However when the agent takes a S rau'a.. 'j ý4eeefa' 
firm decision to bring about a jpreliminary criminal offence leading to 
his provisional objective and takes a physical step towards that 
preliminary offence he would be guilty of peregration. Suppose that D2, 
like D,, decides to ask his ex-fiancee for a reconciliation. In case she 
refuses he decides to abduct her. To this end he decides to enter a 
local chemist, distract the pharmacist and steal some ether. He arrives 
at the chemists just as the pharmacist is closing for the day. In this 
hypothetical D2 has made a firm decision to bring about a preliminary 
criminal link in the provisional causal chain and has taken physical 
steps to achieve it. He is thus guilty of peregration for the purpose of 
committing theft. We would not extend D2's purpose to kidnapping since 
the offence of peregration is restricted to the most proximate 
substantive criminal offence. Had D2 been successful in stealing ether 
then he would be guilty of theft with the provisional purpose of 
kidnapping. *" 
It is convenient at this point to summarise my proposals on breakdown of 
the causal chain. An agent who plans a specific substantive offence and 
sets in motion a chain of activity which, when complete, is capable of 
producing such, is subject to criminal liability in accordance with the 
following: - 
Q) where he has taken an otherwise innocent singularly necessary 
exertion to bring about his criminal objective, there being no 
preliminary criminal offence in the causal chain, he is guilty of 
peregration for the purpose of committing the offence which is his 
objective. 
(ii) where there is a preliminary criminal offence in the selected 
causal chain and he has taken an otherwise innocent singularly necessary 
exertion towards the preliminary offence he is guilty of peregration 
for 
the purpose of committing that preliminary offence: 
the criminal 
objective is ignored in the attribution of purpose. 
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(iii) where he makes an exertion which is capable of bringing about the 
preliminary criminal offence he is guilty of an attempt at that offence: 
the criminal objective is ignored in the attribution of purpose. 
(iv) where the agent completes a preliminary criminal offence he is 
guilty of its commission for the purpose of committing any further 
preliminary offence in the selected causal chain with the objective of 
committing the criminal offence which is his objective. 
(v) where the agent brings about the last link in the causal chain which 
leads to his objective he is guilty of an attempt at the criminal 
offence which constitutes that objective. 
(vi) where that last link produces the actus reus the agent is guilty of 
the substantive offence which constitutes his objective. 
(vii) where the agent plans a provisional causal chain (i. e. some 
criminal objective which is subject to the existence of some fact or 
circumstance at the appropriate future time) then 
(a) if he has determined to bring about a criminal offence which is a 
necessary preliminary to the provisional objective and has made an 
otherwise innocent exertion towards that preliminary offence he is 
guilty of peregration for the purpose of committing that preliminary 
offence: the provisional purpose is ignored in the attribution of 
purpose. 
(b) if he brings about that preliminary criminal offence he is guilty of 
its commission with the provisional purpose of committing the offence 
which is his provisional objective. 
(c) if at some point along the causal chain the agent determines to 
bring about his provisional objective the causal chain would now apply 
to an unconditional objective and would be subject to (i) to (v) above. 
The agent does not commit a further offence of peregration at each link 
of the preregratory causal chain since the activity which constitutes 
that causal chain is viewed as a whole for the purpose of ascriptions of 
criminal responsibility. However the distance which the agent 
travels 
along the peregratory chain towards commission of 
the substantive 
offence would be subject to consideration at the sentence stage. 
' 
I turn now to the third category of attempts. 
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3. Attempts in which the agent holds a mistaken belief about some fact 
or circumstance of his enterprise which either (a) effectively prevents 
his enterprise or (b) cannot prevent the object of his activity. 
In order to discuss this category it would be useful to sub-categorise 
thus 
(a) where the agent's mistake effectively frustrates his enterprise. 
Illustrations include the agent who puts sugar into his victim's tea 
believing it to be arsenic and the agent who shoots at a tree stump 
believing it to be his enemy. From the case law there is Shimpuri. 73 
where D purchased a harmless substance believing it to be heroin. The 
main feature of category 3(a) attempts is that the agent is aiming at a 
particular actus reus which, in the actual circumstances, is not capable 
of fruition and his enterprise is thereby frustrated. 
The ideal typical subjectivist construction would hold the agent in 
category 3(a) guilty of an attempt at the substantive offence on two 
grounds. First the agent should be judged on the facts as he believed 
them to be. This reasoning follows that put forward by Sir Rupert Cross 
about defences to criminal liability generally. ' Second, (and perhaps 
following upon the first) the agent is both dangerous, since he has 
demonstrated his resolve to bring about the proscribed harm, and 
culpable since, at the time of the exertion which would, as he reads it, 
bring about the proscribed harm, he believes that his act will bring it 
about and acts as he does because of that belief. 
With regard to the first subjectivist ground for liability one might ask 
if the law would always wish to judge the accused on the actual state of 
his belief? There are qualitative gradations of belief and there is a 
point where one would judge the belief to be so unreasonable 
that one 
would regard it as evidence that the accused did not possess real moral 
responsibility and thus, perhaps, should be excused on 
the basis of 
involuntariness. For instance Derek may pick up an obviously plastic toy 
gun and 'fire' at his enemy in the belief that 
the toy is a real and 
loaded revolver. My view is that at the point where 
his belief in a 
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particular fact or circumstance becomes unreasonable the agent may be 
said to lack the capacity to appreciate physical reality and should thus 
be free from criminal responsibility although subject to the civil 
process in appropriate cases.? To this extent the subjectivist notion 
that the agent be judged in the light of the facts as he believes them 
to be stands in need of modification. I should point out here that Derek 
has committed the actus reus of an assault on his enemy with the 
intention of doing so and one is thus entitled to ascribe criminal 
liability to him for that substantive offence provided that his enemy 
believes the gun to be real and is thus put in fear of immediate and 
unlawful physical violence. ' 
The ideal typical objectivist construction would apply a hybrid approach 
to this category of attempts and ascribe criminal responsibility to the 
agent whose act manifests a desire for the proscribed consequence whilst 
excusing from the criminal process the agent whose act does not manifest 
conduct proscribed by the criminal law. Thus the agent who takes an 
unloaded gun believing it to be loaded and fires at his enemy would 
accordingly be criminally liable for an attempt on his victim's life 
since his inapt action bears the hallmark of attempted murder whilst the 
agent who shoots at a tree stump believing it to be his enemy would be 
free from liability for attempted murder since his action is innocent on 
its face. 77 It seems to me that this logic is defective since both 
agents have the same mens rea (the intention to kill), and both believe 
that the act perpetrated will produce the actus reus at which they aim. 
The only difference between them seems to be that one agent has a 
mistaken perception about the efficacy of the means employed for the 
purpose whilst the other has a mistaken perception about the target. 
In 
my submission this distinction between the agents should be ignored 
for 
the purpose of attribution of criminal responsibility. 
Galloway'' provides a specific argument against such 
distinction. He 
says that an attempt to commit a crime is itself not criminal 
because of 
the liklihood of success, nor because of the dangerousness of 
the agent 
but because it amounts to an affront on the interests which 
the criminal 
law considers sufficiently worthy of protection. 
An affront on a person 
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is more than a physical intervention in his life since one can also 
attack a person's interests. Thus whilst the agent who shoots at a tree 
stump thinking it is his enemy is not physically interfering in his 
victim's life he is nonetheless attacking his victim's interests. 
Consider the case of V who has been advised by an independent observer 
that an attempt on his life has just been made by D who has fired at a 
tree stump believing it to be V. He would probably feel that there has 
been an affront on his interests and that affront should be subject to 
the criminal process. '`' 
Current criminal law has followed the ideal typical subjectivist 
construction. ed I turn now to the second division of category 3 attempt. 
(b) where the agent is mistaken as to some fact or circumstance which 
cannot thereby frustrate the object of his enterprise. 
Examples here include the agent who has intercourse with a girl of 
sixteen believing her to be fifteen and the agent who purchases 'clean' 
goods in the belief that they are stolen. The main feature with category 
3(b) attempts is that the agent is mistaken about a particular quality 
of some material fact or circumstance which cannot prevent the 
consequence although it may affect its legal character. 
The ideal typical subjectivist construction would hold the agent in this 
sub-category guilty of an attempt at the substantive offence where his 
mistake causes him to believe he is committing a criminal offence on the 
main ground that the agent should be judged on the facts as he believes 
them to be. The objectivist model would excuse the agent here since the 
agent has not brought about any effect which signals danger to society. 
Current law follows the subjectivist model. In Anderton vR an=1 D 
purchased a video recorder in the belief that it was stolen property. At 
the trial the prosecution conceded that the goods were not in fact 
stolen but contended that D was guilty of attempting to handle stolen 
goods on the basis of s. 1(3) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. The 
House of Lords quashed the conviction on the ground that 
Mrs. Ryan's 
activity was objectively innocent. However the House reversed 
the 
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decision later in ShiYpurill and it is clear that the criminal law 
interprets this category of attempt in accordance with the ideal typical 
construction of subjectivism. 
There is a very clear distinction between the sub-divisions of category 
3 attempts. In 3(a) the agent's plan is to commit a criminal offence. He 
is aware that the effect aimed at by him constitutes a criminal offence 
and if his plan is not successful (if the criminal offence is not in 
fact committed) then he would feel that his enterprise has in some way 
been frustrated. Thus in a case like Shýpuri the mistaken fact which 
eventuates in a breakdown in the planned causal chain leads the agent to 
the conclusion that his enterprise has been a failure - that there has 
been a mistake which has prevented his otherwise intended illegal goal. 
In category 3(b) attempts the agent's activity is entirely successful - 
there is nothing in the actual causal chain which he feels has 
frustrated his enterprise. Thus, no doubt, Mrs. Ryan did not feel that 
her planned causal chain had been in any way frustrated by the news that 
her belief that the video recorder was stolen was unfounded in fact. On 
the contrary her enterprise was successful in circumstances which, in 
terms of actus reus at least, did not breach any standard set by the 
criminal law. 
Current law makes no distinction between the two sub-divisions of 
category 3 attempts. In Shi=uri92 the House of Lords specifically 
overruled the decision in Anderton v Ryan so that the agent who 
purchases 'clean' goods believing them to be stolen is guilty of 
attempting to handle stolen goods on current law. " But in my view it is 
wrong that neither current law nor the theorists are prepared 
to make 
the distinction between the two divisions. My objection is based on two 
main grounds. 
First, I would maintain the premise that in cases of consensual activity 
between parties which is de facto legal any duty 
imposed by criminal law 
on one party not to take part in the transaction 
in any given 
circumstance reduces, if not extinguishes, the right of 
the other party 
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to have legal relations with whom he chooses. I illustrate my objection 
with two hypotheticals. 
(1) Daniel has been approached by Peter with a view to a prospective 
sale of Peter's watch. Daniel is suspicious about the legal status of 
the proposed contract since the 'asking' price is much below the market 
value. If Daniel forms the belief that the watch might be stolen 
property then he must, on peril of criminal sanction, refrain from 
entering into the consensual interaction and this deprives the true 
owner, Peter, of his right to have a particular legal relationship with 
the mistaken party. The basis of my objection is illustrated even more 
clearly if the object of the prospective sale is not a common item such 
as a watch but one for which there is a very restricted market. In this 
case the duty which the criminal law imposes upon Daniel not to enter 
into the de facto legal contract substantially reduces Peter's ability 
to sell his merchandise. 
(ii) David wishes to have a sexual relationship with Vera, aged 16 
although David believes her to be aged 15. One evening when they are 
alone together David has intercourse with Vera. Under current law David 
is presumably guilty of attempted unlawful sexual intercourse since, 
once he forms the mistaken belief that Vera is under 16 years of age he 
must, under peril of criminal sanction, refrain from sexual relations 
with her. This deprives Vera of her undoubted right to have intercourse 
with the mistaken David and since David is presumably the only male with 
whom Vera is prepared to have such a relationship current law, by way of 
the law on attempts, has effectively prevented Vera from entering into 
that kind of relationship altogether. This will certainly be so if David 
is convicted of attempting to have unlawful sexual intercourse with Vera 
and is awarded a prison sentence. 
Second, the distinction between the two types of category 3 attempt for 
the purpose of ascriptions of criminal liability may be justified on 
grounds similar to those postulated by Galloway. " In the case of 
the 
agent who, on realisation of the true facts, feels that 
his mistaken 
belief has frustrated his enterprise we find that the agent is 
de facto 
attacking the interests of the person whom he believes he 
is harming. In 
the case in which the agent would not feel that 
his mistaken belief has 
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led to a failure of the enterprise we find that the agent is de facto 
contributing to the enhancement of the general wellbeing of the other 
party to the transaction. 
In conclusion I submit that the category 3 attempts should be restricted 
to cases in which the agent has made a factual error concerning some 
fact or circumstance of his activity which effectively frustrates his 
enterprise. Since current law does not make the distinction between the 
cases it would be necessary to legislate in order to achieve it. There 
are two major strategies available. First, we may amend the substance of 
the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. I set out below the current provision 
of s. 1 relating to impossibility and add to s. 1(3)(b) a proposed proviso 
(in italics) which marks the distinction between the two sub-divisions 
of category 3 attempts. 
"(2) A person may be guilty of attempting to commit an offence to 
which this section applies even though the facts are such that the 
commission of the offence is impossible. 
(3) In any case where 
a) apart from this subsection a person's intention would not be 
regarded as having amounted to an intent to commit an offence; but 
b) if the facts of the case had been as he believed them to be, his 
intention would be so regarded, then for the purposes of s. 1(1) 
above he shall be regarded as having an intent to commit that 
offence unless the defendant would have continued with his activity 
whether or not the facts had been as he believed them to be. 
The proposed proviso separates category 3 attempts into (a) cases 
in 
which the agent would cease all activity leading to the object of 
his 
enterprise when disabused of his mistaken belief and (b) cases 
in which 
the agent would continue with his enterprise even if 
disabused of his 
mistaken belief before the executive causal link. The proviso 
thus marks 
the distinction between the sub-divisions of category 3 attempts. 
Shivpuri would have desisted had he been aware of 
the true facts at the 
time of (as he saw it) the executive causal 
link and we may thus charge 
him with an attempt. 8E On the other hand Mrs. 
Ryan would have continued 
with the purchase of the video recorder even 
if disabused of her 
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mistaken belief just short of (as she saw it) the executive causal link. 
Mrs. Ryan would not be guilty of an attempt on the proposed definition 
of attempt. 
One might object to this strategy on the ground that it leads to 
unjustified distinctions in the cases. We might take as an example the 
case of the tourist, Dudley, who is approached by a rogue and offered a 
brand name watch at a very low price. Dudley buys the watch in the 
belief that it is stolen when, in fact, the watch belongs to the rogue 
and bears a false brand name. '' Whilst he would have continued with his 
transaction though disabused of his mistake about the possibility that 
the watch was stolen Dudley would certainly have abandoned his plan to 
buy the watch had he been made aware of the fact that the watch was a 
cheap imitation. On this reasoning it seems that one must conclude that 
Dudley would desist from his activity when in possession of the actual 
facts and is thus guilty of attempting to handle stolen goods. On this 
basis we are distinguishing between Dudley and Mrs. Ryan which seems 
wrong since both agents have performed the same activity with the same 
erroneous belief and thus ought to be subject to equal consideration in 
any assessment of criminal responsibility. 
I share the objector's concern here but submit that the qualification 
does not lead to such distinctions between the cases. It will be noted 
that the net effect of s. 1(2) and s. 1(3) of the Criminal Attempts Act 
19819e` is that current law restricts liability for mistaken beliefs to 
facts which, as the agent sees it, brings him within the criminal law of 
attempts: current law thus refers to a mistake of facts which affects 
legal status. My proposed extension to s. 1(3)(b) has the same effect: 
the question would be whether or not D would have desisted from his 
activity short of the executive causal link had he been aware of the 
true facts which affect his liability for an attempt? If the answer 
is 
no then he has not committed an attempt on my proposed category 
3. In 
the illustration above Dudley is mistaken about a fact which, 
if true, 
would affect his legal status concerning the transaction with 
the rogue, 
and he would certainly have continued with the transaction 
if that were 
the only mistake he was making. However there 
is second factual 
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misperception made by Dudley, namely the belief that the brand name on 
the watch is genuine. Whilst the latter mistake would affect his 
decision in carrying on with the agreement it does not affect Dudley's 
legal status concerning the transaction and can be ignored for the 
purpose of assessing criminal responsibility. On this basis Dudley is in 
the same position as Mrs. Ryan; he has purchased property believing it 
to be stolen when it is not, a misperception which would not per se have 
affected his decision to go through with the contract. On the proposed 
category 3 attempt neither Dudley nor Mrs. Ryan is guilty of attempting 
to handle stolen goods. 
A further possible objection to the qualification in category 3 attempts 
is that it is too sophisticated since we might arrive at the same legal 
position by simply excluding de facto innocent transactions from the 
category. I would make two comments here which I think indicate that 
this objection (and alternative qualification) is not well grounded. 
First, it is not always clear whether or not particular activity is in 
fact criminal in nature: for inevitably there will be activity which 
falls at the fringes of specific criminal offences. A particular example 
here would be the case of the agent who shoots at a tree stump believing 
it to be his enemy V. Can D not claim that his activity is de facto 
innocent and that he ought not thus incur any liability concerning his 
mistaken belief that he is killing V? Second, if we exclude innocent 
transactions from category 3 attempts then we automatically include all 
transactions which are criminal in character regardless of the source of 
criminality. This would render Dudley in the illustration above guilty 
of attempting to handle stolen goods since the transaction is criminal 
in nature because of the dishonest preparatory activity of the rogue 
which has led to at least attempted fraud. This proposed alternative 
qualification to category 3 would thus lead to a distinction between the 
cases of Dudley and Mrs. Ryan. Yet, as I have pointed out above, 
Dudley 
has the same mental state and perpetrates the same activity as 
Mrs. Ryan 
and should receive equal status in any assessment of 
liability. It is 
submitted that the proposed alternative qualification ought 
to be 
rejected. 
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A second strategy to mark the divisions of category 3 attempts is to 
insist upon my model of direct intention'-' as the only requisite mental 
state for the inchoate offence of attempt. This would bring into play 
the test of failure. 1° Thus we may say that the agent must be aiming to 
bring about the criminal enterprise and if, owing to a mistaken belief 
the enterprise is de facto innocent then he would feel his enterprise 
has failed and thus intended both the consequence and its criminal 
nature. On the other hand where the agent does not feel that his 
activity has been a failure where the supposed illegal quality is absent 
then D does not directly intend to commit a crime and does not thus 
commit an attempt. This strategy will have the same effect as the first. 
The agent who aims and shoots at a tree stump believing it to be his 
enemy directly intends his death and would feel that his enterprise has 
been frustrated when made aware of the true facts. On the other hand 
David who has intercourse with Vera, aged 16, believing her to be 15 
does not directly intend unlawful sexual intercourse since he would not 
feel that his enterprise has been frustrated when made aware of the fact 
that she is 16. We may emphasise David's non-liability by juxtaposing 
with his case the hypothetical of Dennis, a paedophile, who has 
intercourse with Vannessa believing her to be 14 when she is in tact 18. 
There is I think a significant moral distinction between David and 
Dennis. Dennis is out to have unlawful sex with children - adults do not 
interest him. When he learns the true facts Dennis would no doubt feel 
that his otherwise criminal activity has been frustrated: he has not 
achieved his directly intended goal namely intercourse with a child 
under 16. 
I am inclined to the the second strategy but whichever we adopt the case 
of Saughton v Smith" presents problems if we wish to place agents such 
as Roger Smith into category 3(a) attempts and attribute liability to 
him for an attempt. In the case the police intercepted a van carrying 
stolen goods. In order to catch the receivers the police allowed 
the van 
to proceed to the rendevous point with two policemen inside suitably 
disguised. Smith and another entered the van and the vehicle was 
driven 
to London under Smith's direction. At destination 
Smith played a leading 
role in the disposal of the van and its contents. 
The gang were then 
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arrested. Smith was convicted of attempting to handle stolen goods. The 
prosecution did not charge Smith with the full offence since they were 
of the opinion that by the time he joined the van the goods were no 
longer stolen since they were restored to lawful custody in accordance 
with s. 24(3) of the Theft Act 1968.11 Smith successfully appealed 
against conviction and the prosecution appealed to the House of Lords. 
Lord Hailsham questioned whether the prosecution were right to assume 
that the goods had in fact been restored to the rightful owner. But in 
any event on the assumption that lawful custody had been restored Lord 
Hailsham considered that a count of theft or attempted theft would have 
been appropriate and ought properly to have succeeded. He felt however 
that he was not able to substitute a verdict of theft since there was 
not an appropriate count in the indictment. He dismissed the appeal on 
the ground that for the purpose of s. 22 of the Theft Act 1968 the goods 
must not only be believed to be stolen but actually continue to be 
stolen goods at the moment of handling. 
The decision raises several problems. First, were the goods restored to 
lawful custody? Lord Hailsham (and Lord Reid) thought that the answer 
might be no but generally left the question open. If the answer is no 
then a charge of handling stolen goods would have been appropriate. 
Second, is Lord Hailsham right when he says that, on the assumption that 
the goods were restored to lawful custody, Smith could be charged with 
theft or attempted theft? It is submitted that this cannot be right 
since first, Smith did not have the intention to deprive the owner 
permanently of his property since he believed the property to be already 
stolen and second, the owner (the police as agent for the true owner) 
was present and allowed Smith to enter the vehicle, direct it to London 
and arrange disposal of van and contents. All of this suggests that it 
is by no means clear whether or not Smith's activity amounted to a 
criminal offence. 
Where does Smith stand in relation to the alternative strategies for 
distinguishing category 3(a) and 3(b) attempts? Ignoring the police 
trap 
for a moment can we say that Smith would have desisted 
from his activity 
181 
had he been aware that the goods had been restored to lawful custody? 
One might argue that if Smith had been disabused of his mistake before 
the executive causal link he might have continued with his activity, 
thus committing a new act of theft. On this submission Smith would be 
free from criminal liability on the first strategy. Also it might be 
said that Smith would not have considered his enterprise a failure had 
he disposed of the goods and then realised that they were in fact back 
in lawful custody at the time of his activity. On this view Smith did 
not directly intend to handle stolen goods. -: = It is submitted that 
Haugghton v Smith is a special case on its own facts for two reasons. 
First Lord Hailsham and Lord Reid seemed to think that lawful custody 
had not been restored and so Naughton v Smith is not a case of 
impossible attempt at all: it represents a case in which the agent 
perpetrates the substantive offence. Second, assuming that there was not 
restoration of lawful custody the case is one in which the police are in 
effect setting a trap for the receiver and his mistake about the fact 
that the goods are stolen at the time of his activity is intimately, 
perhaps conceptually connected with the fact that a trap has been set. " 
On this basis we might say that Smith falls into category 3(a) attempts 
on either strategy: he would have desisted on the true facts being made 
known to him before the executive link and he certainly would have 
considered his activity a failure when the arrest is made and the goods 
are returned to the true owner. The problem would be eradicated by a 
statement from the court (when the opportunity arises) that once goods 
are stolen they remain stolen until either they have been returned to 
their actual owner (no agency permissible) or otherwise legally disposed 
of where the actual owner cannot be traced. 
Category 3 Attempts and Peregration. 
(1) On the strategy that the agent is guilty of an attempt 
if he would 
desist from the executive causal link if disabused of 
his mistake before 
that point: if the agent would desist from his planned activity when 
informed of the true position then that activity 
falls within the 
parameters of category 3 attempts and he is 
thus guilty when he has 
completed the executive causal link which, in 
his view, is capable of 
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bringing about the proscribed harm aimed at by him. It folows that in 
such a case there is a peregratory causal chain leading up to that 
executive causal link and the agent is thus guilty of peregration if he 
abandons his enterprise before his activity reaches the executive causal 
link which, on his belief, is capable of bringing about the proscribed 
harm. On this basis the agent who takes aim at a tree stump believing it 
to be his enemy but desists before pulling the trigger is guilty of 
peregration for the purpose of committing murder since he has embarked 
upon the peregratory chain which he abandons short of the executive 
causal link. The same reasoning applies to the agent who aims a gun at 
his victim wrongly believing it to be loaded but desisting before 
pulling the trigger. 
If the agent would continue with his planned activity though disabused 
of his misperception about some fact or circumstance then his activity 
falls outside the parameters of category 3 attempts and there can thus 
be no executive causal link. It follows that there can be no peregratory 
causal chain and the agent who desists from that activity in the 
preparation stages attracts no criminal responsibility notwithstanding 
that he believes his activity will lead to the proscribed harm aimed at 
by him. On this basis Mrs. Ryan would not be guilty of peregration if 
she decided at some point in her activity to decline the offer of sale 
and did in fact do so. Similarly if Dudley had decided not to buy the 
false brand name watch at some point in his activity and had gone no 
further he would not be guilty of peregration with the purpose of 
handling stolen goods since he had not embarked on a peregratory chain. 
The same reasoning applies to the agent who moves some way towards 
sexual intercourse with a girl whom he wrongly believes to be under 16 
but who desists short of penetration. 
(ii) On the strategy that the agent must directly intend the criminal 
aspect of his activity: if the court or jury is satisfied that the agent 
directly intends both the effect and its criminal character then they 
may convict of peregration for the purpose of committing the prospective 
criminal offence at the first link in the causal chain which 
is 
singularly necessary as a preliminary to that offence. 
Thus where D 
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decides to kill V and purchases some rope with which to commit the 
murder then D commits peregration even though at the time of the 
purchase V, unknown to D, is already dead. 
If the court or jury are not satisfied that the agent directly intends 
the criminal character of his activity then the agent cannot be guilty 
of an attempt at the substantive offence nor of peregration for the 
purpose of attempting it. Thus where D takes t1OO out of his bank 
account for the sole purpose of buying some property which he believes 
might be stolen when it is not he does not commit an act of peregration 
in taking out the cash if the court or jury are not satisfied that the 
fact that the goods were stolen was a sine qua non of D's objective in 
handling them. 
4. Attempts which are Incompetent because the Agent is Mistaken about 
the Causal Properties of his Activity. 
Illustrations of this category of attempt include the voodoo artist who 
pushes pins into an effigy believing that the victim will die as a 
consequence and the agent who puts sugar into his victim's tea believing 
that sugar can kill. In this category the agent makes no contingent or 
necessary mistake about what he is doing (he is knowingly pushing pins 
into an effigy or placing sugar, knowing it to be sugar, into his 
victim's tea), The mistake he has made concerns the efficacy of his act 
in relation to the consequence aimed at by him. 
The general objectivist position is that the agent in this category is 
not criminally responsible for his attempt on the ground that the agent 
is hopelessly inadequate and he represents no danger to society-" The 
subjectivist is prepared to attribute criminal responsibility to this 
agent on the grounds that (i) he is both dangerous and culpable and it 
is right that he be subject to liability in the interests of the 
intended victim and society in general, and (ii) in all cases of 
impossible attempts the agent should be judged on the 
facts or 
circumstances as he believes them to be. Current law, adopting 
the 
second subjectivist standpoint, 3r, holds the agent 
in this category 
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guilty of attempting the substantive offence at which his activity is 
directed. 
Harris criticises the subjectivist approach to this category of attempts 
using the voodoo artist to illustrate his case. 97 He notes the 
subjectivist stance that the agent should be judged on the facts as he 
believes them to be and asks if the exponent of voodoo is to be blamed 
and punished to the same extent as the agent who sticks knives into his 
enemy with the same belief (that he is about to bring about the death of 
his victim). For Harris there is a moral diff:: rence in the quality of 
each agent's attempt. That moral difference has to do with the quality 
of the attempt and the quality of the beliefs of the agent about his 
capacity for bringing about the harm aimed at by him. 
Underlying Harris' statement is the consequentialist theory that blame 
and punishment should be awarded only insofar as the benefits to be 
gained outweigh the costs involved. On this view punishment awarded to 
our voodoo practitioner would produce no (let alone proportional) 
benefit to the intended victim or to society. Should we accept this 
consequentialist notion and seek to modify the subjectivist approach? 
A possible response which may be made by the subjectivist is that the 
voodoo artist has a guilty disposition but has chosen an inefficient 
method of demonstrating it. When he realises that his exertion has 
failed to produce the intended result this agent may resort to some 
other activity which might result in the more efficient dispatch of his 
victim. I am not sure that this response is tenable since one cannot be 
sure whether or not this agent would go beyond 'retributive' activity 
which is carried out in accordance with his spiritual beliefs. One 
cannot be sure that the voodoo artist is in fact dangerous and thus, on 
subjectivist philosophy, one who ought to be subjected to the overall 
objectives of the criminal system. 
The reality of the voodoo case is that, as with the other cases in this 
category, the agent has done his act in the belief that the act will 
produce an adverse change in the world when, in fact, there is no causal 
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nexus between his act and the consequence which he believes he is 
bringing about. My submission is that an essential condition for 
criminal liability is that the agent must have some capacity to 
appreciate physical causality. If the agent's perception of 'causal 
nexus' is deficient so that he cannot produce the result which he is 
aiming to bring about he should not be guilty of an attempt. This 
approach may be justified on two grounds. First, an agent such as the 
voodoo man is not in any way dangerous whilst he confines himself to his 
ineffectual activity, and second, and agent who is so hopelessly out of 
touch with reality cannot be expected to resort to any efficient method 
of execution of his design: there is some fundamental defect in this 
man's reasoning power which, if it is to be the subject of legal 
assessment of any kind, might suitably be subjected to scrutiny by the 
civil process. 
My submission is that the Criminal Attempts Act (and the ideal 
subjectivist position) should be suitably amended to exclude this class 
of agent from criminal responsibility. This may be done by a suitable 
proviso to s. 1(3)(b) to the effect that in the cases of impossible 
attempts the agent should be judged on the facts as he believed them to 
be 'unless the accused's mistaken belief arises from incapacity to 
appreciate the causal properties of his exertion'. 
Although my proposal has objective overtones (the agent in this category 
has (i) done nothing which is prohibited by the definition of the 
offence, (ii) produces no state of affairs which violate the criminal 
law and (iii) is being kept distinct from the criminal process) I think 
that it conforms with the spirit of subjectivism for the agent in this 
category of attempts is neither dangerous nor culpable and there is no 
need to subject him to the criminal process in the interests of public 
safety. 
My suggested reformulation of s. 1(3) (b) would not only meet 
Harries' 
argument that the voodoo practitioner should receive less punishment 
than the agent who sticks knives in the back of his victim; 
it goes 
further and excludes him from criminal liability entirely. 
Of course one 
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might resort to the 'separate offence' strategy in this particular area 
and prohibit the practice of witchcraft by suitable legilative 
enactment. 
One final point about the voodoo artist. In a proper assessment of 
criminal rersponsibility one must look at all the circumstances of his 
case. Interesting issues may be encountered. For example the voodoo man 
may claim that he was acting in self defence In Huyuzi and Kudemera v 
Republic (Malawi) I young children in a village were dying shortly after 
birth. The first appellant, a witchdoctor, decided that there must be 
witches among the villagers. He believed that any witch who drank muabvi 
would die. He therefore prepared some muabvi and administered it to 
sixteen volunteers. Four died shortly after. A government analysist 
examined the mixture and was satisfied that it was not poisonous. Nyuzi 
was charged with agreeing to hold a trial by ordeal contrary to s. 3(2) 
of the Witchcraft Ordinance. The trial judge said that Nyuzi's defence 
was self defence (in this case the defence of the person of others). 
Category 4 Attempts and Peregration. 
If one accepts my contention that category 4 attempts do not fall within 
the criminal law of attempts then it follows that there can be neither 
an executive causal link nor a peregratory chain of causal activity. 
5. Activity which brings about a change in the world or a state of 
affairs which the agent believes to be contrary to law when it is not. 
Here the agent is making a mistake about the current criminal 
law. An 
example would be the agent who has intercourse with a girl whom 
he knows 
to be 17 years old in the belief that it is unlawful to 
have intercourse 
with a female under the age of 18. 
Objectivists would excuse the agent in this category 
from criminal 
responsibility and this would seem to be the correct view. 
There is no 
actual or possible act or circumstance which 
is contrary to law and the 
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criminal law should concern itself with conduct which has been 
proscribed thereby. 
The ideal typical construction of subjectivism would not attribute 
liability to this agent since it insists that the agent should be judged 
on the facts as he believed them to be and not on the law as he believes 
it to be. This proposition is based upon the more general subjectivist 
argument that if the purpose of the criminal law is to signal society's 
condemnation of activity of a particular type then activity which is not 
subject to criminal law does not need be punished since the agent will 
have done nothing which society need condemn. On this view an agent who 
perpetrates innocent activity cannot be guilty of an offence (including 
an attempt) whatever the state of his mind as to the legal status of 
that activity. To ascribe liability in such a case would be tantamount 
to punishing a man for his thoughts. On a more practical point the 
ordinary man may create law neither by choice nor by belief. It is 
submitted that the agent in this category cannot be guilty of an 
attempt. 
Whilst the phraseology of the 1981 legislation on attempts is not 
entirely clear it seems that in law the agent in this category is free 
from liability since s. 1(3) talks in terms of mistake as to a fact and 
not a mistake as to law. Perhaps the matter ought to be put beyond doubt 
by express provision in the statute. 
Category 5 Attempts and Peregration. 
On my proposal (presumably accepted by the current law) category 
5 
attempts are not subject to criminal liability and it thus 
follows that 
there can be no executive causal link or peregratory causal chain. 
6. Attempts in which the agent is reckless concerning a circumstance 
which is an integral component of the actus reus of 
the substantive 
offence in issue. 
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I include this category of attempts for completeness üe. -e. I deal with 
reckless attempts in detail in Chapter 8. °'y I now apply the proposed 
structure of mens rea to a second inchoate offence 
2. Conspiracy. 
The inchoate offence of conspiracy fits well into the proposed structure 
of intention, purpose and objective. At current law if a person agrees 
with another or others that one or more of them perpetrates a criminal 
offence they are guilty of conspiracy concerning that offence. 10°' On the 
proposed structure of wens rea the agreement to commit a crime would be 
a preliminary criminal offence: the term conspiracy would be retained. 
The conviction against the agents would be conspiracy for the purpose of 
committing the offence which is their criminal objective. If the 
conspirators agree to commit a crime subject to a condition then they 
would be guilty of conspiracy for the provisional purpose of committing 
the offence which constitutes their provisional objective. 101 
The proposed structure would differ from the current law on conspiracy 
in two respects. First, where one of the parties has made some otherwise 
innocent exertion which is a singularly necessary preliminary to the 
making of the agreement then he would be guilty of peregration for the 
purpose of a conspiracy to commit the offence which constitutes the 
criminal objective. Where, for example, D makes a telephone call to P 
in order to negotiate the commission of a burglary but D is not at home 
D would be guilty of peregration for the purpose of a conspiracy to 
commit burglary. If P answers the phone and D proposes the crime but P 
does not hear or does not agree D would be guilty of attempted 
conspiracy to commit burglary since, as he reads it, his activity is 
itself capable of bringing about the conspiracy. At current 
law D cannot 
be guilty of attempted conspiracy. 1c" Second, if the conspiracy 
between 
D, and D2 involves the commission of the offence by only 
D2 who goes on 
to complete the offence, D, would be guilty of the substantive offence 
by way of extraneous agency. On current law 
D, would be convicted of 
conspiracy. It is submitted that it is right that 
D, should be convicted 
with the substantive offence since his aim 
is that the harm be brought 
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about and he acts as he does (conspires with 
D2) in the belief that this 
will bring about the harm. This aspect is dealt with in a little more 
detail in the application of the proposed structure of mens red to a 
third inchoate offence, but suffice it to say here that my submission 
would not affect the current legal position in relation to sanction 
since the maximum punishment for conspiracy is the same as that which 
might be awarded for the commission of the substantive offence. 10= 
3. Incitement. 
At current law an agent is guilty of incitement where he persuades or 
encourages another to commit a crime. If the other commits the cI-ime 
then the inciter will be an accessory and may be charged accordingly; 
but he may be charged with incitement whether or not the offence incited 
is committed. At common law one may attempt to in, oite. Giving assistance 
in the preparation stages which will lead to the offence is not 
incitement unless there is some encouragement also. 
The proposed structure of mens rea would retain incitement a an 
inchoate offence: the conviction would be incitement for the purpose of 
committing the criminal offence through extraneous agency. Any 
preparatory activity by the agent towards the commission of 
incitement'" would count as peregration for the purpose of inciting the 
commission of the offence through extraneous agency. I use the term 
'extraneous agency' for two reasons. First we may not use the 
term 
'innocent agency' since the person incited will usually be 
liable for 
his activity which leads to the offence. '° Second the term 
is used in 
order to demonstrate that, on the proposed structure, the agent 
is 
liable for the offence itself as though he had committed 
the actus reus 
himself. This is very much in line with existing law which 
holds him to 
be an accessory and liable to the same punishment as 
the principal 
offender where the offence is committed. 1°6 
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1. It is interesting to compare my six-fold classification of attempts 
with the six-fold classification posited by Turner J in Rv Donnelly 
(1970) NZLR 980. He says that a man who sets out to commit a crime may 
fall short of commission for the following reasons; 
(i) he may change his mind before he commits any act sufficiently overt 
to amount to an attempt. 
(ii) he may change his mind, but too late to deny that he had got so far 
as an attempt. 
(iii) he may be prevented by some outside agency from doing some act 
necessary to complete commission of the crime. 
(iv) he may fail to complete the commisssion of the crime through 
ineptitude, inefficiency or insufficient means. 
(v) he may find that what he is proposing to do is after all impossible 
for some physical reason, whatever the means adopted for the purpose. 
(e. g. D enters a room to steal a particular item but it is not there). 
(vi) he may do everything sufficient to bring about the effect aimed at 
and find that what he has done, contrary to his own belief at the time, 
does not after all amount in law to a crime. 
2. There is some disagreement between the theorists about whether the 
punishment should be different for such attempts and for successes. See, 
for example, Ashworth in 'Sharpening the Subjectivist Element in 
Criminal Law' in Philosophy in the Criminal Law. Franz Steiner Verlag 
Weisbaden G. M. B. H. 1984. 
3. There is presumably no substantive offence with which he could be 
charged but the ideal typical model would convict him of assault where 
D, points the gun at the victim who is aware of his activity. 
4. Both for the offence with which he is convicted and when he is 
convicted on a subsequent occasion. One might argue that there cannot be 
a truly objectivist conception of attempt at all. Fletcher treats 
attempts as a paradigm case of subjectivist criminality. My own view is 
that, for the purpose of the complete and competent attempt at least, an 
objectivist model is possible since in such a case the agent has 
perpetrated activity which manifests the objective aimed at (as where 
shoots at his victim but misses). 
5.6 Cox C. C. 559 (1855). 
6. See G. P. Fletcher, 'Rethinking the Criminal Law' at pp. 140-1. 
7. Holmes, The Common Law (1881). 
8. Rv Barker (1924) NZLR at p. 874. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Lloyd Weinreb, 'Manifest Criminality, Intent and the "Metemorphus of 
Larceny"', (1980) Yale LJ at 314. 
11. Supra note 8. 
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12. Ibid at p. 877. 
13. See D. Galloway, 'Patterns of Trying: a Critique of Fletcher on 
Criminal Attempts' in QLR 1982 pp. 233-252 at p. 245. 
14. See the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 s. 1(1) . 
15. Unless Smith may be charged with a status offence e. g. carrying an 
offensive weapon contrary to s. 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1968. 
16. And on Ashworth's theory the punishment will be as for the 
substantive offence where the agent has performed the last act which is 
capable of producing the proscribed harm. See supra note 2. 
17. (1915) 2 QB 342. 
18.119871 Crim LR 195. See infra p. 8 for the facts of the case. 
19. In conversation with me. 
20. See infra p. 157f f. 
21. Which is the point of an attempt on my model of that inchoate 
offence. See infra p. 160. 
22. Supra note 17. 
23. Perhaps an appropriate charge might be an obstruction of the course 
of justice. 
24. Supra note 18. 
25. In conversation with me. 
26. Capable in the sense that in the nature of things that link will 
produce the proscribed effect although it might not actually produce 
that effect for some reason (for example the gun might have a faulty 
sighting mechanism or, unknown to D the gun might not be loaded). 
27. 'Purpose' as defined supra chapter 4. 
28. See supra chapter 2 p. 18. 
some 29. I say 'nothing short of direct intention' not because there Is 
significant difference between direct and oblique (or concomitant) 
intention but because there is no room for oblique intention in this 
context. 
30, For which see supra chapter 4 p. 112ff. 
31. See supra chapter 4 for a discussion on purpose crimes. 
32. For a fuller discussion on impossible attempts see infra p. 
172if. 
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33. See supra p. 90ff for a discussion on intention and desire. 
34. Or 'objective' if there is only one later offence in the causal 
chain of activity. 
35. See supra Chapter 4. 
36. See infra pp. 160-1. 
37. e. g. an offence contrary to s, 1(1) of the Firearms Act 1968 or s. 3 
of the Explosive Substances Act 1883. 
38. Compare my structure of peregration with Professor Williams' 
suggestions in 'Police control of Intending Criminals' in the Ila 
Criminal Law Review (1955) 66. 
39. It might be useful to compare my comments on abandonment with the 
views of Wasik in (1980) Crim LR 785. 
40. In 'Theory of Legislation' (1876) at p. 426. 
41. Which on current law equates with the substantive offence except for 
murder. The maximum sentence for 'attempted murder is 10 years 
imprisonment. 
42. Supra note 17. 
43. Supra note 18. 
44. See Skipp (1975) Crim LR 385 and Peter Jackson Ltd. v Consolidated 
Insurance of Australia Ltd. (1975). 
45. But for reasons explained in the last paragraph current law would 
not attribute liability to him for theft. 
46. We cannot include at this point the prospective offence against the 
car dealer since peregration can only be charged in relation to the 
nearest prospsective criminal offence. See supra p. 158. 
47. 'With the objective' since the obtaining by deception is the last 
criminal offence in the selected causal chain and is thus Dominic's 
criminal objective. See supra Chapter 4. 
48. See G. H. Gordon, ' The Criminal Law of Scotland' (Edinburgh 1967) 
pp. 167-76. 
49. See P. R. Glazebrook, ' Should we have a Law of Attempted Grime? ' LQR 
(January 1969) pp. 28-49. 
50. See Criminal Code of Canada s. 24. 
51 ss. 5.06-5.07. 
52. S-221.2 
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53. See particularly ss. 224.2-224.9, 
54. On this issue see Clarkson and Keating's discussion on 'precurser 
offences'. 
55. Although that authority does not support generally the proposed 
lesser offence of peregration relating to effects which fall short of 
the last act which is sufficient for the purpose of bringing about the 
proscribed harm. 
56. Bv Schofield (1784) Cald 397. 
57. E. g. s. 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 which states that 
'any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof 
whereof shall lie on him, has in any public place any offensive weapon 
shall be guilty of an offence ... '. 
58. Supra note 49 at p. 39. 
59. Supra p. 159. 
60. Ibid. 
61. See the ninth feature of peregration, supra p. 159. 
62. See generally Smith and Hogan, 6th ed. at p. 376ff.. 
63. The issue about the agent who desists voluntarily as opposed to 
being prevented is of importance here. See supra p. 159. 
64. supra note 49. 
65. Supra p. 157. 
66. That activity has no other purpose or objective other than the 
commission of burglary. 
67. Although it is a link in the causal chain. 
68. Supra p. 160ff. 
69. Supra p. 162. 
70. See supra chapter 4 at pp. 132. 
71. For a summary account of the law on kidnapping see RvD[ 9841 AC 
778. See also B. W. Napier, 'Detention Offences at Common Law' in 
Reshaping the Criminal Law (ed. Glazebrook) 1981. 
72. Note that the maximum sentence for peregration will be much 
leers 
than for an attempt at the substantive offence. This provides 
the agent 
with the maximum incentive to desist. See supra p. 159. 
73.119871 AC 1. 
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74. R. Cross, 'Centenary Reflections on Prince's Case' in the LjjkL 
Qarterl y Review 9.1.540. 
75. For example in accordance with to provisions of the Mental Health 
Act 1959. 
76, For a general discussion on assault see Smith and Hogan 6th ed. at 
p. 375f f. 
77. See J. Harris, 'Overexertion and Under Achievement' in Philosoonhy 
and the Criminal Law. Franz Steiner Verlag Weisbaden G. M. B. H. 1984, and 
G. P. Fletcher, 'Rethinking the Criminal Law' (1978). 
? 8. Supra note 13. 
79. On Galloway's argument see I Dennis, 'Preliminary Crimes and 
Responsibility' in Current Legal Problems (1978) 31. 
80. See Shivpuri supra note 73, and s. 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 
1981. 
81.119851 2 All ER 354 
82. Supra note 73. 
83. Supra note 81. 
84. Shivpuri. is clearly a case in which the agent would have felt that 
his enterprise had been in some way frustrated by the mistake of fact 
and thus falls within category 3(a). 
85. Supra p. 173. 
86. On the test of whether the agent would desist see J. C. Smith, in 
(1957) 70 Harvard Law Review 422 and (1962) Crim L. R. 135 and 'Attempts, 
Impossibility and the Test of Rational Motivation' in Aukland Law School 
Centenary Lectures (1983) 25. 
87.1 take the example from Harris supra note 77. 
88. See supra p. 177. 
89. For which see generally chapter 2 
90., see supra p. 117. 
91.119731 3 All ER 1109. 
92. Note that the prosecution also indicted him with conspiracy to 
handle stolen goods but they did not proceed with the charge. 
93. I. e whether or not the goods remain stolen at the time of 
his 
activity was a matter of indifference to him. 
195 
94. The fact that police officers are in the van suitably disguised and 
allowing Smith to proceed with his activity i: -= not otherwise explainable 
other than by the fact that the goods are now back in lawful custody. 
95. see J. Harris, supra note 77. 
96. See the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 s. 1 (3) (b). 
97. Supra note 77. 
98. Malawi (1967). 
99 Infra pp. 279. 
100. Contrary to s. 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 as amended by s. 5 
of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 and s. 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1987. Note that there remains the common law offence of conspiracy to 
defraud. This is supposedly an interim situation until the Law 
Commission put forward proposals for a more detailed formulation of the 
offence of fraud. See Law Comm No. 76 1.113. See also Law Commission 
Working Paper No. 50. S. 12 of the 1987 Act provides that where there has 
been a conspiracy to defraud the prosecution has a choice as to the form 
of the indictment (i. e. to charge with a statutory conspiracy or 
conspiracy to defraud) The decision will made in accordance with the 
guidelines laid down by the Director of Public Prosecutions which are 
contained in s. 10(l) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. 
101. See Reed [1982] Grim L. R. 819 C. A. and Jackson [1985] Grim L. R. 442 
C. A. 
102. See s. 5(7) of the Criminal Law Act 1977. 
103. The Criminal Law Act 1977 s. 3(3). 
104. e. g. where D arranges to take a walk with P aiming to incite 
commission of an offence during the walk. 
105, If he is an innocent agent the inciter will be liable as principal 
(e. g. where D incites P, a boy of 9, to take some money from a till and 
hand it over to him). 
106. See s. 8 Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. 
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Whilst some offences (murder and attempt for example) accept only 
intention as the mens rea constituent of the offence, the majority of 
criminal offences admit either recklessness or malice as a mental 
element. The ideal typical construction of subjectivism requires as an 
essential element of the concept of recklessness and malice an actual 
awareness by the agent that a particular harm is a possible outcome of 
his activity. Ideal objectivism is prepared to admit into either form of 
mens rea a mental state, akin to gross negligence, ' which amounts to a 
failure by the agent to a substantial degree to measure up to the 
standards of the ordinary person. 2 
1. Recklessness. 
Since recklessness figures as a mental state in some crimes but not in 
others, it is important, I think, that we have a definition of the 
concept which expresses its parameters with precision. However during 
this century there has been much movement between the two ideal typical 
constructions on the part of both judges and theorists so that there is 
some confusion as to the precise contours of the concept. The cases 
since 1957 provide a good illustration of the way in which judicial 
thought has wavered between the subjective and objective approaches to 
the concept of recklessness. 
In Rv Cunningham' D ripped a gas meter from a wall in the cellar of the 
house in which he lived in order to steal the contents. A cloud of gas 
escaped and percolated through a porous wall which separated D from his 
neighbour, W. She inhaled the gas and was made ill by it. D was charged 
with unlawfully and maliciously causing W to take a noxious thing so as 
to endanger life contrary to s. 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861. The trial judge directed the jury that 'malicious' for the purpose 
of s. 23 meant 'wicked' - something which the accused 
had no business to 
do and perfectly well knew it. He concluded that 
"(a)s I have already told you, it is not necessary to prove that he 
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intended to do it; it is quite enough that what he did was done 
unlawfully and maliciously". 
D was convicted and appealed. In the Court of Criminal Appeal Byrne J 
considered the following principle propounded by Professor Kenny' that 
"... in any statutory definition of crime 'malice' must be taken not 
in the old vague sense of 'wickedness' in general, but as requiring 
either (i) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm 
that in fact was done, or (ii) recklessness as to whether such harm 
should occur or not (i. e. the accused has foreseen that the 
particular kind of harm might be done, and has yet gone on to take 
the risk of it). It is neither limited to, nor does it indeed 
require, any ill-will towards the person injured". 
Byrne J noted that the principle was repeated in Turner in his tenth 
edition of 'Russell on Crime', and that it had derived some support from 
the judgments of Lord Coleridge CJ and Blackburn J in Pembliton. r- He 
continued 
"in our opinion the word 'maliciously' in a statutory crime 
postulates foresight of consequence ... With the upmost respect to 
the learned judge, we think that it is incorrect to say that the 
word 'malicious' in a statutory offence merely means wicked ... In 
our view it should have been left to the jury to decide whether, 
even if the appellant did not intend injury to (W), be foresaw that 
the removal of the gas meter might cause injury to someone but 
nevertheless removed it". ' 
The conviction was accordingly quashed. The decision of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal thus made it clear that the test for malice (and, it 
seems from the judgment, recklessness) in any assessment of criminal 
responsibility was to be construed in accordance with the ideal 
typical 
construction of subjectivism. However the view that recklessness and 
malice must be interpreted on a subjectivist basis was not subject 
to 
universal judicial approbation. 
In Xdwatt7 the defendant was charged with the offence of wounding 
contrary to s. 20 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861. The trial 
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judge directed the jury that if they were satisfied that the defendant 
did rain a series of blows upon his victim then clearly "any ordinary 
man would realise that some physical harm would be sustained by the 
victiid'. The defendant was convicted and appealed on the ground that the 
trial judge had misdirected the jury in that he did not direct on 
'malicious' as the mens rea element of the offence. 
In the Court of Appeal Criminal Division Diplock LJ, as he then was, 
pointed out that there may be cases where the accused's awareness of the 
possible consequences of his act is genuinely in issue and that the 
passage from Kenny might be appropriate in such cases. However he 
continued 
"(b)ut where the evidence ... shows that the physical act of the 
accused ... was a direct assault (on another) which any ordinary 
person would be bound to realise was likely to cause some physical 
harm to the other person ... (then), in the absence of any evidence 
that the accused did not realise that it was a possible consequence 
of his act that some physical harm might be caused to the victim, 
the prosecution satisfy the relevant onus by proving the commission 
by the accused of an act which any ordinary person would realise was 
likely to have that consequence". "' 
The learned Lord Justice concluded that there was no need for the judge 
to give the jury any instructions on the meaning of the word 
'maliciously' and dismissed the appeal. 
Two major issues follow from the judgment of Lord Diplock in fi t. The 
first is whether or not an agent can be convicted under s. 20 if he did 
not foresee any physical harm at the time of his act. Lord Diplock 
observed that where the defence is something other than that the assault 
was accidental or that the defendant did not realise that it might cause 
some physical harm to the victim (for example the defence that he did 
not assault the alleged victim or that the assault was done in self 
defence), it is not necessary to deal specifically in the summing up 
with what is meant by the word 'maliciously' in the section. 
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Is Lord Diplock suggesting that, in such a case, the jury are entitled 
(or, perhaps, bound) to infer that the agent foresaw the result by 
reason of its being a natural and probable consequence of his activity? 
Glanville Williams and Smith and Hogan seem to accept this as Lord 
Diplock's view. Williams criticises this aspect of the decision in 
Nowatt on the ground that it is out of line with s. 8 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1967. `' Smith and Hogan point out that the decision in Xowatt 
was delivered before s. 8 took effect" and that this aspect of the 
decision must be regarded as suspect. However one ought to note that the 
dictum of Lord Diplock is confined to cases of assault where the 
defendant offers no evidence of lack of foresight, and his comments are 
meant to apply to the evidential burden of the prosecution in such 
cases. Lord Diplock does not thus apply an objectivist approach as a 
matter of law: he talks of "any ordinary man" as a standard of evidence 
for the prosecution in such a case. Where a defendant in fact pleads 
lack of foresight there would be need for the prosecution to prove that 
he did foresee the relevant result of his activity. 
Smith and Hogan suggest that where the agent raises some defence other 
than lack of foresight he does not admit malice and the prosecution 
should be invited to prove malice in the usual way, and that the trial 
judge's due consideration in Iowatt that there is overwhelming evidence 
in relation to malice should not act as a bar to due consideration on 
the issue by the jury. One can see the logic in these comments in cases 
of recklessness generally but on the specific facts of lowatt, where the 
prosecution offer evidence of the defendant's raining blows upon his 
victim and the defendant offers no evidence on lack of foresight, it is 
difficult to see what more evidence the prosecution need submit in order 
to establish the requisite mental state (foresight of injury). 
To summarise on this first aspect of Nowatt. It is submitted that Lord 
Diplock's standard of "any ordinary person" was intended to constitute 
the kind and extent of evidence that the prosecution must produce 
for 
the actual foresight which conviction requires in cases in which the 
agent's defence is something other than 'lack of foresight'. 
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The second issue which flows from the judgment of Lord Diplock in Rawatt 
is whether or not foresight of some minor harm is sufficient for a 
conviction under s. 20 where the agent has committed an assault on his 
victim? One might argue that Lord Diplock ruled that such foresight was 
sufficient" but there has been criticism of this view. 12 Smith and 
Hogan submit that a person who foresees harm which is less than really 
serious has the wens rea for the less serious offence of assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm under s. 47 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861, and that it is wrong that the mens rea of the less 
serious offence should suffice for liability for the greater. One might 
argue that, because the maximum sanction is the same for both offences, 
a shared mens rea produces no hardship since the agent who foresees only 
minor harm cannot receive a greater maximum sentence under s. 20 in 
respect of the serious harm caused by him than he would have received 
under s. 47 had actual bodily harm resulted. 
It is submitted that this argument should be rejected. If we are to 
distinguish between the cases of actual bodily harm and grievous bodily 
harm for the purpose of conviction (as we should) then that distinction 
should apply to both the actus reus and wens rea in each case. In the 
offences of murder and manslaughter we have a common actus reus and it 
is the different levels of mens rea which provide the distinction for 
the purpose of conviction. This is, I think, the right approach since 
the agent who intends death or grievous bodily harm ought to be 
distinguished at the conviction stage from the agent who intends only to 
frighten, or the agent who has brought about death by gross negligence. 
The same principle should be applied to the non-fatal offences: the 
agent who foresees only minor harm but causes grievous bodily harm 
should be distinguished from the agent who foresees and causes grievous 
bodily harm. We may achieve this by providing each of the offences under 
sections 20 and 47 with a distinct mens rea which is restricted to 
foresight of the harm defined by the actus reus of the offence. Thus 
where the agent causes grievous bodily harm with foresight of such harm 
he may be charged under s. 20, and where the agent causes grievous 
bodily 
harm with foresight of minor harm we may charge him with causing actual 
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bodily harm only. This is not illogical since actual bodily harm has 
been inflicted. 
What of the agent who causes actual bodily harm with foresight of 
serious bodily harm? A preliminary point to note here is that this agent 
is reckless regarding grievous bodily harm which in fact he has not 
brought about. In my view the agent is not liable in respect of it. 
This reasoning follows the current legal position which insists upon the 
occurrence of the harm towards which the agent has been reckless. He 
should be charged with causing actual bodily harm simpliciter, that is 
to say we should discount the more substantial mental state held by the 
agent and count him as foreseeing actual bodily harm. This is not 
illogical since he foresees that lesser mental state as a part of his 
total mens rea regarding possible injury. 13 
An interesting point for discussion here revolves around the agent who 
actually intends harm of a particular type and degree and succeeds in 
inflicting harm of that type but not of that degree. Suppose that D,, 
who does not foresee grievous bodily harm, assaults his victim intending 
minor harm but in fact causes more serious harm, or that D2 intends 
grievous bodily harm to V but in fact causes non-serious harm. The 
position with regard to the latter agent may be stated shortly. D2 is 
guilty of an attempt under s. 18 and also of the substantive offence 
under s. 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. But what of Di? 
May we count his intention to cause minor harm as recklessness as to the 
more serious harm of the same type? Duff alludes to this type of 
reasoning in relation to specific offences of homicide when he suggests 
that one may read the doctrine of implied malice in murder as holding 
that an intent to cause serious injury constitutes recklessness as to 
the death which in fact ensues. '° What Duff has in mind here, I think, 
is that the risk of death is such an integral aspect of the agent's 
activity (a really serious physical attack on his victim) that one ought 
to count the agent as responsible for the more serious harm of which he 
was unaware. We may do this by counting him as reckless in relation to 
that harm. I am not sure if Duff would accept this interpretation of his 
analysis but I think that it fits well with respect to cases in which 
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the agent brings about a greater (and unforeseen) non-fatal injury than 
that which he intended. I shall return to this issue when assessing the 
various interpretations of 'Caldwell recklessness'. 'Is Suffice it to 
conclude here that in cases in which the agent is making a physical 
attack upon another the court or jury will be likely to conclude that he 
must have foreseen the harm caused by him as a possible consequence of 
his intended activity. 
It should be noted that the Criminal Law Revision Committee has proposed 
a reversal of the Klowatt view of what must be foreseen. 
The decision by the Court of Appeal in Cato' 6" gave rise to some debate 
upon the position of the concept of recklessness in relation to the two 
ideal typical constructions of subjectivism and objectivism concerning 
the offences of manslaughter and s. 23 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861. In that case D and three friends decided to pair off and 
inject each other with heroin, the quantity of which was decided by the 
recipient. D and F continued this practice for several hours until they 
became unconscious. F subsequently died and D was charged with both 
manslaughter and maliciously administering a noxious thing contrary to 
s. 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. In summing up on 
manslaughter the trial judge directed the jury 
"Wow manslaughter in law is causing ... death ... quite 
inadvertently by doing an unlawful and dangerous act, or 
alternatively, by doing a lawful act with gross negligence, that is 
to say, recklessly". " 
The judge went on to give the jury six questions to answer and told them 
that they were entitled to convict if they answered all questions 
positively. The sixth question took the form "was the conduct of 
(the 
appellant), in respect of the injection, grossly negligent or, 
in other 
reckless"? " The phrases in italics indicate 
that for the trial words, 
judge recklessness, in cases of manslaughter at 
least, is equivalent to 
gross negligence and thus in line with ideal objectivism. 
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D was found guilty on both counts and appealed. In respect of the 
conviction for manslaughter counsel for D argued that he had admitted at 
his trial that he was aware that injecting heroin might give rise to 
addiction but he had no idea that it could give rise to death or serious 
bodily harm: that in deciding whether D had acted recklessly one would 
have to have regard to the fact (if accepted) that he did not know about 
the potentiality of the drug. The argument was that this crucial point 
had not been dealt with sufficiently by the judge in the summing up. 
Lord Widgery CJ dismissed this argument on the ground that 
"recklessness is a perfectly simple English word. Its meaning is 
well known and it is in common use. There is a limit to the extent 
to which the judge in summing up is expected to teach the jury the 
use of ordinary English words". 'e, 
With respect to the learned Lord Chief Justice the concept of 
'recklessness' had taken on a distinctly legal meaning as a result of 
the dicta by the judges in the cases and if Lord Widgery was to uphold 
the meaning attributed to the concept by the trial judge then he ought 
to have justified his decision by reference to the case law. If he had 
looked to the case law he would have found that in very few if any had 
the concept of recklessness been equated with gross negligence. In any 
event there is a particular category of manslaughter based on gross 
negligence which covers a failure by the defendant to foresee an obvious 
risk of death or serious injury so there was no need for the trial judge 
to apply an extended interpretation to gross negligence in the case 
before him. However it is clear that Lord Widgery agreed with the 
definition of recklessness supplied by the trial judge which shifted 
the 
contours of the concept towards the typical ideal construction of 
objectivism. 
In respect of the appeal against count 2 counsel 
for Cato, relying upon 
Byrne J's approbation of Kenny's definition of malice'' 
in cunninichan, 
argued, inter alia, that 'maliciously' requires some 
foresight as to the 
consequences. Lord Widgery considered the definition and said 
"(n)o doubt this is correct in the Cunningham type of case where 
the 
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injury to the victim is done indirectly ... We think in this case 
where the act was entirely a direct one that the requirement of 
malice is satisfied if the syringe was deliberately inserted into 
the body of (the victim) as it undoubtedly was, and if the appellant 
at the time when he inserted the syringe knew that the syringe 
contained a noxious substance". : 20 
Two points may be made on this aspect of the decision in Cato. First, 
Lord Widgery bases his argument in part on the fact that D knew that the 
syringe contained a 'noxious substance', but is this not to say that he 
thus knew that it was likely to cause harm (that is what 'noxious' 
means)? Second, on Smith and Hogan' s interpretation of the decision-' D 
was not counted reckless as to the risk of death or grievous bodily harm 
even though he did not realise that risk, but that the offence requires 
wens rea (malice) only as to the administration of the noxious thing - 
not as to the consequent risk; that the phrase "so as to thereby 
endanger life" concerns the actual effects of admininistering the 
substance, not the agent's intention or foresight. On the basis of this 
reasoning it would seem that Lord Widgery's judgment as regards the 
mental state concerning s. 23 maintains the principles of ideal 
subjectivism.. 22 
One year later the Court of Appeal applied the ideal subjectivist 
approach regarding the concept of recklessness in respect of an offence 
under s. 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. In Briggs -D was charged 
with causing criminal damage to a car door belonging to a lady tenant. D 
was convicted and appealed on the ground that the trial judge had 
misdirected the jury on the meaning of 'recklessness' which he described 
as being an act done "not caring (or careless of) whether it happens", 
thus not distinguishing sufficiently between recklessness and 
inadvertence. The court allowed the appeal stating that a man 
"is reckless in the sense required when he carries out a deliberate 
act knowing that there is some risk of damage resulting from that 
act but nevertheless continues in the performance of that act". 
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This view of the Court of Appeal gives an overriding precedence to 
awareness of the risk but in the same year that court came to a 
different conclusion when hearing an appeal against conviction under s. 1 
of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. In Parker CD ryl)24 the appellant, in a 
fit of temper, had damaged a telephone when slamming it down. The 
question here concerned his recklessness as to an effect which was 
intimately connected with his activity. The Court had to consider 
whether the defendant, who had not thought about the risk because of his 
self induced temper, could be said to be reckless regarding the damage 
which he had caused. Lane LJ thought that a failure to allude to the 
risk in such a case could amount to recklessness and amended the 
definition of that concept in Briggs thus: 
"A man is reckless in the sense required when he carries out a 
deliberate act knowing or closing his mind to the obvious fact that 
there is some risk of damage resulting from that act but 
nevertheless continuing in the performance of that act". 21 
Lord Lane's definition of recklessness in Parker modifies the 
'awareness' based model of recklessness offered by the Court of Appeal 
in Briggs. Supporters of the ideal typical construction of subjectivism 
have argued that the decision does not violate the subjectivist 
requirement of awareness since a 'certain amount of toughness' in 
interpreting subjectivist recklessness in cases such as Parker is 
permissible since the defendant has the relevant knowledge stored in his 
brain and the power to bring it to the forefront of his mind if he 
chooses to do so. 2G Viewed in this way we might say that the 'choice' 
element of subjective recklessness is retained: we might say that Parker 
had chosen not to consider a risk of which he would have been aware had 
he thought about it. However the phrase 'closed his mind' opens up 
interesting discussion. Just what does the phrase mean? Does it mean 
that the agent had a flash of awareness and closed the door on it so 
that his mind was free from it at the time of his activity? If this is 
the correct interpretation then how does it differ from the agent who 
has 'been blinded' concerning the risk for some reason. 
There seems to 
be a subtle distinction. In the former the agent 
had some form of 
momentary enlightenment of the risk: in the latter this was 
denied to 
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him - he was blinded to the fact that the risk existed. Is the 
distinction significant? If so how are we to distinguish between them 
for the purpose of ascriptions of criminal responsibility? I shall argue 
later that neither case constitutes recklessness: that both are a 
species of gross negligence and that the agent should be liable 
accordingly unless he can produce evidence of some legally recognised 
factor in sufficient degree to prevent him from appreciating the risk. 27 
Briggs informs us that recklessness is to be construed in accordance 
with the subjectivist ideal: that the agent must be aware of the risk 
that he is taking regarding his activity. Parker modifies the definition 
of recklessness in Brigge in order to bring into account the agent who 
fails to foresee the risk of proscribed harm because he has closed his 
mind to that risk. But what of the agent who, owing to some incapacity 
at the time of his activity, does not have the relevant store of 
knowledge regarding the risk of harm and is thus unable to bring the 
risk to the forefront of -his mind? The Court of Appeal was 
faced with 
this question in 1979. 
In Steph nQ son28 the defendant had crept into a hollow in the side of a 
large haystack and started a fire there in order to keep warm. The 
haystack caught fire and was damaged. Stephenson suffered from 
schizophrenia and might well have acted as he did whilst suffering from 
the complaint. The trial judge, in accordance with the decision in 
Parker, directed the jury that the accused was reckless if he had closed 
his mind to an obvious risk in relation to his act, and that 
schizophrenia might be a reason which made a person close his mind 
to 
the obvious risk. Stephenson was convicted and appealed on the ground of 
a misdirection as to what constituted recklessness for the purpose of 
the statutory offence. 
Lord Lane referred to the irascible agent who has caused 
the actus reus 
of an offence whilst in a self induced state of annoyance and said 
"(t)he fact that he may have been in a bad temper at 
the time would 
not normally deprive him of his knowledge or 
foresight of the risk. 
If he had the necessary knowledge or foresight and 
bis bad temper 
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merely caused him to disregard it or put it to the back of his 
minders not caring whether the risk materialised, or if it merely 
deprived him of the self-control necessary to prevent him from 
taking the risk of which he is aware, then his bad temper will not 
avail him. This was the concept which the court in Parker was 
trying to express when it used the words "or closing his mind to the 
obvious fact that there is some risk of damage resulting from that 
act". 
Lord Lane concluded that the test for recklessness remained subjective 
in character. 
"The knowledge or appreciation of a risk of some damage must have 
entered the defendant's mind, even though he may have suppressed it 
or driven it out". 2 
Lord Lane thus puts a gloss on his judgment in Parker, for he is saying 
here that the defendant must have had a momentary recall of knowledge3° 
which he then suppresses so that he is in a state of unawareness at the 
time that he brings about the untoward harm of his activity. 
Subjectivists may plausibly argue here that Lord Lane's statement on the 
parameters of the concept of recklessness does not depart in any way 
from the ideal subjectivist approach since, in such a case, the agent 
has had a momentary recall of knowledge, a flash of awareness of the 
risk he is running and, in suppressing that knowledge, he is choosing to 
run the risk: that is to say the deliberate suppression of his knowledge 
of risk is of a piece with his deciding positively to run the risk. But 
is there not a distinction between the agent for whom the risk entered 
his mind and which he then suppressed or drove out and the agent who 
'closed his mind' to the risk? Just what does the phrase mean if it does 
not involve a flash of awareness? How do these two cases differ, if at 
all, from the case in which the agent whose fit of temper has 
'blinded 
him' to the risk? Or he whose temper causes him to 'disregard 
the risk', 
or he whose temper causes him to put the risk at the back of 
his mind? 
The dictum of Lord Lane in Stephenson3' suggests 
that there is no 
s 
distinction to be made for the purpose of conviction. 
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I am in agreement with the learned Lord Chief Justice that where the 
agent does not appreciate the risk at the time of his act because he is 
in a state of self induced temper then there is no need to enter into a 
deliberation of precisely why, because of his temper, he is not aware of 
the risk. But I think that Lord Lane is wrong to make, by implication, 
no distinction between the agent who is not aware of the risk and the 
agent who is aware of the risk but whose self-induced temper leads him 
to take it anyway. ý'ý First it produces conceptual incoherence since, it 
is argued, one is introducing a negative mental state into the concept 
of recklessness for the purpose of catching a morally reprehensible 
attitude concerning the risk of harm. Second, in amalgamating 
recklessness and gross negligence in this way we are unable to mark the 
significant moral distinction between the agent who is willing to take a 
risk with the person or property of another and the agent who is unaware 
of the risk. I shall argue later that the agent who, for whatever 
reason, does not appreciate at the time of his activity a risk of 
untoward harm should fall into an appropriate category of mens rea 
distinct from that which houses the agent who i aware of the risk. " 
Lord Lane concluded by looking at the facts of the case before him. Of 
the defendant's mental condition he said 
"(t)he schizophrenia was on the evidence something which might have 
prevented the idea of danger entering the appellant's mind at all-" 
If that was the truth of the matter, then the appellant was entitled 
to be acquitted. That was something which was never left clearly to 
the jury to decide". 
In his judgment Lord Lane is prepared first to excuse mental 
abnormalities, such as schizophrenia, which prevent the agent from 
appreciating the risk of specific harm and second, to count as reckless 
cases of self induced non-appreciation of the risk such as anger 
in 
assessing responsibility. Two points may be raised on 
the distinction 
drawn by Lord Lane. First, it is interesting to consider just what 
mental abnormalities which prevent the agent 
from appreciating an 
obvious risk Lord Lane would be willing to count as not reckless 
in 
relation to particular harm. I have in mind 
here mental states and 
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emotions such as tiredness, distress, panic, dispair, shock, emotional 
distress or fatigue, pre-menstrual depression, post-natal depression 
and so forth. -'s Second, in ascribing some negative mental states to the 
concept of recklessness and excluding others Lord Lane brings conceptual 
incoherence to that concept. My view is that we should aim at conceptual 
clarity; that we should place negative mental states concerning an 
obvious risk into one concept of mens rea and provide for an excusing 
provision where we feel that such negative states have been brought 
about in circumstances in which the agent should be free from criminal 
responsibility. '=" 
At the turn of the decade two cases in the Court of Appeal, Flack v 
HUDVE and Sullivan, " affirmed the ideal subjectivist position 
concerning offences under s. 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861. The latter case is worth mentioning here since it deals with an 
intention to frighten as the mens rea of the offence under that statute. 
In Sullivan D was driving his passenger home. They were both drunk. D 
was driving at about 30 miles per hour in a very narrow street. He 
mounted a pavement and struck V, a pedestrian. D was charged under ss. 18 
and 20 and contended that he had only intended to frighten V. He was 
convicted and appealed. The Appeal Court, in dismissing the appeal, 
noted that there were two schools of thought as to the burden of proof 
on the prosecution in relation to the mental element in an offence under 
s. 20.1e Professor Williams: 21" represented one view with 'the particular 
kind of harm', meaning the wounding or grievous bodily harm mentioned in 
the section. D. W Elliot-40 represented the other school of thought that 
the person charged probably had the appropriate mens rea if he intended 
the victim to be frightened. The Court thought that s. 8 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1967 removed the whole basis of the argument that the intent 
to frighten was enough to constitute the necessary wens rea under s. 
20. 
However a jury might be convinced from the evidence relating 
to an 
intent to frighten that the person charged was aware that his act was 
likely to have the result of causing some sort of injury 
to the victim. 
Nevertheless since s. 8 a mere intention to frighten without more was not 
sufficient; the person charged must be proved to 
have been aware that 
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the probable consequences of his voluntary act would be to cause some 
injury to his victim, but not necessarily grievous bodiy harm. In the 
circumstances a properly directed jury could not have come to any other 
conclusion than that D must have been aware that what he was doing was 
likely to cause physical injury to the victim and the offence not being 
one of specific intent the proviso would apply. 
Two questions might be raised in relation to the decision. First, the 
Court talked in terms of "some sort of injury to the victim but not 
necessarily grievous bodily harzd' and "the defendant must have been 
aware that what he was doing was likely to cause physical injury to the 
victim". The type of harm perpetrated was not thus restricted to 
'grievous bodily harm' and one might therefore ask whether or not 
foresight of non-serious harm is sufficient (or ought to be sufficient) 
as the wens rea for an offence under s. 20 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861. This raises an issue similar to that raised above41 
regarding foresight and s. 18 of that Act and my view is that the same 
considerations should apply here. Second, suppose that Sullivan had 
claimed at his trial that he had thought about the risk of injury to V 
and had decided that there was none since, say, his profession as a 
stunt man had left him in no doubt that he would stop the vehicle short 
of striking his victim. Sullivan would thus be claiming that he intended 
to frighten V but that he had neither intended nor was reckless in 
relation to actual injury to V since, at the time of his activity, he 
was convinced that no injury would result. Ought we to accept this claim 
and excuse Sullivan from criminal responsibility in relation to serious 
injury which he causes to his victim? An answer to this question must 
await an assessment of fin. " 
A final general point on 'intention to frighten'. 
Is there any 
justification for counting an intention to frighten, regardless of 
foresight of harm, as recklessness in relation to that 
harm? There are 
two possible answers in favour which might be put 
forward. One is that 
an intention to frighten someone itself involves or constitutes 
recklessness as to the injury which is in 
fact caused. Second, an 
intention to frighten must be an intention to induce 
the belief in V 
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that he is likely to suffer injury; and it will be usually quite hard to 
do that other than by making it actually likely or possible that he will 
suffer injury; thus intention to frighten would include (subjective) 
recklessness as to the risk of injury. 
One should note that whilst Flack v Hunt and Sullivan acknowledged the 
subjectivist approach to recklessness in relation to cases under s. 0 of 
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, two cases, which were heard in 
the same two year period, seemed to be pointing the path of recklessness 
towards the ideal objectivist position in relation to reckless driving 
and the wilful neglect of a child. 
In Xurpph_y44 D was charged with causing death by driving recklessly 
contrary to s. 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 (as amended by the Criminal 
Law Act 1977, s. 50). In his summing up to the jury the recorder made no 
reference to the contours of the concept of 'reckless' since it was a 
word in the English language and " (y)ou know what it means as well as I 
do". D was convicted and appealed on the ground that the recorder had 
failed to direct the jury that proof was required that he had foreseen a 
risk of injury, or at least the risk of an accident, and had yet gone on 
to take that risk (i. e. that there must be proved a subjectivist mental 
element as indicated in the cases of Briggs, Parker and Stephenson. 
At the appeal hearing counsel for the Crown argued that for the purpose 
of the legislation 'reckless' is used objectively and means 'heedlessly 
rash', that is to say indifferent to the risk in the sense of not caring 
whether there is a risk or not and that heedlessness or rashness may 
consist in the very failure to recognise obvious risks. ' 
In delivering the judgment of the court Lord Eveleigh LJ stated that 
"we have come to the conclusion that for an offence under s. 
50 there 
has to exist the mental element involved in the word 
'recklessly'. 
However it does not follow from this that foresight of 
the risk of 
an accident must have existed in the accused's mind and 
then for him 
to have made a deliberate decision to take that risk". 
4r- 
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The learned Lord Justice went on to say that knowledge might be 
interpreted either as something which is stored in the brain and 
available if called upon or as something which is actually present in 
the mind because it has been called upon. However he thought that such 
"philosophical quibbles" were not appropriate to motor cases in which 
"everyone knows that there is a risk if a vehicle is not Driven with due 
care and attention". 
Lord Eveleigh then distinguished between result crimes and conduct 
crimes,. He thought that contemplation of the ultimate risk assumed 
greater importance with respect of the former but as regards conduct 
crimes 
"we are concerned with an attitude of mind to the manner in which an 
act is performed or, more precisely, to the quality of the (agent's 
behaviour) ... 
A driver is guilty of driving recklessly if he deliberately 
disregards the obligation to drive with due care and attention or is 
indifferent as to whether he does so (a matter of evidence for the 
jury on the facts) and thereby creates a risk of an accident which a 
driver driving with due care and attention would not create". 11 
What is there in the judgment which conflicts or might conflict with 
subjectivism? I think that the agent who deliberately disregards the 
obligation to drive with due care and attention falls within orthodox 
subjectivism since he has made a conscious decision to drive in a manner 
which he knows creates a risk to other road users. However of the agent 
who "is indifferent as to whether he (drives without due care and 
attention) and thereby creates a risk" one might say that he is unaware 
that his driving falls short of that of the prudent and reasonable 
driver and thus does not fall within the 'awareness' based model of 
subjectivism. Lord Eveleigh described the latter agent in an alternative 
way a little earlier in his speech. He said 
"(a) driver may regulate his driving as a result of contemplating a 
specific risk or as a result of a subconscious appreciation of 
risks 
in general but what he has to achieve, whether or not 
the question 
of risk is prominent or suppressed in his mind, 
is the standard of 
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driving which a prudent an careful driver would observe". 
One might say from this that the indifferent agent does not have the 
subconscious appreciation of risks in general at the time of his 
activity which produces the untoward harm. But just what do we mean when 
we speak of the indifferent agent who does not have a subconscious 
appreciation of risks? 
Duff undertakes an analysis of the question. ` He alludes to Lord 
Eveleigh's distinction between two mental states, namely 'knowledge 
which is stored in the brain and available if called on' and 'knowledge 
which is actually present because it has been called on'. " But for Duff 
this distinction does not represent the whole picture since an agent 
with a general and latent store of knowledge about particular activity 
may act (i) with explicit knowledge, i. e. consciously contemplating the 
surroundings and circumstances in which he is driving and adjusting his 
actions or reactions in the light of that knowledge, or (Ii) with tacit 
knowledge, i. e. he is using his store of knowledge in driving as he does 
without making any conscious reference to that knowledge, or (iii) with 
neither explicit nor tacit knowledge, i. e. he does not notice the 
surroundings or circumstances of his driving (e. g. that he is driving 
too fast with regard to the prevailing road conditions) or if he does 
notice them he simply fails to relate them to the manner in which he is 
driving. 
As I understand Duff's submissions the following statements may be said 
to represent the position on recklessness. If the agent in (i) above 
drives with disregard to the surroundings or circumstances then he is 
paradigmatically reckless regarding the risk of which he is aware. The 
agent in (ii) is subjectively reckless concerning the risk since he has 
failed to apply his latent knowledge to the surroundings or 
circumstances of which he is aware. The agent in (iii) 
is objectively 
reckless in relation to the risk since he has failed 
to contemplate the 
surroundings and circumstances of his driving and thus cannot apply 
his 
latent knowledge to them. He would be aware of the risks which 
he 
creates (and thus that his driving is reckless) if 
he were attending to 
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his surroundings but, as he is not so doing, he cannot be said to be 
aware of the risks. 
My view is that the judgment in Murphy adopts the third categorisation 
of reckless activity and that the case thus extends the concept of 
recklessness into the realms of ideal objectivism. My submission is 
borne out by the Court' s statement that 
"what he has to observe and achieve, whether or not the question of 
risk is prominent or suppressed in his mind, is the standard of 
driving which a prudent and careful driver would observe". 6c' 
The positive duty contained in the dicta indicates, I think, that the 
defendant is not entitled to say in his defence that he has subjectively 
failed to contemplate a risk which a prudent and reasonable motorist 
would have noted and acted against. The defendant could not thus state, 
for example, that he was unaware that he was travelling at a speed which 
was excessive in relation to the circumstances in which he was driving: 
if he is so driving then he fails to reach the standard of driving which 
a prudent and careful driver would observe. Any subjective reason for 
that failure would thus seem irrelevant .' 
But this extension of the concept of recklessness in cases of reckless 
driving creates the problem of drawing the distinction between reckless 
driving and the less serious offence of careless driving. The court in 
llurViy sought to resolve the problem by saying 
"(w)hether or not a man is driving in defiance or with indifference 
to the proper standard will usually be a matter of inference for the 
Jury on the evidence as to the manner in which the vehicle was 
actually driven and as to road conditions. But it will not always 
be so. There may be some other explanation: for example, a 
mechanical defect or an inadvertent failure to observe a traffic 
sign and so forth". ---" 
The court thus leaves the issue of whether the defendant 
is guilty of 
reckless driving (defiance or indifference to the proper standard), as 
distinct from careless driving (inattentiveness), 
for the jury to decide 
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having regard to the circumstances of the driving in relation to the 
surroundings in which it takes place. The jury may be satisfied by some 
explanation by the defendant about his failure to assess the risk that 
his activity did not manifest indifference or disregard and that his 
case thus amounts to the lesser offence of careless driving. The agent's 
plea that he was simply unaware of the risk which he was creating must 
lead to a conviction of reckless driving since, on his own admission, he 
has failed to observe and achieve the standard of driving which a 
prudent and careful driver would observe. 
This specific issue on reckless driving leads to the question about the 
relationship between the concepts of recklessness and negligence in 
criminal law generally in areas in which the law extends the concept of 
recklessness so that it includes cases of what might be described as 
gross negligence. I shall return to this question when discussing 
Caldwell below. 13 
One last point on why. What if an agent who drives dangerously pleads 
that he was sure at the time that there was no risk in relation to his 
driving because he believed himself to be competent enough to cope with 
any emergency and thereby prevent injury or damage? Such an agent is 
unaware of the risk and should not thus be counted as reckless on 
subjectivist thinking. Duff points out~4 that we might catch such an 
agent in the subjectivist web on the ground that 
"he knowingly takes somec-$ risk (he must know that all driving 
involves some risk) which is objectively unreasonable for him to 
take, since it is created by an unreasonable manner of driving; or 
that he is aware of those aspects of his driving (his speed, his arm 
round his passenger's shoulders) which in fact conflict with the 
objective standard of careful driving, and that his ignorance of 
this conflict, being ignorance of the law not of 
fact, is no 
defence". 
I agree with Duff's later comments that 
these arguments are not 
persuasive: they represent a dilution of orthodox subjectivism 
for the 
purpose of ascribing liability to an agent who 
deserves censure but who 
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would avoid such on the 'awareness' based model of recklessness. My own 
view is that we ought to introduce a new species of wens rea, confined 
to a negative mental state, with which we may attribute liability to the 
agent who brings about untoward harm without alluding to the risk 
thereof. s1 
I introduced discussion on Murphy by saying that there were two cases 
which diverged from the more orthodox subjectivist approach adopted in 
Flack v Hunt and Sullivan at the beginning of the decade. 
The second case was Sheppard. 57 In that case a child of sixteen months 
died as a result of hypothermia and malnutrition because his parents, 
who were both of low intelligence, did not realise that he was so ill 
that he required medical aid from a doctor. The defendants were charged 
with wilful neglect under s. 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 
1933. Following a line of authority in relation to the statutory offence 
the trial judge treated the case as one of strict liability and directed 
the jury that the test was 
"would a reasonable parent with knowledge of the facts that were 
known to the accused appreciate that failure to have the child 
examined was likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to 
health"? 
The parents were convicted and appealed on the ground that the phrase 
'wilfully neglects' requires proof of a mental element on the part of an 
accused (i. e. intentionally and knowingly neglecting): that if the Crown 
proves the necessary degree of neglect there is a prima facie case which 
the defence may rebut by reasonable doubt as to the intention to 
neglect, for example ignorance of the child's need for medical aid. 
Lord Diplock acknowledged the contention by counsel for the prosecution 
that the adverb 'wilfully' might be given a restricted interpretation, 
confined to the doing of the act itself even though the agent did not 
realise that the proscribed consequence might happen and might 
have 
acted positively in the light of that realisation. 
However for Lord 
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Diplock the restricted interpretation was not the natural one and indeed 
such an interpretation would render the adverb otiose. 
The learned Law Lord thought that a parent could not properly be 
described as wilful 
"unless (he) either (i) had directed his mind to the question 
whether there was some risk ... that the child's health might suffer 
if he were not examined by a doctor ... and he made a conscious 
decision for whatever reason to refrain from arranging for such 
medical examination; or (ii) had so refrained because he did not 
care whether the child might be in need of medical treatment or not. 
As regards the second state of mind, this imports the concept of 
recklessness which is a common concept in mens rea in criminal law". 
Lord Diplock agreed that the cases since Senior l had treated the 
offence of wilful neglect as one of strict liability=" but decided that 
this was wrong and that the offence required one of the specific mental 
elements quoted above. He concluded that his definition of the required 
mental state 
"would afford no defence to parents who do not bother to observe 
their children's health or having done so do not care whether their 
children are receiving the medical examination or treatment that 
they need; it would involve the acquittal of those parents only who 
through ignorance or lack of intelligence are genuinely unaware that 
their child's health may be at risk if not examined". E° 
Lord Edmund-Davies came to much the same conclusion. He decided that a 
parent cannot be guilty of an offence under the legislation if he does 
not know that the child needs some kind of medical assistance. But 
"a parent reckless about the state of his child's health, not 
caring whether or not he is at risk, cannot be heard to say that he 
never gave the matter a thought and was therefore not wilful in not 
calling a doctor. In such circumstances recklessness constitutes 
wens rea no less than positive awareness of the risk involved 
in 
failure to act". ` 
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The House thus decided that a defendant must be at least reckless toward 
the risk to his victim which his failure creates for his neglect of his 
child to be wilful. To what extent, if at all, does the judgment in 
Sheppard provide an objective account of the concept of recklessness? 
The subjectivist may put forward two submissions in support of the 
argument that the decision maintains the spirit of ideal subjectivism. 
First, to be guilty of the offence the parent must be aware of the fact 
that his failure to attend to the child's needs or symptoms might well 
lead to a deterioration in the child's health or welfare, otherwise how 
else can he be in a position not to care about the risk to the child? 
The parent is not caring about a risk of which he is aware. This 
argument resembles that used by the subjectivist to justify a 
subjectivist interpretation in Xurphy ; that a parent has a store of 
knowledge about the needs of a child which he could call upon if 
disposed to do so. Thus we may attenuate the subjectivist approach to 
incorporate the agent who is unaware of the risk because he fails to 
draw upon the knowledge possessed by him which would inform him of the 
risk he is taking. Support for the 'store of knowledge' argument may be 
drawn from the dictum of Lord Diplock who said his ruling 
"would involve the acquittal of those parents only who through 
ignorance or lack of intelligence are genuinely unaware that their 
child's health may be at risk if it is not examined by a doctor to 
see if it needs medical treatment". 6"ý 
Lord Diplock is thus prepared to excuse from liability a parent who, for 
some subjective reason, does not possess the general store of 
information about child welfare which is generally held by parents. 
Thus, unless he can show that he genuinely lacked particular knowledge 
about child welfare, we may say that a parent is subjectively not caring 
about the welfare of his child where he fails to summon up the 
particular knowledge which he possesses. However it should be pointed 
out here that a parent will avoid liability where his failure to realise 
the danger stems from a genuine mistake as to the true physical status 
of the child which causes the parent to believe that the child 
is not at 
risk. 
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This is in line with Duff's criteria for recklessness. e4 For on his 
analysis a parent who is either expressly or tacitly aware at the time 
that his behaviour endangers his child is (on a subjectivist view freed 
from the idea that an 'awareness' of a risk must be explicit rather than 
implicit) reckless regarding that danger. A parent who never knew the 
relevant facts about children's needs and so on (who lacked the relevant 
store of latent knowledge) will not be counted reckless either by 
'awareness plus tacit knowledge' subjectivism or by .A parent 
who has the relevant latent knowledge may fail to realise a risk to the 
child in the particular case, either because he fails to notice the 
relevant facts, or because he fails to apply his latent knowledge to 
those facts. Is this a significant distinction for the purpose of 
criminal responsibility? My view is that these two ways of failing to 
realise a present risk are not significantly different: what is relevant 
is that we need to ask why he fails to realise the risk (to apply his 
latent knowledge or to notice the relevant facts); and to distinguish 
between the person whose failure expresses or flows from a lack of care 
and the person whose failure is explicable in some other way which does 
not ascribe to him a lack of concern for the child. 
A second submission which might put forward to substantiate the claim 
that Sheppard maintains the spirit of ideal subjectivismýs concerns the 
time factor between the agent's alluding to the possible risk and his 
later failure to allude to it owing to his indifference. Suppose that D 
is aware at some early point in his neglect for his child that that 
neglect might put his child at risk. He then persists in that neglect 
putting the knowledge of risk out of his mind so that he is unaware of 
the risk at the time of the actus reus of the offence. The argument here 
is that we may attach the agent's previous awareness of the particular 
risk with his later actus reus (accompanied by a now negative state) and 
count him as consciously reckless. However this argument would have 
insuperable practical difficulties regarding contemporaneity of actus 
reus and mens rea and the task for the jury in deciding on the accused's 
mental state at some point in time prior to the actus reus. 
It is 
submitted that the argument should be rejected. 
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To conclude on Murphy and Ehe=rd. It seems that the cases extend the 
concept of recklessness beyond the orthodox subjectivist requirement of 
conscious risk-taking into the realms of 'indifference to the risk', an 
attitude of 'couldn't care less' and 'a failure to bring to the 
forefront of one's mind a store of knowlege pertaining to the risk which 
Is stored in one's brain'. An assessment of this extended concept of 
recklessness must await an analysis of Caldwellc-1 but it is worth noting 
here that the cases seem to point to a specific criterion for the 
argument for a distinction between those crimes which insist upon the 
'awareness' model of recklessness and those which extend the 'awareness' 
model so as to include a failure to use tacit knowledge; that criterion 
being concerned with the direct relationship (or lack of it) between the 
risk and the agent's intended activity. IowatV` involved a case of 
wounding which is clearly a crime in which the risk is directly related 
to the agent's intended activity. The same applies to the cases of Cato, 
Parker, '-e and Murphy. Sheppard might be taken as a 'negative act' 
equivalent of the cases cited. On the other hand, in cases such as 
Cunningham, which accept the 'awareness' definition of recklessness, the 
risk of harm is not intimately connected to that which the agent is 
doing. 
The dicta in some of the cases suggest that we already have such a 
distinction in our current criminal law. In zatwjjit-- Lord Diplock 
expressly stated that the passage from Kenny confirming the 'awareness' 
model of recklessness7° might be appropriate in cases in which the risk 
is not directly related to the agent's activity (e. g. Cunningh") but 
not to an offence concerning a direct attack on the victim. In Cato Lord 
Widgery said of count 2" that Professor Kenny's meaning of the concept 
of 'malice' was no doubt correct for Clunningbaim: type cases where the 
injury to the victim is done indirectly but not in respect of cases in 
which the injury is direct. 
So should we adopt a concept of recklessness which is given a restricted 
meaning in cases in which the risk of untoward harm 
is indirect, but 
whose meaning is extended to include failure to allude 
to the risk in 
cases in which the risk of harm is intimately related 
to the agent's 
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activity? There are three reasons why I think we ought to accept neither 
that the distinction exists in our current law nor that it ought to be 
drawn. First, there are cases which indicate that there is not universal 
judicial consensus in favour of the distinction. In Sullivan, 7 for 
example, the risk of injury was directly related to D's activity but the 
court came down in favour of the 'awareness' model of recklessness in 
that case. Second, it may not always clear whether a particular case is 
one in which the risk of harm is directly related to the agent's 
activity. Third, it is my submission that the concept of recklessness 
should have a universal definition across the spectrum of substantive 
criminal offences'-3 and we should thus seek to reduce, and not extend, 
the number of situations in which different meanings are attached to the 
concept. 
The contrasting views of the concept of recklessness expressed in the 
cases at the turn of the decade culminated in a case which is 
acknowledged as the leading case on the subject. 
In Caldwell. 74 D had done some work for the owner of a hotel which led to 
a quarrel between them. D later got drunk and set fire to the hotel out 
of spite. The fire was put out before any serious damage was done. D was 
charged, inter alia, with causing criminal damage to property with 
intent to endanger life or being reckless whether life would be 
endangered contrary to s. 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. He argued 
that he was so drunk that the thought of endangering lives had not 
crossed his mind at the time of his act. The trial judge directed the 
jury that drunkenness was not a defence to a charge under s. 1(2) and D 
was convicted. D's appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed but the 
Crown appealed to the House of Lords. 
Lord Diplock's speech in the case has been the source of much academic 
and judicial debate. The speech is basically in two parts, the 
first 
dealing with the concept of recklessness, the second 
dealing with the 
defence of intoxication. It is necessary for present purposes 
to look at 
the first part of the speech in some detail. I shall quote and 
annotate 
shortly the major passages of the speech and go on 
to assess the various 
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commentaries on it. I shall enumerate the various passages for 
convenience. 
Lord Diplock pointed out that the Criminal Damage Act 1971 virtually 
replaced the detailed provisions in the Malicious Damage Act 1861. The 
latter Act described the mens rea of the various offences defined 
therein as 'malicious', a word which Lord Diplock considered to be a 
technical expression, a term of art7s the contours of which were 
described by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Gunning ýt" which approved 
as an accurate statement of the law the definition posited by Professor 
Kenny. 77 Lord Diplock considered that Kenny, in attempting to define 
'malicious' for the benefit of students, had used several synonyms 
including the word 'recklessness', 
1. "the noun derived from the adjective 'reckless' of which the popular 
or dictionary meaning is careless, regardless, or heedless, of the 
possible harmful consequences of one's acts. It presupposes that if 
thought were given to the matter by the doer before the act was 
done, it would have been apparent to him that there was a real risk 
of its having the relevant harmful consequences". tea 
An important point here is that Lord Diplock seems to accept that the 
dictionary meaning of the concept of recklessness is objective only to 
the degree that the agent has failed to foresee a risk that he would 
have recognised had he given any thought to the matter. One might thus 
say that Lord Diplock is applying what Professor Williams calls a 
conditionally subjective interpretation to the concept of recklessness 
at this point in his speech. '' He continued 
2. "but granted this, recklessness covers a whole range of stater of 
mind from failing to give any thought at all to whether or not there 
is any risk of those harmful consequences to recognising the 
existence of the risk and nevertheless deciding to ignore 
it". 
Several observations may be made here. First the concession 
"but granted 
this" (which relates to passage 1 above) at least suggests 
that Lord 
Diplock is maintaining a conditionally subjectivist approach-7': 
-4 to the 
concept of recklessness. Second one might ask just what states 
of mind 
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does Lord Diplock include in his range? Would he include, for example, 
the agent who foresees a risk and takes all possible measures to limit 
it, as opposed to ignoring the risk altogether? Also does his range 
include the agent who considers the possibility of a risk of harmful 
consequences and then concludes, wrongly, that the risk does not exist? 
The latter agent, at least, may be said to fall outside the range 
posited by the learned Law Lord and cannot thus be reckless in relation 
to his activity. My submission here is that if we are to have a range of 
mental states which fall within the concept of recklessness then we 
ought to know precisely what mental states constitute the range, 
otherwise we do not have a clear-cut model of the concept. 
Lord Diplock thought that Kenny's phrase in parenthesis, "(i. e. the 
accused has foreseen the particular kind of harm, and has yet gone on to 
take the risk of it)", ''° was used to indicate the parameters of the word 
'malicious' 
3. "but it was not directed to and consequently has no bearing on the 
meaning of the adjective 'reckless' in section 1 of the Criminal 
Damage Act 1971". 0' 
Lord Diplock thus admits that the concept ' malicious' is a term of art 
which has been given a legal meaning quite different from that as 
understood in ordinary language. However he contends that the concept 
'recklessness' is an ordinary English word which has not acquired such a 
legal meaning and should be interpreted accordingly. He thus maintains 
his view in the earlier passage 2 above that the agent who fails to 
foresee a particular risk may be reckless in respect of it. He continued 
4. "the restricted meaning that the Court of Appeal in Rv Cunningham 
had placed upon the adverb 'maliciously' (insisting on foresight 
by 
the defendant) called for a meticulous analysis by the jury of the 
thoughts that passed through the mind of the accused at or 
before 
the time he did the act ... in order 
to see on which side of a 
narrow dividing line they fell ... 
If it had crossed his mind that 
there was a risk ... but 
because his mind was affected by rage or 
excitement or confused by drink, he did not appreciate 
the 
seriousness of the risk ... this state of mind 
would amount to 
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(Cunningham) malice ... whereas if for any of these reasons he did 
not even trouble to give his mind to the question whether there was 
any risk ... this state of mind would not suffice ... Neither state 
of mind seems to me to be less blameworthy than the other". 82 
One might ask why Lord Diplock is prepared to allow the 'meticulous 
analysis' by the jury regarding offences involving malice but is 
prepared to reject such an analysis in cases of recklessness. Also to be 
noted is the fact that the learned Law Lord confines this passage of his 
speech to the agent who is acting in one or other of three affective 
states of mind. He thus leaves out of account both the agent who fails 
to see the risk and the agent who fails to see the seriousness of the 
risk in those cases in which the failure has been caused by some 
affective state of mind other than rage, excitement or through 
intoxication, for example tiredness, emotional distress, senile 
dementia, ignorance, mental subnormality and so forth. 
A third point on this part of Lord Diplock's speech. The learned Law 
Lord talks of the agent who does not trouble to give his mind to the 
question of whether there is any risk. What does he mean by this? Is it 
that the agent fails to call upon his general knowledge of physical 
causation in relation to the facts and circumstances in which he finds 
himself? Does it relate to a case in which the agent obtains a flash of 
awareness about the general possibilities in relation to his activity 
and then fails to deliberate upon the actual possibilities? Is Lord 
Diplock referring to the agent whose very attitude to the risk involved 
has caused his failure to allude to that risk? 
Lord Diplock continued by stating that the distinction between the two 
mental states posited by him earlier in his speech" 
5. "would not be a practical distinction for use in a trial by jury. 
The only person who knows what the accused's mental processes were 
is the accused himself - and probably not even he can recall 
them 
accurately when the rage or excitement under which 
he acted has 
passed, or he has sobered up if he were under 
the influence of drink 
at the relevant time". 
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A word or two on this passage. First Lord Diplock makes no reference 
here to the previous cases in which a jury had the task of making such a 
distinction for the purpose of assessing criminal liability (for example 
Briggs 4 and Cunningbaim. e-, Second note that Lord Diplock continues to 
restrict his speech to the affective states of mind which he notes in 
passage 4 above, He continued 
6. "Cm)y Lords, I can see no reason why Parliament when it decided to 
revise the law as to offences of damage to property should go out of 
its way to perpetuate fine and impracticable distinctions such as 
these, between one mental state and the other. One would think that 
the sooner they were got rid of, the better". 
Lord Diplock thus maintains his view that there is no significant moral 
distinction between the two mental states which he posits in passage 2 
above. Reference was then made to earlier cases on criminal damage. Lord 
Diplock noted that 
7. "R v Briggs ... excludes that kind of recklessness that consists of 
acting without giving any thought at all to whether or not there is 
any risk of harmful consequences of one's act; even though the risk 
is great and would be obvious if any thought were given to the 
matter by the doer of the act". '=I 
Lord Diplock reminds us of the ratio in Briggs but two points are worth 
noting here. First, when talking of failure to attend to a risk of harm 
he retains the phrase "if thought were given to the matter by the doer 
of the act". He thus maintains a conditionally subjectivist position on 
the matter. Second, when talking of a failure to foresee the risk Lord 
Diplock includes the phrase "even though the risk is great". He did not 
include this phrase in his summing up on recklessness but could he have 
meant to include that or a similar phrase to be included therein? 
Evidence that this may have been his intention is found in 
Lord 
Diplock's judgment in Lawrence E17 in which he talks of an 'obvious and 
serious' risk. However a subsequent passage by Lord 
Diplock indicates 
that the question must be answered in the negative. 
111' The learned Law 
Lord continued 
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B. "B v Parker°"' opened the door a chink by adding as an alternative 
to the actual knowledge of the accused ... a mental state described 
as 'closing his mind to the obvious fact' that there is a risk. 
KV Ste n° slammed the door again upon any less restricted 
interpretation of 'reckless' ... The court ... made the assumption 
that although (Parliament replaced the word 'maliciously' with 
'recklessly' in the Criminal Damage Act) it nevertheless intended 
the words to be interpreted in precisely the same sense as that in 
which the single adverb 'maliciously' had been construed by 
Professor Kenny ... 
I see no warrant for making any such assumption ... 'Reckless' as 
used in the new statutory definition ... is an ordinary English 
word. It had not by 1971 become a term of legal art with some more 
limited esoteric meaning than that which it bore in ordinary speech 
-a meaning which surely includes not only deciding to ignore a risk 
of harmful consequences resulting from one's acts that one has 
recognised as existing, but also failing to give any thought to 
whether or not there is any risk in circumstances where, if any 
thought were given to the matter it would be obvious that there 
was" . ~-' 
Lord Diplock might have noted that in Stephenson Lord Lane did in fact 
uphold Parker concerning the agent who has closed his mind to a 
prospective harm which might flow from his activity. One should note 
that in this section of his speech Lord Diplock omits two important 
factors which formed an integral part of his earlier analysis. First he 
makes no reference to the expression 'by the doer of the act' in talking 
of failure to foresee a risk. Second, he leaves out of account any 
reference to an affective state of mind. One might thus interpret this 
part of his speech as leaning heavily towards the ideal typicai 
construction of objectivism concerning the concept of recklessness which 
includes a failure by the agent to foresee a risk which a reasonable 
person (free from rage, excitement or the effects of drink) would 
have 
foreseen. It is thus not surprising that this section of 
Lord Diplock's 
speech has received so much attention by the theorists. 
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Lord Diplock went on to deprecate the theorists' obsession with the 
terms 'subjectivism' and 'objectivism' . Of the two states of mind 
discussed by him in passage 2 above he said 
9. "(i)f one is attaching labels the latter state of mind (failing to 
give thought to an obvious risk) is neither more nor less 
subjective than the first. But the label solves nothing. It is a 
statement of the obvious; mens rea is, by definition, a state of 
mind of the accused himself at the time he did the physical act that 
constitutes the actus reus of the offence; it cannot be the mental 
state of some non-existent, hypothetical person. 
Nevertheless to decide whether someone has been 'reckless' ... does 
call for some consideration of how the mind of the ordinary prudent 
individual would have reacted to a similar situation. If there were 
nothing in the circumstances that ought to have drawn the attention 
of an ordinary prudent individual to the possibility ... the accused 
would not be described as 'reckless' ... for failing to address his 
mind to the possibility; nor, if the risk of the harmful 
consequences was so slight that the ordinary prudent individual upon 
due consideration of the risk would not be deterred from treating it 
as negligible, could the accused be described as 'reckless' in its 
ordinary sense if, having considered the risk, he decided to ignore 
i". ` 2 
The last section of this passage from Lord Diplock's speech refers to 
risk of harm of such a degree that it is unreasonable for the agent to 
run that risk. All commentators agree on the desirability for this 
constituent of 'recklessness' and that it is objective in character. Of 
the rest of the passage one is left to wonder as to just what Lord 
Diplock has in mind. He states clearly in the first paragraph that one 
is concerned with the state of mind of the defendant and not the 
reasonable man when assessing criminal liability. He makes much the same 
sort of statement in Sheppard" where he states 
"(t)he concept of the reasonable man as providing the standard 
by 
which the liability of real persons for their actual conduct 
is to 
be determined is a concept of civil law ... the obtrusion 
into 
criminal law of conformity with the notional conduct of 
the 
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reasonable man ... though not unknown ... is exceptional and should 
not be lightly extended". 914 
But if Lord Diplock is so concerned about any extension of 'the 
reasonable man' test in our criminal law then why does he introduce that 
test in the second paragraph of this passage in his speech in Caldwell 
as what he suggests at least as the basis of liability for recklessness? 
Of course Lord Diplock limits his speech to the agent who has failed to 
foresee what a reasonable man might be taken to have failed to have 
foreseen on the same facts and in the same circumstances but his purport 
is obvious; that if the agent fails to foresee an obvious risk then, 
provided the ordinary man would have foreseen it, the defendant is 
reckless as to that risk. It thus seems that Lord Diplock's passage here 
reduces itself into the statement that we must look to the state of mind 
of the defendant. If he has foreseen the risk and gone on to take it 
then he is reckless. If he is in a state of unawareness then that 
(negative) mental state amounts to recklessness if the risk is obvious 
in the sense that the reasonable man would have been aware of it. If 
this is the correct interpretation of the passage then it seems that 
Lord Diplock is introducing an orthodox objective test for recklessness 
under the cloak of allegiance to subjectivist principles. 
Did Lord Diplock intend the phrase 'by the doer' to be added to the 
words "if any thought were given to the matter" in passage 9 above? The 
addition of the phrase would give sense to the passage as a whole since 
one might say that Lord Diplock is using the standard of the reasonable 
man as the criterion in deciding whether or not the agent would have 
foreseen the risk, and if he can produce evidence of subjective factors 
which, at the time of his activity, rendered his mental capacities less 
effective than those of the reasonable man (e. g. mental subnormality) 
then he is entitled to put that evidence to the jury who may acquit 
if 
they feel that his mental defect was such that he was unable 
to 
appreciate the risk of harm to the same extent as the reasonable man. 
Lord Diplock concluded that a person charged with an offence under 
s. 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 is 
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10. "'reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or 
damaged' if (1) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk 
that property will be destroyed or damaged and (2) when he does the 
act he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there 
being any such risk or has recognised that there was some risk 
involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it". 
This is perhaps the most important passage in the first part of Lord 
Diplock's speech. One should note that Lord Diplock's earlier 
restrictions on foresight of an obvious risk to 'the doer of the act had 
he thought about it' and to the affective mental states of 'rage, 
excitement and drink' have both been omitted in the model direction. 
Thus on a straight interpretation of the passage recklessness includes 
failure to think about an obvious risk, i. e. a risk which the ordinary 
man would have recognised as existing at the time of the act which 
brings about the untoward harm, and the defendant is not entitled to put 
forward evidence relating to his own mental condition or capacity which 
may have brought about his failure to foresee the obvious risk. 
One final point on passage 10. Lord Diplock states at (1) that there 
must in fact be an obvious risk. Then at (2), in relation to a positive 
mental state, he says that the agent must be aware that there is some 
risk. But what of the agent who concludes, rightly, that there is some 
risk which it is unreasonable for him to take but which is not an 
obvious risk? In this case the agent satisfies only condition (2) of 
Lord Diplock's test: he does not satisfy condition (1) which apparently 
is a sine qua non of Lord Diplock's definition of recklessness. It is 
submitted that Lord Diplock would hold such an agent reckless; that his 
definition does not accommodate such an agent, and to this extent at 
least his model direction is in need of modification. 
What is one to make of this part of Lord Diplock's speech 
in Caldwell? 
My view is that it is open to several interpretations which might 
be 
chosen at random by the competing theorists in order 
to argue that the 
model definition accords with their particular viewpoint. 
The 
objectivist would presumably look no further 
than passage 10 and 
230 
attribute criminal responsibility to the agent who has failed to foresee 
a risk which would have been obvious to the reasonable man. The 
subjectivist might argue that we must look at Lord Diplock's speech as a 
whole and that, on its general tenor, we may restrict the negative 
mental component to the agent who has failed to appreciate a risk which 
he would have recognised had he thought about it, and that he may adduce 
evidence of a mental state other than rage, excitement and drunkenness 
to show good reason why he was not capable of alluding to the risk at 
the time of his activity which may lead to an acquittal. 
Lord Edmund-Davies dissented. He referred to Lord Diplock's views on 
Professor Kenny's statement on recklessness approved in Cunningbakz", and 
observed that, over time, the legal meaning of words takes on a 
different quality from their extra legal meaning. For Lord Edmund-Davies 
Professor Kenny used lawyers' words in a lawyer's sense when putting 
forward the parameters of the concept of recklessness. He pointed out 
that Professor Kenny's statement on the law of recklessness is 
recognised in other common law countries9lý, and that the Criminal Damage 
Act 1971 was the main work of the Law Commission who one year earlier 
defined recklessness in the following way: 
"A person is reckless if, (a) knowing that there is a risk that an 
event may result from his conduct or that a circumstance may exist, 
he takes that risk and (b) it is unreasonable for him to take it, 
having regard to the degree and nature of that risk which he knows 
to be present". 
Lord Edmund Davies suggested that it was this definition and the much 
respected decision of Rv Gunninghak which the draftsman had in mind 
when drafting the 1971 legislation and concluded 
"it has therefore to be said that, unlike negligence, which has to 
be judged objectively, recklessness involves foresight of 
consequences combined with an objective judgment of 
the 
reasonableness of the risk taken. And recklessness 
in vacuo is an 
incomprehensible notion. It must relate to foresight of risk of 
the 
particular kind relevant to the charge preferred which, 
for the 
purpose of s. 1(2), is the risk of endangering 
life and nothing other 
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than that". 
The learned Law Lord pointed to s. 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 11-3,57 and 
Lord Lane LPs exposition on recklessness in Stephen on-ý in support of 
his view. '°° His concluding remarks are important to present discussion. 
He said that1°1 
"if a defendant says of a particular risk, 'it never crossed my 
mind', a jury could not on those words alone properly convict him of 
recklessness simply because they considered that the risk ought102 
to have crossed his mind, though his words might well lead to a 
finding of negligence. But a defendant's admission that he 'closed 
his mind' to a particular risk could prove fatal, for, 'A person 
cannot, in any intelligible meaning of the words, close his mind to 
a risk unless he first realises that there is a risk; and if he 
realises that there is a risk, that is the end of the matter' 'O: =". 
It is an interesting point that Lord Edmund-Davies makes here. For the 
learned Law Lord' Ci4 the phrase 'closing one's mind to an obvious risk' 
involves at least a flash of awareness of the risks surrounding a, 
perhaps imminent, piece of activity followed by a decision by the agent 
to ignore, to suppress from his mind, the actual risk of harm at the 
time he performs that activity. I am not at all sure that this is in 
fact the proper interpretation of 'closing one's mind to a risk'. I 
think also that one ought not to apply such a mental state, whatever it 
means, to the concept of recklessness. '"s 
On the same day on which it delivered its judgment in Caldwell, the 
House delivered a further judgment on the parameters of recklessness as 
it relates to s. 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1972. 
In Rv Lawrence1°s the defendant was convicted of causing death by 
driving a motor vehicle on a road recklessly contrary to s. 1 of 
the Road 
Traffic Act 1972 and appealed ultimately to the House of 
Lords. Lord 
Diplock, who delivered the unanimous decision of the 
House, stated that 
"Mn my view, an appropriate instruction to the 
jury on what is 
meant by driving recklessly would be that they must 
be satisfied of 
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two things: 
First, that the defendant was in fact driving the vehicle in such a 
manner as to create an obvious and serious risk of causing physical 
injury to some other person who might happen to be using the road or 
of doing substantial damage to property; 107 and 
Second, that in driving in that manner the defendant did so without 
having given any thought to the possibility of there being any such 
risk, or having recognised that there was some risk involved, had 
nonetheless gone on to take it". 
Lord Diplock thus defines recklessness for the purpose of the Road 
Traffic legislation in much the same way as he did for the purpose of 
the Criminal Damage Act, However it is interesting to note that he talks 
here of an 'obvious and serious' risk of harm. Presumably he adds the 
word 'serious' for the purpose of s. 1 of the Road Traffic Act since (i) 
drivers do (or ought to) attend to their activity at all times whereas 
the agent who perpetrates criminal damage is not in a constant mental 
state about the possible consequences of his activity and (ii) the 
motorist who fails to attend to a lesser risk is guilty of a lesser 
criminal offence (driving without due care and attention). it is 
suggested that if Lord Diplock had introduced the word 'serious' into 
his definition of recklessness for the purpose of offences of criminal 
damage he might have attracted less criticism from the subjectivists who 
might be prepared to attribute responsibility to an agent who fails to 
foresee the very serious risk. '° Lord Diplock concluded 
(i)f satisfied that an obvious and serious risk was created by the 
manner of the defendant's driving, the jury are entitled to infer 
that he was in one or other of the states of mind required to 
constitute the offence and will probably do so; but regard must be 
given to any explanation he gives as to his state of mind which may 
displace the inference". ' ``'y 
The italicised phraseology merits comment. Just what 
does Lord Diplock 
have in mind as the substance of this proviso to his 
two mental states? 
Just what excusing factors should the jury be looking 
for: One reading 
of Lord Diplock's very opaque comment expressed by 
Duff "' is that he is 
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thinking of his own definition in terms not just of not giving thought 
to the risk, but of not doing so because he was indifferent (of not 
bothering to give thought) to it. On this view we might say that the 
proviso was designed to excuse the agent whose failure to appreciate the 
risk was due to some factor which indicates that he was not indifferent 
to the risk at the time of his activity. My own view is that Lord 
Diplock, by his rider, is prepared to allow evidence from the defendant 
as to his negative state of mind at the time of his activity which 
produces the proscribed harm and if the jury are satisfied that he could 
not''' advert to the obvious and serious risk then they are entitled to 
acquit. All of this suggests that here we have yet another area of the 
decision in Caldwell which is in need of clarification. 
On the basis that he intended my view as the interpretation of his rider 
in Lawrence, one is left to speculate on why Lord Diplock did not 
include the rider in his dicta in Caldwell. 12 Had he done so then one 
might plausibly argue that Stephenson" : might avoid criminal 
responsibility after 1982 if the jury are satsfied that his 
schizophrenia rendered him at the time of his activity incapable of 
appreciating the consequences of his activity as opposed to merely 
failing to use his power of perception concerning them. Of course the 
learned Law Lord may have meant this qualification for motoring offences 
only (with, perhaps Hill v Baxter' 14 in mind) but he does not make this 
clear by expressly excluding the rider in Caldwell. 
One final point on the rider. Generally courts are prepared to make the 
wens rea requirement for motoring offences far more strict than that 
required for non-traffic offences on the ground that driving a vehicle 
is inherently dangerous and the motorist should thus be judged in 
accordance with standards of the the prudent individual. 
However in 
making the rider available to the motorist but not to the agent 
in a 
non-traffic offence Lord Diplock effectively makes 
the mens rea 
requirement for recklessness less strict concerning road 
traffic 
offences. This is certainly at odds with what is perceived 
to be the 
general position. 
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There is no doubt that the decisions in Caldwell and Lawrence have 
produced a definition of recklessness which leans towards the ideal 
typical construction of objectivism. It had been objected in Ra sh , 
that Lord Diplock's statement about 'any thought being given to an 
obvious risk' should be interpreted in Professor Williams' 
'conditionally subjective' sense"' thus requiring that the risk would 
have been obvious to the defendant had he given any thought to the risk. 
However Archbold"' insists that the test is objective. His view was 
confirmed in Lawrence and Win. "I Ia It now seems clear that statutory 
recklessness must be construed objectively. "= 
To what extent does Caldwell recklessness apply in relation to offences 
which admit mental states which fall short of intention? In i? ° 
the House of Lords declared that Caldwell recklessness was to apply to 
all statutory offences which admit recklessness as a requisite mental 
state. However one year later in Satnam and Kewal. ' 2' Bristow J decided 
that Caldwell recklessness should not apply to s. 1(1) of the Sexual 
Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 concerning rape (or (obiter) offences 
against the person) since, in such cases, the agent is reckless as 
regards circumstances and not as to the facts in relation to his 
activity. This judgment conflicts with that of the House of Lords in 
Pigg. ' 12 It is submitted that Bristow Ps general commentary in Satnam 
and Kewal does not represent the law although one should note that 
s. 1(2) of the 1976 legislation, arguably at least, ' applies the ideal 
typical construction of subjectivism to the concept of recklessness. It 
thus seems that in all statutory offences the concept of recklessness 
shall be construed in accordance with Lord Diplock's model direction in 
Caldwell unless the statute expressly provides to the contrary. 
It had been thought that Caldwell recklessness did not apply to common 
law offences which can be committed recklessly. However in Seyi ur'` 
Lord Roskill stated that "it would be quite wrong to give the adjective 
'reckless' or the adverb 'recklessly' a different meaning according to 
whether the statutory or the common law offence is charged". Lord 
Roskill is thus prepared to apply a common definition of recklessness to 
common law and statutory offences. 
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It seems from the dicta of Lord Diplock in Caldwell that the mode 
direction on recklessness should not apply to offences which are 
committed maliciously on the ground that the latter concept was a term 
of art whereas the former was not and should thus bear it: -z ordinary 
meaning. In V (a minor) v Dolbey' 2s the Divisional Court confirmed Lord 
Diplock's distinction between the two concepts holding that in order to 
establish that a defendant had acted maliciously it had to be shown 
that, on the facts known to him at the time, he actually foresaw that a 
particular kind of harm might be done to his victim. This view was 
confirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Morrison'-lý'' This leaves the 
law in an unsatisfactory state since where an offence requires 'malice' 
as an appropriate mental state the court or jury must decide whether or 
not the agent was aware of the risk at the time of his act whereas where 
the offence admits 'recklessness' as a relevant mental state the agent's 
actual mental state is not relevant. "', 
Professor Smith has criticised the judgment'''' in Caldwell pointing out 
that Parliament has approved, at least implicitly, the views of the Law 
Commission'29 and the Criminal Law Revision Committee'3" both of which 
advocate a subjective approach to recklessness. He notes that Lord 
Diplock evades this 'overwhelming' evidence of Parliament's intentions 
by reference to the long title of the Criminal Damage Act which shows 
the purpose of the Act "to revise'-' the law". 
Lord Diplock considered that there was no reason why Parliament, when 
revising the law, should go out of its way to perpetuate the "fine and 
impractical" distinctions between the agent who has considered a risk 
and has gone on to take it and the agent who has failed to consider an 
obvious and serious risk. But, as Professor Smith points out, 13- the 
Criminal Damage Act made a considerable revision of the law generally, 
and Parliament may be taken to have accepted the then current 
legal 
position on the requisite mental element as the only part of 
the current 
law satisfactory in substance although not, perhaps, in 
form. 'a3 In any 
event if Parliament had some form of recklessness in mind, other 
than 
that which had been settled by the judges in 
their interpretation of 
statutory malice then surely that form of recklessness 
(which would have 
236 
amounted to a change in the current law) would have been made clear by 
way of definition in the Criminal Damage Act 1971. 
A Possible Lacuna in 'Caldwell Recklessness'. 
Griew'---'4 notes two types of agent who, he submits, fall outside the 
Caldwell criteria for recklessness. 
"M does give thought to whether there is a risk of damage to 
another's property attending his proposed act and he mistakenly 
concludes that there is no risk; or he perceives only a risk such as 
would in the circumstances be treated as negligible by the ordinary 
prudent individual. He misses the obvious and substantial risk. 
N is indeed aware of the kind of risk that will attend his act if he 
does not take adequate precautions. He takes precautions that are 
intended and expected to eliminate the risk (or to reduce it to 
negligible proportions). But the precautions are plainly - though 
not plainly to him - inadequate for this purpose". 
For Griew these cases appear not to be cases of recklessness since 
"evidence of conscientiousness displaces what would otherwise be an 
available inference of recklessness". 1: 34 
However in Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v 
Si Il' yes Taylor J. referred to Griew' s examples and rejected his 
submission in relation to the case of N. In Shimen the defendant, who 
was an expert in the Oriental Art of Taikwan-Do, kicked out at a shop 
window in order to impress his friends on his ability to stop short of 
contact. However D did make contact and in fact broke the window. At his 
trial the justices decided that D had in fact created an obvious and 
serious risk but that the inference that he was in one or other of the 
states of mind to constitute the offence might be rebutted by virtue of 
his evidence relating to his expertise in Taikwan-Do; that he could be 
acquitted if he perceived there could be a risk and, after considering 
such risk, determined that no damage would result. They dismissed the 
charge. 
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On appeal the prosecution conceded that there might exist a lacuna in 
the Caldwell model of recklessness; that there may be a state of mind 
which fell into neither of the two categories enunciated by Lord 
Diplock, namely that where he creates an obvious risk that property will 
be destroyed the agent either (i) has not givan any thought to the 
possibility of there being any such risk or (ii) has recognised that 
there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it. '~a 
Taylor J. thought that the two examples posited by Griew (above) provide 
useful material with which to assess the issue. Taylor J. thought that 
M's case might fall outside the Caldwell criteria since, although he has 
given thought to the possibility, he has not recognised that there was 
some risk involved and may be said to fall outside the second state of 
mind referred to by Lord Diplock. '37 
However Taylor thought that in N's case the agent falls within the 
second state of mind posed in Caldwell: he took precautions which he 
expected would eliminate the risk but the fact that he was conscientious 
to the degree of trying to minimize the risk does not mean that he falls 
outside the second limb since that limb is simply whether or not he 
realised that there was some risk. For Taylor J. the agent N certainly 
did recognise that there was some risk and went on to do the act and he 
thus falls within the second limb of Caldwell recklessness. Of the case 
before him Taylor J. decided that Shimmen did recognise that there was a 
risk; it was not a case of considering the possibility and deciding that 
there was no risk. Indeed Shimmen had admitted at his trial that "I 
weighed up the odds and thought I had eliminated as much of the risk as 
possible by missing by two inches instead of two millimeters". Taylor J. 
thus allowed the appeal. Watkins L. J. agreed and the case was remitted 
with the direction to convict. 
With respect to Taylor J it is submitted that this reasoning 
is wrong. 
It seems that Griew's M is to be acquitted if he either believes 
there 
is no risk, or "perceives only a risk such as would 
in the circumstances 
be treated as negligible by the ordinary prudent 
individual". I take it 
that the point is that if he has given thought, and perceives 
only a 
risk which it would not be unreasonable to 
take (this is what it means 
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for a risk to be treated as negligible by the ordinary prudent 
individual), he is not reckless. But then one may argue that the same 
should apply to N who believes either that there is no risk pertaining 
to his activity, or that there is only a risk such as would in the 
circumstances be treated as negligible by the ordinary prudent 
individual. If this is accepted then to Justify convicting Shimmen it 
needs to be shown (which may very well be true) that the risk which he 
believed himself to be taking was not just risk but an unreasonable 
risk - that it would be not treated as negligible by the ordinary 
prudent individual. 
What of the fictitious Shimmen2 who claims that he had anticipated the 
possibility of damage to the window and that he believed that he had 
taken precautions which he thought (mistakenly) had eliminated that 
risk. Lord Diplock talked of realisation of a risk and nonetheless going 
on to do the intended act. I think that with the word 'nonetheless' Lord 
Diplock had in mind for the second state of mind realisation of some 
risk at the time of intended activity no matter how slight that risk 
might be (with the proviso that the risk be considered more than minimal 
by the ordinary prudent individual so that the agent is not justified in 
taking that risk). If this interpretation of Lord Diplock's dicta in 
Caldwell is correct then Shimmen2 and Griew's N are not reckless. The 
case of N is thus no different from that of M at the time at which each 
act is perpetrated since both agents have considered a possible specific 
risk associated with their activity and both have ruled out that risk at 
the point at which they begin that activity. "s 
But if we are to excuse Shimmen2 and Griew's N, who believes that 
he has 
eliminated the risk entirely, but count as reckless the actual 
Shimmen, 
who believes he has reduced the risk to negligible proportions when 
the 
risk would not have been considered negligible by 
the ordinary prudent 
individual, is there not a lack of fit with peoples' views as 
to what 
that we are and what are not significant moral distinctions? 
My view is 
are right to convict Shimmen if we are satisfied 
that he has taken a 
known risk of harm which, is on the facts of 
the case, an unreasonable 
one for him to take. On this view one might say 
that we ought to convict 
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Shimmen2 on the ground that there is no significant moral difference 
between the two agents. But if we are to as = ribe viability to Shimmen- 
then, on my submission, we may not do so on the basis of recklessness 
since, by so doing, we make that species of mens rea conceptually 
incoherent since it would embody mental states with differing 
characteristics. If we want to ascribe liability to Shim n2 then we 
must, I think, rely on some other category of mans rea which admits 
negative mental states. Provided that Shimmen2 has failed to foresee a 
risk which the ordinary prudent man would have regarded as high then he 
would fall within the rebuttable inference of gross negligence on my 
proposed twofold model of negligence and would be be liable accordingly 
unless he could avail himself of the rebutting provision. 13*: 
It is worth noting here that Taylor J, in his deliberation, made 
reference to a specific defence raised by Shimmen at his trial using the 
dicta in Lawrence that 
"(i)f satisfied that an obvious and serious risk was created by the 
manner of the defendant's driving, the jury are entitled to infer 
that he was in one or other of the states of mind required to 
constitute the offence and will probably do so; but regard must be 
given to any explanation he gives as to his state of mind which may 
displace the inference". 
Both Taylor J. and Watkins L. J. considered the defence put forward by 
Shimmen and, although the defence was turned down, it is interesting to 
note that neither Judge denied the defence on the ground that the 
passage in Lawrence applied only to recklessness in motoring cases. 
Arguably at least the court. was prepared to accept the passage as 
forming a part of the Caldwell test of recklessness. If this is the case 
then we may talk of an obvious and serious risk in cases of criminal 
damage and we may have regard to any explanation offered 
by the 
defendant which may displace the inference that he is one or other state 
of mind in such cases. 
One final point on the possible lacuna. Duff thinks 
that Griew's M falls 
under the Narg an14° doctrine: that the agent's 
honest mistake is 
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sufficient to excuse him from liability whether or not the mistake was 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
'Caldwell Recklessness' and 'Conditional Subjectivism'. 
Some debate has revolved around Lord Diplock's 'creation of an obvious 
risk'. Obvious to whom? Some commentators have insisted that the risk 
must be one which would be obvious to the defendant if he gave it some 
thought. ' 4' They base their contention on specific passages from 
Caldwell on recklessness' 1.2 and Lord Diplock's comment on drunkenness 
that the defence is not available if the risk would heve been obvious to 
the defendant had he been sober. 143 They also cite the case of Brig '44 
wherein Lord Diplock suggested that the concept of recklessness includes 
those cases in which if thought had been given to the matter by the doer 
before the act is done, it would have been apparent to him that there 
was a real risk of its having the relevant harmful consequences. 
If we assess this dictum in isolation from the general commentary then 
we could argue that, in cases of subnormality or mental disorder at 
least, 1415 the defendant cannot be reckless in relation to any harm which 
he causes since the risk would not have been apparent to him even it he 
had thought about the matter. 
Glanville Williams has considered the subjective overtones put forward 
in the judgments and is prepared to amend his generally subjectivist 
stance in the light of them. die talks in terms of the agent who knows of 
a particular risk generally but does not think of it at the moment of 
his act since he is intent upon something else. For Williams the agent 
in such a case has general knowledge and can recall it given the will 
and ability to do so. 141 He argues that if the agent simply forgets to 
consider a risk of which he would otherwise have been aware 
then he is 
guilty of negligence, not recklessness. But in relation 
to cases in 
which the agent acts in a blind rage or whilst in a 
drunken state 
Williams would apply what he calls a 'conditionally subjective 
test' in 
any analysis of recklessness: we should ask whether 
the agent did in 
fact realise the risk and, if he did not, whether 
he would have realised} 
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the risk if he had stopped to think, which includes waiting to be in a 
fit state to think where it is reasonable to include this 
requirement-"' However Williams intends his 'conditional 1;. y subjective' 
test to apply only in cases in which the agent is unaware of the risk 
because he is drunk or in a blind rage; the test does not extend to 
cases in which the agent is unaware of the risk because he is excited 
and acts without an evil intent. i4 In applying this proviso Williams 
excuses from recklessness the agent who, in a state of annoyance, flings 
open his car door in order to remonstrate with a negligent motorist. 
Note that Professor Williams is extending the pure subjective boundary 
of recklessness to catch the agent who is unaware of an obvious risk 
through rage or drink: he is not prepared to extend the concept of 
recklessness so as to include cases of 'gross negligence' generally, 
Duff points out that Williams' qualification to his 'conditionally 
subjective' test might lead to anomalies in the cases. '4'9 He posits the 
case of the mugger who fails to notice that he is endangering his 
victim's life because he is in a state of excitement (short of rage), or 
is simply too callous to notice the risk. Duff contends that the 
assailant who brings about harm in a state of calm or excitement short 
of rage is no less culpable than the agent who brings about the same 
harm whilst in a drunken state or in a blind rage. Duff suggests that we 
need a more sophisticated mode of conditional subjectivism. 
One might respond that Williams' proposal does in fact catch Duff's 
mugger since he excludes from the excusing provisions cases in which the 
agent has an evil intent. 1 ° However Professor Williams restricts this 
exclusion, in relation to drunkenness at least, to cases in which it can 
be said to be the agent's purpose to interfere with a person or 
property. For Williams the exclusion does not apply to cases of drunken 
clumsiness. 'c-' Duff refers to this restriction and asks if we might 
extend it to cases of blind rage. 
"Should we then say that what makes an agent reckless 
is not just 
the degree to which his state of unawareness is dangerous or 
reprehensible, but the quality of the intent"' which 
that state, or 
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getting into such a state, involves; that being or becoming absent 
minded need not involve "an evil", whereas being or becoming enraged 
does; that one who does not notice the risk he takes may still be 
held reckless if his failure to notice it is due or related to an 
evil intent? " 15 
The words in italics are important. Duff is here canvassing the rather 
general claim that a causal relation between an evil intent and 
unawareness of risk is sufficient to make the agent reckless. He then 
goes on in the article to canvass the different and more limited view 
that the evil intent must be more intimately connected to the 
unawareness - either (i) that the risk be created by a course of 
activity which is itself motivated by the evil intent, and/or (ii) that 
the risk be integral to the evilly intended activity. To illustrate 
Duff's more limited suggestions. The agent D, who, through rage, is 
unaware of the physical danger to the victim attacked by him is blind to 
a risk of activity "which is motivated by, and which expresses, that 
rage". '-' The agent Da: who, in a rage at his wife's confession of 
adultery, flings open his car door in a state of unawareness of the risk 
of injury to a passing cyclist is merely negligent in relation to that 
harm since "there is no motivational connection between the rage which 
makes him fail to notice the risk and the action, which creates the 
risk". 'c-d The distinction between the two more limited claims may be 
illustrated thus. Suppose D, " has pulled up at the home of his wife's 
lover and is bent on causing grievous bodily harm to him. He flings open 
the car door in a state of unawareness concerning the danger to a 
passing cyclist who is injured thereby. Can we say that this agent is 
reckless in relation to the injury sustained to the cyclist? On Duff's 
motivational criterion D_" would be convicted; on the 'integral' 
criterion he would not. 
Duff asks if Professor Williams, by his proposed test of conditional 
subjectivism, compromises subjectivist principles for the sake of social 
utility. He points out the tension between individual 
justice on the one 
hand and practical and social purposes on the other 
has led to this 
qualification of the subjectivist principle that 
the a&.: nt must have 
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been aware of the risk; i. e. ideally we should count as reckless only 
the agent who is aware-of the risk but on occasion it is necessary to 
sacrifice the principle to social utility. Williams restricts tie 
compromise to cases in which the agent is unaware of the risk through 
drunkenness or rage. Duff goes further than Williams in one sense. e 
says 
"the fact that an agent is unaware at the time of his act of a risk 
which that act creates should not preclude the judgment that he is 
reckless as to the risk, if his very unawareness of the risk itself 
manifests the kind of practical indifference which is central to the 
meaning of recklessness". 
For Duff, then, an agent should be counted as reckless where he has 
failed to see a risk the causal genesis of which is his indifference to 
it. The fact that the risk is integral"' to his intended action is one 
of the grounds which might justify this conclusion. However Duff would 
not go so far as Williams since he does not think that failure to notice 
a risk due to drunkenness is necessarily recklessness. ""- 
Professor Williams puts forward another criticism of the decision in 
Caldwell. He points out that Lord Diplock's model direction in Caldwell 
extends to the agent who is sober and calm but fails to apply his mind 
to the risk which bears upon his activity, and pleads for the 
acknowledgement of the distinction between this agent and the man who 
considers the risk and decides to ignore it. He cites the contrasting 
cases of an agent who opens his car door 'momentarily forgetful of the 
risk' to a passing cyclist and the agent who is aware of that risk but 
chooses to disregard it. 1 For Williams there is a significant 
distinction between the two agents sufficient to merit classification 
for the purpose of ascriptions of criminal responsibility. 
Clarkson and Keating allude to Williams' contrasting cases and agree 
with him that there is some argument for distinguishing between them at 
the conviction stage. 1 The learned authors criticise the 
decision in 
Ga1dtMe11 since Lord Diplock blurs the distinction between advertence and 
gross inadvertence. They also point out that since the dividing 
line 
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between gross inadvertence and simple inadvertence is extremely 
difficult to draw, Lord Diplock in fact blurs the distinction between 
recklessness and negligence. 
Despite the arguments put forward by the learned authors it is clear 
that Lord Diplock meant his model direction to be objective in nature 
since, as Griew points out, the arguments AA inconsistent with 
Lawrence in which Lord Diplock speaks only in terms of "the ordinary 
prudent individual". Griew also suggests that if their lordships were 
prepared to excuse ignorance of risk because of incapacity then they 
would certainly have raised the issue expressly in the course of their 
judgment. "" The ideal objectivist view on 'foresight' was applied by 
the Divisional Court in Elliot vC (a minor) '~"' In that case a young 
girl of fourteen who was of low intelligence and who had not slept for 
twenty four hours, poured white spirit onto the floor and tried to light 
it. The shed was destroyed by fire. The magistrates found that, because 
of her age, understanding and lack of experience and exhaustion, the 
risk of damage to the shed would not have been obvious to her if she had 
given any thought to the matter. The Divisional Court held that a 
defendant was reckless if the risk was one that was obvious to a 
reasonably prudent person. In Stephen Malcolm E'62 the Court of Appeal 
came to the same conclusion. In that case a boy of 15 threw petrol bombs 
into a girl' s bedroom. He was convicted of arson contrary to s. 1(2) (b) 
of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. The Court of Appeal rejected the 
argument that in deciding upon recklessness one should restrict the 
creation of an obvious risk to someone of the appellant's age and 
characteristics which might affect his appreciation of the risk. "' 
It thus seems that the test concerning the 'obvious risk' relates to the 
reasonable man and not to the defendant's own ability to appreciate 
the 
risk had he thought about it. One point which emerges from the foregoing 
is that we perhaps ought not take particular phrases and view 
them in 
isolation from the overall context of a particular judgment. 
't"° 
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We may ascertain the contours of malice from the statement by Kenny' r=. 6 
as expressed in the court in Cunninscha "I Generally the agent must 
appreciate the risk associated with his activity and make a conscious 
decision to take that risk. However we ought to note the decisions in 
o1 7 and Iowatt"I which at least suggest that the test for malice is 
objectivist in character where the agent's activity is constituted by a 
direct assault upon another. That the test for malice remains 
subjectivist can be seen from the decisions in two recent cases. 
In Lynch 169 D amused himself by firing at bottles on a garage roof with 
an air pistol having made some inadequate precautions in order to 
prevent injury to others. A neighbour was struck by a pellet. D was 
convicted of malicious wounding contrary to, -. 20 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861 on the ground that whilst he was -oncerned 
to avoid harm he had in fact appreciated the risk of that harm. 
In Aorrison17° D was convicted of wounding with intent to resist arrest 
contrary to s. 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The 
conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal on the ground of 
misdirection. In his summing up the trial jud8e had said 
"Recklessness presupposes something in the circumstances that would 
draw the attention of an ordinary, prudent and sober person to the 
possibility that the act that he is committing is capable of causing 
harm to (the victim), and that risk that he was going to take was 
more than just a possibility: it was a risk which he either took 
deliberately, or he closed his mind to the possibility of causing 
injury. " 
Lord Lane said that there were now two forms of recklessness 
in our 
criminal law. The first is that defined by Lord Diplock 
in Ga1dwell. "' 
The second type of recklessness is that 
defined by Byrne J in 
73 Lord Lane noted that Lord Diplock distinguished 
Cunningham in Caldwell so that the decision in the 
latter case stood and 
was binding on the Court of Appeal. The 
Lord Chief Justice concluded 
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that the statutory provision in issue involved 'malice' and that the 
Cunningham definition therefore applied in the present case. For Lord 
Lane the judge should have driven it home to the jury that what was 
going on in the defendant's mind, not in the ordinary, prudent 
observer's mind, was what they had to consider. 
The two recent cases show quite clearly that the offences which admit 
foresight contained in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and 
other offences of malice must be construed subjectively. 
To summarise the present law on recklessness. Caldwell and Lawrence 
inform us that 
(i) an agent is reckless where he appreciates that there is a risk of a 
proscribed harm and goes on to take that risk. There is no distinction 
between low and high risk for the purpose of the concept except that a 
person will not be reckless in respect of a risk that he has considered 
and decided to ignore if the risk was slight enough to be treated as 
'negligible' by the ordinary prudent individual. However the gravity of 
the probable consequences is an important factor in the assessment of 
this aspect of recklessness. 
(ii) an agent is reckless where he fails to foresee a risk which is 
obvious (Caldwell and Lawrence) and serious (Lawrence). 
(iii) Caldwell recklessness applies to all common law offences which 
admit recklessness as a mental element and to all statutory offences 
unless the statute expressly provides for some other form of 
recklessness. 
(iv) the law remains unclear in relation to the agent who attends to the 
possibility of a risk and, after due deliberation, (wrongly) considers 
the risk to be absent. 17 LR 
(v) Caldwell informs us that the two concepts of recklessness and malice 
are mutually exclusive and that the mental state required 
for each is 
not the same. 
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In the last Chapter 1 pointed out that at current law the concept of 
recklessness is in a confused state. In the cases since Cunningha' we 
have differing statements as to the meaning of recklessness including 
"knowing that there is some risk ... but nevertheless continues in the 
performance of that act" "heedlessly rash" (Murphy) ;- "not 
caring whether or not .. ." (Sheppard); I "indifferent" (voiced indirectly 
by Lord Diplock in gad) ;s "do not bother to observe" ;6 "doing an 
unlawful act with gross negligence, that is to say recklessly" (the 
trial judge in Cato); ' "closing his mind to the obvious fact that there 
is some risk" (Lane LJ in Parker) ; "'' "the knowledge or appreciation of 
risk (of some damage) must have entered the defendant's mind, even 
though he may have suppressed it or driven it out" (Stephen on); '= 
"'couldn't care less'. In law this is recklessness" (K )'ý' and so 
forth. 
The decisions in Caldwell'' and Lawrence': have made a significant 
contribution to the confusion. As we have seen, Lord Diplock in Caldwell 
includes the phrase "does not trouble to give his mind to the question 
of whether there is any risk". '"- He also introduces the negative mental 
state of failure to foresee an obvious risk. However in two passages he 
restricts this negative mental state to a risk which would be obvious tQ. 
the doer had he thought about the risk although he omits this 
restriction in his final definition of recklessness. Did he mean to 
include the restriction in his model? If not why did he see fit to make 
express reference to the restriction in two separate passages in his 
speech? Lord Diplock also seemed prepared to restrict this negative 
mental state to certain affective states of mind in two separate 
passages in his speech14 but he left them out of account in his 
formulation of the concept of recklessness. Did he intend the 
restriction to his proposed negative state in his definition of 
recklessness? Lord Diplock also draws a distinction between 'malice' and 
'recklessness' stating that 'malice' is a term of art which is 
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constituted only by a positive mental state in respect of the risk of 
harm. " We thus have two quite different constructions of foresight 
depending upon the form of mens rea designated to the offence. 
In Lawrence" r, Lord Diplock adds 'serious' to the phrase 'obvious risk' 
in relation to the negative mental component of recklessness proffered 
by him in Caldwell and adds the rider that consideration must be had to 
any explanation which the accused gives as to his state of mind which 
may displace the inference. The proposed model of recklessness in 
reckless driving offences thus differs from that put forward in criminal 
damage cases in two important respects. 17 
This leads to a further point. Parliament is free to include a 
particular definition of recklessness in relation to each offence which 
it creates by legislation. An example of this is s. 6 of the Public Order 
Act 1986 which uses 'awareness' as part of the mental element in respect 
of the statutory provision contained therein. 1' We thus have the 
position whereby Parliament may define recklessness in varying ways and 
the courts interpreting statutory definitions of recklessness in varying 
ways. This inevitably leads to incoherence concerning the parameters of 
the concept. However, I think that it is important that we have a 
coherent and uniform definition of recklessness in our criminal law. The 
best if not only method of achieving this is a general statutory model 
of recklessness which would be applied to all offences which admit 
recklessness as a mental element. In this Chapter I offer six levels of 
foresight concerning untoward harm, postulate the various positions 
taken by the judges and theorists in relation to each and construct a 
model of recklessness and gross negligence which would replace the 
current concept of recklessness. 
1. Foresight by the Agent of a High Risk of Untoward Harm. 
By 'high' risk I mean a risk which is more likely than not to occur: 
i. e. there is a better than 50% chance of the untoward harm being 
brought about by the agent's activity aimed at something else. There is 
judicial and academic consensus that foresight of a high risk amounts to 
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recklessness in respect to it. That consensus in fact extends to 
foresight of any degree of risk, subject to the rule that the risk must 
not be so low that the agent would not be considered unjustified in 
taking it. Let us call the mental state for this head of foresight 
'gross recklessness'. Thus where an agent, with the appropriate mental 
state, brings about particular untoward harm we may count him as grossly 
reckless concerning that harm. I should point out that the agent must be 
aware that there is a high risk of harm. If he fails to allude to the 
risk or is mistaken about the degree of risk (i. e. he thinks that it is 
low when it is in fact high) then he does not bring about the harm by 
gross recklessness. 19 
2. Foresight by the Agent of a Low Risk of Untoward Harm. 
This head of foresight may be stated shortly. It involves awareness by 
the agent of the risk of untoward harm which, given my definition of 
'high risk', is one which is nat more likely than not to occur: that is 
the chances of the occurrence of the untoward harm are 50% or less. Let 
us call the mental state for this head of foresight 'simple 
recklessness'. 
Whilst they are agreed that foresight of both a high risk and a low 
risk constitute recklessness, " few if any commentators say anything on 
whether the two levels of foresight should be distinguished for the 
purpose of attribution of criminal responsibility. It seems that most if 
not all commentators are happy to bracket together all cases of 
foresight for the purpose of conviction regardless of the degree of risk 
involved in each case. 
My submission here is that for the purpose of conviction we are entitled 
to and ought to distinguish between the taking of a high risk and the 
taking of a low risk (a risk which is not more likely than not to 
occur): that for the purpose of ascriptions of liability we should 
distinguish between gross and simple recklessness. Of course the current 
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general view, which treats all degrees of foresight of risk as 
recklessness or malice simpliciter, has remained undisturbed for 
centuries and a significant restructuring of the concept of recklessness 
on the lines which I am suggesting will require some justification. I 
posit several reasons why my submission should have serious 
consideration. 
First there is a significant moral distinction between the agent who 
knowingly takes an unjustified and high risk of harm and the agent who 
takes a significantly lesser risk. In the former case the agent is 
perhaps expecting the occurrence of the untoward harm whereas the latter 
agent may have good ground for expecting that the untoward harm will not 
occur. A second point within this first submission is that the latter 
agent may genuinely say that if the risk had been significantly higher 
then he would not have taken it, a claim which might not be made by the 
former agent who has demonstrated his willingness to expose a person or 
property to the high risk of harm. 
Second the distinction between gross and simple recklessness at the 
conviction stage enables us to reward the agent who considers a risk and 
takes significant steps to prevent the harm from occurring. Consider the 
case of a bomber who plans to cause an explosion in a building in order 
to cause property damage. He realises that his initial plan involves a 
high risk of injury to people unless he takes substantial measures to 
prevent that injury. He thus rethinks the place, time and day of 
execution and type and size of device in order to reduce the risk of 
injury so that it is now not more likely than not to occur. However a 
person is injured in the ensuing explosion. If we wish to encourage such 
risk minimisation then we should reward at the conviction stage the 
agent who takes efforts to reduce the risk of untoward harm. We may do 
this on the proposed models of recklessness by charging him with causing 
injury2' through simple recklessness. 
One might argue against this that, as a law and order matter, we 
do not 
want to make it easier for some criminals by giving them a 
lesser 
penalty because they have minimised the risk: that we may thereby 
be 
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encouraging them to commit the crime itself. I would comment that if -the 
agent is prepared to commit the primary offence (the offence aimed at) 
whilst aware of a high risk of the commission of the secondary offence 
(the offence foreseen as more likely than not to flow from his activity) 
then we are not increasing the prospect of the primary offence by 
providing an incentive f or the agent to take positive steps to reduce 
the risk of the secondary offence: we are encouraging the reduction of 
the risk of the secondary offence and thus crime generally. 
Third the distinction would allow us to set more specific maximum 
sentences regarding the two distinct types of recklessness which would 
reduce the possibility of inconsistent sentencing patterns in the cases. 
Finally the proposed structure of recklessness excludes malice as a 
separate form of mens rea. We would thus eliminate the unsatisfactory 
state of affairs whereby the court or jury, when assessing guilt, must 
apply one or other mental state to an offence depending upon whether it 
is one of recklessness or malice. `' 
There is one major difficulty for the proposed models of recklessness, 
namely the problem for the court or jury in deciding on which side of 
the dividing line between gross and simple recklessness a particular 
case falls. For there will be cases which fall within a short range 
along the spectrum of foresight around 'even probability' which might 
cause some difficulty for a court or Jury when adjudicating upon the 
precise boundary in which the defendant's mental state falls. Whilst I 
accept this difficulty I see no problem for the practical application of 
the proposed distinction between gross and simple recklessness in the 
cases. Where a particular case falls within the penumbra between the two 
mental states the decision would go in favour of the defendant. This 
would not however excuse the agent from liability for we attribute to 
him the lesser mental state of simple recklessness (and perhaps lesser 
punishment). This practical measure would mean a lighter conviction and 
sentence than that which, ideally, the agent might have received in only 
a few cases and is a small concession to make in order to achieve my 
proposed objective, namely the separation of the much more from the much 
less moral turpitude in relation to foresight of untoward harm. 
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3. Failure By the Agent to Foresee a High Risk of Untoward Harm. 
The term 'high risk' is unknown to current criminal law: the nearest we 
have is 'obvious and 'serious' risk enunciated in Caldwell and 
L ence24 and it is thus convenient to formulate discussion on the 
decisions in those cases. In both Caldwell and Lawrence it was decided 
that the agent's unawareness of the risk was irrelevant in determining 
liability for recklessness in relation to offences under s. l of the 
Criminal Damage Act and s. 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1972. Reference to 
the model definitions has been made in relation to other offences. In 
;l the model definitions were applied to a case of motor 
manslaughter and in Kong Cheuk Kwan v R2 they were applied to 
manslaughter generally. 27 
Caldwell recklessness has been criticised on the general ground that it 
renders the concept of recklessness objective in character. The 
criticism has generally taken one of three forms. 
(i) Outright rejection on the ground that recklessness is a mental state 
and thus nothing other than positive awareness of the risk is 
sufficient. The holder of this view maintains that there is a crucial 
moral distinction between advertence and gross inadvertence which should 
be recognised in any assessment of criminal responsibility but which 
Caldwell recklessness has ignored-2a 
(ii) Acceptance of Caldwell recklessness with the proviso that 
unawareness of the risk is restricted to a risk of which the defendant 
would have been aware had he stopped to think about it. 2 The holder of 
this view would restrict the objective element of recklessness to cases 
in which the agent's failure to appreciate the risk has been brought 
about by a reprehensible affective state of mind (e. g. rage or 
drunkenness). 
(iii) Acceptance of Caldwell recklessness provided the lack of foresight 
is due to indifference on the part of the agent. " Proponents of this 
qualified view of Caldwell recklessness would be prepared to excuse 
from 
liability the agent whose failure to anticipate a risk is due not 
to 
indifference toward it, but because his mental process has been impaired 
by some phenomenon which renders that failure non-culpable. 
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An exception to Caldwell recklessness, common to all three schools of 
thought, is lack of capacity, i. e. that the defendant himself was so far 
removed from the standards of the ordinary person that he was incapable 
of judging the situation as the ordinary person would. However in Elliot 
YC (A mminorY" the Divisional Court interpreted Caldwell recklessness 
in a way which positively rejected the views of the three schools of 
thought opposed to it. Robert Goff LJ held that the model direction was 
intended to express a purely objectivist test (thus rejecting the first 
and second school), and one which could not be qualified by the concept 
of indifference (thus rejecting the third school) since the concept was 
not specifically made a qualification to the model direction and no 
doubt would have been had Lord Diplock in Caldwell intended such 
qualification. It is interesting to note here that Goff LJ commented 
that he would not have regarded the appellant's conduct as reckless in 
the ordinary sense of the word. : 32 
One reason why the courts are so reluctant to modify Caldwell 
recklessness to include indifference is that the jury would have an 
additional and difficult task of deciding upon the mental state of the 
agent at some time prior to his activity which brings about the untoward 
harm and also the question of whether he would have gone through with 
that activity even if aware of the risk, The qualified model would thus 
make the law much more complicated than it was prior to the Caldwell 
decision. One can however point to parts of Lord Diplock's speech which 
indicate that he might have been prepared to accept indifference as a 
limitation to the model. For example he talks of a defendant who "did 
not even trouble to give his mind to" the risk. -`= In any event it is 
clear that the wholly objectivist interpretation of the model direction 
by Goff LJ excludes the defence of incapacity (which all three schools 
of thought above would accept) and a defence of 'non-indifferent 
thoughtlessness' due to reasons which make that thoughtlessness morally 
non-culpable. It is submitted that both pleas ought to afford a 
defence. 
Birch 4 points out that one solution here is to slip in, alongside 
the 
summary definition in Caldwell, an instruction to the jury not 
to 
convict unless D's conduct was reckless in the ordinary sense of 
the 
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word. He puts forward the case of Scott73-- to show that the Court of 
Appeal has left room for this prospective development of the law on 
recklessness. In that case D threw a stone at V but it missed and 
damaged the window of a public house. Croom-Johnson L. J. decided that 
"'(r)ecklessness' being an ordinary English word which has not 
acquired any specific legal meaning, it should be brought home to 
the jury that they should consider as a matter of fact and using the 
evidence as applied to the ordinary English word, the circumstances 
in which the event took place". 
My own view is that the criticism of Caldwell has concentrated on the 
issue of just what constitutes recklessness and has largely ignored the 
more important issue, namely should the agent in this category be 
responsible at criminal law for the unforeseen harm which he brings 
about? If we start from the premise that the agent should thus be liable 
then we must decide into which relevant mental state he falls (or what 
mental state is required by the substantive offence). I think that the 
criticism of Caldwell is well grounded - that we ought to mark clearly 
the distinction between one who foresees and one who does not foresee a 
risk, but if we do so then how can we attribute criminal responsibility 
to the agent who brings about unforeseen harm in relation to an offence 
which admits recklessness as a minimum mental state (as in Caldwell and 
Lawrence)? The question provides a clue as to why the courts have pushed 
this category of mental state into recklessness; because the agent who 
fails to foresee an obvious and serious risk deserves blame and 
punishment and that, given the context of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 
as presently drafted this is the only way of criminalising that kind of 
conduct. The courts thus compromise the concept of recklessness in order 
to ascribe liability in cases of unawareness which deserve criminal 
blame and punishment and in doing so obscure the boundaries of 
two 
distinct species of mens rea, namely recklessness and negligence. 
No 
doubt Lord Diplock had this obscuration in mind when he expressly 
confined the 'unawareness' element of Caldwell recklessness 
to an 
'obvious risk': in this way he ensured that the concept of recklessness 
took in only the more serious cases of negligence. 
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But if our criminal law had a more sophisticated set of wens rea terms 
which expressly distinguished between gross and simple negligence, and 
if the criminal damage legislation expressly admitted gross negligence 
as a requisite mental state there would be no need for the judges to 
compromise recklessness in this way. My submission is that we need a 
distinct species of wens rea which will catch negative mental states in 
relation to a high risk of untoward harm whilst preserving the 
traditional view that recklessness is constituted by conscious risk 
taking. We ought thus to admit 'gross negligence' as a distinct form of 
mens rea in our criminal law.: " 
The Proposed Concept of Gross Negligence. 
The proposed concept of gross negligence is constituted by a failure on 
the part of the agent to appreciate a high risk of untoward harm which 
accompanies his activity but it shall be a defence to a charge based on 
gross negligence that at the time of his activity there existed some 
legally recognised factor or factors which operated upon his mental 
processes to prevent him from appreciating the high risk. 
There are several features of the proposed concept of gross negligence. 
(i) The agent must have failed to foresee the risk. Thus where the agent 
is aware of the risk at the time of his activity his mens rea is 
61e 1ý, 
recklessness. There are three types of 'failure to appreciate' a, risk, 
namely 
(a) failure to allude to the risk altogether, 
(b) a consideration of the risk and a wrong conclusion that the risk 
does not exist, and 
(c) a consideration of the risk and a wrong conclusion that the risk is 
low when it is in fact high. 
It will be noted that my definition of gross negligence talks of 
'failure to appreciate' a high risk. The word 'appreciate' is meant 
to 
catch both a failure to allude to the risk and a failure to comprehend 
the existence or extent of the risk to which the agent has alluded. 
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(ii) The risk must be high. I have defined this particular concept 
above. : =''' My submission is that a 'high risk' is a risk which is more 
likely than not to result in the occurrence of the untoward harm, All 
risks which involve a 50% chance or less (not more likely than not) of 
occurring should be designated low risks. I have pointed out elsewhere 
the difficulties in practice for the court or jury in deciding just what 
constitutes a 'high risk' in the marginal cases and the practical 
solutions to the problem. =_'O Whether the risk in a particular case is 
high or low is a question for the court or Jury who would apply the 
standard of the ordinary prudent man in the same circumstances as the 
defendant. I think that the proposed terminology is preferable to Lord 
Diplock's 'obvious and serious risk' on two major grounds. First, Lord 
Diplock's phrase used in Lawrence involves a double uncertainty, namely 
just what is the dividing line between 'obvious' and 'not obvious', and 
what is the dividing line between 'serious' and 'non-serious' risk. 
Second the word 'serious' is ambiguous in the context used by Lord 
Diplock. Does it mean serious in the sense of likelihood or in the sense 
of the degree of injury which is likely to flow should the risk manifest 
itself through the agent's activity? My formula removes these problems; 
'high risk' relates simply to the chances of the harm occurring 
regardless of the degree of harm which may eventuate. 
The Rebutting Provision. 
(iii) There would be a presumption in law that an agent who fails to 
appreciate a high risk of untoward harm is grossly negligent in relation 
its occurrence. However he would have a defence to a charge of gross 
negligence that there was present in his case some legally recognised 
factor, of sufficient degree in the circumstances, which prevented 
him 
from appreciating the high risk of untoward harm at the time of 
his 
activity which brought that harm about. The legally recognised 
factors 
would be listed in the legislation which creates the proposed concept of 
gross negligence. Schizophrenia: " and subnormality are obviously strong 
candidates for the list since both involve a lack of capacity 
to 
appreciate the high risk. Other factors affecting capacity wetrid 
include 
mental breakdown and senile dementia. But it is submitted 
that the list 
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of legally recognised factors should not be resticted to those which 
affect capacity generally. For other factors, both physical and mental, 
permanent and transient might suitably be included to exclude agents 
from liability in approriate cases. Candidates here include shock, 
stress, panic, ignorance about causal properties, exhaustion, tiredness, 
distress, severe agitation, pre-menstrual tension, post-natal 
depression, physical inflictions such as a heavy head cold which reduce 
an agent's powers over his senses44°' and so forth. 
When a plea in rebuttal is entered at the trial it would be for the 
judge to decide whether or not there is sufficient evidence that the 
alleged legally recognised factor existed at the time of the actus reus. 
If he decides that there is insufficient evidence then the plea would 
not be put to the Jury and they would attribute gross negligence to him 
in accordance with the legal presumption. If the judge considers that 
there is sufficient evidence of the legally recognised factor then he 
would put the matter to the Jury who would then decide whether or not 
the factor was present to such a degree in the circumstances that it 
prevented the agent from appreciating the high risk of untoward harm. If 
the jury are not so satisfied then they would attribute gross negligence 
to him in accordance with the legal inference. If they are satisfied 
that the factor was sufficient to cause the agent to fail to appreciate 
the high risk then they would not attribute gross negligence to him. 
But how would the court or jury decide whether or not the legally 
recognised factor was present to such a degree that it effectively 
denied him the power to appreciate the high risk of harm? In deciding on 
this issue they would have regard to all the circumstances of the case, 
together with medical or other evidence. The central criterion would 
presumably be that the greater the risk of the untoward harm in the 
circumstances, the greater must be the degree of the legally recognised 
factor present and affecting the agent's mental or physical powers of 
appreciation of that risk. 4' 
My proposal would effectively result in two categories of 
factors which 
tend to restrict the mental or physical processes; 
those factors which 
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may and those factors which may not rebut the inference of gros 
negligence. Once established the exculpatory list would constitute a 
matter of law in criminal proceedings. In those cases in which the 
alleged mental restriction falls within those on the non-exculpatory 
list the issue would not be put to the jury; the defendant would not 
kw 
rebut the general inference and would guilty of the offence by reason of 
gross negligence. I would just add here that cases of drunkenness, 
rage and excitement ought to be placed on the 'non-rebutting' list of 
factors which may restrict the agent's mental or physical processes. 
Several advantages flow from the creation of this category of mens rea. 
First, it allows the concept of recklessness to be restricted to 
positive appreciation of the risk, that is, we confine recklessness to a P6%6VG 
state of mind. ` We thus preserve the distinction between recklessness 
and negligence, the latter being concerned not with the agent's mental 
state but with the dangerousness of his activity. 44 There is thus no 
obfuscation between advertence and gross inadvertence. One consequence 
of this diminution of the contours of recklessness is that agents such 
as Stephens=4"17 would fall under the proposed concept of gross 
negligence and would be able to plead the rebutting provision. If the 
court or jury are satisfied that there existed a legally recognised 
factor which prevented D from appreciating the high risk then he would 
be free from criminal liability. A second advantage of the concept of 
gross negligence is that it goes a significant way in bringing together 
the three schools of thought mentioned above. " Since the concept 
retains for recklessness conscious risk taking simpliciter the concept 
satisfies the proponent of the distinction between advertence and gross 
inadvertence. Also the concept satisfies the subjectivist who is 
prepared to attribute criminal responsibility for a negative mental 
state to the agent who would have appreciated the risk had he 
thought 
about it; the concept of gross negligence catches such an agent without 
the need for "a certain toughness" on the part of the subjectivist 
in 
relation to the concept of recklessness ., 47 For 
the proposed concept 
excuses the agent only where he is in fact prevented 
from thinking about 
the high risk because of some legally recognised 
factor operating upon 
his mental processes. Finally the concept satisfies 
the proponent of 
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blame and punishment f or the agent whose failure to appreciate a risk 
has been caused by indifference to it; the concept of gross negligence 
catches such an agent whilst excusing the agent whose failure to foresee 
the high risk has been caused by some non-culpable legally recognised 
factor. 
A third advantage of the concept of gross negligence is that we may make 
use of it to remove the somewhat artificial concepts of 'basic' and 
'specific' intent which are used at present concerning the defence of 
intoxication (both drunkenness and drugs). On current law the 
intoxicated agent who is aware of and intends harm which is proscribed 
by law has no defence: ""' but if he is so intoxicated that he does not 
know what he is doing, or does not appreciate the risk, then on current 
law he will be acquitted or found guilty of the substantive offence 
according to whether it is one of basicQ. 9 or specific-'° intent. It is 
argued that the two lists of criminal offences which fall into one or 
other category of basic or specific intention are arbitrary and the 
existence of the two species of intention add to the obfuscation of the 
boundaries of that mental state. With the proposed concept of gross 
negligence we may simply exclude as a legally recognised factor 
voluntary intoxication. If we do so then the the agent who is so 
intoxicated that he is unaware of a high risk of untoward harm is 
grossly negligent in relation to it and cannot avail himself of the 
rebuttal provision since intoxication would not be a legally recognised 
restriction on his mental process which may rebut the inference of gross 
negligence. 
These submissions would not greatly affect the substance of the current 
law concerning intoxication for the intoxicated agent would continue 
to 
have a defence to a charge of an offence which admits only intention as 
a relevant mental state and, on my proposals, he would also 
have the 
defence where the minimum mental state requirement 
for the offence i=_ 
recklessness5l since his intoxication has led to 
his failure to 
appreciate the risk of harm. Indeed on the proposed structure of 
mens 
rea intoxication would be of no avail to the agent only 
in relation to 
those offences which admit gross negligence as a requisite 
mental state. 
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No doubt Parliament would bear this in mind when allocating mental 
states to new offences. 
There would be two strategies available to the legislature here. First, 
Parliament could create one offence concerning a specific actus reus and 
extend the mental element to include gross negligence where it wishes to 
blame and sanction self induced intoxication which renders the agent 
unable to appreciate the high risk of harm created by his activity. 
Second, Parliament could create two offences concerning a particular 
actus reus, one more serious than the other, and extend the mens rea of 
the less serious offence so that it includes gross negligence. An actual 
illustration of this is, perhaps ss. 18 and 20 of the Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861. S. 18 is the more serious offence and requires 
intention concerning the actus reus of grievous bodily harm: s. 20 is the 
lesser offence and admits subjective recklessness as a constituent of 
malice. When re-enacting these offences in the light of the proposed 
structure of mens rea Parliament could extend the present s. 20 to 
include gross negligence. Then if an agent, in a state of unawareness 
through intoxication wounds another he would not be guilty under s. 18 
(which would admit only intention as a requisite mental state) but he 
would be guilty under s. 20 since the inference of gross negligence could 
not be rebutted by the claim that his unawareness was brought about by 
intoxication. 
A fourth advantage of the concept of gross negligence is that it would 
enable us to distinguish between the foolish agent and the agent who 
knowingly takes a risk with the person or property of another. An 
illustration of this point would be the agent at a fancy dress party who 
sets fire to the grass skirt of a fellow reveller to add to the 
excitement of the moment not realising the high risk which his activity 
is creating. This agent is a fool and deserves blame and punishment 
for 
the injury he causes'52 but we ought not attribute equal responsibility 
to this agent and the one (like, a perhaps sober, 
Caldwell) who 
knowingly runs a serious risk. We may mark the distinction 
by ascribing 
gross negligence to the former and gross recklessness 
to the latter 
agent. 
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Fifthly, the concept of gross negligence would significantly simplify 
the law on manslaughter since we may conflate the present heads of 
reckless manslaughter and gross negligence manslaughter. " A final 
advantage of the proposed concept of gross negligence is that it 
eliminates the confusing statements by the judges in cases of 
recklessness concerning lack of foresight. It would no longer be 
necessary for the judge to talk in terms of 'closing his mind' to an 
obvious risk. "-" For if the agent does not appreciate the high risk of 
harm at the time of his act he falls into the category of gross 
negligence: there is no need to make such confusing and artificial 
statements. 
A difficulty for the concept of gross negligence concerns unforeseen 
harm which is intimately related to the harm intended. In the absence of 
a plea of rebuttal by the defendant there is no problem: if he intends 
minor harm x but fails to foresee intimately and more serious harm y he 
is grossly negligent concerning harm y. But what if the agent puts 
forward a plea in rebuttal, say tiredness, which was sufficient to 
cause him to miss the high risk of the more serious prospective harm y? 
My submission here is that in cases in which the risk caused is 
intimately related to the activity admittedly intended we ought not to 
excuse the agent since there is simply no room for such a defence. There 
are two strategies f or dealing with the problem. First we could restrict 
the rebutting provision in the definition of gross negligence so that it 
includes contingent risks only (i. e. risks which are not intimately 
related to the intended activity). Second, we may count intention to 
cause harm x as itself recklessness in relation to the more serious and 
intimately related harm y. I am not sure that I would extend the concept 
of recklessness in this somewhat artificial way on the main ground that 
my proposed structure of mens rea is intended to restrict the concept 
of recklessness to conscious risk taking. I would thus face 
the 
difficulty by restricting the risks to which the rebutting provision 
relates to contingent risks of the agent's activity. 
This of course 
means that the agent who fails to foresee a high risk that 
his victim is 
not consenting to intercourse is grossly negligent concerning 
non- 
consensual intercourse and has no rebutting defence to a charge with 
the 
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substantive offence. We may mark the moral distinction between this 
agent and he who is aware of the high risk and runs it by noting the 
appropriate mental state in the conviction. 66 
One final and significant advantage of my concept of gross negligence 
is that it makes provision for the mental state to which i now turn. 
4. Alluding to the possibility of a particular risk of untoward harm and 
deciding (mistakenly) that there is no risk. 
In their respective model definitions neither Caldwell nor Lawrence make 
any reference to this state of mind as a necessary constituent of the 
concept of recklessness. The reason is presumably because the facts of 
neither case made it necessary to do so; Caldwell and Lawrence failed to 
see an obvious and serious risk but there is nothing in the case reports 
to suggest that either had alluded to the risk and had decided 
(mistakenly) that there was none. However it has been suggested by 
several theorists that this mental state falls outside the scope of 
Caldwell recklessness and that we cannot thus count as reckless the 
agent who, having made such a mistake, brings about a particular 
proscribed harm. `- 
Much of the philosophical debate here centres around Lord Diplock's 
statement that recklessness is a state of mind. 7 According to the 
argument, if recklessness is constituted by a state of mind then we 
cannot count as reckless the agent who is mistaken about the existence 
of a risk since he has no state of mind in relation to it; the agent is 
negligent in making his mistake and negligence is not the same thing as 
recklessness. `ý, 
Caldwell recklessness makes no reference to this state of mind and it 
is 
not clear how the courts will react to a plea by the defendant that, at 
the time of his activity, he was mistaken as to the 
fact that the 
particular risk existed. However there have been one or 
two cases in 
which there has been express reference to this mental state. 
In H. J. J. 
(a minor) v Gooney"' several youths were playing 
in a disused hut. They 
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placed a large quantity of combustible material into the fireplace and 
set fire to it. They did not think that damage would result from their 
activity at this stage. However they soon realised that the fire was 
getting out of control and fled. The hut was destroyed. The magistrates 
convicted the defendant on the ground that the risk of damage was 
'obvious'. The Divisional Court decided that the prosecution must prove 
that the defendant's state of mind fell within one or other set by Lord 
Diplock in his model of recklessness in Caldwell and that the conviction 
would be quashed because little if any importance had been given at the 
trial to the defendant's plea that he thought that no damage would 
result from his activity. It seems from the dictum that the Divisional 
Court may be prepared to consider a plea of mistake as to the existence 
of a risk, following upon an assessment of that risk, as providing a 
defence to an accusation of recklessness. 
In Chief Constable of Avon and So rset Constabulary v Shi=en"-' n was 
convicted of criminal damage contrary to s. 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 
1971. On appeal he contended that he had considered the risk of damage 
to the window and had satisfied himself that he had reduced the risk to 
a minimum and that his conviction ought to be quashed. Taylor J thought 
that it may well be arguable that a lacuna exists in the parameters of 
Caldwell recklessness in relation to the agent who considers the risk 
and wrongly decides that there is none. However since the case before 
him did not involve such a mental state'-' he did not explore the 
possibility any further, stating that the issue may need to be 
considered on another occasion-" 
po. s, bt C. 
The dicta of Taylor J in Shimn informs us of the judicial acceptance 
of the lacuna in the model direction, viz. the agent who considers the 
possibility of risk and wrongly concludes that there is none. 
One should 
also note that the dictum of Taylor J implies that he might well 
have 
been disposed to uphold the decision of the magistrates 
had Shimmen's 
case fallen within the alleged lacuna. 
In Lawrence6`1 Lord Diplock himself implied, at least, that the agent who 
is mistaken about the existence of the risk might 
fall outside the model 
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direction with his qualifying statement that "regard must be had to any 
explanation the defendant gives as to his state of mind which may 
displace the inference". I have noted elsewhere the problem in deciding 
just what Lord Diplock had in mind in making the qualification. `-4 In 
Griffi hs6F- the Court of Appeal interpreted the qualification as a 
substitute for involuntariness. Thus where the driver's attention has 
been distracted by some external phenomena (e. g. a wasp or a loud bang 
or his course has been affected by a mechanical failure in the steering) 
one might say either that his activity is involuntary or that his case 
falls within the qualification which Lord Diplock made to his model 
direction. However in Bell the same Court thought that such excuses 
related more to the question of whether or not there has been an actus 
reus rather than as to whether there has been a requisite state of mind. 
The Court did not need to go further since on the facts of the case 
there was no doubt that Bell fell within one or other state of mind set 
by the model direction (his plea that he had received his order to drive 
as he did from God did not disturb the fact that he perceived his 
driving to be dangerous). The precise ground of Lord Diplock's 
qualification thus awaits definition. 
Should an agent who considers the possibility of a risk and mistakenly 
concludes that there is none be guilty at criminal law for his mistake? 
A straight interpretation of Lord Diplock's summary on recklessness in 
Caldwell would mean that this agent would be acquitted. But, as Birch" 
suggests, a full consideration of the merits ought to include the moral 
dimension. There seems to be general acceptance that the agent who makes 
a serious mistake as to the existence of a risk is less morally 
blameworthy than the agent who is aware of or does not advert to the 
risk on the ground that "moral obligation is determined not by 
the 
actual facts but by the agent's opinion regarding them". E-L' On my 
submission this view is wrong since we have the right to expect others 
to act responsibly having given due and careful regard 
to the facts and 
circumstances surrounding their activity. This proposition 
has been well 
sign posted by the theorists in their consideration of 
the offence of 
rape: the agent must pay regard to the wishes and rights of 
the woman. - 9 
In my view the agent who proceeds with intercourse 
having mistaken the 
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woman's action or inaction as consent when it is not is as morally 
blameworthy as the agent who has not even bothered to think about 
whether or not she is consenting and should be punished accordingly 
although, it is submitted, neither is as blameworthy as the agent who is 
aware of the high risk that she might not be consenting but proceeds to 
have intercourse with her. 
I thus agree with those who, like Hall, attribute lesser moral 
responsibility to the agent who is mistaken about risk than to the agent 
who knowingly runs a risk, but I submit that there is no moral 
distinction between the agent who is mistaken about a risk and the agent 
who simply fails to allude to it. The only possible moral distinction 
between the two agents would be that in the former case the agent has 
considered the risk and misperceives the position whilst in the latter 
case the agent has not thought about the risk at all. However closer 
analysis reveals that the former agent has both perceived . risk which 
is a possible consequence of his activity and failed to appreciate the 
risk of harm which is actually created by his activity. Viewed in this 
way I think that we are entitled to disregard the first aspect of his 
mental state and hold that he has, like the latter agent, failed to 
allude to the risk which accompanies his activity. On this thinking 
there is neither a moral nor practical distinction between the two 
agents. 
I think that this reasoning would be in accord with the spirit of 
Caldwell recklessness. If Caldwell had pleaded that, against all 
evidence to the contrary, he was convinced that there was no one in the 
hotel at the time of his activity I am confident that Lord Diplock would 
have put out a model definition which would have brought him within the 
contours of recklessness. Similarly if Lawrence had pleaded that, 
against all the evidence to the contrary, he was convinced 
that there 
was no danger to other road users, Lord Diplock would no 
doubt have 
found him to have contravened the appropriate legislative enactment. 
However, as I have pointed out, whilst there 
is no moral difference 
between the agent who mistakenly believes that 
there is no risk in 
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relation to his activity and the agent who fails to allude to a risk, 
there is a moral difference between these two agents and the agent who 
knowingly runs a risk in relation to person or property since the first 
two agents act in the belief that no untoward harm will result and might 
well have acted differently had they been aware of the attendant risk. 
But if this argument is accepted then how are we to mark the difference 
at the conviction stage? It is submitted that my concept of gross 
negligence enables us to make such a distinction. I have pointed out 
above that the agent who runs a known risk of untoward harm is reckless 
in relation to that harm. "' I have also put forward the view that the 
agent who fails to allude to a high risk is grossly negligent with 
respect to it. " My submission here is that the agent who mistakenly 
concludes that there is no risk of any untoward harm attaching to his 
activity is grossly negligent in relation to that harm, if the risk is 
high, since he has failed to appreciate the actual risk in the same way 
as the agent who has failed to think about a risk at all, and who thus 
does not appreciate it. In this way we preserve racklessness as a state 
of mind whilst attributing lesser liability to the agent who 
misperceives the risk and the agent who fails to allude to it. 
Before leaving this category of mental state it is worth making two 
final observations of the dicta in Sim n. First, it seems that the 
agent who perceives that there is a risk will be reckless in relation to 
it regardless of the measures he takes to reduce that risk even when the 
risk has been reduced to the point at which it is just about 
unreasonable for him to take it. I have argued? that such an agent 
should be rewarded at the conviction stage for his positive activity 
carried out to reduce the risk of untoward harm. Second, and important, 
although the dictum of Lord Diplock that regard must be had to any 
explanation the defendant gives as to his state of mind's was 
acknowledged by the Court as raised in the original hearing, neither 
Taylor J nor Watkins LJ denied that the passage (from 
Lawrence) was 
inadmissible in cases of criminal damage. Does this mean 
that a 
defendant will be allowed to put forward evidence about 
his mental state 
at the time of his act which might satisfy the court or 
jury that he 
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ought to be acquitted? If this is the case then the decision in Caldwell 
might not be so severe as the subjectivists have made it out to be. 
5. Alluding to a risk of untoward harm and deciding that it is slight 
when in fact the risk is high. 
In this category of mental state the agent has decided that there is 
some risk but has misperceived the degree of risk involved. He has thus 
failed to appreciate a high risk of untoward harm and, it is submitted, 
the agent is grossly negligent in relation to it. One might object to 
this submission on the ground that, as the agent has perceived the risk 
he ought to be held reckless in relation to it. In response I would 
comment that he cannot be guilty of gross recklessness on my model since 
he has not in fact foreseen that the risk is high. Also he cannot be 
guilty of simple recklessness since the risk was in fact high. The 
natural home for this mental state on my model is grass negligence since 
his failure to appreciate the extent of the risk means that he has 
failed to appreciate the actual high risk of harm. 
A second abjection to my classification of the agent in this category is 
that such a model of gross negligence fails to distinguish between the 
agent who at least thinks about the possibilities in relation to risk 
(although he gets it wrong) and the agent who fails to think about the 
possibilities of risk altogether. One might argue that the latter agent 
is more morally blameworthy than the former. This argument is much the 
same as that put forward in the last section. My response is that there 
is no significant moral distinction between the two agents. If one is 
driven to choose between them one might argue that the agent who has 
considered the possibility of low risk (when the risk is high) is more 
morally blameworthy than the agent who fails to think about risk since 
the former is aware that his activity may cause harm whilst the 
latter 
is confident that his activity is 'risk free'. However 
the moral 
turpitude of the latter in failing to consider the risk at all must 
be 
taken into account. It is submitted that there 
is nothing to choose 
between then in terms of moral blameworthiness. My model of gross 
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negligence gives effect to this conclusion since it holds that both 
agents are guilty of the substantive offence by way of gross negligence. 
Does the case of Shinmn7" fall within this category? At first blush the 
answer would seem to be yes but I think that there are one or two 
special features of Shimmen which require consideration in assessing the 
category to which his case belongs. It will be recalled that Shimmen was 
an expert in the martial art of TaiKwan-Do which gave him a power of 
muscular control not present in the ordinary person. Also Sbimmen, in 
kicking out, was genuinely trying to stop short of the window and in the 
majority of such attempts would have been expected to have done so. It 
is my view that whilst one would consider there to be a high risk when a 
novice attempts what Shimmen attempted to do a Jury might plausibly 
conclude that in Shimmen's case the risk was low and that Shimmen thus 
brought about the damage to the window by way of simple negligence. 7S On 
this wiew Shimmen would not be guilty of causing criminal damage unless 
that offence were extended to include simple negligence. 
6. Alluding to the possibility of untoward harm and deciding that the 
risk is high when it is in fact low. 
The agent here cannot be guilty of gross negligence here since he has 
actually perceived the risk. Neither can he be guilty of gross 
recklessness since, on the facts, there is no high risk of harm. On my 
twofold model of recklessness the agent is guilty of causing the 
proscribed harm by way of simple recklessness since, on the facts and 
circumstances of the case, the risk was not more likely than not to 
occur. The agent's misperception of the extent of the risk is 
thus 
discounted for the purpose of ascriptions of criminal liability. 
Gross Negligence, Simple Recklessness and Punishment. 
I think that it would be generally accepted that gross recklessness 
should be punished more severely than simple recklessness and 
that gross 
negligence should be punished more severely 
than simple negligence. 7 
But should gross negligence generally 
be punished more severely than 
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simple recklessness? The difficulty which underlies this question iss 
that simple recklessness might not always be less Serious than gross 
negligence. It might be that some cases within the two categories are of 
approximately equal moral culpability whilst other cases of simple 
recklessness are either more or less reprehensible than cases within 
gross negligence. My view here is that there would be a significant 
overlap in moral culpability between these two proposed species of mens 
rea in the cases and that for this reason we ought not to place the two 
concepts in a straight hirearchical order for the purpose of blame and 
punishment. I think that it would be a matter of judicial discretion as 
to which case in each category ought to receive the heavier penalty. 
To summarise I offer my proposed models of recklessness and gross 
negligence. 
1. A person commits an offence by way of gross recklessness where he 
foresees a high risk of untoward harm and continues regardless of the 
risk. His attitude concerning the occurrence of the risk is irrelevant. 
'High risk' means a better than even chance that the untoward harm will 
occur, 
2. A person commits an offence by way of simple recklessness where he 
foresees a low risk of harm and continues regardless of the risk. 'Low 
risk' means an even chance or less than even chance that the untoward 
harm will occur. 
3. There is a rebuttable presumption that a person commits an offence by 
way of gross negligence where there is a high risk of untoward harm and 
(i) he fails to allude to the risk, or 
(ii) he considers the possibility of the risk and decides that there is 
none, or 
(iii) he perceives the possibility of the risk and wrongly decides that 
it is low. 
since in each case the agent has failed to appreciate the existence of a 
high risk of untoward harm. The presumption may be rebutted by the agent 
where he can show that at the time of his activity there was present 
some legally recognised factor which was sufficient to cause 
him to fail 
to allude to, or appreciate the extent of, the high risk of proscribed 
harm. 
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In chapter 5I offered six categories of attempt. The sixth concerns 
reckless attempts and it is convenient to discuss that category here. It 
would be useful to start discussion on this category of attempts with 
two illustrations. 
(i) David throws Valerie to the ground in order to have sexual 
intercourse with her. He knows that she is not consenting to what is 
about to be visited upon her. He is about to achieve penetration when he 
is disturbed by a third party who enters the room. David makes a swift 
departure without completing the actus reus of rape. 
(ii) Duncan has been drinking with Verity at her home. She becomes semi- 
conscious through drink. Duncan decides and sets out to have intercourse 
with her but cannot be sure whether her movements are indicating that 
she is consenting. Verity is not in fact consenting at the time; her 
movements constitute an attempt to express physical objection. He is 
about to achieve penetration when Verity's mother walks into the room. 
Duncan desists before actual penetration. 
In case (i) there is no doubt that David is guilty of attempted rape 
since he intends to have non-consensual intercourse with his victim. 
However in case (ii) Duncan does not intend to have sex without consent, 
nor does he know that his victim is not consenting. He is not sure about 
consent and may be counted as reckless in relation to it. Is Duncan 
guilty of attempted rape? More generally can an agent be guilty of a 
reckless attempt? 
By way of an introduction to deliberation on this issue we may note that 
the criminal law has never entertained the attribution of criminal 
liability for an attempt concerning recklessness as to consequences 
since the risk of untoward harm cannot be said to be a part of the 
agent's aim or objective. Thus where D shoots at a bird and the bullet 
ricochettes off a branch and narrowly misses V, D cannot be guilty of an 
attempt in relation to any offence against V since he is, at most, 
reckless in relation to the danger to V. 
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But suggestions have been put forward that we may count as criminal 
attempts cases in which the agent has been reckless as to circumstances. 
To accept the proposition would be to accept a distinction between 
circumstances and consequences for the purpose of the criminal law on 
attempts. The Law Commission Working Party on codification did in fact 
accept the distinction between the two concepts and that an agent might 
be counted as having attempted a substantive offence where he has 
embarked upon activity leading to a specific end being reckless as to a 
crucial circumstance which, if present, would render that end a criminal 
offence. ''c-' However the Working Party's proposal was not accepted by the 
Law Commission which, in its Report, concluded that the distinction 
between circumstances and consequences would be "difficult and 
artificial". ''-nl The Law Commission pointed to a hypothetical posed by 
Buxton`"° in order to illustrate the difficulty. Buxton cites the case of 
a man who takes an unmarried female under sixteen out of the possession 
of her parents contrary to s. 20 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and 
contends that the fact that the girl is in possession of a parent is 
both a circumstance and part of the consequence of his act (assuming he 
has completed the actus reus of the offence). 
However Williams sees no difficulties in drawing a sharp distinction 
between consequences and circumstances. -' He points out the distinction 
between 'conduct-crimes' and 'result-crimes. For Williams a conduct- 
crime does not involve any consequence; it amounts to the creation of a 
state of affairs. He uses rape as an illustration and suggests, 
implicitly at least, that in conduct-crimes it is the presence of the 
circumstance which produces the actus reus of the offence, the agent is 
not expecting or hoping for some change in the world to flow from his 
activity. Williams draws a temporal line between circumstances and 
consequences at bodily movement. Any change in the world which follows 
bodily movement would be a consequence and would thus need intention on 
the part of the agent if we are to charge him with an attempt 
in 
relation to the consequence. e2 
If we relate Williams' commentary to Buxton's example we see 
that the 
agent who takes the unmarried girl under sixteen out of 
the possession 
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of her parents commits a conduct-crime since "you do not have to wait to 
see if anything happens as a result of what the defendant does", 8: 2 
To summarise discussion so far. If we accept that there is a distinction 
between circumstances and consequences then it is open for us to (i) 
draw the boundary of wens rea for result-crimes at direct intention, and 
(ii) charge with an attempt at a substantive offence the agent who 
embarks upon activity leading to a specific end being reckless about a 
necessary circumstance which, if present, renders that end a conduct- 
crime. 
But there is a further problem for the suggestion that we subject 
conduct-crimes to the criminal law of attempts which was made apparent 
when the draft Bill submitted by the Law Commission was being 
processed' 3 ready for debate in Parliament. The problem is that an agent 
may commit an impassible offence (which constitutes an attempt at 
current criminal law) whilst being reckless as to a circumstance 
relating to that attempt. Suppose for example that Duncan in our earlier 
illustration S4. attempts (unsuccessfully) to have intercourse with Verity 
not knowing whether or not she is consenting (thus being reckless as to 
her consent) when in fact Verity is consenting although her bodily 
motions do not make her consent clear. Here Duncan commits an impossible 
attempt recklessly. Williams posits the further example of D who 
attempts (unsuccessfully) to obtain money by making a representation not 
knowing whether his statement is true or false. The representation is in 
fact true. Williams thinks that we may be stretching the law a little 
too far in holding such an agent guilty of a criminal attempt. " 
The force of Williams' thought is made clear when we consider the case 
of Duncan who attempts intercourse with Verity being reckless as to her 
consent which she is in fact giving. One might properly question a model 
of criminal responsibility which holds such an agent guilty of attempted 
rape. Perhaps we could justify the exclusion of the impossible reckless 
attempt from the criminal process on ground similar to 
that raised in 
category 3 attempts above; -6- that in cases of consensual 
interaction 
between parties which is de facto legal any duty 
imposed by criminal law 
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on one party not to take part in the transaction in any given 
circumstance (more particularly here doubt as to whether a particular 
circumstance of the transaction is present) reduces, if not 
extinguishes, the right of the other party to have legal relations with 
whom he chooses. E''' 
Quite apart from the proposal contained in the last paragraph we might 
well argue that the agent who has attempted to have intercourse with his 
victim being reckless as to her consent which she is not giving ought to 
be subject to criminal liability. This is in fact possible by way of a 
charge of indecent assault but it is submitted that there is a 
distinction between this agent and one who indecently assaults his 
victim with the intention of stopping short of penetration. On the other 
hand there is a significant distinction between this agent and David in 
our earlier illustration'' who attempts intercourse knowing that his 
victim is not consenting. 
My suggestion is that we ought to mark clearly the criminality of the 
agent who attempts intercourse being reckless as to his victim's consent 
which in fact she is not giving whilst excluding from criminal liability 
the agent who believes that his victim is not consenting or is reckless 
as to that consent when, in each case, consent is in fact being given. 
In order to do that it is necessary to construct a legal provision to 
that effect. We might say that where a person attempts" a specific 
effect being reckless as to a circumstance which if present would render 
that effect a criminal offence then if that circumstance is present he 
is guilty of a reckless attempt at that offence. 
Two aspects of the fairly rough proposal should be noted. First, it is 
necessary that the circumstance toward which the agent is reckless 
be 
actually present at the time of his act. Thus it is necessary 
that his 
victim is not consenting to intercourse or that the statement made 
by 
the agent in order to obtain money be untrue 
in fact. If the 
circumstance is not present then the agent is not guilty of any offence 
on the draft proposal. The proposed category of attempts 
thus excludes 
cases of attempted intercourse where the victim 
is in fact consenting. 
282 
Second, I have specifically called this category of attempts 'reckless 
attempts' so that it is clearly distinguished from cases of attempt in 
which the agent intends the consequence or state of affairs (i. e. 
intends but fails to achieve a conduct-crime). The proposed category 
thus distinguishes between David and Duncan in the illustrations which 
introduced discussion on this category of attempts: David is guilty of 
attempted rape whereas Duncan is guilty of a reckless attempt at rape. 
In this way we accurately record the distinction in moral culpability 
between the agents at the conviction stage but, more important, we 
subject Duncan to the law on attempted rape which seems more 
appropriate than a charge of indecent assault. 
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The proposed twofold model of recklessness involves a positive awareness 
by the agent of a risk of untoward harm which, on the facts of the case. 
is an unreasonable one for him to take. The proposed structure of wens 
rea contains a twofold model of negligence which is constituted by a 
failure by the agent to allude to or appreciate a particular risk of 
untoward harm. The contours of gross negligence are set out in Chapter 
7.1 
The Proposed Concept of Simple Negligence 
It is submitted that unawareness of a low' risk of proscribed harm 
constitutes the proposed concept of simple negligence. Offences of 
simple negligence would take two forms, namely specific offences of 
simple negligence and a general offence of criminal negligence. 
(i) The Specific Offence of Simple Negligence. 
Where Parliament wishes to criminalise an effect which has been brought 
about negligently by an agent whose conduct-' is otherwise innocent it 
may do so by the introduction of a specific offence of negligence. 
Perhaps an illustration of such at current law is the offence of driving 
without due care and attention: the activity itself is otherwise 
innocent but where the agent causes damage or injury because he has 
failed to allude to or appreciate the low risk of untoward harm he 
commits the offence. Where an agent has brought about a requisite 
untoward harm in the appropriate circumstances there would be a 
rebuttable inference that, by his conduct, *' he has brought about the 
proscribed harm by way of simple negligence. That inference may be 
rebutted where the agent can adduce evidence which satisfies the court 
or jury on the balance of probabilities that at the time of 
his activity 
or inactivity there existed a legally recognised factor which was 
in the 
circumstances, sufficient to cause him to fail 
to allude to or 
appreciate the low risk of proscribed harm. The rules 
here would be the 
same as those which I submitted in respect of 
the rebuttal of a charge 
of gross negligence. " The rebutting provision would not apply 
where the 
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agent's conduct is otherwise criminal. I would Just add here that 
Parliament should resort to 'specific offence' negligence sparingly 
since the requisite mental state is constituted by inattention which we 
all sometimes exhibit; and we cannot be expected to take such thorough 
care that we always notice all the risks which our activity may involve. 
(ii) The General Offence of Criminal Negligence. 
It is submitted that Parliament should enact legislation to criminalise 
all the consequences of negligence which have been brought about whilst 
the agent is involved in activity which itself constitutes a substantive 
criminal offence. ', Suppose that D is embarked upon a burglary. He i= 
interrupted and makes a speedy exit. However in his haste he knocks over 
and damages an expensive ornament. Presumably D would not be liable for 
the damage on current law if his mental state concerning the damage 
falls short of recklessness. My submission is that D should be liable 
for the damage on the basis of criminal negligence provided that his ne e` ýc 
mental state falls within the criteria for negligence stated below. It 
is further submitted that an agent who causes damage or injury 
negligently whilst embarked upon a substantive criminal offenceE should 
not be able to plead the rebutting provision which is available to the 
agent charged with a specific offence of negligence. For the provision 
is designed to excuse from liability the agent who lacks the capacity of 
the reasonable person or the agent who, through no fault of his, finds 
himself in circumstances which prevent him from appreciating that which 
would be apparent to the reasonable man. In any event when one talks of 
the ordinary prudent man it is usual to talk of the ordinary prudent man 
in the position of the defendant. But is there such a thing as a 
reasonable burglar, or robber or rapist? 
My qualification concerning the rebuttal provision so that it 
does not 
apply to criminal negligence raises one or two 
issues. First, does it 
reintroduce the concept of constructive malice? 
I submit that it does 
not for the doctrine of constructive malice held the agent guilty of a 
substantive offence which could only be committed with 
intention where 
he was merely negligent concerning the actus reus whereas 
on the 
proposed concept the conviction would state 
that the harm had been 
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brought about by criminal negligence. Thus where D, a burglar, rushed V 
aside whilst escaping and V fell downstairs to his death D was guilty of 
murder on the doctrine of constructive malice, whereas on my proposal, 
assuming the risk of death to be low in the circumstances, D would be 
guilty of causing death by criminal negligence. 
Second, if we are to qualify the rebutting provision of simple negligence 
so that it is denied to the agent whose voluntary conduct is criminal in 
nature, then should we not apply the same qualification to cases of 
gross negligence? My view is that we ought not qualify the rebutting 
provision of gross negligence in this way on the main ground that gross 
negligence is a more serious form of mens rea' than simple negligence 
and the agent should thus have the opportunity of adducing evidence to 
show that his failure to allude to or appreciate the high risk was 
brought about by some legally recognised factor sufficient in the 
circumstances to cause him to fail to appreciate the risk. In other 
words, the more serious the crime charged (and that seriousness will be 
reflected, inter alia, by the level of mens rea required for the 
particular offence) the more subjective (or morally blameworthy) should 
be the mens rea requirement: we may achieve this by, inter alia, 
allowing the rebutting provision of gross negligence to the agent 
whether or not he is embarked upon activity aimed at some other offence 
whilst denying it to the agent who has brought about 'low risk' untoward 
harm whilst engaged on activity aimed at some other offence. 
The following features of the proposed concept of simple negligence may 
be noted. 
(1) There may be specific offences of negligence where Parliament wishes 
to criminalise otherwise innocent activity which brings about certain 
harm. There is also the general offence of criminal negligence which 
catches all harm brought about negligently by the agent who 
is engaged 
in the commission of a substantive offence. 
(ii) The agent must have failed to allude to 
the de facto low risk of 
harm or have failed to appreciate that such a risk exists. 
The second 
part of the criterion catches the agent who actually 
alludes to the 
possibility of such a risk and wrongly concludes 
that there is none or 
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that the risk is so low that the ordinary man would not feel that he was 
unjustified in taking it. Let us take a hypothetical concerning the 
general offence of criminal negligence to illustrate the point. Suppose 
that D breaks into a laboratory in order to steal some sulphuric acid. 
He pours some into a container brought by him but some spills on the 
carpet causing damage. Assuming that the risk here is low then if D 
fails to allude to it he would be guilty of causing damage to property 
by criminal negligence. If he alludes to the risk and considers it to be 
so low that the ordinary man would feel justified in taking it then he 
fails to appreciate the degree of risk and is liable as above. If he 
iow 
appreciates the degree of risk but takes it anyway he is guilty of 
causing criminal damage since his mental state amounts to simple 
recklessness. 
(iii) The risk must be low, i. e. not more likely than not to occur as a 
result of the agent's activity or inactivity. '3 There is a sharp and 
clear dividing line between gross and simple negligence which takes 
place at the point at which the risk changes from 'not more likely than 
not to occur' (simple negligence) to 'more likely than not to occur' 
(gross negligence). It may thus be noted that the distinction between 
gross and simple negligence is not a difference in mental state but a 
difference in that to which the agent's mental state has not been 
directed. As with failure to allude to or appreciate a 'high risk' of 
untoward harm the test for 'low risk' would be based upon the ordinary 
prudent individual's perception of the degree of risk on the facts and 
circumstances as those faced by the defendant. 
(iv) The defendant who commits a specific offence of negligence whilst 
engaged upon otherwise innocent activity may rebut the inference of 
simple negligence in the same way as he may rebut the inference of gross 
negligence. 10 The question for the court or jury is whether the ordinary 
person in the position of the defendant would consider the risk of harm 
to be low but an unjustified risk for the defendant to take. If this 
requirement is fulfilled then he will be guilty of the specific offence 
by way of simple negligence unless he can adduce evidence 
to the court 
of a legally recognised factor which was at the time of 
his activity 
sufficient in the circumstances to cause him to 
fail to allude to or 
appreciate the low risk of harm. Note that, 
for the reasons stated 
2 92 
above, this fourth criteria is restricted to offences of specific 
negligence and does not extend to the general offence of criminal 
negligence. 
Several advantages flow from the proposed concept of simple negligence. 
First it is conceptually clear and consistent: the boundaries are stated 
with precision and there is no 'overlap' with either the proposed 
twofold model of recklessness or the concept of gross negligence. For 
gross and simple recklessness the agent must have alluded to the 
(respectively high or low) risk and appreciated the existence thereof. 
For gross negligence the agent must have failed to allude to a high risk 
or have failed to appreciate its degree; for simple negligence he must 
have failed to allude to or appreciate a low risk. The proposed concepts 
are thus separate and distinct and yet comprehensive in that they cover 
the entire range of mens rea concerning foresight or lack of foresight. 
Second, the proposed rebutting provision excuses the agent who lacks the 
mental capacity possessed by the ordinary prudent individual. Thus where 
a latter-day Stephenson"' perpetrates activity which brings about 
untoward harm which, on the facts, is not more likely than not to occur 
we may excuse the agent since his schizophrania would fall in the 
rebutting provision. On current law it seems that such an agent would be 
liable for the harm brought about. Third, the division between gross and 
simple negligence and the admission of the latter mental state as a 
recognised form of mens rea enables us to attribute liability for gross 
negligence without the need to artificially extend the boundaries of 
recklessness to catch the more serious forms of negligence. Because of 
this the term 'negligence' (and thus 'recklessness') becomes 
terminologically coherent since it is restricted in its definition so 
that it fits with peoples' perception of the meaning of the term. 
A Comparison of the Proposed Structures of Recklessness and Negligence. 
It will be noted that my definitions of gross and simple recklessness 
and gross and simple negligence contain variables relating 
to (i) 
allusion to the risk and (ii) the degree of risk actually present 
in the 
293 
cases. My qualification to simple negligence introduces a further 
variable namely whether or not the agent is engaged upon criminal 
activity at the time he brings about the 'low risk' harm. It would be 
useful to indicate the variables diagrammatically, 
Gross Recklessness. 
Allusion to Risk. 
Agent alluded to risk and 
appreciated its extent, 
Degree of Risk. 
High. 
Simple Recklessness. Agent alluded to risk and 
appreciated its extent. 
Low. 
Gross Negligence. Agent failed to allude to High. 
the risk or failed to 
appreciate that the harm was more 
likely than not to occur subject 
to defence of legally recognised 
factor sufficient in the circumstances 
to cause lack of appreciation. 
Simple Negligence. Agent failed to allude to Low 
the risk or failed to 
appreciate its extent subject 
to defence of legally recognised 
factor sufficient in the circumstances 
to cause lack of appreciation in those cases in 
which the agent's conduct is 
otherwise innocent. 
A useful outline of the concept of negligence at current law is provided 
by Cross and Jones. " They say that a person is negligent if his conduct 
(positive or negative activity) in relation to a reasonably 
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ascertainable risk falls below the standard which would be expected of a 
reasonable person in the light of the risk. An agent may be negligent 
concerning a consequence of or a circumstance relevant to his conduct. 
"(He) is negligent as to a consequence of an act or omission on 
his part if the risk of its occurring would have been foreseen by a 
reasonable person and the accused falls below the standard of 
conduct which would be expected of a reasonable person in the light 
of that risk. (He) is negligent as to a circumstance relevant to his 
conduct if he ought to have been aware of its existence because a 
reasonable person would have thought about the risk that it might 
exist and would have found out that it did". '' 
Notice the requirement by the learned authors that the agent "fall below 
the standard of conduct of the reasonable person" regarding foresight of 
a consequence, and that "he ought to have been aware" of a circumstance. 
In using this terminology they quite rightly include within the 
parameters of negligence the agent who has considered the possibility of 
a risk (of a circumstance or consequence) and decided wrongly that there 
is none. Generally, however, negigence is a state of unawareness of the 
risk. 
At current law the term negligence is designed to cover all degrees of 
failure to comply with the standards of the ordinary prudent individual 
although sometimes the courts use the phrase 'gross negligence' in that 
area of law which is considered to be the paradigm case of liability for 
negligence, namely manslaughter. In Rv Finney 4 D, an attendant at a 
lunatic asylum, asked a patient to vacate the bath and, believing him to 
have responded to his request, turned on the hot tap. The patient, who 
had remained in the bath, was scalded to death. Lush J directed the jury 
"to render a person liable for neglect of duty there must 
be such a 
degree of culpability as to amount to gross negligence on 
his part 
... (F)rom his own account 
(the defendant) had told the deceased to 
get out and he thought he had got out. If you 
think that indicates 
gross carelessness, then you should find the prisoner guilty 
of 
manslaughter". 
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In Rv Bateman' the Court of Criminal Appeal, in considering a case in 
which D, a doctor, had caused a patient's death, decided that 
"(t)he prosecution must prove the matters necessary to establish 
civil liability and, in addition, must satisfy the jury that the 
negligence or incompetence of the accused went beyond a mere matter 
of compensation and showed such disregard for the life and safety of 
others as to amount to a crime against the state and conduct 
deserving punishment". 
On the issue of 'gross' negligence Lord Atkin suggested that 'reckless' 
was the adjective that most nearly coincided with the very high degree 
of negligence required to prove 'gross' negligence. 14 
Illustrations of cases in which the courts talk in terms of negligence 
simpliciter include (i) as concerns consequences, offences under s. 3 of 
the Road Traffic Act 1972 (e. g. driving without due care and attention) 
and (ii) as concerns circumstances s. 25 of the Firearms Act 1968 which 
states that it is an offence for a person to sell a firearm or 
ammunition to another person whom he knows or has reasonable cause for 
believing to be drunk or of unsound mind. Regardless of whether the 
courts use the term 'gross' negligence in any given case the mental 
state requirement for negligence is unawareness of the risk. It seems 
that for those offences in which the courts insist upon gross negligence 
as the requisite mental state for a particular offence which admits 
negligence as a mental state they are looking for a more serious 
departure from the standards of the ordinary person. 
It is submitted that the concept of negligence at current law i=- 
deficient on the following grounds. First the lack of legal recognition 
of the two distinct concepts of gross and simple negligence has 
led to 
artificial extensions of recklessness to take in the more serious 
forms 
of negligence. This has led to conceptual incoherence. 
Second the test 
for negligence rests on the perceptions of 
the ordinary prudent 
individual in the position of the defendant and no account 
is taken of 
any personal factor which denies the defendant 
the capacity or power of 
perception found in that ordinary individual. 
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Negligence and Criminal Responsibility. 
Should simple negligence be a fault element in crime? It has been 
necessary to include negligence as a fault element at current law since 
the concept covers cases of gross negligence including 'gross 
negligence' manslaughter. But on the proposed twofold model of 
negligence cases of gross negligence at current law would be absorbed 
into the definitive concept of gross negligence so is there any need for 
the proposed lesser concept of simple negligence to figure in 
ascriptions of criminal responsibility? There has been much debate on 
whether negligence'" should be a fault element in criminal law and it is 
not necessary for me to rehearse the arguments here. " Those who would 
exclude negligence as a fault element in criminal law point to the small 
number of offences which admit the concept as a minimum mens rea. My 
view is that given that the criminal law is concerned with activity 
which is itself criminal the number of specific offences of negligence 
brought about by otherwise innocent activity must necessarily be few. I 
would accept the notion of a specific offence of negligence or. the 
ground that on occasion such a legal measure might be both proper and 
necessary. Also, as I have argued above, we ought to have a general 
offence of criminal negligence. The agent who, for the fun of it and 
seeing no further than the prank, sets fire to a newspaper which V is 
reading should be liable for an injury caused even where the risk of 
injury is low and thus presumably not subject to 'Caldwell' 
recklessness. In order to catch this agent it would be necessary to have 
some form of liability for negligence. 
In summary on simple negligence. Where a particular offence admits the 
concept as a requisite mental state then there would be an inference 
that the agent has brought about 'low risk' untoward harm 
by way of 
simple negligence. That inference may be rebutted where 
the agent 
adduces evidence that satisfies the court or jury on 
the balance of 
probabilities that at the time of his conduct, 
there existed some 
legally recognised factor sufficient in degree 
in the circumstances to 
cause him to fail to appreciate the risk. 
The rebutting provision would 
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not be available to the agent whose conduct (which brings about the 
untoward harm) is aimed at some other substantive criminal offence. 
Where, if at all, 'do road traffic offences fit into the proposed concept 
of simple negligence? Such offences which admit negligence as a minimum 
mens rea are few, the most important, perhaps, being driving without due 
care and attention. My view is that in motoring offences which admit 
negligence as a minimum requisite mental state, provided his activity in 
driving the car is otherwise legal, the agent ought to have the 
opportunity to adduce evidence of some legally recognised factor of 
sufficient degree in the circumstances to cause him to fail to allude to 
or appreciate that his driving is causing a low risk of harm. But 
suppose that D has stolen a vehicle and causes a road traffic accident 
whilst driving without due care and attention. On my proposal D would be 
guilty of that offence and he would not be able to introduce any 
evidence concerning the rebutting provision since his activity in 
driving the car is otherwise illegal. But what of road traffic offences 
which are designated ones of strict liability? I shall return to this 
issue later. '' 
The Proposed Structure of Lens Rea and 'Strict Liability'.. 
A crime of strict liability is one in which mens rea is not required for 
one or more elements of the actus reus2° although wens rea will be 
required for at least one element of the offence. 21 Although there are 
one or two instances of strict liability at common law I shall be 
concerned here with statutory offences of strict liability. The 
difference between strict liability and negligence at current law is 
that the former applies to blameless inadvertence on the part of the 
defendant: it does not matter that he is honest and has reasonable 
grounds for his belief that his act or omission is 
free from risk, or 
that he has exercised reasonable care in acting or 
failing to act as he 
does or does not know and had no means of knowing 
that, on the facts, he 
is in breach of a particular statutory provision. 
Should there be strict 
liability offences at current law? 
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The criteria applied by the adherents in support of the concept of 
strict liability include the following. 
(i) Where the conduct or harm is one which the law should seek to 
prevent then the offence should be made one of strict liability. Lady 
Wootton has said that if the primary function of the courts is conceived 
as the prevention of forbidden acts then if the law says that certain 
things shall not be done, it is 
"illogical to confine this prohibition to occasions on which they 
are done from malice aforethought ... for the reasons for 
prohibiting it are the same whether it is the result of (intention), 
negligence or of sheer accident". : 22- 
It is this sort of reasoning which the court in E ine23 had in mind 
when it considered that men should be deterred from taking young females 
out of the possession of their parents or guardian whatever their age. 
However, as Smith and Hogan suggest, 24 this reasoning is not appropriate 
to many offences of strict liability. For if a butcher has sold tainted 
meat despite having taken all reasonable precautions against doing so, 
and if the physical state of the meat is undiscoverable by any 
precaution that he can be expected to take we should not say that he 
ought not to have acted as he did for we want sellers of merchandise, 
having taken reasonable steps to ensure the soundness of their stock, to 
sell their merchandise. It is submitted that the criterion leads to an 
undue imbalance between criminal and moral blameworthiness since it 
brings into liability those who have taken all measures open to them to 
avoid harm and who have acted in the honest and reasonable belief that 
their activity will not cause harm to others. This is surely out of fit 
with people's ideas of what conduct ought to be subject to criminal 
liability. The agent himself would certainly feel aggrieved at being 
convicted of a criminal offence: that grievance would be magnified in 
those cases in which a conviction may have far reaching effects outside 
the courts.: 21-' 
(ii) Where the offence is 'quasi-criminal' or a regulatory offence it 
may be treated as one of strict liability since 
it is not considered 
criminal in any real sense and the sanction is not great. 
In Alnbacell v 
Voodwardw15' the House of Lords referred to cases which are not 
"criminal 
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in the real sense". However it is suggested that the criminal law ought 
to be reserved exclusively for conduct which is truly criminal in 
nature; i. e. vested with criminal content as regards actus reus and mens 
rea. Where the agent has done what is reasonable in order to prevent 
harm and (or) does not know, and has no way of knowing that specific 
conduct might bring about harm, then he lacks wens rea and an essential 
element of criminal conduct is missing. It is submitted that where a 
change in the world brought about by D can be said to be "not criminal 
in any real sense'27 then it is a case where D lacks yens rea concerning 
a crucial element of the actus reus and should not be subject to 
criminal blame and punishment. In Varner v Hetropolitan Police 
co , ssioner2' Lord Reid distinguished 'quasi-criminal' offences and 
offences involving the disgrace of criminality for the purpose of 
ascriptions of criminal liability. The learned Law Lord has a point: the 
criterion is surely that criminal law should be confined to acts or 
omissions which are truly criminal in nature. 
(iii) Where the particular type of offence would require undue time or 
personnel to litigate the issue of the accused's culpability then the 
offence may be made one of strict liability. 2*ý' 
But if we avoid the expenditure of such time and personnel by excluding 
discussion on mental state for the purpose of conviction, we will still 
need to consider the mental state which accompanied the actus reus for 
the purpose of sanction. For a Judge is surely interested in 
discriminating between the butcher who sells unsound meat knowing full 
well that it is unsound and the butcher who sells such meat having no 
such knowledge and who, perhaps, is in possession of a veterinary 
certificate that the meat is sound. ý° At least two factors flow from 
this. First, the facts of the case relating to mens rea will have to be 
dealt with regardless of the status of the offence as one of strict 
liability. Second, the judge is deciding sanction on facts different 
from those an which the jury convicted, an unsatisfactory state of 
affairs. One might respond here that this is the case already in all 
sentencing for the jury does not take into account the fact that the 
accused had a criminal record: this is something only for sentencing. I 
would agree that the judge is entitled to look at 
facts relating to 
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previous offences at the sentencing stage but it is the current legal 
position that it is the court or jury and not the judge which is the 
arbiter of the facts of a particular case. It should thus be for the 
court or Jury to decide upon the mental state of the accused at the time 
of his activity. One might also question whether the imposition of 
strict liability is the only alternative to cases in which proof of mens 
rea would be difficult and costly to attain. For there are other 
alternatives which preserve the moral status of the agent who has acted 
blamelessly - for example the application of a 'no negligence' proviso 
either by the court or by the legislature. 31 
(iv) Where difficulty in proving mens rea would lead to the acquittal of 
an undue number of guilty individuals the offence might suitably be made 
one of strict liability. ý'= This fourth criterion was used as a ground of 
the decision by the House of Lords in A13hacell. 43 In that case D owned 
settling tanks which had overflow channels leading into a river and 
pumps to prevent such overflow. The pumps ceased to operate due to 
obstruction by vegetation and the river was polluted. D was found guilty 
of causing polution of the river contrary to s. 2(1) (a) of the Rivers 
(Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951. In the appeal to the House of Lords 
it was stated that if mens rea were necessary with some regulatory 
offences which are harmful to the public the difficulty in proving mens 
rea would mean that D would often secure an acquittal which would render 
the legislation nugatory. With respect to the learned Law Lords the 
dictum poses problems. First just what is a regulatory offence? It is 
not always easy to classify offences in this way. Second, in the cases 
the judges have been disposed to use the phrase concerning offences 
which carry severe sanctions. Is it right to subject to possible heavy 
sentence the agent who is faultless as to the actus reus of a regulatory 
offence? Third would the requirement of a minimum mens rea of negligence 
have the effect which the House of Lords suggests? In any event 
is there 
not some alternative to denying D the right to an aquittal on 
the 
grounds of lack of mens rea which would preserve 
the farce of the 
legislation - for example the provision of a 
'no negligence' clause. 11 
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(v) Where the legislation requires high standards of care to ensure that 
social interests are protected the offence may be suitably be made one 
of strict liability. " The argument here is that the imposition of 
strict liability will lead to greater care by those who are involved 
with conduct which constitutes danger to society, for example drugs, =`t- 
pollution37 and road traffic offences; '' The criterion assumes that the 
existence of strict liability does induce individuals and organisations 
to aim at higher standards. =``' 
But if our object is to make people more careful concerning specific 
risks of harm can we not ensure that by admitting negligence as the 
minimum relevant fault element - might not the prospect of a criminal 
conviction for negligence weigh just as heavy on the mind of a 
prospective offender? Smith and Hogan, who favour the 'minimum 
negligence' alternative to strict liability, 4C' say that it is likely 
that people will not do more than is reasonable in any given case and it 
is unfair to require them to do so. In any event it is submitted that 
the claim that strict liability promotes higher standards of efficiency 
and care than those which result from the imposition of offences of 
negligence is not necessarily substantiated in fact. Suppose that the 
offence with which AZT cell" was convicted was today an offence 
requiring negligence as a minimum form of mans rea. Would this 
relaxation in the mens rea requirement cause firms like Alphacell to 
relax their policies concerning minimisation of the risk? " If it is 
conceded that the answer is no then we might equally claim the reverse: 
that an agent is not likely to take greater preventative measures than 
he considers to be reasonable to minimise the risk of an offence the 
minimum mens rea of which has been reduced from negligence to strict 
liability. A further criticism of the criterion is that in reducing the 
mens rea requirement to this level we attribute liability 
to the agent 
who is faultless with regard to the actus reus of the strict 
liability 
offence. 
My view is that we ought not set the level of wens rea 
lower than that 
required for negligence. The grounds upon which my view rests are 
fivefold. First, the criminal law should be concerned with conduct which 
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is truly criminal in nature, both as to actus reus and wens rea. By 
'truly criminal' I mean conduct which is such that we would 
consider it as sufficiently morally blameworthy to count as appropriate 
for attributions of criminal blame and punishment. Second, we should not 
seek to set criminal prohibitions at a level at which it is not possible 
for the agent reasonably to comply therewith. Third, the level of wens 
rea designated for any offence should not be set primarily for 
administrative convenience. Fourth, the minimum level of mens rea 
generally should not be lower than that which is efficient in attaining 
the legislator's purpose, i. e. ensuring that agents take all reasonable 
care in avoiding the commission of the actus reus of the offence. 
Finally, where a negative mental state is sufficient to ground liability 
the agent should have a fair opportunity to adduce evidence (or prove) 
that he lacked mens rea, 4: T' 
But if we are to exclude strict liability as a species of mens rea then 
how, if at all, are we to subject the existing corpus of strict 
liability offences to the scrutiny of the legal system? Several 
alternatives to the concept of strict liability have been proposed. " 
First, Lord Reid has suggested that an improvement on the concept of 
strict liability would be for the prosecution to prove gross negligence 
in appropriate cases. 16 
Second, in Sweet v Pars1ey4-1=" Lord Diplock, who espoused the notion that 
mens rea should be read into a statutory provision when necessary, 
stated that the accused should have the burden of adducing evidence of 
lack of mens rea whereupon it would be for the prosecution to prove at 
least negligence. The Learned Law Lord thus proposes that in cases of 
strict liability the accused should have the opportunity to present 
evidence that he lacked mens rea concerning an essential element of the 
actus reus of the offence whereon the onus shifts to the prosecution. 
Put why should the prosecution require a finding of at least negligence? 
Lord Diplock bases his suggestion on his interpretation of Proudman v 
X67 that the accused does not have to prove the existence of an 
honest and reasonably held mistaken belief on 
the balance of 
probabilities, but may merely raise a reasonable 
doubt as to its non- 
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existence: once such doubt is established it would be for the 
prosecution to establish negligence. 
Third, Lord Reid has put forward the suggestion that "once the necessary 
facts are proved (the accused) must convince the jury that on the 
balance of probabilities he is innocent of any criminal intention". 48 
The phrase 'innocent of any criminal intention' is not entirely clear 
but it is submitted that Lord Reid is saying that in strict liability 
cases the burden of proof is with the accused to show that he lacked 
mens rea concerning the crucial element of the actus reus of the 
offence. On this interpretation of Lord Reid's dictum this third 
alternative to strict liability differs from the second, proposed by 
Lord Diplock, in that with the former if the agent satisfies the court 
or jury that he lacks the necessary wens rea then that is an absolute 
defence whereas with the latter the prosecution may still secure a 
conviction by proving negligence. My interpretation of the third 
alternative to strict liability was favoured by Day J in Sherras v De 
ß. 4a In Harding v Price ° Singleton J considered that the absence 
of any word importing mens rea merely placed the burden of establishing 
the lack of mens rea on the accused, However the view is not generally 
accepted in the cases and goes against decision by the House of Lords in 
Voolmington v D. P. P. s" In that case Lord Sankey asserted that 
"no matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that 
the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the 
common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be 
entertained. 
Strict Liability Subject to the Defence of 'Ho Negligence'. 
One question on this third alternative to strict liability concerns 
whether D may prove that he lacked mens rea simpliciter or whether he 
must prove that he lacked wens rea and was not negligent in failing to 
appreciate the risk that a circumstance exists or a consequence may flow 
from his conduct. In met v Parsley Lord Reid pointed out that the 
Australian case of Prnudmn v Daten= ' was precedent for the view that 
it is open for D to establish that he had an honest and reasonable 
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belief in a state of facts which, if they existed, would make D's act 
innocent. Thus for Lord Reid the agent must prove that he lacked mens 
rea and that he was not negligent in failing to appreciate the risk. 
The decisions since Sweet v Parsley:, indicate that the courts are 
generally not prepared to accept either of the modifications to the 
concept of strict liability suggested by Lords Reid and Diplock. However 
on the odd occasion, they have been prepared to read into a statute a 
'no negligence' S4 defence in relation to what would otherwise be a 
strict liability offence. In accordance with this defence D would be 
acquitted if he can prove on the balance of probabilities that he lacked 
mens rea as to an essential element of the actus reus and was not 
negligent. In Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissionee- the House of 
Lords decided that the accused could effectively disprove the 
unauthorised possession of dangerous drugs in a container where he 
establishes that there were no circumstances which aroused his 
suspicions regarding the contents and that whilst he may have had the 
right to check the nature of the substance or substances in the 
container it would not have been reasonable for him to have done so. 
Parliament too has been prepared to introduce no negligence' defences 
into statutory offences which might otherwise be construed as strict 
liability offences. For example by s. 28(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971 it is a defence to a charge that D has a controlled drug in his 
possession, that he neither knew of nor suspected nor had reason 
to 
suspect the existence of some fact alleged by the prosecution which 
it 
is necessary for the prosecution to prove if he is to 
be convicted of 
the offence charged. Also the Licencing Act 1988, which 
has removed the 
word 'knowingly' from the offence of serving alcohol 
to a person under 
age, provides that it will be a defence to the publican 
to show that the 
offence occurred despite due diligence on his part. 
" 
A fourth suggestion concerning alternatives or modifications 
to the 
concept of strict liability has been raised 
by the Law Commission which 
recommends that where a future offence makes no provision 
for fault or 
strict liability concerning a circumstance or consequence 
of particular 
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activity then, subject to three exceptions, it should be irrebuttably 
presumed that Parliament intends a minimum mental state of 
recklessness. 57 The three exceptions constitute examples by which 
Parliament expressly excludes the presumption (i. e. where Parliament 
expressly makes the offence one of (i) strict liability or (ii) 
negligence, or where Parliament has (iii) provided a 'no negligence' 
defence). Furthermore the Law Commission recommends that the accused 
should not be liable if at the time of the actus reus he believed 
reasonably or not that any circumstance existed which would have excused 
him from liability or allowed him a defence to the charge. The Law 
Commission is recommending that where a statute is silent as to the wens 
red requirement concerning some aspect of the actus reus then the 
prosecution must prove that the accused was at least reckless and an 
honestly (even if unreasonably) held belief as to a circumstance or 
consequence will secure an acquittal. 
The Proposed Structure of Xens Rea and Strict Liability. 
My view is that the minimum fault element concerning mens rea at 
criminal law should be simple negligence. In accordance with that 
proposed concept where D has brought about a 'low risk' untoward harm 
the burden is with him to prove a legally recognised factor of 
sufficient degree in the circumstances to cause him to fail to allude to 
the risk. All current strict liability offences should be removed from 
the criminal law. There are two alternative strategies here. 
(i) We could remove strict liability to a 'Regulatory Code' ": 1 to be 
administered in a special set of courts, -=' called regulatory courts with 
a separate set of procedures, evidence and sanctions. An objection to 
this strategy is that in effect we are preserving crimes of strict 
liability but simply giving them a different name. I would agree that 
the difference between the proposed regulatory breaches and criminal 
offences would indeed be largely symbolic but the proposed system would 
remove the stigma of criminal liability in relation to current strict 
liability offences. 
(ii) We could modify current strict liability offences so 
that they 
include simple negligence as a minimum wens rea requirement. 
On this 
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submission it would be necessary for the court or jury to deliberate 
upon whether an accused, in bringing about the actus reus of an 
erstwhile strict liability offence°' he had failed to appreciate a low 
risk of untoward harm, and the defendant would have the rebutting 
provision of the proposed concept of simple negligence unless his 
conduct amounted to the commission of a substantive offence. '="' 
My proposal that all criminal offences ought to have simple negligence 
as a minimum mens rea would create a problem concerning those road 
traffic offences which are subject to strict liability at current law 
(such as speeding, driving without a licence, insurance, tax and so 
forth), since it might be difficult for the prosecution to prove 
negligence thus leading to some unsatisfactory acquittals. It is this 
problem which persuades me that the strategy to be adopted is (i) above: 
to remove current strict liability cases from the criminal law and 
place them into the structure of a new 'Regulatory Code'. The Code 
would, inter alia, state the various road traffic breaches which require 
no mental state as a necessary prerequisite to civil liability and the 
penalty f or breach. That penalty may be the same in substance (though 
not in status) as that imposed at present at criminal law, i. e. penalty 
points which may lead to temporary suspension and a pecuniary penalty. " 
Of course those road traffic offences which require a minimum mental 
fault of negligence (e. g. driving without due care and attention) would 
remain within the criminal law, although, if my proposed twofold 
definition of negligence is accepted, the structure of such offences 
would require amendment. The same strategy may be applied to non-traffic 
offences. In current strict liability offences concerning business 
organisations, for example, we might incorporate the current strict 
offence into the Regulatory Code and apply penalty points and/or 
temporary loss of licence to trade together with a pecuniary sanction 
for breaches of the Code. 
This is not to say that such road traffic and non-road traffic 
breaches 
of the Regulatory Code would be 'non-criminal' breaches regardless of 
the precise mental state accompanying the conduct which 
brings about the 
breach. For the agent who, say, deliberately drives without insurance 
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has committed the appropriate criminal offence with direct intention and 
would be subject to the criminal process accordingly. But where, say, 
D has been asked to drive and drives a vehicle belonging to P, having 
been advised by P and thus believing that the policy of insurance covers 
anyone driving the vehicle with P's permission when in fact P's pol icy 
is restricted to 'policyholder only driving' then, if he is to be 
subject to any legal sanction, D would be found in breach of the 
Regulatory Code and dealt with accordingly. My submission would require 
a significant reorganisation of the structure of criminal law relating 
to current strict liability offences. For we would need equivalent 
criminal offences to the current strict liability (now regulatory) 
offences to catch agents who perpetrate the actus reus of the current 
strict liability offences with a specific mens rea. For example if D 
knowingly drives a car without an M. O. T. certificate and we wish to 
ascribe criminal liability for that activity then we would need to 
create a new and appropriate criminal offence with a minimum negligence 
requirement. 
There is an administrative problem here. Suppose that D is prosecuted 
for an alleged offence on the basis of intention concerning conduct 
which violated the Regulatory Code and the court or Jury acquit. Is the 
accused now handed over to the Regulatory process? Will the two 
processes run independently and in any temporal order concerning a 
particular transaction? My submission here is that if the agent is 
charged with a criminal offence on the basis of the existence of a 
specified mental state then the judge or magistrates should have the 
power to administer the Regulatory Code and deal with the alleged breach 
of the Regulatory Code should the criminal charge fail. Presumably if 
the agent is convicted of the criminal offence a criminal sanction will 
be applied and the breach of Regulatory Code would not be proceeded 
with. 
To summarise my proposals concerning simple negligence and strict 
liability offences. On the proposed model of mens rea the minimum fault 
element is simple negligence which is constituted by a failure by the 
agent to appreciate a low risk of untoward harm. However, provided that 
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his conduct which brings about the 'low risk' untoward harm does not 
itself constitute a substantive offence he may rebut the inference of 
simple negligence where he can establish some legally recognised factor 
of a sufficient degree in the circumstances to cause him to fail to 
appreciate the risk. All current strict liability offences would either 
be removed to a Regulatory Code or require at least simple negligence as 
a requisite mental state. Where offences have been removed to a 
Regulatory Code criminal offences which admit the same actus reus but 
which require a minimum mental state of simple negligence would be 
created to catch agents who perpetrate the actus reus with some form of 
mens rea. If the prosecution charge the agent with the criminal offence 
ýe 
onibasis of a specific mens rea, for example that the accused brought 
about the actus reus with direct intention, the court or jury may 
convict on the higher mental state if so satisfied on the evidence. If 
the criminal charge fails then the Regulatory Code may be brought into 
effect and the alleged breach of the Code may be dealt with. 
It is submitted that the legislation which codifies criminal law ought 
to contain a provision that where a statutory provision which creates a 
new criminal offence is silent on mens rea then that silence should be 
interpreted as implying the presence of the minimum recognised mental 
state, which on my proposed structure of mens rea would be simple 
negligence. Then when Parliament, in a later statute, wishes to create a 
strict liability offence it would have to do so expressly. " There would 
be no need to describe all the requisite mental states in the new 
statutory offence. Indeed only one need be mentioned, i. e. the minimum 
mental state required by law, since all higher mental states would 
automatically be included. 
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1. pp. 257-8. 
2. i. e. the risk is not more likely than not to occur. 
3. Whether positive activity or an omission. 
4. See supra chapter 7 p. 265ff. 
5, For which see below, 
6. I say 'substantive' criminal offence because 
untoward harm which the agent has brought about 
the course of peregration. Peregration involves 
activity and it is the agent's purpose which br 
the perview of the criminal law on the proposed 
It is submitted that preliminary or preparatory 
subject to the criminal law on negligence. 
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In this Chapter I summarise the proposed structure of mens rea, state 
the criteria upon which the various concepts are based and indicate the 
advantages which they have over the existing legal concepts. I conclude 
by applying both the current and proposed structures of mens rea to a 
series of hypotheticals in order to test the strength of my arguments. 
The proposed structure of wens rea is constituted by the following 
concepts. 
1. Direct Intention. Where the agent believes that an effect x may flow 
from a particular exertion of his and he makes that exertion because of 
that belief then he brings about x with direct intention to do so. Where 
untoward effect y is conceptually certain to flow from his exertion 
aimed at x the agent directly intends effect y when he aims at x even if 
he fails to appreciate that effect y will flow from his exertion since x 
and y are effectively the same and to aim at one is to aim at the other. 
2. Concomitant Intention. Where the agent foresees that a de facto 
empirically certain effect y may, or will, flow from his exertion aimed 
at x he concomitantly intends to bring y about as he makes his exertion 
which he believes may bring x about. An empirically certain effect is 
one which in the circumstances of the case must flow from the agent's 
activity subject to extraneous agency, i. e. some difference in, or 
intervening change in, the facts or circumstances perceived by the agent 
at the time of his exertion aimed at the effect directly intended by 
him. 
3. Purpose. Where an agent makes an exertion which is not per se capable 
of bringing x about, but is a singularly necessary preliminary exertion 
in a selected causal chain which he believes will 
lead to x then, if x 
is not the last link in the causal chain, but represents a 
further link 
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(or means) towards the ultimate end then effect x is the purpose for 
which the agent makes his preliminary exertion. 
4. Objective. Where the agent makes an exertion which is not itself 
capable of producing effect x but is a necessary preliminary exertion in 
the chain of activity leading to it, then, if effect x is the ultimate 
end of the agent's activity he makes his exertion with the objective of 
bringing x about. 
5. Gross Recklessness. Where the agent foresees a high risk of the 
occurrence of untoward effect y in relation to an exertion aimed at 
effect x then he brings about y with gross recklessness. 
6. Gross Negligence. Where the agent fails to appreciate the existence 
of an objectively high risk of untoward harm y which may flow from his 
activity aimed at x, or having alluded to the risk of y he wrongly 
concludes that the risk is low or does not exist, then he fails to 
appreciate a high risk of untoward effect y and brings it about with 
gross negligence. He may rebut the inference of gross negligence by 
proving the existence of some legally recognised factor which was 
present in sufficient degree to prevent him from appreciating the high 
risk of harm. 
7. Simple Recklessness. Where the agent anticipates the objectively low 
risk of untoward effect y which may flow from his activity aimed at x, 
he brings y about with simple recklessness. 
8. Simple Negligence. Where the agent fails to appreciate the 
objectively low risk of untoward effect y which may flow from his 
conduct he brings about y with simple negligence. There would be a 
general offence of criminal negligence whereby the agent who brings 
about y negligently whilst embarked upon criminal activity shall be 
liable for y on the basis of criminal negligence. In addition there 
would be specific offences of negligence where Parliament sees fit to 
attribute criminal liability for proscribed harm brought about 
by 
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otherwise innocent activity. In such offences the agent would have 
available the rebutting provision stated in 6 above. 
The first four proposed concepts of mens rea form a congruous set of 
fault terms which would replace the current concept of intention and 
would be applied separately or in combination in accordance with the 
legislator's view of the specific wens rea requirement for each new 
offence. The four concepts are to be preferred to the current legal 
notion of intention on several grounds. First the greater number of 
fault terms allows us to extend or contract the mens rea requirement of 
each offence without the need to extend the the contours of the specific 
fault terms. We may, for example, restrict the contours of the mens rea 
of attempts to direct intention whilst including concomitant intention 
for, say, the offence of causing grievous bodily harm contrary to s. 18 
of the offences Against the Person Act 1861. The proposed fault terms 
would thus be conceptually clear and consistent whereas the current 
legal concept of intention is conceptually unclear and inconsistent 
since its boundaries have been the subject of varying definitions by the 
judges in the cases in order to meet the needs of justice in a 
particular case. This has led to the confusing mutations of the concept 
which include direct intention, ulterior intention, further intention, 
specific intention, basic intention, dominant intention and so forth. 
Second the proposed concepts, with their narrow definitions, allow us to 
place a more accurate label on the agent concerning his attitude to the 
proscribed harm brought about by him. 
The fifth, sixth and seventh proposed concepts equate roughly with 
the 
the current legal concept of recklessness. Gross and simple recklessness 
are in accord with the current legal concept concerning positive 
awareness of risk. However the division of the positive mental state 
into gross and simple recklessness enables us to record 
the agent's 
mental state (and moral status) with greater specificity. 
For we clearly 
distinguish between the moral turpitudes of the agent who 
is prepared to 
take a very high risk of causing untoward 
harm and the agent who takes a 
small risk of such harm. 
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Gross negligence equates roughly with the negative mental state within 
the current legal concept of recklessness. It is submitted that this 
negative mental state is quite distinct from the equivalent positive 
mental state, i. e. foresight of a high risk of harm, and thus ought to 
be granted separate status within the framework of mens rea. The 
proposed concept of gross negligence provides the distinction and 
removes the conceptual incoherence of the current legal concept of 
recklessness, the contours of which confuse two quite distinct forms of 
mental state. The eighth proposed concept of wens rea, simple 
negligence, is constituted by a failure by the agent to allude to or 
appreciate the extent of a low risk of harm. 
Identifying the Dental State in the Conviction. 
A central feature of the proposed structure of mens rea is that the 
court or jury would be required to state the appropriate form of mens 
rea with which the agent has brought about the actus reus of a 
particular offence for the purpose of the conviction. If, for example, 
the offence in issue admits gross negligence as a minimum mental state 
the prosecutor would charge the agent with the commission of the offence 
without stating the form of mens rea which he believes accompanied the 
agent's activity which brought the harm about. At the trial evidence 
would be submitted by both sides in order to prove or disprove an 
alleged mental state as the case may be. In his summing up to the jury 
the judge would indicate to them the available forms of mens rea in 
accordance with the definition of the offence and invite them to 
consider which admissible mental state, if any, was held by the agent at 
the time he brought about the actus reus of the offence. 
This provision in the proposed structure of mens rea provides us with 
the means of recording more precisely significant distinctions in moral 
turpitude with which agents do harm. Paradigm examples of this 
feature 
would be cases of strict liability. Suppose that D, sells tainted meat 
with the intention of so doing. D2 sells tainted meat in the belief 
that 
it is sound because he has a veterinary certificate 
to that effect. The 
significant difference in moral status between the two agents would 
be 
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recorded in the conviction. D, would be convicted of selling unsound 
meat with direct intention whereas D2 would be convicted of that offence 
by way of strict liability., 
It is submitted that the eight proposed concepts form a mutually 
exclusive coherent and consistent model of mens rea which eradicates the 
conceptual incoherence and inconsistencies in the present legal 
structure which I have indicated throughout the preceding chapters. But 
more important, I think, the proposed structure provides a sophisticated 
set of fault terms which is better equipped to draw out significant 
distinctions in moral status with which agents commit criminal offences. 
We may test my contentions by applying the proposed and current legal 
structures to a series of hypotheticals. 
1. Alan plans to kill his wife, V, using a specific poison which is 
stored in his garage. He later changes his mind and abandons his 
objective. 
Alan has abandoned his enterprise before he has taken any physical 
activity which is a necessary preliminary to his objective. He is guilty 
of no criminal offence on current law since he has made no physical 
change in the world concerning the consequence which he has planned. 2 
Nor is he guilty on the proposed model which insists upon some physical 
movement by the agent towards his intended objective. ' The ideal typical 
constructions of subjectivism and objectivism would also exclude him 
from criminal liability on the basis of lack of culpability and 
dangerousness respectively. 
2. Brian plans to kill his wife V. He purchases rat poison 
for the 
purpose but later changes his mind and abandons his plan. 
Here the agent formulates a plan to bring about a proscribed 
harm by 
particular activity and makes a physical, albeit 
innocent, exertion 
which brings about some change in the world which 
is a singularly 
necessary preliminary, but abandons his plan 
before he reaches that link 
in the chosen causal chain which is itself capable 
of causing the harm 
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planned by him. Brian is not guilty of any offence in relation to his 
wife's death on current law since presumably he is yet to do something 
which is more than merely preparatory to commission of the substantive 
offence. 4 On the ideal constructions of subjectivism and objectivism he 
is guilty of no offence on the ground of lack of proximity between the 
preparatory activity and the prospective harm aimed at by him. However, 
on the proposed model Brian is guilty of peregration since he has made a 
physical change in the world which is a singularly necessary preliminary 
regarding his objective. I justify my departure from current law largely 
on grounds of moral status. Suppose that Benny buys the same poison for 
the purpose of ridding his premises of rats. There is no difference in 
the acts of Brian and Benny but there is a significant difference in the 
moral status with which each act was done which deserves recognition at 
law. We may mark that distinction by attributing liability to Brian on 
the basis of the wicked purpose for which he acquires the poison. ` 
3. Charles plans to kill his wife V. He buys some poison, places it in 
her coffee and hands the mixture to her. However, before she has taken 
any, V inadvertently knocks the cup over and the mixture spills onto the 
floor. Charles decides not to try again. 
In this hypothetical the agent has taken all the physical steps 
necessary in order to bring about the change in the world which 
constitutes his plan but his activity has failed to bring that change 
about. Charles is guilty of attempted murder on current law since he has 
certainly done something which is more than merely preparatory to the 
commission of the substantive offence. On the proposed model Charles is 
guilty of an attempt since he has reached the executive causal 
link in 
the chain of activity which he has chosen regarding his wife's 
death. 
Current law, the proposed model and the ideal constructions of 
subjectivism and objectivism are as one here. 
4. Don, from a vantage point, aims and fires at 
his wife V with the 
intention of killing her. She dies as a result of 
the injury inflicted. 
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Here we have what is for lawyers and academics the paradigm of the 
concept of intention. The agent has made a physical exertion which he 
believes may bring about the proscribed harm and he acts as he does 
because of that belief. His objective has been realised. Current law, 
the proposed model of mens rea and the ideal typical constructions would 
hold Don guilty of murder on the basis of intention. - 
5. Eric creeps into V's bedroom, takes out a knife and stabs what he 
believes to be the sleeping V. In fact the 'victim' turns out to be some 
pillows. 
This hypothetical brings into focus impossible attempts. On current law 
Eric is guilty of attempted murder. The proposed model follows law here? 
as does the ideal typical construction of subjectivism. ' The ideal 
typical construction of objectivism would hold that Eric has attempted 
to kill V on the ground that his activity is objectively dangerous. ' 
6. Frank, who is aware of the minimum age of consent, has intercourse 
with V believing her to be 15 years old when, in fact, she is 17 years 
old. 
Here the agent's mistake about a crucial circumstance of his activity 
causes him to misperceive the legal status of that activity. current law 
would hold Frank guilty of an attempt at unlawful intercourse on the 
ground that he should be judged on the facts as he believed them to 
be. 1° The ideal typical construction of subjectivism would follow the 
law here. " The ideal typical construction of objectivism would excuse 
Frank from liability since his act is objectively legal and his activity 
is not dangerous. The proposed model would also excuse Frank from 
liability on the ground that only a direct intention to bring about a 
criminal offence is sufficient for a conviction for an attempt and the 
test to be applied is the test of failure. On that test we find that 
Frank would not have considered his activity a failure when disabused of 
his mistake and he thus does not directly intend unlawful intercourse. 
In Chapter 51 put f orward reasons why the case of Frank ought to be 
R9 
distinguished from other cases of impossible attempts exemplified by the 
hypothetical concerning Eric. 12 
7. Graham, who is aware of the minimum legal age of consent, has sexual 
intercourse with V believing her to be 17 years when she is in fact 15 
years old. 
Here Graham, like Frank, has misperceived a crucial circumstance of the 
transaction with V and that misperception renders his activity (having 
an illegal relationship) quite different from that which he believes he 
is carrying out (having a legal consensual relationship with V). Neither 
the current law nor the ideal typical construction of subjectivism would 
attribute liability to Graham on the ground that he should be judged on 
the facts as he believed them to be. The ideal typical construction of 
objectivism would come to the same conclusion provided that Graham's 
mistake about V's age was a reasonable one to make in the circumstances. 
The proposed model would exclude Graham from liability on the same 
ground as that stated in the case of Frank. 
8. Harold has intercourse with V knowing her to be 17 years of age but 
believing wrongly that it is a criminal offence to have sexual 
intercourse with a girl under 18 years of age. 
This case involves a misperception of the current law by the agent. 
Current law, the two ideal typical constructions and the proposed model 
would exclude Harold from criminal liability. 
9. Ian plans a burglary at 25 Acacia Avenue. His scheme is that he will 
throw a brick through a rear downstairs window during the evening when 
no one is at home. He will then retreat and return later and effect a 
quiet entry. A neighbour, who knows him, sees Ian throw 
the brick 
through the window and make off. The police are informed and 
Ian is 
arrested. 
Here the agent has perpetrated a criminal offence which 
is a singularly 
necessary preliminary to the commission of a prospective 
offence. At 
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current law Ian is guilty of criminal damage but not of attempted 
burglary since his activity has not gone beyond the preparatory stages 
concerning that offence. The same position obtains on the ideal typical 
constructions of subjectivism and objectivism. On the proposed structure 
Ian is guilty of causing criminal damage with direct intention with the 
objective of committing burglary. I submit that this is right, for in 
ascribing purpose to Ian we accurately record his moral culpability 
concerning his preliminary criminal activity: Ian's activity is far 
more morally reprehensible than that of Iris who throws a brick through 
a window in an act of sheer vandalism. 
10. John, with the intention of causing it to fall therefrom, hurls a 
large stone at an ornamental cart wheel hanging on an outside wall at 
V's home. The wheel hangs directly above a cold frame in the garden. 
John does not intend any damage to the frame but knows that his 
activity, if successful, is certain to bring such about. The stone 
strikes the wheel and causes it to fall onto the frame causing extensive 
damage thereto. 
In this hypothetical the agent anticipates that an untoward consequence 
is certain to flow from his activity which is aimed at something else. 
That untoward consequence plays no part in the agent's deciding to act 
as he does but he is prepared to allow that harm by his activity. At 
current law John is guilty of bringing about the damage to the cold 
frame with intention to do so. ' The ideal typical constructions of 
subjectivism and objectivism draw the same conclusion. Whether or not 
John can be said to directly intend the damage to the cold frame on the 
proposed model would depend upon whether or not the damage was an 
indivisible effect or a concomitant effect of his activity. If we draw 
the conclusion that the untoward harm is an inseparable effect of John's 
activity aimed at something else then we may attribute direct intention 
to him in relation to the damage to the frame. However if we consider 
that the untoward harm is a concomitant effect of his activity, 
i. e. it 
must occur subject to extraneous agency, then we may attribute 
concomitant intention to him. The distinction is, perhaps of 
little 
importance where the untoward harm is brought about but 
it is of vital 
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importance where the harm does not occur. Suppose, for example that the 
stone had missed the cart wheel and the cold frame had not been damaged. 
Could we charge John with an attempt concerning damage to the cold 
frame? If we are satisfied that such damage is a conceptually certain 
effect of his activity we may do so, but if we consider such damage to 
be a concomitant effect then we may not attribute liability to him for 
the harm which has failed to occur. 
11. Joan alludes to the possibility of damage to the cold- frame and 
wrongly concludes that such damage is unlikely to occur. 
Here the agent has misperceived the degree of risk involved. On the 
ideal model of subjectivism she is reckless since she has appreciated 
that there is some risk and has nevertheless gone on to take it (the 
ideal construction of subjectivism would accept the objectivist 
requirement that in the circumstances the risk must be an unreasonable 
one for the defendant to take). The ideal typical construction of 
objectivism would count her as directly intending the damage on the 
basis that such damage is inevitable and her act is dangerous. Current 
law would probably follow the objectivist line here. It is not clear 
whether this is the case since for the purpose of a conviction for 
criminal damage at current law it is only necessary to show that the 
defendant was at least reckless regarding the damage to ensure a 
conviction: there is thus no distinction drawn between intention and 
recklessness in the cases on criminal damage. On the proposed structure 
of mens rea Joan brings about the untoward harm (i) with direct 
intention if the damage to the cold frame can be said to be a 
conceptually certain consequence of her activity aimed at the wheel, or 
(ii) with concomitant intention if it can be said that the damage to 
the 
frame was certain to flow from her exertion subject to extraneous 
agency. She would concomitantly intend the harm since she 
has foreseen 
that it may occur. As I have stated above I am inclined 
to the view that 
the damage to the frame is a conceptual certainty and that Joan directly 
intends the damage. 
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12. Julie alludes to the possibility of damage to the cold frame and 
wrongly concludes that there is no risk of damage to it. 
Julie has made a similar mistake as Joan but her case differs in that 
she has come to a positive conclusion that there is no risk at all. The 
ideal typical construction of subjectivism would not ascribe 
recklessness to Julie on the ground that she was not aware of the risk 
at the time of her activity. Current law would presumably hold her 
guilty of recklessness but one must remember the argument that the 
Caldwell test might not cover the agent who has considered a risk and 
has decided that there is none. Is The ideal objectivist model would 
ascribe intention to Julie on the ground that the untoward harm is a 
certain consequence of her activity. The proposed structure of wens rea 
would ascribe gross negligence to Julie concerning the damage to the 
cold frame since she has failed to appreciate the high risk. I r- The 
proposed structure is preferable here for two reasons. First, unlike 
current law and the ideal constructions, it enables us to record Julie's 
negative mental state concerning the untoward harm. Second, unlike 
current law, it enables us to draw out the distinction in moral status 
between Julie and the hitherto unmentioned agent Jean who deliberately 
aims at damage to the frame: for at current law both Julie and Jean are 
guilty of criminal damage simpliciter whereas on my proposals Jean would 
be guilty of causing criminal damage with direct intention. 
13. Janet fails to consider the possibility of damage to the cold frame. 
Much of the commentary relating to Julie above applies to Janet although 
at current law there is no doubt that she is recklessness since her 
mental state concerning the damage falls into that of Caldwell. It seems 
that there is a possibility at current law that if D considers a risk 
and decides that there is none then he is to be treated differently from 
the agent who fails to consider the risk at all. 17 On the proposed 
structure of mens rea Janet is guilty of causing criminal 
damage by 
gross negligence. Julie and Janet would thus be treated 
in the same way 
which is surely right since their moral culpability 
for their failure to 
appreciate the risk is about equal-'e 
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14. Kevin takes a 'pot shot' at the alarm bell on a wall at his 
neighbour's house. He realises that there is a high risk of damage to 
the window situated near to the bell. The bullet damages the window. On 
the ideal constructions Kevin is guilty of causing damage recklessly. On 
current law he is guilty of causing criminal damage since his mental 
state falls within the wens rea requirements for the offence. However 
his precise mental state is ignored. On the proposed structure Kevin is 
guilty of causing criminal damage by gross recklessness. I have put 
forward my arguments in favour of a division of recklessness into gross 
and simple recklessness. 'y In short the division enables us to place a 
more precise label on the agent in relation to his attitude towards the 
risk of harm. Another important point here. My proposal, unlike current 
law, enables us to mark off the distinction between the agent who is 
reckless toward the harm and the agent who directly intends it. 
15. Lucy awakes just as the train on which she is travelling is pulling 
out of the station at which she ought to have disembarked. She considers 
pulling the communication cord and the risk of injury to fellow 
travellers which may be caused thereby. she comes to the conclusion that 
such injury is unlikely to occur. Given the speed at which the train is 
travelling and the circumstances of the case (newly embarked passengers 
looking for seats), there is an objectively high risk of injury. She 
pulls the cord and V, an elderly passenger returning to his seat, is 
thrown to the floor and is injured. 
Here the agent has formed an opinion of the risk which is lower than 
that which obtains in relation to her activity. At current law Lucy will 
be liable for the injury on the basis of malice2O since she is aware 
that there is some risk of such harm. The ideal constructions would 
reach the same conclusion. On the proposed structure Lucy has 
brought 
about the injury by gross negligence since she has failed to appreciate 
the high risk of injury. The solution adopted by my proposal 
is to be 
preferred since (i) we record more accurately 
the precise mental state 
of the agent and (ii) we draw a sharper picture of 
the particular moral 
status of the agent. It is possible that 
Lucy would not have taken the 
risk had she appreciated the true extent of 
the risk to passengers and 
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it is right that she is distinguished from the agent who takes a risk 
which he knows to be high. The current concept of malice is not able to 
draw this distinction between the agent who knowingly takes a high risk 
and the agent who misperceives the extent of the risk. 
16. Mavis decides to dispose of her household refuse by throwing it out 
of the window of her flat on the third floor. She considers the risk of 
injury or damage to others and decides that there is none. Given that 
the block of flats in which she lives abuts a major thoroughfare Mavis 
has failed to appreciate an objectively high risk of harm to others. The 
defenestration causes damage to a passing car. 
Here the agent has considered an objectively high risk of injury or 
damage and has mistakenly concluded that there is no risk concerning her 
prospective activity. The situation highlighted in the hypothetical has 
provided much griss for the academic writers concerning the contours of 
Caldwell recklessness21 since Lord Diplock's definition of that concept 
was silent on this mental state. If such a mistake does in fact fall 
within the Caldwell criteria then, it is submitted, the risk must be 
obvious and serious which is presumably the position in the case of 
Mavis. The ideal typical construction of objectivism would hold Mavis 
guilty of the substantive offence on the ground of recklessness since, 
being objectively high, the risk would have been apparent to the 
ordinary prudent individual. The ideal typical construction of 
subjectivism would not attribute recklessness to Mavis since she was 
unaware of the risk at the time of her activity. " On the proposed 
structure of mens rea Mavis has brought about the injury by gross 
negligence. I justify the position taken by the proposed structure on 
the same grounds as those stated in the hypothetical concerning Lucy. It 
is interesting to note that if Mavis had in fact injured a pedestrian 
she would not be guilty of any offence contrary to the Offences 
Against 
the Person Act 1861 since there the mens rea requirement is malice which 
insists upon awareness of the risk as a prerequisite 
to liability. This 
division of 'foresight of the risk' into recklessness and malice and 
the 
different requirements for each category is unsatisfactory since 
frequently different results are reached on substantially similar 
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factual situations. the proposed structure eradicates the distinction 
since malice is excluded as a specific mental state. 
17. Norman disposes of a worn tyre by throwing it from a bridge into a 
river which is privately owned by P who does not allow public access. 
Before acting Norman has considered the risk of possible damage or 
injury and decided (rightly on objective grounds) that it is unlikely 
that his activity will cause damage or injury. As the tyre falls V is 
passing under the bridge in his canoe. The tyre causes damage to the 
canoe. 
The agent in this hypothetical has rightly perceived a low risk of 
injury or damage to others and has gone on to take it thus causing 
untoward harm. On the ideal constructions Norman is guilty of causing 
criminal damage on the basis of recklessness provided that in the 
circumstances the risk was such that he was unjustified in taking it. On 
current law Norman is guilty of causing criminal damage since his mental 
state falls within that required for the substantive offence. 2 No 
distinction is made between intention and recklessness here. On the 
proposed structure Norman is guilty of causing criminal damage by simple 
recklessness. I have stated the reasons in support of my division of 
this concept into gross and simple recklessness. " My proposal provides 
a more accurate picture of the agent's moral status at the time of his 
activity than that supplied by the current legal structure since the 
latter (i) fails to distinguish between Norman, who might not have been 
prepared to run a more substantial risk, and Kevin (above) who is 
prepared to do so and (ii) fails to distinguish between cases of 
intention and recklessness in cases of criminal damage and other 
offences which include both forms of wens rea. 
18. Olive is smoking on a train. She flicks her cigarette and some 
sparks fly into the eye of a fellow passenger causing temporary, if 
painful, injury. 
In this hypothetical the agent has failed to allude to an objectively 
low risk of harm and is presumably negligent concerning 
the harm which 
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her activity has brought about The ideal typical construction of 
subjectivism would exclude Olive from criminal liability on the basis of 
'unawareness of risk'. The ideal typical construction of objectivism 
would exclude her on the ground that the risk is not sufficiently 
serious to attract criminal liability. At current law she is not liable 
since the mental state in issue is malice which requires subjective 
foresight. On the proposed structure of mens rea agents such as Olive 
would not be liable unless Parliament saw fit to criminalise such 
negligence by a specific offence of negligence. As I have stated21 my 
view is that negligence should figure only sparingly in the definition 
of any criminal offence and where it does so the penalties should be 
civil in character (e. g. loss of licence and so forth). 
19. Peter is engaged in a burglary. He is disturbed by the householder 
and rushes for the door. He negligently knocks over and damages an 
expensive vase. 
Here the agent negligently brings about harm whilst embarked upon 
criminal activity. The ideal typical constructions would not ascribe 
criminal liability to Peter. It seems that current law would follow the 
ideal typical constructions since the offence of criminal damage 
requires a minimum mens rea of recklessness (which includes failure to 
allude to an obvious and serious risk which is presumably not the case 
in the hypothetical). But, as I have argued : 26 the agent who negligently 
brings about harm whilst engaged in criminal activity should be liable 
for that harm on the main ground that his moral culpability should 
extend to all harm caused by him. On the proposed general offence of 
criminal negligence Peter would be guilty of causing damage by criminal 
negligence. 
It is submitted that the series of hypotheticals lend force to my 
contention that the current structure of mens rea is inadequate since 
the concepts which constitute that structure are conceptually incoherent 
and inconsistent and, in part, terminologically incoherent: that the 
current structure is not capable of marking off significant 
distinctions 
in moral status with which agents bring about particular 
harm, and that 
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the structure does not allow distinctions between the concepts in 
offences which admit more than one form of wens rea. 
The proposed structure provides a set of mutually exclusive fault terms, 
conceptually clear and coherent, which would enable the legislature to 
(1) apply more precise mental states to specific criminal offences and 
(ii) provide for the precise classification of mental state by the court 
or jury when convicting agents of those offences which admit more than 
one requisite mental state. In this way we would be able to draw much 
sharper distinctions in moral turpitudes with which harm is done. 
It is submitted that the law on actus reus has similar deficiencies to 
those which I have pointed out in the current concepts of wens rea since 
the definitions of actus reus in the offences often incorporate a 
substantial area of activity so that it is not possible to draw out 
significant distinctions between agents concerning the particular harm 
which they have brought about. Unfortunately discussion on this issue 
lies outside the current field of research. 
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1. My proposed structure does not include strict liability. I use the 
example to show the merits of the theoretical concepts in the light of 
existing law. If my proposals were admitted into law then the maximum 
gap between the mental states would be direct intention and simple 
negligence. Of course where simple negligence is in issue the agent 
would be able to plead the rebutting provision in appropriate cases. 
2. S. 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1981 sets the threshold of 
liability at an act which is more than merely preparatory to the 
commission of the substantive offence. 
3. See the fourth feature of direct intention supra p. 18. 
4. See supra note 1. 
5. See generally my account of peregration supra p. 157ff. 
6. 'Direct intention' on the proposed structure. 
7. See supra p. 177f f. 
B. See supra p. 172. 
9. See supra p. 173. 
10. See s. 1(3) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. 
11. Supra p. 174. 
12. Supra p. 1? 5f f. 
13. See supra pp. 187-8. 
14. Since he foresees the harm as certain 
15. See supra Chapter 6 at p. 237. 
16. 'Certainty' would be classed as 'high risk' for the purpose of 
ascriptions of gross negligence. 
17. See supra Chapter 6 at p. 237. 
18. See supra Chapter 7 at p. 276 for a more detailed account. 
19. see supra Chapter 7 p. 257ff. 
20. See the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. 
21. Supra Chapter 6 at p. 237. 
329 
22. Perhaps worthy of note here is Professor Williams' concept of 
conditional subjectivism which extends the ideal subjectivist position 
to catch cases such as Mavis. See supra Chapter 6 p. 241. 
23. See supra note 1. 
24. See supra Chapter 7 at p. 258. 
25. See generally Chapter 8. 
26. Supra Chapter 8 at p. 290. 
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APPENDIX 
ON OBJECTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVISM 
APPENDIX ON OBJECTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVISM. 
In this Appendix I set out the main arguments of the judges and theorists 
who have called themselves or have been labelled either subjectivists or 
objectivists. I shall point out the major points on which they differ, draw 
out the distinctions between them and construct ideal typical constructions 
of objectivism and subjectivism which will be useful in assessing the 
status of the current legal concepts of mens rea and indicating the extent 
to which the proposed structure of mens rea departs from and is preferable 
to the current legal concepts. I begin with objectivism. 
On Objectivism. 
The most extreme form of objectivism may be seen in two patterns of 
objectivism posited by Fletcher (In Reshaping the Criminal Law (Chapter 
3) ), namely 'harmful consequences' and 'manifest criminality'. 
The pattern of 'harmful consequences' represents the most ancient and the 
most extreme form of objectivism: it ignores both the act of the agent and 
the mental state with which he perpetrates that act, and looks exclusively 
at the consequences of that act. The offence of murder provides an example 
of this type of objectivistism in our early criminal law. For early English 
law, imbued with religious overtones, looked upon a killing as a 
desecration of the sacred order. The focal point was the fact that the 
agent had caused death: the act which caused the death and the accompanying 
mens rea were irrelevant factors (the agent who caused death was not merely 
responsible for the death, he was irrovocably tainted by that death (B. 
Jackson, 'Essays in Jewish Comparative Legal History (1975)). 
By the twelfth century the law of homicide had been brought under the 
king's jurisdiction and the criminal law on murder began to move away f rom 
the objectivist pattern of harmful consequence s. By the Statute of 
Gloucester the concepts of inevitable accident (per infortunium) and 
personal necessity (se defendendo) functioned as excuses 
to a charge of 
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murder, available by way of the royal pardon. By the fourteenth century 
excuses had been extended to include cases in which the agent who killed 
was suffering from insanity (in deverie). The law of homicide thus shifted 
its focus from the fact of death to the act which caused death. This 
enabled the excuses of inevitable accident and self defence to function as 
denials to the charge of murder, leading the way for the introduction of 
the gradation of homicide into murder and manslaughter. 
Fletcher's pattern of 'manifest criminality' requires initially that the 
commission of the crime be objectively discernable at the time of its 
occurrence. Thus in Roman and Biblical law the manifest thief (fur 
manifestus) was subject to immediate execution whereas a thief caught after 
the event with goods in his possession was subject only to multiple 
damages. It thus rejects the criminalisation of ' furtum nec manifestum'. 
The paradigm instance of manifest criminality is the agent caught in 
'flagrante delicto', but it includes instances which fall short of this 
ideal case (for example Gaius (Institutes 186-7) introduced the concept of 
'furtum conceptum' which caught the thief found with stolen property on his 
premises). The pattern of manifest liability incorporates a mental state 
which is presupposed by the initial discription of the act. The mental 
element thus provides the defendant with the means of demonstrating that 
appearances are different from those indicated by the factual description 
of his activity. Two major presuppositions are contained in the pattern of 
manifest criminality. First, the agent must have caused some physical and 
proscribed change in the world by his activity. If there is no actual 
proscribed change in the world then there is no point in making an enquiry 
into the state of an agent's mind. Second, the agent's activity must signal 
danger to the community (See G. P. Fletcher at p, 117) . 
Several features of our modern criminal law indicate that the pattern of 
manifest criminality does not figure as a basis of attributions of criminal 
responsibility. In the case of receiving stolen goods, for example, the 
overt act of the purchase (or other physical handling) is not, per se, 
manifestly unnerving to the community. Some instances of theft and 
deception at current law would be free from criminal responsibility in a 
legal system which accepts the pattern of manifest criminality. 
Where, for 
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example, D calls on an elderly pensioner and tricks her into handing over 
her pension book to him on the doorstep, one cannot point to any specific 
act of of his which is outwardly incriminating. Also with some theft 
offences it is extremely difficult to specify the precise moment when an 
appropriation occurs yet, for the purpose of manifest criminality, one must 
ascertain the precise moment in order to deliberate upon whether the 
criminal act which manifests the appropriation signals danger to society. 
Also the crime of burglary requires one of four manifested intents in 
addition to the act of entry into the building as a trespasser (the Theft 
Act 1968 s. 9). Simple entry as a trespasser without more will not suffice. 
Manifest criminality, which is concerned exclusively with acts, is thus not 
equipped to accommodate sophisticated crimes such as burglary which require 
some ulterior wens rea. 
Furthermore the pattern of manifest criminality cannot accommodate our 
current criminal law on attempts since it would presumably exclude cases in 
which the agent has done something which is more than merely preparatory to 
the commission of the offence (See the Criminal Attempts Act 1981) but 
desists (or is prevented from completing his enterprise) before his 
activity has reached the stage at which it signals danger to society. Also 
in cases of failed attempts where the agent's act is outwardly 
unincriminating he cannot fall within the pattern of manifest liability 
although he undoubtedly would be so liable at current law. J. Salmond who, 
at least in part (in Jurisprudence (7th ed) 1924), espouses the principle 
of manifest criminality describes an attempt as "an act that shows criminal 
intent on the face of it". Consider the following two cases. In an attempt 
to kill Vera, Arthur puts a non-lethal dose of cyanide into her drink 
believing the dose to be lethal. In an attempt to kill Violet, Brian puts 
sugar into her drink believing it to be a lethal dose of cyanide. Which, if 
either, agent is criminally liable for his activity on the pattern of 
manifest criminality? In order to answer the question we must decide upon 
the extent of knowledge we are to ascribe to the observer. 
An act of 
putting cyanide in V's drink is manifestly dangerous, 
but is an act of 
putting a harmless dose of cyanide in V's drink manifestly 
dangerous? 
Clearly everything depends upon whether the observer 
knows what and how 
much is being used by the agent in the two cases. 
This indicates a basic 
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problem concerning the pattern: does it rely solely upon what the ordinary 
by-stander observes or does it permit the attribution of particular 
knowledge to him in the cases? 
I let G. Fletcher make a final objection to the pattern of manifest 
criminality as an element in criminal law. He says that one feature of 
manifest criminality is that the crime itself crystalises as the product of 
community experience rather than being imposed on the community by an act 
of legislative will. This, he argues, is foreign to the modern view that 
the criminal law is imposed on the community by the courts or by the 
legislature. I think that Fletcher's point holds weight. If we were to 
adopt a theory of crime based on what the community perceives to be 
outwardly incriminating then the criminal law might require to be conducted 
on a parochial basis since community perceptions of right and wrong may 
differ between regions temporally and geographically. For example during 
the national coal strike of 1984/5 certain mining communities in Yorkshire 
might well have viewed the removal of coal from pit heads by striking 
miners as in no way wrongful or unnerving. The principle of manifest 
criminality might also lead to bias and prejudice. In the coal strike 
illustration the same mining community might be enraged by the same act 
perpetrated by a strike breaking miner. 
Of Fletcher's comment one might ask if we want a criminal law which is 
"imposed on the community by an act of legislative will"? My view here is 
that to the extent that the legislature reflects the moral standards of 
society as a whole it has a role to play in crystalising that morality in 
concrete rules binding upon society as a whole. Of course this suggests 
that we have a community with shared views on what is and what is not 
morally acceptable but this is not in fact the case. It is because we 
do 
not have such a community that I think it is right that we have a centrally 
imposed system of morality based upon what the legislature perceives 
to be 
the juste millieu of societal morality. 
So much for the early patterns of objectivism. Just what constitutes 
the 
present pattern (or patterns) of objectivism in relation 
to ascriptions of 
criminal responsibility? There are several methodological choices available 
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to one setting out to ascertain the current pattern of objectivism: my 
choice is to take certain substantive views on wens rea aired by the judges 
in the cases and by academic writers, and take the sum total of those views 
as representing or exemplifying the present pattern or ideal typical 
construction of objectivism. On this approach I think that the contours of 
objectivism are captured in the claim that liability should be determined 
(inter alia) by the actual (as distinct from the intended or believed) 
character and consequences of the agent's activity and/or what a reasonable 
person would (as distinct from what the actual agent did) foresee, believe 
or intend. The agent must thus have orchestrated some activity which causes 
or comes demonstrably close to causing injury or damage to another: where 
an agent, by such activity, brings about (or comes close to bringing about) 
proscribed harm then his criminal responsibility shall be judged on the 
standards and perceptions of the ordinary man in society. This is, in my 
view, the ideal typical construction of objectivism. I should point out 
that perhaps no one judge or theorist accepts the construction without 
qualification but I think that it is representative of the the views of 
those who have been labelled objectivists in the litrature. It would be 
useful here to discuss how the ideal construction relates to appropriate 
areas of our criminal law. 
(i) Attempts. 
The ideal typical construction of objectivism adopts a minimalist approach 
to criminal responsibility here since (a) it insists upon an act which is 
at least close to consumation of the substantive offence and (b) it admits 
impossibility as a bar to criminal responsibility only in those cases in 
which the agent's activity is not objectively dangerous. As regards (a) 
objectivism sets the threshold of criminal responsibility for attempts at 
some point close to the last physical act necessary for completion of the 
substantive offence. Rowlatt J typified this objectivist position in 
IL--y 
eng ((1920) 84 JP 63) when he said that there can be no liability for 
an attempt if the agent is "not on the job ... not on 
the thing itself at 
all". In RvE Qleton ((1855) Dears CC 515) Baron Park came 
down in favour 
of Rowlatt J's view. He said that "acts remotely 
leading towards the 
commission of an offence are not to be considered as an attempt 
to commit 
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it, but acts immediately connected with it are. In D. P. P. v Stonehouse 
((1977) 2 All ER 909) Lord Diplock agreed with the dicta in Rv Eagleton 
and added that "in other words the offender must have crossed the Rubicon 
and burnt his boats". One problem for pitching liability so close to actual 
consumation of the substantive offence is that it prevents early 
intervention into criminal activity. 
As regards (b) the restricted stance of the ideal typical construction 
concerning impossible attempts is open to objection. For where the agent's 
activity is dangerous on the face of it (e. g. where D, takes a weapon and 
'fires' at V but the gun is in fact unloaded) the objectivist would ascribe 
responsibility to him for his failed activity: but if the agent's activity 
is not on its face dangerous (e. g. where D, believing it to be his enemy V, 
fires at a tree stump) then the ideal typical construction of objectivism 
would not attribute liability to the failed attemptor. But when each agent 
realises that his attempt at a particular proscribed harm is, on the facts 
and in the circumstances impossible, is he not likely to repeat his 
exercise, making sure he does not repeat his mistake on his second mission? 
One might plausibly argue that we should subject both agents to the 
scrutiny of the criminal law if only by way of individual deterrence. 
(ii) Intention. 
In 1961 a judgment delivered by Viscount Kilmuir in D. P. P. v Smith ([1961] 
AC 290), a case of murder, brought out the ideal typical construction of 
objectivism concerning the concept of intent. He said that it must be 
proved that the defendant intended to to do something unlawful to another. 
"Once the jury are satisfied about that, it matters not what the accused 
in fact contemplated as the probable result, or whether he ever 
contemplated at all, provided he was in law responsible and accountable 
for his actions ... On 
the assumption that he is so accountable for his 
actions, the sole question is whether the unlawful and voluntary act was 
of such a kind that grievous bodily was the natural and probable result. 
The only test available for this is what the ordinary, responsible man 
would, in all the circumstances of the case, have contemplated as 
the 
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natural and probable result". 
Note that the learned Law Lord insists upon intention by D concerning what 
he is voluntarily and unlawfully doing to his victim (whatever that 
unlawful act might be) and, initially at least, seems to be subjective in 
character. However once that intention is established then, on Lord 
Kilmuir's dictum, we must count D as intending death or grievous bodily 
harm (and thus be guilty of murder) if that is a natural consequence of his 
act, i. e. if that is what the reasonable man would foresee as a possible 
outcome of such voluntary activity. D is thus guilty of murder even if the 
thought of death or grievous bodily harm does not enter his head at the 
time he perpetrates the activity which brings about his victim's death. It 
is submitted that the dictum exemplifies the ideal typical construction of 
objectivism since it insists both that the agent should be judged in 
accordance with the actual character of his activity and that where 
foreseeability is a necessary element in criminal fault then it should be 
based upon the standards of the reasonable man. 
(iii) Recklessness. 
The ideal typical objectivist position here is that it is sufficient for 
the purpose of ascriptions of responsibility that the agent has failed to 
appreciate a risk of harm which, having regard to the facts and 
circumstances of the case, would have been apparent to the average man in 
society. The ideal construction is thus removed from the early objectivist 
patterns of 'harmful consequences' and 'manifest criminality' but applies a 
fairly broad approach to criminal responsibility for recklessness based 
upon the notion of reasonable foreseeability. It is submitted that the 
ideal objectivist view was taken by Lord Diplock in Caldwell (11982] AC 
341) when he said that a person charged with an offence under s. 1(1) of the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971 is 
"'reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or 
damaged' if (1) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk 
that property will be destroyed or damaged and 
(2) when he does the act 
he either has not given any thought to the possibility of 
there being 
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any such risk or has recognised that there was some risk involved and 
has nonetheless gone on to do it". 
(iv) Beliefs. 
The ideal typical construction of objectivism allows wrongful beliefs as an 
exculpatory factor in ascriptions of criminal responsibility but a 
necessary prerequisite is that the wrongful belief (mistake) be reasonably 
held by the agent. The test is thus what the ordinary prudent man would 
believe on the same facts and in the same circumstances as those in which 
the agent found himself at the time of his activity which has brought 
about the actus reus of the substantive offence. 
Parliamentary legislation has coloured statutory defences of mistake with 
the objectivist brush. Under s. 19 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 it is an 
offence to take an unmarried girl under the age of eighteen out of the 
possession of her parent or guardian against his will with the intent that 
she shall unlawful sexual intercourse with men or with a particular man. 
However the defendant will have a defence if he can show that he believed 
her to be over eighteen years of age and he had reasonable cause for that 
belief. Again it is an offence for a person to go through a ceromony of 
marriage, believing wrongly but without reasonable grounds he or she is not 
married because his or her spouse is dead, or his or her marriage has been 
dissolved or annulled (See, for example King [1964] 1 QB 285). 
(v) Defences other than those based on wrongly held beliefs. 
The ideal typical construction of objectivism is also prepared to admit 
defences other than that of mistake (i. e. wrongly held belief) into the 
criminal law but insists that, at the time of his act or ommission which 
caused the actus reus of the offence, the defendant acted in accordance 
with the standards of the ordinary and prudent man. 
In Lesbin1 ((1914) 3 KB 1116) Avory J thought that the defence of 
provocation, which reduces murder to manslaughter, must be such as would 
affect the mind of the reasonable man- In Alexander ((1913) 
9 Cr App Rep 
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139) the Court of Appeal decided that evidence of provocation could not be 
adduced by the defence where, although they may have caused the defendant 
to lose his self control, the acts of the victim would not have caused a 
normal person to lose his self control. In Eedder V D. P P Sellers J 
directed the jury that they must consider the effects that the acts of the 
victim (a prostitute) would have had on the ordinary person and not on a 
man who is sexually impotent. In Smith ((1914) 11 Cr App Rep 36) the court 
decided that the subjective fact that the defendant was seven months 
pregnant was irrelevant for the purpose of the defence of provocation. In 
McCarthy- ((1954] 2 All ER 262) it was held that the fact that the defendant 
had been drinking was irrelevant in any plea of provocation. This array of 
case law prior to 1957 no doubt influenced Parliament's decision to apply 
the 'reasonable man' test to the statutory defence of provocation. 
In the defence of duress this ideal objectivist view predominates. In 
Stratton (1779) 1 Doug KB 239) Lord Mansfield said that "if a man is forced 
to commit acts of high treason, if it appears really force, and such as 
human nature could not be expected to resist and the jury of that opinion, 
the man is not guilty of high treason". In A-G v Whelan ([1934] IR 518) the 
court talked of the defence of duress in terms of "threats of immediate 
death or serious personal violance so great as to overbear the ordinary 
powers of human resistance". In the defence of 'self defence' the defendant 
must use a reasonable degree of force in defending himself against an 
attack from his victim (s. 3(2) Criminal Law Act 1967. See Cross and Jones 
10th ed. at p. 437). 
With some offences too there is a measure of objectivism. In a case of 
blackmail, for example, the victim is expected to display reasonable 
firmness against the defendant's threat and not allow himself to be 
persuaded by some trivial minacity (See Clear [1968) 1 All ER 74). 
On Subjectivism. 
The subjectivist school of thought generally ascribes liability on what the 
agent intends or tries to do, or believes he is doing rather than by what 
actually happens or is the case. It would be useful to look at some of the 
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arguments put forward by the subjectivists in order to build up an ideal 
typical construction of subjectivism and assess how that construction would 
affect liability in specific areas of criminal law. 
A central subjectivist tenet is that culpability should count as a factor 
in ascriptions of liability. One particular proposition by Ashworth is of 
interest here. He argues that for the purpose of recording criminality it 
is important that both the actus reus of a particular offence and the 
specified wens rea requirement should accurately reflect the moral 
turpitude of the agent. Ashworth is seeking here a precise description of 
the actus reus and quality of mental state with which the agent brings 
about a proscribed harm. He points out that if a particular criminal 
offence is defined too broadly either in terms of the actus reus or the 
mans rea then we attach to the perpetrator of the offence a label which 
does not accurately record his moral status or culpability in relation to 
his activity. 
In his contribution to the memorial volume to Sir Rupert Cross, Ashworth 
insists that the relevant fault element (whether intention, recklessness, 
knowledge or negligence) must match the particulars of the offence stated 
in the conviction (in 'The Elasticity of Mens Rea'). In his essay Ashworth 
talks of the principle of 'representative labelling'. Glanville Williams 
(in 'Convictions and Unfair Labelling') thinks that the term 'fair 
labelling' more accurately reflects Ashworth's meaning and, anticipating 
Ashworth's deference to Williams, I shall use the latter term for the 
purpose of present discussion. Ashworth says that the principle would be 
trampled upon by, for example, a broad offence of causing personal harm to 
another which is committed whether the victim suffered death or a mere 
scratch. Moreover the agent may rightly feel a sense of injustice if his 
conviction does not reflect his actual guilt. 
The principle applies to the converse situation of inadequate labelling. 
Thus, for Ashworth, where an agent, intending to destroy a priceless ming 
vase, throws a brick inaccurately and damages an adjacent flower pot it 
would be a violation of the 'fair labelling' principle to convict 
him only 
in respect of the damage to the relatively worthless 
item. In my submission 
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such inaccurate labelling could lead to inadequate sentencing in the event 
of a further offence committed by the agent since the judge in the 
subsequent trial will presumably rely on the 'unfair' label which is 
attached to the earlier conviction which inadequately records the agent's 
criminality. The judge may have access to the indictments on the basis of 
which the previous convictions were made. The indictments presumably would 
charge the particular facts. However it is perhaps doubtful that the judge 
would ask to see previous indictments at the sentence stage. They may not 
be available on occasion. Fair labelling at the conviction stage would 
ensure that a judge, at a later trial, has on hand at the sentence stage 
precise details of the mental state with which the defendant committed the 
previous offence. 
Ashworth thus inveighs against criminal offences which are broad based 
either as to actus reus (e. g. causing criminal damage) or wens rea (e. g. 
conspiracy in respect of conduct which the agent believes will involve one 
of a possible number of offences, but he does not know which). He insists 
instead that the requirements of such offences ought to be defined with the 
appropriate specificity. 
This proposition has much to commend it, The current tendency towards broad 
definitions and vague mental states regarding criminal offences leads to a 
criminal law which is incoherent concerning the moral culpability of the 
offender and leaves too much of the real decision making to the judge at 
the discretionary stage of sentencing. A more specific approach to the 
contours of the offences and the required mental state would or could have 
the effect of reducing the scope of judicial discretion at the sentencing 
stage. This could mean that our criminal law would be more coherent and 
would-be offenders could thus predict more accurately the seriousness of 
the offence with which they would be charged and the penalty which can be 
expected for particular breaches of the substantive criminal law. One final 
point here: morally, and sociologically, one might argue that there should 
be accurate criminal labelling, even if in its absence the. law was 
sufficiently certain, and judicial discretion was not duly great. 
II 
Unfortunately Ashworth meire or less restricts his analysis to broad based 
offences in relation to the actus reus and says virtually nothing about 
broad based offences in relation to the mens rea requirement (e. g. where 
the mens rea element comprises both intention and recklessness). Could it 
be that ideal typical subjectivism is not concerned with the distinction 
between the concepts of intention and recklessness in relation to 
convictions for offences which admit both mental states as the requisite 
mens rea requirement? Legislation is not prepared to make such a 
distinction between the various mental states at the conviction stage. In 
the cases too the distinction seems to be irrelevant. In the offence of 
assault, for example, it must be proved that the accused intended to cause 
the victim to apprehend the immediate application of force without his 
consent, or was subjectively reckless as to whether the victim might so 
apprehend such force. The mental element required is thus intention or 
recklessness in relation to the assault and juries convict the defendant 
without making any reference as to their opinion on whether he intended the 
assault or whether he merely foresaw the possibility that the his victim 
might apprehend such force. It seems too that the theorists are not 
prepared to make the distinction for the purpose of conviction, although 
there is evidence that they are generally prepared to argue for a 
distinction between the two mental states at the sentence stage. 
However it is submitted that one might properly question a legal system 
which does not distinguish between these significantly different mental 
states for the purpose of recording a criminal conviction on the ground 
that it violates the fair labelling principle. Is it right to record the 
same criminality against the agent who takes a hammer to a public telephone 
in an act of sheer vandalism as that recorded against Parker ((1985) 83 Cr 
App Rep 69) who slams down and damages the receiver not thinking about 
damage because he is in a state of self-induced temper? Moreover a judge 
hearing a later case cannot accurately judge the mental state with which 
the agent perpetrated the earlier broad based offence. This might 
lead to a 
lighter or more severe sentence than might otherwise have 
been the case. 
There are two alternative methods of structuring criminal 
law in order to 
accommodate the fair labelling principle as it applies to 
broad based 
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mental states. First we might create more offences in relation to a 
particular type of activity in an ascending order of seriousness according 
to the agent's mental state which accompanies his activity. We already have 
instances of this in the criminal law; for example, the different offences 
under ss. 18 and 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. We may thus 
consider dividing rape into two distinct offences reserving the term 'rape' 
to cases where the agent has non-consensual intercourse knowing that his 
victim does not consent and reserving for one or more lesser offence(s) 
those cases in which the agent is not sure that the victim is consenting. 
Secondly we may retain our existing corpus of criminal offences together 
with the wens rea requirement for each, but specifically state at the point 
of conviction the precise mental state with which the agent commits the 
offence. In this may we have on record whether the agent brought about a 
particular harm intentionally, recklessly or negligently (where the offence 
allows the latter two concepts within its definition of mens rea. 
It is submitted that the argument in favour of a more narrow specification 
of the mental state in crime for the purpose of conviction is one which 
deserves serious consideration in any analysis of criminal responsibility. 
It would be useful to consider subjectivist thought in relation to specific 
concepts of criminal law. 
(i) Attempts. 
I select the points for discussion here in chronological order concerning 
the causal chain of activity leading to the substantive offence. 
The first point relates to the question of liability concerning the agent 
who wills a bodily movement in order to bring about a proscribed harm but 
his body fails to respond. On this question Ashworth (accepted generally as 
a subjectivist) points out that no one can be certain when he acts 
that a 
particular result will occur and, for Ashworth, this 
justifies an 
analytical division of human action into the making of an exertion and 
the 
occurrence of an effect as a result of that exertion 
(in 'Sharpening the 
Subjectivist Element in Criminal Law'). Ashworth's central point here is 
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that "it is the agent's considered exertion (his intention coupled with his 
effort to implement it) that lies at the root of criminal responsibility". 
Ashworth rests his exposition on the volitional theory of Prichard and 
Ross. He prays in aid the words of Ross. 
"If a man had, without knowing it, become paralysed since the last time 
he had tried to effect the given type of change; his self-exertion, 
though it would not produce the effect, would obviously be of exactly 
the same character as it would have been if he had remained unparalysed 
and it had therefore produced that effect. The exertion is all that is 
his and therefore all that he can morally be obliged to; whether the 
result follows is due to certain causal laws which he can perhaps know 
but certainly cannot control, and to a circumstance, viz his being 
paralysed which he cannot control, and cannot know until he performs the 
exertion". 
(V. D. Ross, 'Foundations of Ethics' (1939). 
Note the word 'control' in Ross' account. His work fits into the ideal 
typical construction of subjectivism since the agent, when he wills the 
bodily movement, believes that he is in control of that bodily movement 
although, objectively, this is not so. 
Ross was, in his work, referring to moral duty but Ashworth maintains that 
the same logic can be applied to moral and criminal responsibilty (since 
criminal blame and punishment should equate with moral fault). For Ashworth 
all an agent should be blamed for is his exertion. He prefers 'exertion' to 
'intention' since one does not always act upon one's intentions. 
But what constitutes an exertion in Ashworth's theory? Is it some overt act 
which is sufficiently proximate to the actus reus or will some preceding 
mental activity which follows the decision to act 
but precedes the act 
itself suffice as a definition? Prichard sees an 
'exertion' as an internal 
mental act of willing (in 'Acting, Willing, 
Desiring' in Philosophy in 
Action (ed. White)), separate from the agent's intention, which constitutes 
the originating of the change in the world. 
This exertion is just as 
capable of failing to produce the bodily movement as 
the overt bodily 
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movement itself may fail to produce the intended consequence. Suppose, for 
example, that Derek is behind Vera on a cliff face. He decides (forms the 
intention) to push Vera off the cliff. He sets his volitional machinery 
into gear (he wills his arms to push forward into Vera's back) but finds 
that his arms are too numb with cold to respond to his internal act of 
willing. If one applies the Prichardian account of volitions to moral fault 
and criminal responsibilty to Derek, we may thus hold him guilty of 
attempted murder. 
Ashworth uses Prichard's commentary in support of an analysis on attempts 
in which he cites as examples overt acts which fail to effect some change 
in the world intended by the agent. He does not make it clear whether he 
would ascribe criminal responsibilty to the agent whose activity has been 
confined to volitional mental processes which directly precede the actus 
reus and which are intended by the agent to produce it. Yet he does not 
qualify the quote from Ross which he offers in support of his theory in 
general and it thus seems that he has adopted the Prichardian model in 
relation to his exposition on attempts at criminal law. he is thus 
presumably prepared to attribute criminal responsibilty to Derek since 
Derek has the intention (to kill Vera) which has been accompanied by an 
exertion (willing the bodily movement) which is per se capable of bringing 
his intention to fruition. On this view Derek has completed all that is his 
in relation to the actus reus of the substantive offence. 
Given that my presumption that Ashworth accepts the Prichardian model is 
right, would he restrict the attribution of liability to mental exertions 
which are per se capable of bringing about the actus reus of the offence? 
In Derek's case this is the position but consider the variant of the case 
in which Dillon is at the bottom of the cliff when he forms the intention 
to push Vera off the top. He wills his body to start up the cliff path but 
his body fails to respond for some physiological reason. Dillon's mental 
exertion thus relates to a physical act which is not sufficiently proximate 
to the actus reus of the substantive offence. In this variant would 
Ashworth ascribe responsibilty to Dillon? Icy own view is that Dillon should 
attract no criminal responsibility since he has brought about no change in 
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the world which constitutes a link in the chain of causation which would 
lead to the execution of his intended enterprise. 
In any event the Prichardian theory concerning duty does not reflect the 
current legal position for the criminal law insists upon some physical 
change in the external world before it is prepared to embark upon an 
examination into causation and responsibilty. This raises interesting 
questions. Why, for instance, should the criminal law require an overt act 
as a starting point for the assessment of criminal guilt? In particular is 
it anything more than a pragmatic matter; that if one counted the agent who 
failed even to move his limbs as a criminal attempter, this would create 
insoluble problems of proof, even though he should ideally on principle 
count as guilty? 
A second point on attempts. Assuming that it is right to insist upon some 
physical activity by the agent for the purpose of attributing criminal 
liability for the inchoate offence, at just what point in the agent's 
activity which leads to the substantive offence may convict him of an 
attempt? The material suggests that subjectivism admits liability for an 
attempt at some point in the causal chain before the link which is itself 
capable of bringing about the harm which is the object of the agent's 
activity. Perhaps a practical concern here is the provision of machinery in 
order that the administration can take effective action to prevent 
prospective crime. An early supporter of the view that the threshold of 
attempts should lie at some point prior to the last link of the causal 
chain was Stephen (in his Digest of Criminal Law) who states that an 
attempt to commit a crime is an act done with intent to commit that crime 
and forming part of a series of acts which would constitute its actual 
commission if it were not interrupted. One might ask if this viewpoint is 
basically a utilitarian argument: that from the subjectivist viewpoint, it 
is surely immaterial whether the intervention occurs early or late since 
the the subjective basis of liability is present in both cases. Furthermore 
one may argue that early intervention derives from the perception of 
danger, which sounds closer to the ideal typical construction of 
objectivism which is concerned with the character of the agent's activity. 
From the material it seems that the theorists associate 
the dangerousness 
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of the agent with subjectivism and the dangerous character of his activity 
with objectivism. But one must accept that the dangerousness of the agent 
can be just as objective in character as it is subjective. 
A third point on attempts concerns the liability of the offender who has 
done everything necessary to bring about the proscribed harm yet has failed 
to do so. Asworth argues for liability based upon the agent's exercise of 
choice and control. He says that when the agent completes the causal chain 
towards a particular proscribed harm he has done all that is his and the 
rest is chance since, whilst one's endeavours usually bring about one's 
objectives, it cannot be said that changes in the world or states of 
affairs are entirely within one's control. One cannot be sure that intended 
or expected outcomes will occur. They are contingencies which may or may 
not occur; they are subject to the element of chance. He urges us not to 
base criminal responsibility upon outcomes (chance) since criminal 
responsibility ought to be based upon choice. The agent should be 
criminally reponsible for what he has chosen to bring about. He should thus 
be responsible for all intended and expected outcomes regardless of whether 
they actually occur, and he ought not to be reponsible for any outcome of 
his exertion which he neither intended nor anticipated. 
The objectivist, too, would attribute criminal responsibility to the agent 
who perpetrates the last act of the causal chain in the knowledge or 
expectation that it will bring about a proscribed harm: but a specific 
objection to Ashworth made by John Harris (in 'Overexertion and Under- 
achievment) is worthy of note. He points out that if we accept the choice 
principle for failed attempts at proscribed harm then we shall need to 
apply the same principle to failed attempts at praiseworthy activity. If 
this is so then we must, Harris supposes, praise and reward students who 
exert themselves to gain degrees quite as much as if they had actually 
obtained those qualifications. This, he claims, would require far-reaching 
changes not only in society but also in human psychology. 
With respect to Harris he misses an important point here. There is a kind 
of praise that does not depend upon the results of an agent's efforts or 
exertions. A lecturer may not give the hard working student who does his 
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incompetent best a First, though he may give one to a brilliant but 
indifferent student, but he may still praise the former more than the 
latter as a dedicated and assiduous student. This praise is sometimes given 
for effort even where that effort does not result in success. In any event 
the particular and peculiar purposes of the criminal law require rather 
different criteria of responsibility than those used outside the law and we 
should not thus treat those different purposes as if they were the same. 
A second objection to the choice principle, raised by Harris, is that if we 
claim that the agent's attempt is all that is his and the rest is chance 
then we fail to note for the purpose of ascriptions of criminal 
responsibility that some attempts are more realistic than others. An expert 
shot who shoots at his victim's legs may be confident of success whereas 
the agent who has not fired a gun before may aim at his victim's legs 
intending to hit them but in the belief that success in his enterprise is 
unlikely. Harris provides an analogy outside the criminal law of a football 
club which pays a large sum for a top class striker. The football club, he 
argues, is concerned with outcomes and not merely with attempts, and knows 
that triers are not worth the same as succeedors. He concludes "just as a 
football club has an interest in purchasing reliability and success in 
players so in society we have an interest in purchasing unreliability and 
failure in criminals. One rational way of trying to achieve this is by 
differential rewards and punishments for finishing, not merely starting". 
Harris' argument has initial attraction: one might hold the expert more 
culpable on the ground that he knows exactly what he is about in his 
violent actions, whereas the novice might have little idea. Also an expert 
might in some cases be thought to act coldbloodedly rather than in the heat 
of the moment, the latter being more the preserve of the novice (e. g. the 
doctor who carefully selects a poison which cannot be traced and the novice 
who takes rat killer and places it in the victim's tea). 
However it is 
submitted that there are three grounds for denying differentiation 
between 
the agents on the basis of ability, skill and competence. 
First it would 
create the problem of deciding at what stage of the agent's 
development in 
a particular area of activity he ascends in status 
from novice to expert. 
This issue would involve us in considerations about 
degrees of skill with 
I8 
which agents perpetrate 
law would be the poorer 
encourage novices to tr 
differentiation between 
criminal law opens up 
punishment. 
particular criminal activity. Second, the criminal 
for such a distinction since it would effectively 
ya particular crime at least once. Finally such 
the two types of agent for the purpose of the 
difficult questions about quantum of blame and 
A fourth point on attempts concerns just what amounts to appropriate 
punishment. Ashworth uses the subjectivist choice principle to allow equäl 
blame and punishment for the agent who tries and succeeds and the agent who 
tries and fai!. s on the ground that both have made the same exertion with 
the same intention and there is thus nothing to choose between them in 
respect of culpability: to award lesser punishment to the agent whose 
exertion fails to produce the intended result is to base punishment on 
chance rather than choice. 
Harris criticises Ashworth's submission on the ground that it takes no 
account of the agent who delopes. He instances the ritual and practice of 
duelling in which honour required that each party faced each other's shot 
and that each discharge his pistol. Often a party who wished to satisfy the 
demands of honour would delope, that is discharge the pistol away from his 
opponent. 
But with respect to Harris, Ashworth does leave room for the agent to 
desist at any point in the preparation stages leading up to his exertion 
which is capable of bringing about the intended harm. For Ashworth it is 
at the point at which the agent has done 'all that is his' that he has 
crossed the Rubicon and is thus subject to the same punishment as the agent 
who tries and succeeds. Ashworth is thus prepared to award lesser 
punishment to the agent who desists from his illegal enterprise at some 
point short of that act which constitutes 'all that is his'. It is 
submitted that Harris' example which he uses to back his argument does not 
serve his purpose since the agent, when he decides to fire into 
the air, 
has reached his decision not to bring about the proscribed 
harm at some 
point before the stage at which he actually points 
(or rather fails to 
point) the weapon. He has thus desisted before 
the last act necessary for 
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completion of the substantive offence and is thus subject to lesser blame 
and punishment than if he had fired at his adversary and missed. 
A final point on attempts. On the ideal typical construction of 
subjectivism the agent who is mistaken about one (or more) fact or 
circumstance relating to his activity which renders his attempt non- 
competent, ought to be judged on the facts or circumstances as he believed 
them to be. Thus where the agent believes that his activity has reached a 
point at which it is capable of producing a particular harm, then he is 
guilty of an attempt at that harm whether or not it is a possible effect of 
his activity. 
This subjectivist proposition has much support from the theorists, 
Parliament and other bodies. The Criminal Attempts Act 1981, in dealing 
with cases in which the agent is mistaken about some material fact or 
circumstance, states that the accused shall be judged in accordance with 
the facts as he believed them to be. Ashworth (in Sharpening the 
Subjectivist element in Criminal Law) supports the proposition stating that 
"just as an individual cannot absolutely control the outcome of his 
actions, so an individual cannot be absolutely certain in his knowledge 
of human affairs. (The agent) may believe that a fact or circumstance 
exists but he may be wrong: the believing is all that is his, and to 
judge him according to the accuracy or error of his belief is to found 
liabilty upon chance rather than choice". 
For Ashworth the defendant who tries to do something with a wrongly held 
belief as to the facts or circumstances has done 'all that is his' in 
relation to the intended outcome and should be judged on the facts or 
circumstances as he believes them to be (the choice principle), whether 
those facts or circumstances relate to factual elements in the commission 
of an offence or to factual elements in a particular defence to criminal 
liability. Thus where D shoots at a tree stump believing it to be his enemy 
V ideal subjectivism dictates that we judge him on the facts as he he 
believes them to be, convict him of attempted murder and award an 
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appropriate sanction which might prevent D from making a second and 
competent attempt on his victim's life. 
2. Intention. 
For the ideal subjectivist model the concept of intention involves a 
conscious decision by the agent to bring about a particular state of 
affairs by his activity; that is the agent acts as he does in order that a 
specific change in the world be brought about thereby. Nothing short of 
direct intention or foresight of certainty will suffice. I should mention 
that I include 'foresight of certainty' as an element of of the concept of 
intention within the ideal typical construction of subjectivism since 
nearly all (if not all) judges and theorists who have been labelled 
subjectivists accept it as such 
3. Recklessness. 
The ideal typical construction of subjectivism requires as a necessary 
element of the concept of recklessness foresight by the agent of the 
possibility of untoward harm which might flow from his activity. This 
insistance on awareness underlines the cognitive character of subjectivism. 
The question of whether the reasonable man would have foreseen the harm is 
a matter of evidence which might persuade the jury that the defendant 
foresaw the risk but, for the 'ideal' subjectivist, foresight by the 
defendant of the prospective proscribed harm is a sine qua non to a finding 
of recklessness. There is thus on the subjectivist construction a clear 
dividing line between recklessness and negligence: that dividing line 
concerns awareness (recklessness) and lack of awareness (negligence) by the 
agent in relation to the untoward harm which his activity produces. 
4. Beliefs. 
There are two aspects to this issue. 
(1) Where the agent acts in order to bring about a particular harm 
believing wrongly that his activity may bring that harm about. 
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I have explained the subjectivist view on this issue when discussing 
impossible attempts above. Involved here is the notion of choice, for the 
agent here has chosen to bring about the particular proscribed harm and 
believes that his activity may bring that harm about. He is thus to be 
blamed and punished for what he has chosen to (and what he believes he 
actually may) bring about by his activity. 
Theorists who, arguably at least, accept the ideal subjectivist model 
include Sir Rupert Cross (in 'Centenary Reflections on Prince's Case) who 
argues that there is a "general principle of morality and the criminal law 
that people ought to be judged on the facts as they believed them to be". 
The Law Commission's draft 'Criminal Liability (Mental Element) Bill' 
adopts the view stating that 'if the provision creating such an offence 
specifies exempting circumstances, a person charged with the offence is not 
guilty if at the time of the conduct alleged to constitute the offence he 
believed that the exempting circumstances existed'. The orthodox 
subjectivist view has been largely adopted by our criminal law which holds 
generally that it is immaterial whether a belief is justified or not so 
long as it is honestly held. 
Perhaps I should note here, in fairness to the authors, that they are 
offering an exculpatory rather than an inculpatory principle: granted that 
it can, and perhaps in consistency should, be extended as Ashworth extends 
it to an inculpatory version; but it is not clear that that is how, for 
example, Cross would want it to go. 
An interesting question here is what the ideal subjectivist would make of 
the agent, D, who believes (wrongly) that his activity will (or may) bring 
about an untoward harm but proceeds with his activity regardless. Here D is 
not aiming to bring about the perceived harm and, presumably, would prefer 
that the harm does not occur (as it will not). Would the ideal subjectivist 
ascribe criminal responsibility to D? On the basis that the agent should be 
judged on what he has chosen to bring about or believes he is doing 
(creating a risk of particular harm) it would seem that the subjectivist 
would attribute criminal responsibility to D for the wrongful belief which 
accompanies his activity. 
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(ii) Where the agent wrongly believes that some fact or circumstance exists 
which renders his activity safe or legally justifiable. 
For the subjectivist such an agent ought not to be blamed on the ground 
that liability should be determined by what the agent believes he is doing 
rather than what actually happens or is the case. Thus where D alludes to a 
particular risk and decides that there is none then he should not be 
accountable at criminal law if it turns out that the risk was present and 
the untoward harm occurs. Similarly if D believes, even if unreasonably, 
that V is attacking him with a knife and retaliates causing serious injury 
-then D may claim self defence on the ground that he believed that his life 
was in danger. 
5. Defences based on grounds other than wrongful beliefs. 
In such cases ideal subjectivism insists that we look to the agent and the 
various subjective factors of the case to the exclusion of purely objective 
phenomena. In the case of provocation, for example the 'ideal' subjectivist 
will look to the personal attributes of the agent in deciding whether or 
not he was sufficiently provoked to fall within the statutory defence. In 
the defence of self defence a defendant "must demonstrate by his actions 
that he does not want to fight. He must demonstrate that he is prepared to 
temporise and disengage and perhaps to make some physical withdrawal". Also 
the ideal typical construction of subjectivism would deny self defence to 
the agent who has deliberately brought about the attack by V with the 
intention of taking advantage of the situation. 
In conclusion, the ideal typical construction of subjectivism revolves 
around knowledge, belief and choice. If D chooses to engage in activity 
which he knows or believes will produce a particular proscribed harm and 
that harm flows from that activity then the ideal subjectivist will hold 
him accountable at criminal law on the basis of recklessness or intention. 
But there are objections to the ideal typical subjectivist construction. 
First, if one insists that the defendant be aware of the risk at the time 
of his act then one has the problem of deciding just what was going through 
his mind at the time of his activity which has led to the occurrence of 
the 
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proscribed harm in order to see if he at least appreciated the risk at that 
time. To complicate the issue the defendant might claim that whilst he is 
aware of causal properties generally he was not aware of the particular 
causal properties of his activity (e. g. that this bomb would have this 
affect on surrounding property and people). Second, even if we were able to 
'open the defendant's head' and look inside we might find that D was 
unaware of the risk at the time of his act because of some factor which 
renders his unawareness either culpable (e. g. rage or drink) or non- 
culpable (e. g. mental incapacity). We might wish to distinguish between the 
two types of factor at the conviction stage but the ideal subjectivist 
model cannot accommodate such a distinction. 
Third, the ideal typical construction of subjectivism (and current law) 
insists that the prosecution prove mens rea, where appropriate, at the time 
of the actus reus U. e. there must be a coincidence of actus reus and wens 
rea). However on occasion it might be the case that D adverted to the 
possible risk during the preparation stages but did not advert to the risk 
at the time of his activity which brings about the actus reus. D's non- 
advertence to a risk of which he had been previously aware might be 
evidence of his indifference to the risk but indifference is not the same 
as awareness on the cognitive theory of recklessness. In some cases D might 
lack capacity to advert to the risk at the precise moment of the actus reus 
although he had been adverting to it at previous stages. Suppose, for 
example, that D decides to cause damage to a local supermarket. He places 
explosives at strategic points and retreats to the detonator. However as he 
reaches the detonator he suffers an epileptic fit and his hand depresses 
the handle thus setting off the explosives. Although he was thinking about 
it during the preparation stages D certainly does not advert to the risk of 
death or injury at the instant of the actus reus since he is now 
effectively unconscious. This case provides fuel for discussion on whether 
orthodox subjectivism (and current law) is right to insist upon 
contemporaneity between actus reus and mens rea when attributing criminal 
liability. 
Duff (in conversation with me) considers that my example is ill-chosen 
since it is not even clear that there is an actus reus (a "voluntary act" 
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of detonation) here. An analagous case posited by Smith and Hogan would 
suggest that he is right. They put forward the case of D who resolves to 
strangle his wife at midnight, drops off to sleep and, while still asleep, 
strangles her at midnight. They suggest that he is not guilty of murder 
though he may be guilty of manslaughter on the ground of negligence (5th 
ed. at p. 198) It might be noted that in my example D has proceeded a 
substantial distance along a physical causal chain before his medical 
condition intervenes whilst the agent in Smith and Hogan's example has done 
nothing in preparation before he brings about the intended consequence in a 
state of automatism. But I think that it is wrong that D in my example 
should escape liability altogether (assuming his activity whilst conscious 
is not proximate to the intended effect) when he has done so much in 
preparation before epilepsy deprives him of the knowledge that he is 
actually bringing about the proscribed harm for which he has striven. Yet 
if we are to ascribe liability to him then we shall need to modify both the 
ideal subjectivist model and current law which insists upon contemporaneity 
between actus reus and mens rea. 
In conclusion it would be useful to restate the ideal typical constructions 
of objectivism and subjectivism which have been formed from an analysis of 
the views of the exponents in this field of criminal law. 
The ideal typical construction of objectivism, as it applies to criminal 
responsibility, is constituted by the following propositions, namely (i) an 
agent intends an effect of his activity where it is a natural consequence 
thereof, (ii) an agent is reckless concerning an effect of his activity 
when he knowingly runs the risk or he fails to notice a risk whci would 
have been obvious to the ordinary prudent individual, (iii) liability 
should be determined by the actual (as distinct from the intended or 
believed) character and consequences of the agent's activity and/or what a 
reasonable person would (as distinct from what the actual agent did) 
foresee, believe or intend. 
The ideal typical construction of subjectivism, as it applies to criminal 
responsibility, is constituted by the following propositions, namely (1) an 
agent intends an effect of his activity when he aims to bring that effect 
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about or where he is certain that his activity (aimed at something else) 
will bring that effect about, (ii) an agent is reckless concerning an 
effect of his activity aimed at something else where he appreciates that 
there is a risk of that effect which, in the circumstances, render it 
unjustified for him to take that that risk, (iii) criminal liability should 
depend on choice and what the agent knows or believes to be within in his 
control concerning activity upon which he is embarked rather than what 
flows or fails to flow from that activity by chance, 9iv) the form of the 
conviction should mark accurately the moral status of the agent who has 
brought about proscribed harm and (v) punishment should be awarded in 
accordance with what the agent has chosen to bring about by a particular 
exertion and not on what actually occurs or fails to occur. 
I would conclude by way of footnote that the comment by Professor Williams 
(in Divergent Interpretations of Recklessness) that an agent should be 
counted as recklessness for his failure to foresee a risk of harm of which 
he would have been aware had he stopped to think about it seems to have 
received approbation from the leading subjectivists. However I would not 
include the qualification in the ideal typical construction of subjectivism 
which would count such a qualified mental state as one of negligence in 
some degree. 
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